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When I started working at the Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modification 
(COGEM), I was aware that controversial technologies were not simply resolved 
through more scientific knowledge. But as with most problems, it is easier to 
identify what doesn’t work than to come up with strategies that might prove 
effective. Working for a scientific advisory body, I have experienced throughout 
the years how resilient certain patterns in discussions and problem solving 
have become. But it wasn’t until the ‘alarming study’ published by Séralini, 
that the apparent unresolveability really started to dawn on me. 
And this is where I got fascinated by the entanglement and dynamics of 
different factors in science, society and regulations. This dissertation analyses 
the role and limits of decision-making in each of these fields, with GM crops 
as a case study. The analysis allowed me to build my argumentation for the 
importance of decision-making in situations of (scientific) uncertainty, a 
plurality of conflicting views in society and a legal framework that can provide 
the rules but not determine the outcome. Analysing each of these factors calls 
for different methodologies and expertise. For me this has been a struggle 
and, hopefully, finally also a strength in the process of compiling this thesis. 
A background in both science and philosophy teaches you how to translate 
knowledge, cross bridges and close gaps, but you don’t really belong in either 
of these fields. Taking up a PhD meant finding myself again in an unknown 
world; the one of Philosophy of Law. Leaning on the limited legal knowledge 
I had, the GMO regulations, questions about my methodology and theoretical 
framework have moreover left me puzzled. On the other hand, being challenged 
and questioned continuously to justify my choices from different perspectives 
has also increased my understanding and sharpened my analysis. It challenged 
me to use a variety of tools to analyse and study GM crop authorisations as 
a wicked problem by design. I hope this thesis is able to cross boundaries to 
reveal some of the dynamics of the GM crop issue that rise above the limits of 
the separate fields of expertise. 
I would like to thank my supervisors for accepting me as an external PhD 
candidate and supporting me throughout this process with both critical 
questions and motivating appraisals that helped me to structure my thoughts. 
I also want to thank those - you know who you are - who took me on crazy 
(mud) runs and self-organised marathons, endless bike rides and freezing 
open water swims to balance the all-night writing sessions, those inviting me 
for English tea and creative LEGO sessions in the country that I kept refusing 
because I was always too busy, and those meeting me for beers & loud music to 
forget about all the brilliant things I thought I came up with.
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The first three chapters of this thesis provide the problem description and 
analysis, the main research question and my hypothesis. These are followed by 
a set of five chapters consisting of published articles that deepen this analysis. 
This thesis is concluded with a final chapter to answer my research questions 
and substantiate my hypothesis. This first chapter introduces biotechnology 
as the object of this thesis. It illustrates both the potential and challenges of 
using and regulating biotechnology through a) a brief overview of applications, 
definitions and a general characterisation of the discussion in this field and 
b) an overview of the European regulatory framework in both theory and 
practice. A practice where market authorisation decisions on GM crops are 
systematically delayed and stalling. From there, I will present two concepts 
that I will use to illustrate and characterise the problem: ‘alarming studies’ 
and ‘wicked problems’. 
1. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of molecular biology in the 1970s can be marked as the 
birth of modern biotechnology, enabling the altering of the genetic code of 
living organisms. This process is also known as genetic modification, genetic 
manipulation or genetic engineering. 
Over the years different techniques have been developed to modify the 
hereditary material (DNA) of living cells, aimed at improving the efficiency, 
precision and accuracy of the desired genetic changes. Starting in the 1930s 
with inducing random mutations through radiation and mutagenic chemicals, 
it is now possible to change single nucleotides[1] in the DNA of living organisms 
(Natarajan 2005 and Rees & Liu 2018). The newest techniques such as 
CRISPR-Cas[2] are versatile and used as a one-size-fits-all tool in agricultural, 
environmental, medical and industrial biotechnology. Genetic modification 
was initially applied only in micro-organisms, but soon after the field has been 
broadened to plants and animals, including humans. 
Agricultural applications focus on the development of new plant varieties 
to increase production by improving insect- or disease resistance, herbicide 
1 Nucleotides form the basic structural unit of nucleic acids such as DNA.
2 CRISPR-Cas is an abbreviation of Clustered Regularly Interspaced Palindromic Repeats with a CRISPR 
Associated Protein (Cas). It is one of the newest tools used to alter DNA sequences and modify gene 
function because it acts like a programmable pair of molecular scissors that is able to cut strands of DNA, 
remove DNA and insert new pieces of DNA with added functionality. The alterations possible with this 
technique vary from singe point mutations to inserting or removing entire (parts of) genes.
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tolerance, or resilience to climatological changes and other stress factors 
(ISAAA 2018). Other developments focus on agricultural product quality 
such as composition, size and appearance. In the field of veterinary science, 
biotechnology is used for genetics research to aid the animal breeding process 
and for the development of veterinary vaccines. Cloned animals, such as the 
sheep dolly (Callaway 2016), and genetically modified animals, such as the bull 
Herman (Mackenzie & Cremers 1992), have been developed in the 90s but these 
applications never became steadily integrated into animal breeding so far. The 
only commercial application of a GM animal is a fast growing GM salmon 
developed in Canada. It was developed in the late 90s and took almost 20 years 
to get authorised for human consumption (Nature 2017). The development of 
GM animals is back into the picture since a few years because new techniques 
were developed that overcome several technical hurdles of modifying animals 
(Nature 2016a,b). Contrary to commercial applications, the development of 
genetically modified laboratory animals (i.e. rats, mice) to function as disease 
and testing models for human medicine have been common practice for a long 
time. In the medical field, biotechnology is used for preventative, diagnostic 
and therapeutic purposes. Preventative purposes include the development 
of vaccines for common diseases like seasonal flu as well as vaccines for 
outbreaks such as Ebola (FDA 2019) or COVID-19 (Stoye 2020). Biotechnology 
is used in diagnostics to identify hereditary diseases or develop personalised 
treatments, and gene therapy is increasingly used to treat cancer or metabolic 
disease (Cornel 2019). Industrial biotechnology refers mainly to the production 
of substances in GM micro-organisms, ranging from food additives (i.e. 
vitamins), pharmaceutical products (i.e. insulin), biofuels (i.e. ethanol) and 
raw/fine chemicals (fibers, plastics, lubricants) (for an overview see Rodrigues 
& Rodrigues 2017). 
The developments in biotechnology continue to expand and they may have 
a growing and more substantial impact on our health, food production 
and environment in the future, such as the possibility to change human 
characteristics with germline modification, the production of meat without 
animals or the elimination of an entire population of pest insects with 
gene drives.[3] Furthermore, biotechnology increasingly converges with 
3 In 2015 Chinese scientist Jiankui He announced the birth of two girls, genetically modified to be HIV 
resistant, opening a worldwide debate on germline modification of humans (Nature 2018); the term gene 
drive is used for a genetic mechanism that modifies the inheritance pattern of a specific characteristic in such 
a way that it spreads in the population faster than normal. This can be used to insert a lethal gene in pest or 
disease-spreading insects to eliminate for example malaria (Nature 2019) and the so called ‘impossible 
burger’ is a plant based burger that ‘bleeds’ and tastes like regular meat products because of the presence 
of ‘heme’ that is produced in GM yeast (Nature Biotechnology 2019).
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other technologies such as nanotechnology, 3D printing, computer science, 
neuroscience, robotics and engineering, creating a landscape of seemingly 
futuristic applications.[4] 
This broad variety of applications also triggers diverging views on the role 
this technology should play in our lives. And this in turn creates a multitude 
of challenges for the governance of biotechnology on a national, European and 
global level (see Chapter 8). Governance[5] is a broad term that in my view 
can be best described as the whole process of ‘dealing with’ (technological) 
developments on different levels, ranging from society, science, industry and 
regional, national or international governments and institutions. ‘Dealing 
with’ can, for example, concern public debate and participation, aiming for 
responsible innovation by science and industry or designing and enforcing 
regulations by policy makers. 
For many technological/scientific applications that vary in appraisal in 
society (e.g. smartphone use, automobiles, industrial agriculture, animal 
testing), existing governance approaches seem to be sufficient to manage 
their implementation in society. This doesn’t mean there is no debate, but 
the existing systems of governance enable using or avoiding the technology in 
a way that facilitates the needs of different stakeholders such as consumers, 
producers, science and industry without too much upheaval i.e. without 
substantial protests or the blocking of regulatory processes. 
But somehow, for genetically modified organisms (GMOs) the governance 
mechanisms in place do not seem to work in the same way and genetic 
modification is considered controversial (e.g. European Commission 2010, 
Tosun & Schaub 2017). This is particularly the case in Europe, where Member 
States (MS) cannot agree on the safety of GM crops despite clearance from the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and where a majority, but not all, of 
4 Choi et al. 2020 describe nanoparticles that deliver ‘suicide gene’ therapy to brain tumors; Goulart 
2019 announces the printing of a functional mini-liver; Koch et al. 2019 present the results of research into 
storing data in DNA; El-Shamayleh & Horwitz 2019 manipulate the neural activity in monkeys with genetic 
constructs responding to light; Kriegman et al. 2019 created a living self-healing robot from frog cells and 
Heveran et al. 2020 invented self-healing bricks with the help of GM bacteria.
5 Political scientist Mark Bevir described governance in general as ‘all forms of social coordination and 
patterns of rule’ and more in particular as ‘all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, 
market, or network, whether over a family tribe, formal or informal organisation, or territory, and whether 
through laws, norms, power or language’ (Bevir 2012). In academic literature, numerous levels, types and 
styles of governance are described such as global, public or private governance, corporate, environmental 
or regulatory governance, participatory, contract or collaborative governance. 
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the 27 MS have voted to ban GM crops based on non-safety arguments (see 
Smart et al. 2015 and New Scientist 2015). The controversy is also reflected in 
public opinion research, recurring debates in media and politics and hampered 
decision-making on market authorisations as well as regulatory reforms.
This thesis aims to analyse what is not working, why it is not working and 
what could be done to improve the situation in Europe with regard to regulatory 
decision-making on the authorisation of GM crops. First, we need to define 
what we mean when we are talking about biotechnology and GMOs.
2. VARYING DEFINITIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GMOs
Several definitions of biotechnology and GMOs are in use that vary depending 
on the context in which they are used (i.e. general, political, scientific or legal). 
Starting with biotechnology, one of the most used general definitions is the 
one from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): 
‘The application of science and technology to living organisms, as well as parts, 
products and models thereof, to alter living or non-living materials for the 
production of knowledge, goods and services.’ (OECD 2005, p.9)
The OECD description covers all biotechnology, including more traditional 
activities such as brewing and cheese making. To distinguish between 
traditional and modern biotechnology, the OECD added a list-based definition, 
consisting of seven categories of techniques in modern biotechnology, last 
updated in 2018: 
1. DNA/RNA: Genomics, pharmacogenomics, gene probes, genetic engineering, 
DNA/RNA sequencing/synthesis/amplification, gene expression profiling, and use 
of antisense technology; large-scale DNA synthesis, genome- and gene-editing, 
gene drive.
2. Proteins and other molecules: Sequencing/synthesis/engineering of proteins and 
peptides (including large molecule hormones); improved delivery methods for 
large molecule drugs; proteomics, protein isolation and purification, signalling, 
identification of cell receptors;
3. Cell and tissue culture and engineering: Cell/tissue culture, tissue engineering 
(including tissue scaffolds and biomedical engineering), cellular fusion, 
vaccine/immune stimulants, embryo manipulation; marker assisted breeding 
technologies, metabolic engineering.
4. Process biotechnology techniques: Fermentation using bioreactors, biorefining, 
bioprocessing, bioleaching, biopulping, biobleaching, biodesulphurisation, 




5. Gene and RNA vectors: Gene therapy, viral vectors;
6. Bioinformatics: Construction of databases on genomes, protein sequences; 
modelling complex biological processes, including systems biology; and
7. Nanobiotechnology: Applies the tools and processes of nano/microfabrication 
to build devices for studying biosystems and applications in drug delivery, 
diagnostics, etc.
      (OECD 2018, p.8)
The focus of this thesis is on modern biotechnology and more specifically 
on organisms whose genetic material (DNA) has been altered, called living 
modified organisms (LMOs) or GMOs. One of the main international treaties 
covering the use biotechnology, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (hereafter: Cartagena Protocol) uses the 
term LMO, which is defined as: 
‘any living organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material 
obtained through the use of modern biotechnology’ (CPB, Art. 3)
The Cartagena protocol also defines living organism and modern bio-
technology.[6] In addition, it recognises that in everyday usage LMOs are 
usually considered to be the same as GMOs but notes that definitions and 
interpretations of this term vary widely (Cartagena Protocol, FAQ). In the 
European regulatory context, the term GMO is the standard, defined as: 
‘an organism, with the exception of human beings, in which the genetic 
material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating 
and/or natural recombination’ (Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 2)
While most definitions of ‘biotechnology’ show relatively small variations 
in wording and interpretation,[7] the definition ‘GMOs’ and ‘LMOs’ and of 
6 The Cartagena Protocol defines a ‘living organism’ as ‘any biological entity capable of transferring 
or replicating genetic material, including sterile organisms, viruses and viroids’; modern biotechnology is 
defined as ‘the application of: a. In vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or b. Fusion of cells beyond the 
taxonomic family’ (CPB, Art. 3).
7 See for example the UN convention on biological diversity who defines biotechnology as ‘any 
technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or 
modify products or processes for specific use’ (CBD, Art. 2) or the Novel feeds regulation Canada which 
defines biotechnology as ‘the application of science and engineering to the direct or indirect use of living 




‘genetic modification’ or ‘genetic manipulation’ varies more substantially.[8] 
To illustrate, the Cartagena protocol has a focus on ‘novel combinations’ of 
genetic material, while the European legal definition emphasizes the ‘non-
naturalness’ of the recombination. While there seems to be an overlap, novel 
and non-natural are not necessarily the same and this may lead to different 
interpretations and implementations of regulations.
In addition, numerous definitions and metaphors have been introduced, and 
contested, to mediate public understanding of biotechnological techniques. 
See for example O’Keefe (2015) and McLeod & Nerlich (2017) who analyse and 
discuss the use of some of these metaphors. I will briefly summarise some 
examples of language differences and metaphors here. In general, the notion of 
‘genetic modification’ is mostly used in a scientific context, whereas ‘genetic 
manipulation’ is more common in a political/societal context from a critical 
perspective on these techniques. With regard to specific techniques, the term 
‘synthetic biology’ was introduced early 2000 for modified organisms that 
were, basically, no different from GMOs.[9] Synthetic biology was presented by 
scientists as a means of precise and highly controllable ways to achieve genetic 
changes (other wordings used in the context of synthetic biology are ‘designing 
life’ and ‘rewriting the code of life’). In contrast, it was named ‘extreme genetic 
engineering’ or ‘GMOs on steroids’ by stakeholders and organisations with a 
more critical attitude towards GMOs, such as ETC Group (2007) and Friends of 
the Earth (2012). The struggle for defining biotechnology developments is also 
illustrated on a policy and regulatory level, where the European Commission 
(EC) appointed three scientific committees to come up with a single definition 
of synthetic biology. Literature research and international surveys resulted in 
35 published definitions, out of which the following ‘operational definition’ of 
synthetic biology was distilled: 
8 See for example the European legal definition of a GMO as ‘an organism, with the exception of human 
beings, in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating 
and/or natural recombination’ (Dir. 2001/18/EC, Art. 2) versus the Canada novel feeds regulation that 
defines genetic modification as ‘to change the heritable traits of a plant, animal or microorganism by 
means of intentional manipulation’ (Food and Drug Regulations, B28.001). The EU definition has a focus 
on modern biotechnology, while the Canadian definition would include all biotechnology applications. In 
addition, Canada regulates plants with novel traits (PNTs) that include most GMOs but also some products 
of conventional plant breeding that are not considered GMOs in Europe (Directive 94-08).
9 The term synthetic biology was first used in 1910 in Stephane Leduc’s publication ’Théorie physico-
chimique de la vie et générations spontanée’, but nowadays refers mostly to the introduction of a series of 
new techniques around 2000 that allow for the creation of synthetic biological circuits to control cells (see 
Garder et al. 2000 and Elowitz 2000).
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‘The application of science, technology and engineering to facilitate and 
accelerate the design, manufacture and/or modification of genetic materials in 
living organisms.’ (SCENIHR, SCCS, SCHER 2014, p.30)
But synthetic biology surely wasn’t the last metaphor to be introduced. Since 
a few years, the introduction of ‘gene editing techniques’[10] suggest an even 
more controllable process of creating genetic changes (O’Keefe 2015). And 
this terminology too is subject to criticism. Environmental nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs) such as GMWatch (2018b) and Beyond GM (2016) criticise 
these metaphors because in their view it unfairly suggests a safe precision 
technology and it tries to steer away from negative connotations or associations 
with GMOs.
For the purpose of this thesis, it is not necessary to discuss what is the ‘right’ or 
one true definition of biotechnology, GMOs, synthetic biology or gene editing. 
From the variety of definitions and metaphors, it is important to remember 
that a diversity of definitions exist and that these can be used in different 
contexts or with different purposes. Furthermore, the identified diversity of 
terminologies seems to hint at a level of disagreement on how GMOs should be 
perceived and regulated.
3. RECURRING THEMES IN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT BIOTECHNOLOGY
The application of biotechnology brings forward questions to individuals 
and societies on how they want to relate themselves to its use with regard to 
acceptance and desirability. These questions may be a topic of conversation by 
the general public when confronted with information and news from (social) 
media or with consumer goods such as GM food, but they are also discussed in 
academic literature, in legal and policy areas and in political debates. 
This section provides a non-exhaustive overview of recurring themes in these 
discussions, gathered from my experience at the Netherlands Commission on 
Genetic Modification (COGEM). COGEM is an independent scientific advisory 
body of the Dutch government that advises on the risks to human health 
and the environment of the production and use of GMOs and informs the 
government of ethical and societal issues linked to genetic modification. The 
advisory task of COGEM focusses in essence on regulatory science, whereas its 
10 Gene editing refers to a series of new recombinant DNA technologies such as Zinc Fingers, Transcription 
activator-like effector nucleases (TALENs) and CRISPR-Cas. These techniques can be used to precisely cut, 
replace or add DNA without leaving traces of modification.
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informing task uses regulatory knowledge including legal, moral and economic 
knowledge. This thesis is therefore written from the perspective of this type 
of science. Regulatory science concerns the use of scientific knowledge to 
justify regulations and substantiate the safety of applications that are subject 
to regulations (see Section 2.2). Regulatory science is a part of regulatory 
knowledge, which may in addition include legal, procedural, moral, economic 
and other knowledge, see Faulkner & Poort (2017). All these types of knowledge 
are reflected in the themes that play a role in discussions about biotechnology. 
An overview will be given below. For a more extensive analysis of the history, 
character and dynamics of the GM debate, see for example Bovenkerk (2010, 
Chapter 2) and COGEM (2017).[11]
An (ideal typical) distinction can be made between themes relating to moral 
views towards biotechnology (is the technology acceptable or not?), themes 
relating to risks and benefits (is it safe and useful (enough?) and themes relating 
to broader issues that play a more general role in technology discussions (e.g. 
socio-economic issues). This distinction is somewhat artificial, as terms like 
risk, harm or damage as well as benefits also relate to moral perspectives. 
For example, risks can relate to obvious and measurable harms like toxicity 
to humans or animals, but also to the loss of biodiversity or a specific food 
production system that is valued by a part of society. Or as Stirling (2012) 
phrased it: ‘much of the controversy over genetically modified organisms 
concerns not the likelihood of some agreed form of harm, but fundamentally 
different understandings of what harm actually means.’ What is considered 
harm or acceptable risk may vary from person to person and is also related to 
what one considers valuable or worth protecting.
3.1 FUNDAMENTAL MORAL PERSPECTIVES
For some, genetic modification is no different from other ways in which 
mankind changes its environment to achieve desired goals.[12] According to 
these type of views, plant breeding or animal breeding is all the same, regardless 
of the technologies used, whether they be conventional breeding methods or 
genetic modification. This does not necessarily mean that people holding these 
11 COGEM (2017). Gentechdebat op scherp: invalshoeken voor een vruchtbare dialoog (available in 
Dutch) is a book based upon policy reports written mainly by the author of this thesis in her role as a scientific 
secretary of the Subcommittee on Ethics and Societal Aspects. The reports were re-edited by Mampuys and 
reflected on by a variety of experts to reassess their value and contribution to the GM debate.
12 Tosun & Schaub (2017) describe a pro-GMO coalition consisting of amongst others agro-chemical 
companies, biotech research institutes, big farming, and selected (European) Member States who ask for 
the authorisation of new GM products.
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views approve of all types of applications, but they do not distinguish between 
the technologies used. For others, altering the DNA of living organisms 
is fundamentally different from other techniques.[13] It conflicts with the 
‘naturalness’[14] and integrity of processes in living organisms. From this 
perspective, the use of GMOs is therefore unacceptable. This view can have 
religious as well as non-religious moral or ethical reasons. Both views reflect 
people’s conceptions of ‘a good life’, i.e. what people consider a valuable way 
of life. Obviously, a variety of perspectives exists between the two extremes 
of embracing the technology or fully rejecting it. These may vary in the level 
of technology interference or control over nature people feel comfortable with 
or that they believe is contributing to their view on ‘a good life’. Fundamental 
moral perspectives are not per se always articulated as such but may also 
be reflected by intuitive feelings or emotions. For example, public opinion 
research has shown that the idea of GMOs gives some people a general feeling 
of unease or disgust. This is also known as the ‘yuk’ factor (see Midgley 2000).
3.2 ATTITUDES ON RISKS/BENEFITS
Technologies are developed and applied because they are perceived by at least 
some people to provide certain benefits. From this perspective, biotechnology 
has a potential to contribute to the quality, quantity and sustainability of food 
production, new therapies to improve health and welfare and the production 
of a wide variety of components for industrial use. On the other hand, there 
may also be risks or negative (side) effects to the use of technology. The risks 
can relate to accidental and unintended risks to humans and the environment 
(biosafety) as well as risks that the technology could inspire misuse in the form 
of bioterrorism or biowarfare (biosecurity).[15] The safety of humans and the 
environment is considered important on a collective level and most countries 
have regulations in place that safeguard the risk of technologies in society. The 
potential risks of GMOs are being studied in scientific research and mandatory 
risk assessments are a part of the regulatory approval process. 
13 Tosun & Schaub (2017) describe an opposing camp against GMOs consisting of amongst others 
citizens, consumer-protection groups, and environmental NGOs who demand GMOs to be regulated 
more strictly or even banned.
14 The word naturalness has different meanings and is often used differently depending on context. In this 
context it refers to the meaning of naturalness as ‘whole’ and ‘pure’, ‘without human interference’. For an 
overview of the ethical debate on naturalness in discussions about plant-biotechnology, see Van Haperen 
et al. (2012).
15 Biosafety aims to prevent the accidental or unintended misuse of the life sciences while Biosecurity 
aims to prevent the deliberate misuse of the life sciences by non-state actors. For a review of biosafety and 
biosecurity issues in synthetic biology see Gómez-Tatay & Hernández-Andreu (2019).
20
1
While some reviews of scientific literature conclude that GM crops are as safe 
as traditionally bred crops (Nicolia et al. 2014, National Academies of Sciences 
Engineering and Medicine 2016, European Commission 2010b), others fear we 
cannot oversee or predict the consequences of genetic modification and the 
way it could, perhaps even irreversibly, damage our health or the environment 
(GMWatch 2016, ETC Group 2014). Both perspectives refer to science, but 
where one points at the absence of evidence of harm, the other points at the 
uncertainties or the unknown consequences of the technology on the long term 
and emphasises the need for evidence of safety. As noted before, individuals, 
collectives, cultures and nationalities may differ on the question what should be 
considered harmful or what risks are acceptable. In addition, recurring doubts 
and discussions about the benefits, risks or downsides of biotechnology use 
also relate to the level of trust in authorities that are assigned to safeguard the 
use of this technology. From there, we arrive at the broader themes relating to 
biotechnology. 
3.3 BROADER ISSUES
Besides fundamental views on biotechnology and attitudes towards risk and 
safety, broader themes play a role relating to issues that are not necessarily 
biotechnology specific. An example can be found in debates on sustainability, 
where some argue that biotechnology can contribute to sustainable agriculture 
(a decrease of insecticide use with insect resistant GM crops, see Oliver 
2014), whereas others are of the opinion that GM crops indirectly facilitate 
unsustainable agricultural practices (an increase in pesticide use with herbicide 
tolerant crops, see Zdjelar & Nikolic 2013). Friends of The Earth (2014) criticised 
the production of vanilla in GM microorganisms being promoted as ‘natural’ 
and ‘sustainable’ while it is in their view unnatural, unsafe and it replaces 
natural production in developing countries, causing local workers to lose their 
jobs and income.
Additionally, there may be alternative solutions to problems in the agricultural 
and medical field that, according to some perspectives, are more suitable 
to address the problem. People may argue for example that vegetarianism 
is a better solution than producing more feed for cattle intended for meat 
production. This is a balance that can be made in different ways depending on 
both people’s moral fundamental views (i.e. views on ‘the good life’) as well 
as attitudes towards risks and benefits.
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Broader themes in biotechnology discussions can also relate to institutional 
and socio-economic questions about authority, autonomy, access to 
technology, ownership, fairness and equity and geopolitical / distributional 
issues regarding food, health and welfare (for an overview of socio-economic 
aspects of GM crops, see Chapter 7). For example, the National Academies 
of Sciences Engineering and Medicine (NASEM) (2016) and the International 
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA) (2018) argue 
that biotechnology holds promises for farmers and citizens in developing 
or malnourished countries. A well-known example is Golden Rice,[16] a GM 
rice variety created to alleviate Vitamin A deficiency in developing countries. 
On the one hand the rice is described as a key example of a technology that 
contributes to alleviate hunger and malnutrition.[17] On the other hand Friends 
of the Earth (2011) argue that this GM rice does not solve the actual problem of 
food distribution and access to a varied diet. Or that accepting this technology 
may be a first step in making farmers (financially) dependent on multinational 
companies that are trying to control the food chain. 
The themes mentioned give a broad overview of the perspectives on 
biotechnology. Because there is a plurality of views that are conflicting on 
various levels, it is not surprising that these lead to debates in science, society 
and in the regulatory and political sphere. As mentioned earlier, conflicts about 
technology use are not uncommon, which is why there are regulations in place 
and policies are developed to address these differences in the best possible 
way. For biotechnology however, these conflicts have shown a remarkable 
resilience to being solved or mitigated, especially in the area of the commercial 
applications of GM crops. Since 2003, the European authorisation procedures 
for commercial release of GM Crops systematically resulted in delayed or 
stalled decision-making and several MS have called a ban on the cultivation 
of GM crops. This makes European market authorisations of GM crops an case 
study. To gain more insight into the potential cause(s) of the conflict over GM 
crops, we first need to zoom in on the way GMOs are regulated. In the next 
section, an overview is provided of the GMO regulatory framework.
4. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR GMOs IN EUROPE
GMOs are subject to regulations in most countries worldwide. After the 
discovery of recombinant DNA technology in 1973, scientists set up a meeting 
16 For an overview of the Golden Rice history and discussion see Kettenburg 2018.
17 See the project website URL: www.goldenrice.org (Accessed 14 July 2020)
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to discuss its implications. At the Asilomar conference in 1975 an international 
community of scientists acknowledged that GMOs could potentially pose a risk 
to humans and the environment.[18] This eventually triggered the initiative for 
national and international legislation to assess the risks of GMOs in laboratory 
experiments. Initially, regulations were focused on genetic engineering (GE) 
of microorganisms in the laboratory, as this was the only field that GE was 
applied to at first. Over time, GE started to be applied in plants, animals and 
human health research, both in the laboratory and in the field. This resulted in 
composing and implementing additional regulations for introduction into the 
environment (field trials and commercialisation or deliberate release). 
Regulatory frameworks applying to scientific developments and technological 
applications determine amongst others who decides about what and based 
on which grounds. The grounds on which GMOs are regulated are similar 
to the way we deal with other technologies that may have potential risks to 
humans and the environment, such as novel foods, pharmaceutical products 
or pesticides. This means an experiment or product needs to be assessed and 
if it meets the safety requirements, it can be approved. Regulatory frameworks 
for GMOs worldwide are quite similar with regard to the risk assessment, but 
there are differences in the way the regulations are set up and implemented.[19] 
These differences are not relevant to the topic of this thesis and will not be 
discussed in detail. Other differences can be found in the division of decision-
making power; i.e. who decides about what. The approval itself can vary from 
an administrative act to a political voting procedure and depends on the type 
of application and national regulations. With relevance to this thesis, the focus 
of the rest of this section is on the EU regulations for GMOs.
The EU regulates GMOs based on a definition of a GMO (see Section 2), 
supplemented with a list of processes and techniques that result in a GMO, 
a list of processes that do not result in a GMO and a list of processes that 
do result in a GMO but are exempted from the regulatory requirements of 
18 The Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA (February 1975) was an influential conference about 
potential biohazards and regulation of biotechnology. An international group of professionals (biologists, 
physicians, lawyers) participated to draw up voluntary guidelines to ensure the safety of recombinant DNA 
technology (see Berg 2008).
19 The main difference highlighted in academic literature is whether the trigger for regulating a product is 
‘product’ or ‘process’ based, i.e. whether it looks at the characteristics of the end product or at the way the 
product was made. Canada is the most prominent example of a strictly ‘product’ based regulation, whereas 
Europe is known for its predominantly ‘process’ based regulation. Both systems have their own benefits and 
downsides, for an overview and comparison see COGEM (2019).
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the regulations, such as a safety assessment (see Directive 2001/18/EC resp. 
Annex IA, part 1, Annex IA, part 2 and Annex IB). European regulations provide 
requirements which EU MS need to implement in their own legislation. There 
are Directives and Regulations[20] for different applications such as contained 
use (i.e. laboratory experiments), deliberate release into the environment (i.e. 
field trials with plants) and commercialisation (i.e. market authorisation of 
GM crops, pharmaceutical products and gene therapy). For the purpose of this 
thesis I will not discuss all GMO Directives and Regulations, but zoom in on the 
relevant regulations for market authorisations of GM crops.
Market authorisation of GM crops (import as food/feed and/or cultivation) is 
regulated on a European level and based predominantly on an assessment of 
food/feed and environmental safety (Directive 2001/18/EC and Regulation (EC) 
No. 1829/2003) and requirements for traceability (for food safety purposes) 
and labelling (Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003). When applying for market 
approval, applicants are required to provide data substantiating the food and 
environmental safety of their product, including reference material and a 
detection method that enables tracing the product in the food chain. The food 
and environmental safety are assessed by the EFSA[21] and competent authorities 
(CA) of the EU MS. Labelling and traceability requirements are assessed and 
validated by the by European Union Reference Laboratories for GM food and 
Feed (EURL GMFF).[22] 
In addition, in 2015 a Directive has come into force which, in addition to and 
separately from the safety assessment, enables MS to ban or restrict cultivation 
of GM crops on their territory based on non-safety arguments, such as socio-
economic aspects or environmental policy objectives (Directive (EU) 2015/412). 
20 Directives lay down results that must be achieved by MS but they are free to decide how to transpose 
those directives into National Laws. Regulations have binding force throughout every MS and enter into 
force on a set date.
21 The European Food Safety authority is a European agency funded by the European Union that operates 
independently of the European legislative and executive institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament) 
and EU Member States. EFSA provides independent scientific advice and communicates on existing 
and emerging risks associated with the food chain, including the commercial application of GMO’s. 
EFSA conducts food safety and environmental risk assessments of GM crops that are applied for market 
authorisation in the European Union. 
22 The core tasks of the EURL GMFF are the scientific assessment and validation of detection methods for 
GM Food and Feed as part of the EU authorisation procedure and the provision of support to the National 
Reference Laboratories (NRL) for GMO control in the EU Member States. The EURL GMFF is supported by 




To facilitate producers’ freedom of choice, MS are encouraged and facilitated 
in taking appropriate measures for coexistence of conventional/organic crops 
with GM crops with the aim of preventing admixture or inadvertent presence of 
GM crops in other products (Commission Recommendation of 13 July 2010).[23] 
Together, these regulations set the requirements (food and environmental safety, 
traceability and labelling) and optional restrictions (coexistence measures and 
non-safety arguments) to determine which GM crops can be allowed to be 
cultivated by farmers and to be used in food for human consumption and feed 
for livestock animals. The next section goes into more detail of how decisions 
about market applications are made. The market authorisation procedure 
of GM crops can be roughly divided in two steps: 1) an environmental and 
food safety assessment (i.e. the grounds on which a decision is made) and 
2) regulatory decision-making based on European comitology procedures (i.e. 
determining the decision-making power: who decides about what and how). 
After describing both steps, I will reflect on how they work out in practice. 
4.1 PREREQUISITE: AN ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND FOOD SAFETY ASSESSMENT
The principles and data requirements for the environmental risk and food safety 
assessment are described in detail in the regulations (e.g. Annex II and Annex 
III of Directive 2001/18/EC). The risk assessment takes into account a broad 
variety of potential effects and the risk assessment principles. Summarised 
these principles focus on the following nine topics for the environmental 
risk assessment: the persistence and invasiveness of the GM plant, selective 
advantages or disadvantages of the GM plant, the chances and possibilities of 
gene transfer to sexually compatible plants, impact of the interaction of the 
GM plant with target organisms, impact of the interaction of the GM plant 
with non-target organisms, effects on human and animal health, effects on 
animal health, effects on biogeochemical processes and impact on cultivation, 
management and harvest techniques used. The food safety assessment in 
addition requires a toxicological, allergenicity and nutritional assessment.
23 GM crops can accidentally comingle with conventional or organic crops during production and transport, 
or their genes can outcross into these varieties in the field. This is particularly a problem for the organic sector 
that prohibits the use of GM. Coexistence measures aim to prevent admixture and outcrossing of GM 
crops. The Commission Recommendation of 13 July 2010 provides guidance to MS for the development 
of coexistence measures, including in border areas. The recommendation encourages MS to cooperate 
with each other to implement appropriate measures at the borders between MS so as to avoid unintended 
consequences of cross-border contamination (European Commission 2010c).
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This means the GM plant needs to be characterised geno- and phenotypically[24] 
and its effects on the environment are compared to a similar non-GM plant 
in field trials. For the food safety assessment, the molecular composition of 
the plant is tested for potential toxic or allergenic effects. The assessment also 
includes mandatory 90 day feeding studies with rodents (see Section 5). Besides 
food and environmental safety assessments on specific applications, EFSA also 
publishes (non-binding) guidance documents on specific aspects of the risk 
assessments to assist applicants who want to file for market authorisation. 
Some of these guidance documents have been translated into legally binding 
texts.[25] 
Applications for market authorisations are also sent to EU MS who get the 
opportunity to assess the application and send their conclusion, remarks and 
questions to EFSA. Eventually, this results in a scientific opinion from EFSA 
that is sent to the EC (European Commission 2015). 
4.2 REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING: COMITOLOGY
Eventually, decision-making about GM crop authorisation lies not with the 
EFSA but with European and national government representatives. If the 
EFSA concludes that the product does not pose a risk to human health or to 
the environment and that additional requirements (such as traceability and 
labelling) have been met, the EC submits a draft implementing decision of 
authorisation to a committee made up from representatives of the MS. Here, a 
voting takes place that officially has to be scheduled within three months after 
publication of the EFSA scientific opinion.
MS representatives vote under the rule of ‘qualified majority’[26] or system of 
weighed voting defined in the Lisbon Treaty (EPRS 2014). Comitology refers 
to a set of procedures that give MS a say in the implementing acts of the EU. 
To understand the challenges of the comitology procedures with regard to GM 
crop authorisations, the working mechanism and role of comitology in Europe 
have to be explained first.
24 Genotype is constituted by an organisms’ entire DNA (its hereditary information), its phenotype are the 
properties that we can observe such as morphology, development and behaviour in the environment.
25 Implementing regulation (EU) No. 503/2013 in accordance with Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003.
26 A measure will be approved if it is supported by 55% of the Member States (15 out of 27), provided 
they represent 65% of the EU population.
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When legislative acts[27] have been adopted by the Council of the European 
Union (i.e. the Council of Ministers, hereafter: the Council) and the European 
Parliament (EP), a system of MS committees oversees the execution of EU 
laws (the non-legislative acts): this is operationalised through the comitology 
system. For an overview of types of EU law see Figure 1. 
The European Union Comitology system (hereafter: comitology) was established 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For an overview of the origins of the EU 
comitology see for example Blom-Hansen (2008). 
The comitology system has undergone several reforms over the years, the last 
significant overhaul resulted in the Lisbon Treaty. Most reforms had to do with 
the division of power between the EC, the Council, the EP and the MS. 
The Lisbon Treaty became effective in 2009 and formalised most of the proposals 
on comitology in articles 290 (Delegated acts) and Article 291 (Implementing 
acts) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).[28] For 
an overview of the differences before and after the Lisbon Treaty see Stratulat 
& Molino (2011). In this introductory chapter, it is sufficient to summarise 
the current working mechanism of the comitology procedures and some main 
differences to the older procedures. 
Delegated acts (Article 290, TFEU) deal with specifications of technical details 
or amending specific parts of legislation. They are defined as ‘non-legislative 
acts of general application’ whose aim is to ‘supplement or amend’ certain 
‘non-essential elements’ of legislative acts. Article 290 makes the EC solely 
responsible for drafting and adopting delegated acts. Delegated acts work 
through expert groups and draft proposals can be objected by the EP and/or 
Council. This means that the EP and the Council can oppose the delegated act 
on any grounds or revoke the delegation. The EP can do so based on a majority, 
the Council can do so based on a qualified majority, see Georgiev (2013). 
Implementing acts (Article 291, TFEU) aim to create uniform conditions in 
the MS. Stratulat & Molino (2011) explain that, when a ‘legally binding 
Union act […] identifies the need for uniform conditions of implementation’, 
27 Legislative acts refer to the joint adoption (so called co-decision) by the EP and the Council of a 
regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the Commission (Article 289 (TFEU))
28 The TFEU is one of two treaties forming the constitutional basis of the European Union. The other one is 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
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it can require the adoption of implementing acts, which are of a ‘technical 
and administrative nature’ (p.2). These acts are adopted by the Commission, 
i.e. the EU executive, and overseen by the Member States, i.e. the ‘national’ 
executives’. The detailed procedures for the Member States’ control of the 
Commission’s executive powers are set out in Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.[29] 
The regulation distinguishes between an ‘examination procedure’ and an 
‘advisory procedure’. In both cases, committees formed by representatives 
of MS are in charge of scrutinising the proposed implementing acts. The 
committees include one representative from every EU country and are chaired 
by the EC. Each committee decides its operating procedures, based on standard 
committee rules of procedure. The voting results and summary record of the 
committee meetings are published in the comitology register.
29 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 
laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the 
Commission’s exercise of implementing powers.
Figure 1: The types of EU law can be divided into primary legislation (the Treaties of the EU) and 




The advisory committee issues non-binding opinions based on a simple 
majority of the MS, whereas the examination committee acts through a binding 
qualified-majority vote on draft measures presented by the EC. The result of 
this voting round under a qualified majority can be ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘no 
opinion’. If the result is ‘positive’ the EC has to adopt the implementing act. 
If the voting results in a ‘negative’ opinion, the EC can 1) amend the proposal 
or 2) send it to an ‘appeal committee’. The appeal committee is also made 
up of EU countries’ representatives, but is intended to have a higher level 
of political representation. It is also chaired by the EC and follows the same 
voting rules of a qualified majority. If the result is ‘no opinion’ the EC can 
also amend the draft or, in specific cases, has no choice but to refer the act 
to the appeal committee. This is mandatory if the measure concerns specific 
matters, i.e. taxation, financial services, the protection of human, animal 
or plant health, or definitive multilateral safeguard measures. In the appeal 
committee, if the qualified majority voting is positive, the act is adopted, if the 
outcome is negative, the act has to be rejected. In case the second voting is also 
inconclusive, the EC may veto a decision. 
Implementing acts cannot be vetoed by the EP or the Council. However, 
Stratulat & Molino (2011) point out that Article 291 ‘grants the EP (alongside 
the Council) the right to intervene by submitting a non-binding resolution 
when it considers that the EC has overstepped its execution competences.’
GM crop authorisations are implementing acts that fall under the responsibility 
of the examination committees which require a qualified majority voting. 
They are discussed in one of the Standing Committees on Plants, Animals, 
Food and Feed and environmental safety (PAFF), either in the specialised 
commission on ‘genetically modified food and feed and environmental risk’ 
(for authorisations through Regulation (EU) No 1829/2003 on import as food/
feed) or in the ‘Regulatory Committee 2001/18/EC’ (for authorisations through 
Directive 2001/18/EC on cultivation). Since these are matters concerning the 
protection of human, animal or plant health, a voting result of ‘no opinion’ 
has to be referred to the appeal committee. If again the result is ‘no opinion’, 
the EC may adopt a final decision on the authorisation based on the original 
recommendation.[30] 
30 Pursuant to the comitology rules, the EC is no longer obliged to adopt a final decision in case of 
disagreement i.e. when the outcome is ‘no opinion’ in both the Standing Committee and in the Appeal 
Committee (‘shall adopt’ was replaced by ‘may adopt’), see Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, Art. 6(3).
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Market authorisations for GM crops are valid for 10 years, after which the 
applicant has an obligation to update the application dossier with any new 
scientific information with regard to safety of the GM crop and monitoring 
reports. The renewal dossier is again assessed by EFSA and the MS. Renewals 
have to go through the comitology procedures again. The decision-making 
process for GM crop authorisations in Europe is visualised in Figure 2.
With relevance to this thesis, three things are important to keep in mind about 
the comitology procedures for GM crop authorisations. First, unless the MS 
reject the proposal with a qualified majority, the EC ultimately has the decision-
making power to authorise or reject a GM crop application, or postpone that 




decision. Second, the Council and EP can protest, but have no compelling 
means to influence the decision. Third, there is a so called ‘sunset clause’ 
(i.e. the authorisation needs to be renewed after specified period of time), but 
while awaiting a new decision, the old one does not expire or become invalid. 
This differentiates GM crops from, for example, authorisations for pesticides, 
which legally expire after a specified timeframe and become illegal to use. 
Together, these characteristics limit the number of parties who determine the 
final decision on GM crop authorisations and they can lower the urgency for 
decision-making itself since consequences seem to be limited.
4.3 DECISION-MAKING IN PRACTICE
After the first EU regulations had entered into force in 1990, several GM crops 
were approved for market release. A British company (Zeneca seeds) was 
the first one to bring a GMO product to the consumer market, which was a 
tomato puree, with a voluntary GM label. The authorisation process seemed 
unproblematic until the first import of GM crops from the United States of 
America (USA) arrived in 1996. The company responsible for the GM soybean 
(Monsanto) refused to label the product as GMO (Stephan 2012). Upon arrival 
in Europe, NGOs such as Greenpeace organised protests against GM crops, also 
initiating a public debate about safety and freedom of choice (e.g. Jasanoff 
2005, Kurzer & Cooper 2007). Around that time, decision-making under the 
comitology procedures also became problematic and the EC started to approve 
GM crop authorisations without support of the MS. In 1997 Austria, Italy and 
Luxembourg banned GM maize Bt 176 (see Tiberghien 2009 and Randour 2014). 
The request of the EC to lift the bans was rejected by the Council. More national 
bans were installed later by Greece and France (see Punt & Wesseler 2016). In 
1999 five MS (Denmark, France, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg) declared in a 
meeting of the Council of Environmental Ministers of the EU that they would 
suspend further approvals of GM crops until new legislation on the labelling 
and traceability of GM foods came into force (i.e. ‘the declaration of five’, see 
Punt & Wesseler 2016). The declaration was supported by other EU MS, leading 
to a majority of 12 of the 15 MS that refused to decide on new authorisation 
requests (see Tiberghien 2009).
This resulted in a de facto[31] moratorium on GM crops between 1998 and 2004. 
Since it was not an official moratorium no formal reasons for the moratorium 
were given. Stephan (2012) mentions political-economic protectionism, 
31 Lieberman & Gray (2006) discuss different interpretations of the moratorium from the perspective of 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism: ‘The moratorium was not an official policy adopted by the EU, 
but a default outcome of deadlock in the regulatory committee and the Council of Environment Ministers, 
which the Commission chose not to resolve.’ (p.602). 
31
1
institutional (GM crop decisions are political in Europe, while mandated to a 
bureau of experts) and cultural factors[32] as reasons that eventually led to the 
moratorium. He criticises the link that is often made between the GM crop 
moratorium and food safety incidents in Europe (e.g. dioxine, Creutzfeld Jacob 
disease), and points out that safety incidents were also happening in the USA 
at the time. On both continents this undermined the regulatory credentials 
of responsible actors such as governments and scientific advisory bodies. In 
addition, NGOs in de USA also set up anti-GMO campaigns (see Thompson 
2015). These events did however not affect the regulatory decision-making 
process on GM crop authorisations in the USA like it did in Europe. 
The European de facto moratorium was upheld until a broad set of measures 
was agreed on to improve the risk assessment, transparency and the (political) 
legitimacy of the decision-making process of GM crop authorisations. For 
detailed overview of the political process of arriving at these changes, see 
Skogstad (2003) and Morris & Spillane (2010). In summary, the negotiations 
between the EC, the Member States, the Council and the EP resulted in three 
new regulations: Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release into the 
environment of genetically modified organisms, Regulation (EU) 1829/2003 
on genetically modified food and feed and Regulation (EU) 1830/2003 
concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms 
and the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically 
modified organisms. In addition, and independent scientific advisory body was 
installed: the EFSA. With these regulatory changes, scientific considerations 
were no longer the only determinant of decisions on GM crop authorisations. 
The precautionary principle was explicitly endorsed in the new regulations and 
the final decision about the authorisation is left to political authorities ‘who 
will use the scientific advice provided by the EFSA not as ‘absolute truth’ but 
as ‘knowledge with a confidence interval’ (Haniotis 2000, see also Skogstad 
2003). The Commission reasoned that different from risk assessment, risk 
management is a ‘political decision’ that ‘involves judgements not only based 
on science but on a wider appreciation of the wishes and needs of society’ 
(European Commission 2000a, p.14) and therefore ‘all interested parties should 
be involved to the fullest extent possible’ (European Commission 2000b, p.16). 
As a result, GM crop field trials and risk assessments had to be made public 
and an option for public consultation regarding experimental and commercial 
releases of GM products was created.
32 Stephan (2012) identifies traditionalist culinary preferences that ‘remain more influential in many 
European societies than the US and notes that discourses are successful in mobilising citizens when they 
resonate with pre-existing cultural values and identities’ (p.115).
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In 2003, new applications that had been considered safe by EFSA were scheduled 
for voting again.[33] Meanwhile, several MS (e.g. Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Italy and France) continued to ban GM crops 
(e.g. Christiansen & Polak 2009 and Anyschenko 2013). Some of these bans 
(e.g. Austria and Poland) have been challenged in court.[34] Smart et al. (2015) 
have shown that since 2003 there has only once been a qualified majority in 
favour of a draft Commission Decision on market authorisation of a GM crop. 
Several authorisation decisions (only importation) have been adopted by the 
EC without the support of the MS for both economic and legal reasons. Europe 
depends heavily on the importation of soybean products from elsewhere in 
the world, mainly for the purpose of feed (soy is the main source of protein in 
animal feed). In addition, the de facto moratorium resulted in an international 
trade conflict. In 2006, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ruled that Europe 
had violated international trade rules by blocking the import of GM food and 
that Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg also had no legal 
grounds to impose their own unilateral import bans.[35] 
Nevertheless, the one sided authorisation decisions by the EC have been 
protested by the EP, who have systematically been opposing the EU commission 
plans to authorise imports of GMO products through non-binding resolutions 
(European Parliament 2020).[36] In these resolutions the MEPs point to amongst 
others the risks of GM crops,[37] the risks of high pesticide levels of herbicide 
tolerant GM crops, the link between GM crops and unsustainable agriculture 
(such as the link between soybean production and deforestation) and repeated 
criticism over the (non-democratic) authorisation process of GM crops in 
Europe. 
33 An overview of the proposals and decisions during the de facto moratorium can be found on the website 
of the Financial Times. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/624a88c6-97db-11da-816b-0000779e2340 
(Accessed 14 July 2020).
34 Austria tried to legally ban GMOs in part of the country to protect organic agriculture, see Joined 
Cases T-366/03 and T-235/04 Land Oberösterreich and Republic of Austria v Commission of the 
European Communities (Rec.2005, p.II-4005); and Joined Cases C-439/05 P and C-454/05 P Land 
Oberösterreich and Republic of Austria v Commission of the European Communities (Rec.2007, p.I-7141). In 
2008 Poland tried to ban GM crops based on ethical and religious grounds (case C-165/08 Commission 
v Poland). The Court concluded that Poland failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 2001/18/EC.
35 WTO dispute DS291 European Communities – measures affecting the approval and marketing of 
biotech products.
36 Since 2016 the EP has adopted over 40 resolutions objecting the authorisation of GM crops (both 
importation and cultivation). For an overview see European Parliament (2020).




Despite these resolutions, the EC went ahead with the approvals for import 
(see the European GMO register).[38]
Authorisation decisions about cultivation have been completely halted and no 
decisions have been taken by the EC since 1998. Three cultivation applications 
on which the voting outcome of the appeal committee was ‘no opinion’ are 
pending since 2018. Only one GM maize has been authorised for cultivation in 
Europe. This is an insect resistant maize (MON810) that has been authorised 
in 1998.[39] 
Most applications in the system are considerably delayed in either the risk 
assessment phase or in the voting procedures. The average timeline for risk 
assessment had increased from 2 to 5 years, with extremes of 8 years (for an 
overview of these delays and a comparison with authorisation procedures in the 
US, see Smart et al. (2016). In 2017, in a complaint filed by three associations 
representing companies which market genetically modified food and feed 
(EuropaBio, COCERAL and FEFAC), the European ombudsman concluded that 
the delays of twenty applications of GM food/feed were unjustified.[40] This 
however, did not result in an improvement of the decision-making process, as 
delays in the approval process continue.
Even when authorised, GM crops can still be scrutinized and measures 
can be taken to revoke its legal status. MS can invoke the safeguard clause 
(Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 23) or apply emergency measures Regulation (EC) 
No1829/2003, Art. 34 to ban authorised GM crops based on new scientific 
information that indicates an overlooked risk associated with GM crops. Eight 
MS have used these measures in the past (Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg and Poland). In these cases, EFSA is requested by 
the EC to reassess the studies on their scientific rigor and draw a conclusion 
on the question whether there is indeed a reason for concern. Thus far, EFSA 
has concluded all safeguard clauses to be scientifically unfounded (e.g. EFSA 
38 European GMO Register, see URL: https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/eu_register_en (Accessed 
14 July 2020).
39 Market authorisations are valid for 10 years. In 2008 a renewal of the cultivation application for 
MON810 was submitted. EFSA published a positive opinion on the renewal in 2009. The draft implementing 
decision was scheduled for voting twice in 2018 with ‘no opinion’ as a result. There is no expiration date on 
the cultivation as long as the renewal application is pending. 
40 Case 1582/2014/PHP, ‘Decision of the European Ombudsman closing the inquiry into complaint 
1582/2014/PHP on the European Commission’s handling of authorisation applications for genetically 
modified food and feed’ European Ombudsman, 15 January 2016
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2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2012f, 2013 and 2014). However, most national bans 
remain in place, because the Council has rejected the Commission’s proposals 
to lift them.[41] In this situation the comitology procedures did result in a clear 
outcome, but one that goes against the Commission’s proposal.
 
In 2011, the European Policy Evaluation Consortium (EPEC) evaluated the EU 
legislative framework for GMOs, concluding that the regulatory process is both 
rigorously scientific and dysfunctional as a consequence of a complex set of 
factors, both external and internal to the authorisation process (EPEC 2011). 
In an attempt to solve the deadlock in decision-making in the comitology 
procedures, the EC proposed another new Directive in 2010 that gives individual 
MS the option to ban or restrict GM crop cultivation on their territory based 
on broader arguments, in addition to the safety assessment. Directive (EU) 
2015/412 came into force in 2015. As reasons for the new Directive, the text 
reads: 
‘In the past, in order to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs, some Member 
States had recourse to the safeguard clauses and emergency measures […]. In 
addition, the decision-making process has proved to be particularly difficult 
as regards the cultivation of GMOs in the light of the expression of national 
concerns which do not only relate to issues associated with the safety of GMOs 
for health or the environment. (8) In that context, it appears appropriate to grant 
Member States, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, more flexibility 
to decide whether or not they wish to cultivate GMOs on their territory without 
affecting the risk assessment provided in the system of Union authorisations 
of GMOs […]The grant of that possibility to Member States is likely to improve 
the process for authorisations of GMOs and, at the same time, is also likely to 
ensure freedom of choice of consumers, farmers and operators whilst providing 
greater clarity to affected stakeholders concerning the cultivation of GMOs in 
the Union. This Directive should therefore facilitate the smooth functioning of 
the internal market.’ (Directive (EU) 2015/412, Consideration 7)
By separating safety and non-safety arguments and giving MS the opportunity 
to ‘opt out’, the EC aimed to improve the decision-making process on market 
authorisations on a EU level. In the first voting on a market authorisation 
of cultivation, a majority of the MS used this Directive to ban cultivation on 




their territory,[42] but the outcome of the last voting in the appeal committee 
on several GM crop authorisation requests for cultivation in March 2017 again 
resulted in ‘no opinion’ (European Commission 2017b). In Chapter 6 of this 
thesis, Poort and I provide a normative analysis of this regulatory strategy 
that was intended to improve the decision-making process on GM crops. We 
conclude that the Directive could work in theory but identify several user and 
design factors that limit the potential success.
In conclusion, there is a regulatory framework that aims to facilitate both 
the safety of GM crops and that leaves room for individual decision-making 
(by MS, regions, producers and consumers) based on broader arguments. By 
adopting the directives and regulations that are into force, MS representatives 
have agreed that safety for humans and the environment is the main criterion 
to authorise GM crops for market release. Additionally, traceability and labeling 
requirements have to be met as well as putting into place effective measures to 
facilitate co-existence on a MS level. And finally, MS can opt out of cultivation 
on their territory based on non-safety arguments. 
However, when the EC presents a draft proposal based on a positive safety 
assessment by EFSA, MS have reasons not to comply with the expected 
outcome of the voting under the comitology procedures. The standard outcome 
is ‘no opinion’ because no qualified majority can be reached due to abstentions 
from voting and negative votes. Official reasons mentioned for the negative 
vote or abstention have been amongst others: no agreed national position, 
negative public opinion, political reasons, risk of harm to the national agri-
food industry, uncertainties in risk assessment, safety concerns for the 
environment, the precautionary principle and the lack of comprehensive 
data on long-term potential impact of GMOs (European Commission 2017b). 
Several of these arguments that relate to safety are supposed to be covered by 
the existing safety regulations discusses in this Section. In addition, MS with a 
negative public opinion or other concerns, have the opportunity to opt out on 
a national level. Instead, they choose to abstain from voting or cast a negative 
vote. Additionally, the EC who is mandated to force a decision or take it herself, 
is not doing so. The lack of decision-making can be illustrated by the market 
42 It should be noted that MS who used the Directive to opt out from cultivation, did so for varying reasons. 
Dobbs (2017) points out that some MS used the directive to provide time to evaluate the situation and 
consider whether to facilitate GM crops. 19 Other Member States and regions had a range of reasons 
for availing the clause, including a ‘green image’, distrust of GM technology, public opinion, environmental 
concerns and concerns over the challenge to prevent the presence of GMOs in non-GM crops (admixture). 
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authorisation timeline of GM maize MON810, the only GM crop authorised for 
cultivation in Europe. This GM maize was approved for cultivation in 1998 
and the applicant filed for a renewal 10 years later in 2007. EFSA issued a 
positive opinion on the renewal in 2009. It took until 2017 for the renewal 
to be brought up for voting. The result of the first and second voting in the 
appeal committee was ‘no opinion’. As of 2020, no decision has been taken on 
the renewal of the authorisation for cultivation of GM maize MON810. Until a 
decision has been made, the original authorisation remains valid. Three other 
GM maize cultivation applications are pending for a decision since 2018. As for 
now, this means decision-making about market applications for cultivation is 
completely stalled. For an overview of timelines for GM crop authorisations see 
Smart et al. (2015).
At a first glance, an apparent disagreement about the safety of GM crops 
seems to be the cause of the problem. Food and environmental safety are 
the cornerstones of the regulatory framework for GMOs, which has been 
implemented by using regulatory science. To understand the dynamics of this 
type of science a theoretical framework is needed to describe a very specific 
characteristic of debates within this field: the recurring unrest or alarm that 
is being raised by scientific studies challenging the safety of GM crops. This 
unrest is used, amongst others, as a reason for MS to ban GM crops on a 
national level. Based on a series of case studies, Brom and I have introduced 
the concept of ‘alarming studies’ to describe these dynamics.
5. ALARMING STUDIES: A CASE OF CONFLICT ON SCIENCE?
The concept of ‘alarming studies’ was introduced in a report I wrote at the 
COGEM (2013). Based upon that report Brom and I introduced this concept 
in the academic literature in 2015 (Mampuys & Brom 2015a,b). The core idea 
of ‘alarming studies‘ is that studies claiming significant risks of genetic 
modification to human health or the environment provoke a recurring pattern 
of discussions, arguments and governance responses. This section provides 
an introduction to the concept of alarming studies. The identified patterns in 
argumentation and governance responses are analysed in depth in Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5 of this thesis.
We defined alarming studies as ‘scientific or other studies claiming that a 
technological innovation (e.g. a GM crop) poses a threat to human health or 
the environment which has not been acknowledged by the existing governance 
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system’ (Mampuys & Brom 2015b). There have been several examples[43] of such 
studies about the risks of GM crops since 1999 and the resulting discussions 
about these studies have shown a similar pattern in societal, scientific and 
political debate. One of the most prominent examples of such a study will be 
discussed here to illustrate the resilience of the conflict over GM crops. 
5.1 THE SÉRALINI STUDY
A study from 2012 (hereafter: the Séralini study) concluded that GM maize 
NK603[44] caused cancer when fed to rats (Séralini et al. 2012). In this study, 
rats (male and female) had been fed with GM maize over a period of 2 years. 
The results were published in a peer reviewed scientific journal, accompanied 
by a press conference, and the publication of a book and documentary titled 
‘Tous Cobayes?’ to inform the general public (translated ‘all of us guinea pigs 
now?’). The publication and media package that was released generated a 
significant amount of uproar, particularly the explicit graphic material of rats 
with enormous tumors.[45] 
The study results alarmed the authorities responsible for food safety, because 
the maize that was used in the study (NK603) had been authorised for market 
release (food and feed)[46] in the European Union (EU) since 2004. Feeding 
trials with rodents had been part of the application to draw conclusions on 
food safety, and these had not given any reasons for concern. In addition, all 
MS had been involved in the risk assessment of maize NK603 and had sent 
their comments to the EFSA, who advises the European Commission (EC) about 
43 The cases studied in Mampuys & Brom (2015a,b) were Séralini et al. (2012) who concluded rats fed 
GM maize developed cancer, Ewen & Pusztai (1999) who investigated adverse effects of GM potatoes 
on rats, Rosi-Marshall et al. (2007) who studied ecosystem effects of transgenic crop byproducts, Huber 
(2011) who wrote a letter to US Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack ed. to warn about a new pathogenic 
organism arising from GM crops and Carman et al. (2013) who found adverse effects of GM soy and 
maize on pigs.
44 GM maize NK603 is a herbicide tolerant maize variety with a decreased binding affinity for herbicides 
containing the active ingredient Glyphosate. This trait facilitates easy herbicide application for farmers. Both 
GM maize and Glyphosate are a topic of discussion for being associated with adverse effects on health 
i.e. carcinogenicity.
45 An overview of media attention can be found on a website dedicated to the work of Séralini (URL: www.
gmoseralini.org/category/media-coverage (Accessed 25 July 2020). It should be noted that this website, 
founded by author of other anti-GM websites such as GMWatch, GMOEvidence and GMOJudyCarman, 
displays a one-sided overview of the media attention. Chapter 4 of this thesis provides an overview and 
discourse analysis of both sides of the debate about this study.




market authorisations of GM crops. In an overall opinion sent to the EC, EFSA 
concluded that the consumption of this GM maize posed no significant risks 
to human health (EFSA 2004). After consulting a draft proposal for market 
authorisation with the MS, the EC approved the maize for market release. 
Logically, the main question after the Séralini publication was: had something 
been overlooked in the risk assessment or approval process? 
The Séralini study was reassessed for its scientific rigor by academic peers, 
competent authorities of MS and by the EFSA (a summary of these reviews can 
be found in Chapter 5). Scientists discussed the methodology and results of the 
study as well as the quality of the peer review process of the publication. Are 
the conclusions justified based on the methodology used? Had the peer review 
process been adequate? Regulatory authorities on MS and EU level investigated 
whether the conclusions were reason to revoke the market authorisation. In 
addition to these discussions, questions arose on public fora such as news 
websites and social media about broader issues relating to GM crops and 
about the motivations and independence of the author’s team (for a discourse 
analysis of the discussion on this and other alarming studies, see Chapter 4). 
Séralini and his team had a reputation of being critical towards GMOs and their 
work was partially funded by the organic industry (who don’t allow GMOs). 
But suspicions also rose about those reassessing the results such as EFSA. Are 
they sufficiently objective to reassess their own previous judgement and would 
they change it if needed?
After investigation, the EFSA (2012c) stated that the conclusions of the Séralini 
study were insufficiently substantiated by the used methodology.[47] Therefore, 
the results were deemed inconclusive, providing no valid/justified reasons to 
revoke the EU market authorisation of GM maize NK603. In 2013, Elsevier 
announced the retraction of the article from the journal because of insufficient 
scientific quality (Elsevier 2013). However, Séralini and his team were sticking 
to the validity of the results. In 2013 they published a detailed response to the 
various criticisms in a newly established scientific journal (Séralini 2013). Soon 
after, the original paper was republished with some minor adjustments in that 
same journal (Séralini et al. 2014). And this was not the end of the debate 
47 Issues were identified with amongst others a) the strain of rat used (Sprague-Dawley rats are prone 
to developing tumours during their life, independent of their food and particularly if their food intake is not 
restricted), b) inadequate controls, c) deviations from standard international protocols for carcinogenicity 
and toxicity feeding studies, d) the number of experimental animals used in each group, e) inadequate 
statement of objectives of the experiments, f) absence of data on the composition and intake of food during 
the experiment and questionable statistical analysis.
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because actors on both sides continued to either defend or dismiss the results 
of the study. The main question was whether the conclusions of the Séralini 
study were unjustified because there was no significant risk (false positive), or 
whether there was a risk but the study methodology was of insufficient quality 
to substantiate this (false negative).
5.2 EU FUNDED RESEARCH TO SOLVE THE DISCUSSION
Despite the conclusions on the Séralini study from the EFSA and several 
national and international authorities, the debate was sufficient reason for 
the EC to fund two research projects. The first project looked into the value 
and methodology of rat feeding studies to assess the food safety of GM crops 
in general and the second one aimed to reassess the specific food safety risk 
of GM maize MON603. In addition, a third project was funded by the French 
Government. Coincidentally, the first project merged with another ongoing 
discussion: about the need for mandatory rat feeding studies in GMO risk 
assessment.
In December 2013, Regulation (EU) No 503/2013 in accordance with Regulation 
(EC) No 1829/2003 entered into force in the EU, providing detailed instructions 
for the risk assessment of GM food/feed, including a mandatory 90-day-
feeding study in rodents in whole GM food/feed. These instructions were not 
new, but had previously been part of the guidance documents from EFSA, 
that had no legal or mandatory status. In an editorial of the EFSA Journal, 
Waigman et al. (2013) describe the background, novelties and challenges of 
this regulation. It had been the outcome of a discussion[48] between the MS 
and the EC with the aim of incorporating the existing EFSA guidance for the 
risk assessment of food and feed from GM plants into a binding legal text. In 
addition to the original text, some elements were newly introduced by the MS 
and the EC based on their particular views and the desire to improve consumer 
confidence in GM plants. The regulation was endorsed by a qualified majority 
of EU MS after a lengthy discussion. According to Devos et al. (2016), the 
mandatory nature of the 90-day feeding studies was not unanimously accepted 
on scientific grounds by various stakeholders. There were doubts about the 
48 The last paragraph of the editorial in EFSA Journal (2013) reflects the difficulties in this process, stating: 
‘The safety and usefulness of GM plants is subject to an intense political and societal debate, characterised 
by widely diverging positions in different EU Member States. Considering that the IR was endorsed by 
the Member States with a qualified majority, one expectation is that risk assessment requirements outlined 
in the IR will satisfy the majority of Member States, and allow them to support safety conclusions on GM 
Plants, where appropriate. The future will show whether the IR will fulfil this expectation and contribute to a 
convergence of Member States views on the safety of GMOs.’
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value of conducting these kind of studies without a hypothesis. Article 12 of 
the regulation obligated the EC to review the requirement on the basis of new 
information before 30 June 2016. 
The legal requirement for review of regulation (EU) No 503/2013 and the 
controversial debate about scientific findings on the safety of GM plants were 
mentioned as the main drivers for the first project: ‘The GMO Risk Assessment 
and Communication of Evidence (GRACE)’ project (GRACE 2015). The project 
was running from 2012 to 2015 and had two main work streams: (1) Improving 
the interpretation of 90-day rat feeding trials, clarifying their added value 
and exploring alternative approaches to reduce or substitute animal trials, (2) 
developing and testing an approach to systematically gather and evaluate the 
quality of existing evidence on the impact of GM plants. 
In addition, the project developed and implemented opportunities for 
stakeholder participation in all key stages of the project. The reason for this, 
can be found in the executive summary of the report nothing that, despite 
an extensive amount of existing research on GM crops, ‘the outcomes are not 
consistently and comprehensively considered by stakeholders, general public, or 
in decision making’. Therefore, ‘A primary objective of GRACE was to improve the 
accessibility and presentation of the scientific information in order to provide better 
understanding for all stakeholders and the general public’. With this approach, the 
project seemed to aim for a robust research design and results that would 
be supported and acknowledged by as many stakeholders as possible. The 
project summary recognises that this aim was not fully achieved but states 
that ‘stakeholder requests that could not be realised (e.g. due to limited resources) as 
well as controversial discussions were documented to allow future consideration of 
the issues raised’ (GRACE 2015, executive summary).
After 3 years, four 90-day feeding trials with rats and an extended feeding 
study lasting 1 year were done with GM maize MON810.[49] The final results: 
‘…showed that non-targeted[50] feeding studies may lead to randomly generated 
significant differences between animals fed with the GM test material and animals fed 
49 GM maize MON810 is an insect resistant ‘Bt’ maize, expressing an insecticidal protein to fight 
Lepidopteran pests. Bt is an abbreviation of Bacillus thuringiensis, which is a soil bacterium that naturally 
expresses this protein. This is the only GM maize that is authorised for cultivation in the EU, therefore this 
maize was already chosen for the GRACE project.
50 Non-targeted means without a hypothesis or an indication that a specific GM crop could have a harmful 
effect. This means that a broad as possible set of parameters is measured and compared to a situation 
where rats are fed non-GM maize to find differences in effect. In these situations it can be challenging to 
draw conclusions on the significance of identified differences.
41
1
with a control diet. Such results are not informative for risk assessment. GRACE data 
support the scientific reasoning that only in case a trigger is available from the initial 
molecular, compositional, phenotypic and/or agronomic analyses, feeding trials with 
whole food/feed may provide an added scientific value for the risk assessment of GM 
crops’ (GRACE 2015, executive summary).
Despite the involvement of stakeholders in all stages of the project, these 
results were met with critique. NGOs opposing GMOs such as GMWatch 
(2015 and 2018a) and Testbiotech (2015) pointed out that the GRACE project 
had been done with a different type of maize (MON810 instead of NK603), a 
different type of rat[51] and it did not look beyond 90 days or a year (i.e. Séralini 
studied rats for two years, which is their approximate life span). Although 
these differences may seem an omission, we should not forget that the Séralini 
study was dismissed because of critique on its scientific method. Therefore, an 
agreement had to be found to conduct feeding studies in a scientifically ‘more 
robust’ way. All GRACE data had been made available for public/stakeholder 
scrutiny and debate and the research methodology had been adjusted moreover 
during the project. But apparently, this turned out to be insufficient to agree 
on the methodology and outcome. Fortunately, another project had also been 
funded with a slightly different objective that to an extent addressed the 
critique on the GRACE project. 
The second project, ‘GM plants Two Year Safety Testing’ (G-TWYST), ran 
between 2014 and 2018 and was also funded by the EU. The study included 
rat feeding studies with GM maize NK603 of 90 days, one year and two years. 
It used the same GM maize as the Séralini team and took into account the 
same time span of two years. The overall conclusion of the G-TWYST project 
was that no adverse effects were observed related to the feeding of the NK603 
maize for up to two years (Steinberg et al. 2019). 
Finally, the third project titled GMO90+ was initiated by the French government, 
investigating potential harmful effects of Maize MON810 and NK603 when fed 
to rats for six months. The final results were published in 2018 and it was 
concluded no adverse health effect could be attributed to the consumption of 
GM maize diets in comparison with the consumption of their non-GM controls 
(Coumoul et al. 2018).
51 Experimental animals such as rats are bred by specialised companies. To improve the robustness of the 
research, the rats should be genetically alike as much as possible. There are several types of laboratory rats 
with different characteristics on for example growth or food conversion or susceptibility to disease. One of 
the critiques on the Séralini study was that they used so called ‘Spraque-Dawley rats’ that are known for their 
susceptibility to develop tumours during their lifespan. The GRACE project used ‘Wistar rats’ and vice versa 
got criticised for using different rats that would not be susceptible enough to reflect the risk of tumour growth.
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5.3 REGULATIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED AND THE DEBATE CONTINUES
In each of the projects it was concluded there were no significant health risks 
reported of feeding GM maize to rats. In addition, the GRACE project concluded 
that the need for mandatory feeding studies in the absence of a hypothesis 
was not supported from a scientific perspective because of a lack of added 
value. These conclusions were not shared by all stakeholders. On the one 
hand, the European biotech sector and several scientists supported the results 
and emphasised the need to ‘reinstate science in GMO safety assessment 
and eliminate unnecessary animal testing’ (EuropaBio 2018a,b).[52] On the 
other hand, several NGOs and other scientists criticised the results and the 
stakeholder process. In a 2015 report, German NGO Testbiotech criticised the 
results of the feeding study and highlights conflicts of interest at GRACE and 
flaws in the process of publication (see Testbiotech 2015a, Testbiotech 2015b). 
Woegerbauer et al. (2016) criticised the GRACE project to have ‘refrained from 
communicating uncertainties which intrinsically affect any scientific analysis 
and subsequently the quality and validity of the drawn conclusions’. 
It seems there are insurmountable differences in views on how ‘good’ science 
on this type of research should be done and by whom. Almost 8 years later, 
Séralini stands by his results and criticises the outcomes of the EU funded 
studies in a detailed and extensive article (Séralini 2020). GMWatch published 
a news item titled ‘EU-funded rat feeding studies do not refute the Séralini 
study’ (GMWatch 2018). The Séralini study is still cited, either directly or 
indirectly, as proof GM maize poses significant risks to human health in 
NGO reports, Communications of the European Parliament (EP) and academic 
literature (e.g. Testbiotech 2019, European Parliament 2020, Then & Bauer-
Panskus 2017, Robinson et al. 2016). Furthermore, the EC has not changed the 
mandatory regulatory requirements regarding feeding studies. Referring to 
scientific uncertainty, in January 2017 the EC presented its conclusion to the 
MS that the requirement for conducting 90-day feeding studies would not be 
revised (European Commission 2017a). 
These outcomes raise several questions, especially since the Séralini study was 
so controversial and a significant amount of funding, time and number of 
52 In addition, the Alliance for Science headlined ‘European studies disprove Séralini’s GMO maize tumor 
claims’ (Alliance for Science 2018) and the French plant biotechnology association stated that the EU 
studies ‘refute the main conclusions drawn from the Séralini studies’ (AFBV 2018).
43
1
partners had been involved in the research projects.[53] Why is it so difficult to 
reach an agreement on a scientific study and its results? What kind of research 
is needed to provide robust answers to questions of safety? Why did the EC 
never formally respond to the results? Why did she not acknowledge or confirm 
the conclusions of the projects that she commissioned herself? [54] Or the other 
way around, why did she neither dismiss the results nor revoke any market 
authorisations of GM crops? Even more confusing, in the summer of 2019, the 
market authorisation for GM maize NK603 (the maize investigated by Séralini, 
G-Twyst and GMO90+ with different conclusions on food safety) was renewed 
in the EU concluding that the risks for humans and the environment from the 
consumption of this maize are negligible. 
The discussion about this alarming study illustrates a disagreement about the 
safety of GM crops and about the way GM crops are assessed in the regulatory 
procedures. This conflict seems to be present on more than one level: among 
scientists (e.g. Séralini’s team versus other scientists supporting the outcomes 
of the EU projects), Member States (e.g. not all of them were in support of 
the mandatory feeding trials) and stakeholders (e.g. the biotech sector versus 
environmental NGOs). In addition, at least a level of ambiguity can be seen 
on a European level with regard to the ECs response to the research results of 
commissioned projects, safety testing requirements and market authorisations. 
Finally, the discussion also seems to suggest that only safety is taken into 
account in the regulation of GM crops, which may be insufficient in the view 
of stakeholders with fundamental objections or broader arguments against 
GMOs. In Chapter 4 a discourse analysis illustrates that broader arguments 
are systematically brought to the fore in discussions about alarming studies. 
The complexity and entanglement of both fact- and value-related factors 
in the discussion about GM crops combined with its resilience to problem 
solving, have been identified in academic literature as characteristics of a 
‘wicked problem’ (e.g. Jelsma 2001, Durant & Legge 2006b, Bovenkerk 2010, 
Inghelbrecht et al. 2014, Newman & Head 2017, Daviter 2011 and Weimer 2014). 
In the next section, the concept of wicked problems is used to characterise the 
53 The GRACE project took 3 years, cost almost 8 million euros and involved 19 partners from 13 countries, 
over 1700 experimental rats were used. The G-TWYST took 4 years, cost almost 4 million euros and 
involved 8 partners from 6 EU countries.
54 Careful reading of Regulation (EU) No 503/2013 shows that the EC was not formally obligated to 
respond, see Article 12. Ad 1 which states that ‘the Commission shall in particular monitor the outcome of 




problem of GM crop authorisations and make a first inventory of proposed 
ways of dealing with these kind of issues.
 
6. BIOTECHNOLOGY AS A WICKED PROBLEM
The term ‘wicked problem’ was introduced by Rittel & Webber (1973) to 
describe complex problems that lack a shared problem definition and are 
extremely difficult to solve.[55] Instead, attempts to solve wicked problems 
only seem to introduce new ones. The notion of ‘wicked problem’ suggests 
that these problems are unresolvable and can only be managed or coped with 
(Roberts 2000). In this section I will look at the GM crop conflict through the 
lens of wicked problems to draw conclusions on whether the concept fits the 
characteristics of this type of problem. This will provide direction for problem 
mitigation strategies that will be discussed later in this thesis.
6.1 RITTEL & WEBBERS’ WICKED PROBLEMS
The term ‘wicked problem’ was introduced by Rittel & Webber (1973) who 
used it to describe solution-resistant policy problems in urban planning. 
In their view, wicked problems differ significantly from purely engineering 
problems in urban planning because they involve societal factors as well and 
are therefore, more complex, unpredictable or even impossible to solve.[56] In 
other words, they were implying that societal factors are the cause of problems 
in technical areas. 
Over time, the notion of ‘wicked problems’ became used in other contexts 
and has been used for a wide variety of issues that seem generally resistant to 
solutions. Termeer & Dewulf (2019) summarise the application of the wicked 
problem concept in fields in environmental and urban science and beyond 
such as economics, computer science and health, relating to problems such as 
climate change, poverty, digital warfare and biodiversity loss. The problems in 
these fields emerge at the policy making level and have been widely studied in 
this field with the main question of what can be achieved in terms of dealing 
with their wickedness (see Roberts 2000, Durant & Legge 2006b, Head 2008, 
Levin et al. 2012). 
55 Rittel & Webber (1973, p.160): wicked problems ‘are never solved’.
56 Rittel & Webber (1973, p.160) societal problems ‘… are inherently different from the problems that 
scientists and perhaps some classes of engineers deal with’ ‘As distinguished from problems in the natural 
sciences, which are definable and separable and may have solutions that are findable … Social problems 
are never solved’ (p.160).
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Rittel & Webber (1973) originally listed ten characteristics of wicked problems, 
some of which are partially overlapping and have been condensed by other 
authors to smaller sets (e.g. Roberts 2000, Xiang 2013, Head & Alford 2015). 
In my view the most relevant characteristics of wicked problems adapted 
to the issue of GMO’s are the following: a) the lack of a definitive problem 
formulation, b) the absence of a stopping rule, c) solutions are not true or false, 
but good or bad, d) attempts to solutions result in unintended and unexpected 
effects and e) there is no opportunity to learn by trial and error (e.g. the issue 
owner has no right to be wrong). I will use these criteria to characterise the 
GM crop problem. 
Firstly, there is the lack of a definitive problem formulation. The GM crop issue 
has a wide variety of different problem formulations: for some the issue is 
related to environmental or food safety risks (see Section 5), for others it is about 
the integrity of life (i.e. organic agriculture),[57] the power of big agricultural 
companies in the food chain, the facilitation of industrial agriculture and 
pesticide use in general, the indirect effects of GM crops on biodiversity or 
sustainable land use (i.e. GMWatch 2018, see also Friends of the Earth).[58] The 
diversity of these issues reflect disagreement about both facts and values and 
results in different problem definitions. The issue of problem framing has been 
addressed amongst others by Helliwell et al. (2017) who concluded that NGOs 
opposition to agricultural biotechnologies is rooted in skepticism about the 
framing of problems and solutions, or Parfit & Dunn (2013) who argue hunger 
needs a political solution and not a technological one like the development of 
GM rice with high levels of vitamins. The diversity of problem formulations is 
not limited to facts versus values, but also present within the field of scientific 
research and particularly in the field of environmental risk and food safety 
assessments (illustrated by the case of alarming studies, e.g. Section 5, see also 
Tepfer et al. 2012). 
Secondly, there is no stopping rule, no definition or criteria of when ‘the GMO 
conflict’ has been solved since it is entangled in a system of related problems. 
This can be illustrated by the attempts of the EC to solve the problem by 
57 The integrity of plants and production systems is one of the key principles of organic agriculture. From 
this perspective they forbid the use of genetic modification since it is at conflict with these principles, see the 
norms of The International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) for organic production 
and processing.
58 NGO Friends of the Earth state on their website that ‘Genetically modified (GM) crops bring unnecessary 
risks to both humans and nature. They increase the corporate control of the food chain, whilst placing heavy 
economic burdens upon conventional and organic food sectors aiming to avoid contamination.’
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introducing additional regulations. After the initial protests and debate 
caused by the first import of GM crops in Europe in the late 90s, additional 
regulations and data requirements were put into place in 2003 to strengthen 
the risk analysis, and mandatory labeling was put into place to facilitate 
freedom of choice for consumers. This however, did not result in a smooth 
decision-making process, instead additional problems came to the fore: (new) 
uncertainties in the risk analysis emerged, and not all food was labeled in a 
satisfactory way to all stakeholders (such as products from animals that have 
eaten GM food, or substances produced by GM microorganisms).[59] 
The third criterion states that proposed ‘solutions’ for the biotechnology 
conflict are not true or false, but depending on one’s perspective of the problem: 
good or bad. There is a wide variety of positions towards biotechnology, but 
the two most voiced in the debate are often characterised as two extremes: 
pro- and anti-GMO; either advocates or critics.[60] On the one hand there is 
a Pro-GM group that embraces biotechnology and sees it as an important or 
even essential technology towards food safety and security and new medical 
and industrial innovations (e.g. EuropaBio, ISAAA, see also Tosun & Schaub 
2017). For this group, the European regulatory framework for GM crops is 
seen as overly cautious, extremely burdensome in terms of time and costs and 
disadvantageous for the plant breeding sector (see also Amman 2014, Tagliabue 
2017, Tagliabue & Amman 2018). On the opposing side, there is a group that can 
be characterised as anti-GMO, GM skeptics or critics. They see biotechnology 
as a risky technology with negative moral and socio-economic consequences. 
They also consider the current regulatory system to be insufficient but from 
their perspective, risks are overlooked or even dismissed and ignored (e.g. 
Testbiotech, ENSSER, GeneWatch UK,[61] see also Tosun & Schaub 2017). From 
59 The reasoning behind what should be labeled is linked with detection limits. Animals that have eaten GM 
feed do not become modified themselves and cannot be distinguished from animals that have eaten non-
GM feed. The same holds true for substances such as vitamins that are produced by GM micro-organisms 
and are purified (not containing any traces of the micro-organisms). From a fundamental moral perspective 
of objecting GMOs, this is insufficient as GMOs have been involved in the food production process.
60 Examples can be found on the websites of biotechnology industry websites who name ‘anti-GM-activists 
or -campaigners’ whereas NGO websites against GMOs speak of ‘Pro-GMO lobbyists, -countries and 
- campaigners.
61 In 2019 the results of a joint research project titled RAGES (Risk Assessment of Genetically Engineered 
Organisms in the EU and Switzerland) were published that criticised the EU risk assessment of GM crops. The 
project was a collaboration of Testbiotech, the European Network of Scientists for Social and Environmental 




their perspective, the last thing that should be done is deregulate certain GMOs 
(e.g. Euractiv 2019). 
Scientific advisory bodies and the EC acknowledge that the current regulatory 
framework is not ideal. The EC aims for a ‘clear’, ‘proportionate’ and ‘robust 
response’ to developments in plant biotechnology (Euractiv 2019a). But part of 
the problem is that the ‘right’ interpretation of such a system is differs among 
stakeholders in the field. Given the conflicting positions, regulatory decisions 
that move towards the desired direction for one group and are considered 
‘good’, are usually considered ‘bad’ by the other. This is also illustrated by 
the regulatory decisions on GM crop authorisations. Interestingly, decisions 
in the GMO conflict are often not directly labeled as good or bad. Instead, the 
discussions are framed as true (good) or false (bad), hiding under the veil of 
‘objective’ science. This can be illustrated by the following quotes. On the one 
hand, Beat Späth, Director of Agricultural biotechnology at industry advocacy 
group EuropaBio says in an opinion piece for European news website Euractiv 
(2019c): “The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Commission, 
and more than 280 scientific and technical institutions around the world have all 
declared that genetically modified crops (GMOs) are at least as safe as conventionally 
bred crops”, referring to amongst reports from the European Commission 
(European Commission 2010b), the European Academies Science Advisory 
Council (EASAC 2013) and the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, 
and Medicine (NASEM 2016). On the other hand, a book titled ‘GMO myths 
and Truths’ from Robinson et al. (2014) of NGO GMWatch quotes: “Genetically 
modified (GM) crops are promoted on the basis of a range of far-reaching claims 
from the GM crop industry and its supporters. … However, a large and growing body 
of scientific and other authoritative evidence shows that these claims are not true” 
referring to amongst other a statement from 300 Members of the European 
Network of Scientists for Social and Environmental Responsibility that cite a 
list of publications that ‘prove’ the risks of GMOs (ENSSER 2013).
The fourth criterion of wicked problems is that proposed solutions may trigger 
unexpected or unintended consequences. Three examples will be provided to 
illustrate such consequences for GM crops; the unexpected long trajectory of 
the development of GM golden rice and the unintended consequences of the 
regulatory framework on (access to) innovation. A GM rice variety (‘Golden 
Rice, because of its purpose and color) was developed in the 1990s to express a 
high level of carotenoids that could help developing countries reduce vitamin 
A deficiency. From a scientific perspective, Golden Rice was expected to be a 
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key example of how GM crops could be beneficial for consumers in relation 
to urgent global nutritional problems (in contrast to most existing GM crops 
which provided advantages for farmers’ production processes). Nearly 30 
years later, the rice is still not on the market and the debate has spiraled into 
arguments about dignity and human rights, equity and empowerment, local 
culture, health and well-being, biodiversity and holism and systems thinking 
(See Kettenberg 2018, Scott 2011 and Parfitt & Dunn 2013 for an overview of the 
Golden Rice debate). 
The second example illustrates unintended effects of the regulatory system for 
innovation. The regulations for GM crops were supposed to guarantee the safety 
of these products on the market, but they also have at least three unintended 
effects on innovation. First, because of the time and costs associated with 
going through the regulatory procedures, only multinational companies are 
able to afford bringing products to the market (for estimations of the costs see 
studies by amongst others Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2007, McDougall 2011 and 
EuropaBio 2015). Because of the costs, non-staple crops are less attractive to 
invest in from a business perspective, as they will not return the investment 
after commercialisation. This means smaller breeding companies do not bring 
GM crops to market and only a limited amount of different GM crops (bulk 
or staple such as maize, soy, cotton, and rapeseed) are developed. A third 
unintended effect can be found in trade politics. African countries seem to 
adapt strongly to the European GM regulatory framework and are reluctant to 
authorise GM crops for cultivation, because this may limit their export market 
to Europe (for examples of effects of EU regulation in developing countries, see 
World Politics Review (2019) and Zaidi et al. (2019).
In the ‘GMO conflict’ there are different problem definitions, solutions are not 
true or false, but good or bad. This makes problem mitigation more difficult 
as proposed strategies by one side are deemed unreliable and bad by the other 
side and vice versa. In addition, attempts to solutions have unintended and 
unexpected effects that change or shift the problem or that introduce new 
problems. Finally, this also means a trial and error approach for steps forward 
(the fifth criterion e) is difficult and any change or proposal will likely be 
resisted by one side or the other. All together, these elements characterise the 
authorisation of GM crops as an example of a wicked problem. 
Over time, other typologies have been introduced to characterise, explain 
and solve wicked problems, such as intractable disagreements (Schön & Rein 
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1994), intractable controversy (Hisschemöller & Hoppe 1995) or ill-structured 
problems (Simon 1973, 1977). The typology proposed by Hisschemöller & 
Hoppe is also widely used in academic literature and will be briefly discussed 
here. They proposed a perspective on structuring of policy problems based 
on a distinction between uncertainties and consensus about facts and values 
in policy problems. Their idea was a response to the tendency in policy 
development to focus on ‘conventional scientific rigor combined with political 
neutrality’ (Hisschemöller & Hoppe 1995). They concluded that this focus is 
unfit to address the underlying value dimensions of most policy issues. It only 
works for so called structured problems with a consensus on both the facts 
and the values at stake. To improve dealing with more complex issues, they 
identify three other types of problems: moderately structured problems with a 
consensus on scientific facts but not on values or vice versa and unstructured 
problems that involve uncertainty and disagreement on both facts and values. 
They proposed different strategies to deal with each of them. According to the 
problem types identified by Hisschemöller & Hoppe (1995), the GMO issue can 
be classified as an unstructured problem, given the variety of different moral 
views (see Section 3) and lack of consensus on facts and values (as illustrated 
by the scientific disagreement on alarming studies in Section 5). 
When I started analysing the GM crop issue with a focus on ‘alarming 
studies’ (2015), I predominantly used the concept of unstructured problems. 
Perhaps inspired by my background in the beta sciences, this typology of 
‘unstructuredness’ suggests a solution can be found in ‘structuring’ efforts. 
Later, further research made me realise that while structuring is essential for 
decision-making, it is likely still unable to truly ‘solve’ the issue. This is why 
I use the typology of ‘wicked problems’ as an overarching identifier of the 
GM crop conflict in Chapters 1-3 and 9 of this thesis. Framing GM crops as 
a wicked problem suggests that a) it is biotechnology itself that is a problem 
and b) the issue is impossible to solve because of its wickedness. This means 
the bar of problem ‘solving’ may have to be lowered to ‘resolving’ the issue 
through dealing, coping or managing the problem in an acceptable way.
6.2 WICKED PROBLEMS: CONSEQUENCES FOR PROBLEM MITIGATION
In the last part of this section, I will reflect on what it means for biotechnology 
to be a wicked problem from the perspective of ‘resolving’ the issue. I will 
discuss criticism on the concept of wickedness and reflect on proposed 
strategies to mitigate these types of problems. Based on these insights, the 
‘wickedness’ of the biotechnology problem can be reassessed. 
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Despite being considered unsolvable, strategies have been proposed in academic 
literature deal with wicked problems. Daviter (2017) reviews these strategies 
and categorises them as coping, taming and solving strategies. In addition, 
the concept of wicked problems has been challenged in academic literature, 
creating room for alternative strategies to mitigate them. I will highlight 
some of the main and relevant criticisms in view of this thesis. For a more 
general overview of literature challenging the concept of wicked problems, see 
Turnbull & Hoppe 2018, Head 2019 and Termeer et al. 2019. 
Termeer et al. (2019) note that the expansive use of the term wicked problem 
for a wide variety of complex problem in different fields ranging from 
environmental and urban problems to societal and economic issues has 
undermined its conceptual definition. They also argue that there is no strict 
separation between wicked and tame[62] problems and point out that recent 
work on wicked problems tends to conceptualise it as a matter of degree. This 
was also recognised by Turnbull & Hoppe (2018) but they approach the wicked/
tame distinction from another perspective. They argue that the wicked/tame 
distinction was originally used to differentiate between societal problems and 
problems of natural sciences, claiming that the latter are usually the wicked 
ones. Referring to literature from the field of Science and Technology Studies 
(STS), they substantiate that the natural sciences too are far from a mechanistic 
reasoning about tame problems. This has also been recognised by amongst 
others Newman & Head (2017). 
With relevance to this thesis, the case description of alarming studies in Section 
5 illustrates how a ‘simple’ scientific question about the safety of a GM crop 
can become extremely complicated to answer. Turnbull & Hoppe (2018) also 
criticise the problem/solution approach. By categorising a problem as wicked, 
it is ‘assumed to have an autonomous, unique nature of its own’ (p.6), which 
can be discovered and then solved. This was also recognised and pointed out by 
Head (2019) and Daviter (2017) who conclude that the concept of wickedness 
has quarantined complex or wicked problems as a special category that requires 
special and equally complex and iterative approaches. This isolates the problem 
from the surrounding context which may very well be part of the problem. With 
62 Rittel & Webber (1973): ‘the problems that scientists and engineers have usually focussed upon are 
mostly “tame” or “benign” ones. As an example, consider a problem of mathematics, such as solving an 
equation; or the taks of an organic chemist in analysing the structure of some unknown compound; or that of 
the chessplayer attempting to accomplish checkmate in five moves. For each the mission is clear. It is clear, 
in turn, whether or not the problems have been solved, (p.160).
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relevance to this thesis, this can be illustrated by the problematic decision-
making process on GM crop authorisations. The European context of decision-
making (i.e. comitology) cannot be seen separately from the ’wickedness’ of 
biotechnology. This is also recognised by Nie (2003) who makes a distinction 
between wicked by nature and wicked by design. He argues that whilst the nature 
and context of some issues can have a certain potential for political conflict, 
they can also be made (more) wicked by design, when used by political actors 
as a surrogate to debate larger and more controversial problems. Applied to 
the issue of biotechnology, the broad (moral, technological and economic) 
implications of this technology certainly have a potential for political conflict. 
In addition, the importance of context can be illustrated amongst others by 
the fact that GM crop authorisations seem to be more problematic in Europe 
than elsewhere in the world and that medical applications[63] of biotechnology 
generally have a higher acceptance, i.e. are less wicked, than food applications. 
The relevance of decision-making actors is illustrated by the increasing 
difficulties in the decision-making process on GM crops as more actors with 
more and diverse expertise, interests and perspectives become involved (e.g. 
applicant, EFSA, EC, comitology committees).
Despite this multidimensionality, Termeer et al. (2019) also note that ‘new and 
existing governance approaches have often been unproblematically proposed 
as ways to solve wicked problems, while only imperfect solutions, partial 
solutions or small wins are achievable in practice’(p.1). This has also been 
pointed out by Hisschemöller & Hoppe (1995) who noted that policy makers 
have a tendency, deliberately or not, to move away from or deny these type (i.e. 
unstructured) of problems through limiting the number of participants in a 
policy arena (economic reasoning / maximising effects for the largest number) 
or by limiting the range of acceptable arguments (technocratic reasoning). 
Both ‘strategies’ can be seen in the conflict over GM crops where decisions on 
authorisation are taken based on a qualified majority and where non-safety 
arguments are dismissed or put in the private sphere. In addition, Termeer et 
al. (2019) conclude that when the concept of wicked problems is used in policy 
practice, they ‘tend to provoke either paralysis or an overestimation of what 
policy can do about wicked problems’ (p.1). 
63 With the exception of human germline editing. For a long time this option was only theoretical and 
gained minimal public attention. The unexpected announcement of the first GM babies in China in 2015. 
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From the field of policy sciences, Head (2019) highlights problem framing, 
policy design, policy capacity[64] and the context of policy implementation as 
useful approaches for ‘mainstreaming’ wicked problems. He then focusses 
on constructivist approaches emphasizing the role of dialogue and conflict 
resolutions. Endorsing problem framing and the importance of dialogue are 
also in line with the learning strategy proposed by Hisschemöller & Hoppe 
(1995). This strategy is inspired by the concept of frame reflection from 
Schön & Rein (1994). Frame reflection can be characterised by a focus on the 
controversy and stimulating participants to reflect on their own and other 
participants’ perspectives. Hisschemöller & Hoppe (1995) propose a learning 
strategy through problem structuring[65] and ‘a reasoned problem choice’.[66] 
Problem structuring involves ‘the confrontation, evaluation and integration 
of as much contradictory information as possible’ (p.63). Recognising that 
problem structuring is no guarantee for a broad consensus on the nature of 
the problem, it can at least form the foundation of a reasoned choice of a 
problem frame, according to Hisschemöller & Hoppe (p.64). As such, this 
strategy does not focus on consensus or problem solving, but on problem 
finding. In 2001 Hisschemöller & Hoppe elaborated on the value of problem 
structuring, describing it as a mutual learning process amongst societal 
actors that interact and deliberate on their perceptions of the problem and its 
potential solutions. With regard to structuring, Hoppe (2010) later criticised 
the tendency to structure problems by dividing them into separate issues and 
questioned whether it is possible to solve messy issues by converting them into 
‘technically controllable’ issues (p.88). Similarly, Head (2019) emphasises that 
wicked problems cannot be tamed or fixed by dissolving them into multiple 
elements which are then reassembled. At the same time, it has been argued 
that wicked and even unstructured problems cannot be solved, and therefore 
strategies should focus on coping or managing wicked problems through 
partial, temporarily and imperfect solutions. In my view there is a fine line 
between partial/temporarily solutions and the conversion and reassembly of 
sub-issues. In other words, complex problems may require complex solutions 
or mitigation strategies, but these too need a starting point. 
64 According to Head (2010), policy capacity links the success of policy making not solely to the 
effectiveness of the policy instruments, but also to the perceived legitimacy of the leaders in the decision-
making process.
65 Hoppe continued to develop this structuring approach further, See Hoppe (2018).
66 In the view of Hisschemöller & Hoppe, policy problems are social and political constructs and as such 
problem structure is a matter of choice: ‘Choosing’ the wrong kind of problem and its accompanying solving 
strategy, may result in the emergence of intractable controversies or unstructured problems.’ (p.53).
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At a first glance, GM crop authorisations are temporarily (they have a validity 
of 10 years), a partial decision on the authorisation does however not seem 
feasible. There is either an authorisation or there is not. One could argue that 
the latest Directive (EU) 2015/412 that allows MS to restrict the cultivation of a 
GM crop resembles a partial decision, but as we have seen, this did not improve 
the yes / no decision on the EU authorisation of GM crops. What the concept 
of wicked problems means in the specific context of GM crop authorisations 
needs to be further investigated, both in terms of problem finding and in terms 
of possible ways of dealing with this issue. In this thesis I aim to contribute to 
this process.
7. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Biotechnology is a broad and multidimensional technology that can have a 
significant impact on humans and the environment. In addition, the societal 
acceptance of different applications of this technology, such as GM crops or GM 
medicines, varies widely. People’s attitudes towards biotechnology are formed 
by moral views, perceptions on risks and benefits and broader arguments 
relating to scientific, socio-economic and ethical grounds. The abundance 
of different perspectives about the safety and desirability of biotechnology 
applications leads to a plurality of conflicting views. Therefore, a regulatory 
framework has been developed in Europe that aims to ensure safe applications, 
freedom of choice for consumers and producers and a functioning market.
For the authorisation of commercial applications of GM crops however, the 
regulatory framework is not working adequately. Decisions about market 
authorisations are structurally delayed or even stalling. There is a deadlock in 
the European decision-making on the authorisation of GM crops. Based on its 
characteristics, the issue can be classified as a wicked problem. There is conflict 
on both facts and values, the problem lacks a shared problem definition and 
different views exist on solutions to the problem. If we accept that GM crops are 
indeed a wicked problem, it follows that the situation is extremely difficult or 
even impossible to resolve. Nevertheless, in regulatory practice, attempts have 
been made to improve the decision-making process on GM crop authorisations. 
The question is whether these attempts can and will work to improve the 
situation. The concept of wicked problems has also been criticised in academic 
literature, resulting in alternatives for problem mitigation by acknowledging 
different degrees of wickedness, and a multidimensional aspect that focusses 
on the context and the actors involved. Proposed mitigating strategies have 
been amongst others focused on learning and problem framing, dialogue and 
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conflict resolution and on policy design and capacity. Both theory and practice 
on problem (re)solving of wicked problems need to be critically analysed.
In Chapter 2, I will discuss and analyse technocratic, participatory and regulatory 
strategies to evaluate their contributions to mitigating the GM crop conflict. 
I conclude that these strategies alone or together have been insufficient to 
improve the decision-making on GM crop authorisations. This substantiates 
that GM crop authorisations are indeed a wicked and thus unsolvable issue. 
Unless something has been overlooked. It is from this perspective that I will 
formulate my research question. Finally, I will further investigate this question 
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Different perspectives on the safety and desirability of GM crops result in a 
plurality of conflicting views about facts and values (see Chapter 1). Therefore, 
a regulatory framework has been developed that aims to facilitate individual, 
national and European decision-making regarding safety as well as broader 
(value) related aspects of GM crops (see Table 1). 
In brief, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the Member States’ 
authorities perform an environmental and food safety assessment for GM crop 
applications for importation and/or cultivation. If the GM crop is considered 
safe, the European Commission (EC) consults the Member States (MS) through 
a voting procedure with a draft proposal for authorisation. In addition to and 
separately from the European marketing authorisation based on safety, MS can 
restrict or ban cultivation of GM crops on their territory based on non-safety 
arguments. Finally, food products made of, or containing GMOs need to be 
labelled to facilitate consumers’ freedom of choice. For GM crop cultivation, 
appropriate measures need to be taken by the MS to facilitate coexistence with 
conventional and organic agriculture. 
59
Table 1: The main GM crop regulations in Europe and their objectives
Directive 2001/18/EC
Protect human health and the environment when carrying 
out the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment 
(i.e. the cultivation of GM crops) or placing on the market 
of GMOs.
Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003
Provide the basis for ensuring a high level of protection 
of human life and health, animal health and welfare, 
environment and consumer interests in relation to genetically 
modified food and feed, whilst ensuring the effective 
functioning of the internal market.
Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003
Facilitate accurate labelling, monitoring the effects on 
the environment and, where appropriate, on health, and 
the implementation of the appropriate risk management 
measures including, if necessary, withdrawal of products.
Directive (EU) 2015/412
Restrict or prohibit the cultivation of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) in their territory based on non-
safety arguments such as environmental or agricultural 
policy objectives, town and country planning, land use, 
socioeconomic impacts, coexistence or public policy 
(optional).
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Yet, decision-making about market authorisations of GM crops is stalling 
because the comitology’s voting procedure in either the standing or the 
appeal committee never results in a qualified majority in favor or against the 
proposal: the standard outcome is ‘no opinion’ (Smart 2015). The EC, who 
is mandated to take a decision in these cases, is reluctant to do so. With 
significant delays, authorisations for importation are eventually approved by 
the EC. Authorisations for the cultivation of GM crops have been completely 
halted. A majority of 19 out of 27 MS has opted out of cultivation of GM crops 
on their territory based on Directive (EU) 2015/412. In addition, several MS 
uphold national bans based on the safeguard clause or emergency measures 
provided in Directive 2001/18/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. Over the 
years, GM crops have become an example of failed European decision-making 
on a supranational level. In Chapter 1 I have argued that the ‘wickedness’ 
of biotechnology is a likely cause of this problem (see Chapter 1, Section 6). 
In brief, wicked problems are complex problems that seem resistant to being 
solved, they lack a shared problem definition and involve disagreement on 
both facts and values. Attempts to solve these problems seem fruitless and 
moreover introduce new problems. 
This chapter explores the cause(s) of the resilience of the problem of EU-
decision-making on GM crop authorisations by looking at mitigation 
strategies that have been proposed and applied. In Section 2, I will discuss 
and evaluate three mitigation approaches that are common in the field of 
regulatory science: improve the science, involve the general public or change 
the regulations. These result in what I categorise as technocratic, participatory 
and regulatory strategies. Although the word ‘strategies’ suggest that these are 
deliberately and purposefully thought out approaches designed by a specific 
actor, this is not necessarily the case. I have chosen these because political 
actors, policy-makers and stakeholders in the field of GMOs repeatedly refer to 
these three factors as problematic and in need of improvement. I will evaluate 
the contributions of technocratic, participatory and regulatory strategies and 
argue that these have been insufficient to improve decision-making on the 
authorisation of GM crops in Europe. Based on this analysis, I will formulate 
my research question and provide an outline for this thesis.
2. MITIGATING THE BIOTECHNOLOGY CONFLICT
Regulatory decision-making on GMOs and GM crops is strongly based on a 
scientific safety assessment (Berg 2008, see also Chapter 1, Section 4). The 
role of science in policy and regulatory processes has been discussed in 
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academic literature since the 60s (e.g. Brooks 1964) and later became known 
as ‘regulatory’ or ‘mandated’ science (e.g. Rushefsky 1986 and Salter 1988).[1] 
For an overview of the development of regulatory science and scientific 
advice see Jasanoff (1990) and Irwin et al. (1997). Jasanoff (1990) explained 
the growth of scientific advising as a response to ‘a growing public concern 
about technological hazards, accompanied by diminished trust in government 
and ambivalence about the place of experts in political decision-making’ 
(p.2). The role of science was to ‘rationalise politics’, to add ‘competence 
and critical intelligence into a regulatory system that otherwise seems all too 
vulnerable to the demands of politics’ (p.1). While recognising the need for 
scientific knowledge in policymaking, Jasanoff also criticised the dominant 
role of this factor in the overall process. She promotes the need for ‘socially 
robust knowledge’ in policy-making. This type of knowledge not only includes 
scientific expertise, but also acknowledges normative and societal perspectives, 
in other words it provides a contextualisation of scientific knowledge (for more 
on socially robust knowledge see amongst others Nowotny 2003, Jasanoff 2003 
and Jasanoff & Hurlbut 2018). The importance of (public) participation and 
deliberation in support of regulatory science for policymaking has gained 
significant attention over the years, illustrated in both literature (see a review 
by Spruijt 2014) and empirical research (Spruijt 2015). 
Taking into account the origin and developments in regulatory science, it is not 
surprising that proposed mitigation strategies for technology related problems 
tend to focus on three areas: science, (public) participation and regulation. 
This is also the case for GM crops, where increasing scientific knowledge, 
public participation and adding or changing regulations have been promoted 
to mitigate the conflict. Technocratic and participatory strategies are not 
explicitly proposed to result directly in decision-making on the authorisation 
of GM crops but as will be illustrated in this chapter, stakeholders suggest 
that removing barriers such as scientific uncertainty or societal dissensus 
could make this process a lot easier. When this seemed to be difficult or even 
impossible, regulatory strategies have been applied that aim for a legal solution 
by acknowledging scientific uncertainty and societal disagreement. 
The focus areas of the mitigation strategies I will discuss are also reflected in 
the reasons given by Member State representatives for abstaining from voting 
1 Salter (1988) argued that mandated science differs from normal science in two ways: 1) because of the 
ways in which society uses the two bodies of knowledge and 2) because scientific and policy considerations 
are closely integrated at every step in its production and use.
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on market authorisations of GM crops. The summary report of the appeal 
committee of 27 March 2017 lists the following reasons provided by MS: ‘no 
agreed national position’, ‘negative public opinion’, ‘political reasons’, ‘risk of 
harm to the national agri-food industry’, ‘uncertainties in risk assessment’, 
‘safety concerns for the environment’, ‘the precautionary principle’ and ‘the 
lack of comprehensive data on long-term potential impact of GMOs’ (European 
Commission 2017b).[2] 
At a first glance, several of these arguments are supposed to be covered by the 
existing regulations on environmental and food safety (i.e. Directive 2001/18/
EC and Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003), suggesting something is amiss with the 
safety assessment. Some of the arguments go (or seem to go) beyond the scope 
of the regulations that the voting applies to. However, these are addressed in 
other regulations that facilitate individual and national diversity in choosing 
to use GM crops or not (i.e Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 and Directive (EU) 
2015/412. The fact that these arguments are brought to the fore as reasons 
to abstain from voting suggest that these elements too are insufficiently 
addressed in the current regulatory framework. 
The summary of arguments illustrates both the interrelatedness and the 
relevance of the focus areas (science, society, regulations) of the strategies 
that I will discuss. The regulatory framework cannot be separated from science 
itself, as it includes technical definitions and techniques, as well as a detailed 
list of requirements for the risk assessment (see Chapter 1, Section 4). As such, 
the regulatory framework relies to an important extent on (regulatory) science 
and scientific expertise. In addition, the regulatory framework presumes 
deliberation and participation, as it explicitly leaves part of the decision-
making to MS representatives in the comitology procedures. This reflects 
that the authorisation of GM crops is not just a technocratic or administrative 
handling, but it suggests room for a broader deliberation that, in practice, goes 
beyond the safety objective of the regulations: MS refer to aspects that assume 
deliberation and participation of stakeholders and the general public (e.g. 
‘political reasons’, ‘no agreed national position’, ‘negative public opinion’). 
And finally, scientific research and the resulting commercial applications such 
as GM crops are subject to EU regulations, but this framework leaves room for 
national differences between MS, some of which have been legally challenged 
2 The same or similar reasons can be found in all summaries of the joint meetings of the standing committee 
on plants, animals, food and feed and the regulatory committee under directive 2001/18/EC as well as 
the summaries of the appeal committees.
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or debated in formal complaints and opinions.[3] As such, strategies that look 
into improving the scientific and societal / stakeholder input or that look into 
improving the regulatory framework, could in theory contribute to the overall 
decision-making about GM crop authorisations. And given interrelatedness of 
scientific, societal and regulatory factors, it seems that they all need to function 
‘adequately’ for the system to work. This seems logical from the perspective 
of a functionalist input-output model of the decision-making process. After 
all, if the scientific facts on the safety of GM crops are unambiguous, if society 
would agree on its use, and if the regulatory framework is fit for purpose, 
applying it to decide about market authorisations should in theory be a piece 
of cake. This ideal logic thinking about technology implementation processes 
has however also been criticised as naïve by amongst others Sarewitz (2004), 
Wellstead (2018), Cairney (2017) and Biesbroek et al. (2015). In this section I 
will discuss strategies that have been applied or suggested to mitigate the GM 
crop conflict and I will evaluate them based on their outcome and insights 
from academic literature. 
2.1 TECHNOCRATIC STRATEGIES
The main objective of the market authorisation regulations of GM crops is 
safety for humans and the environment. Against this background a technocratic 
approach makes sense. If no agreement can be reached about the outcome 
of the safety assessment and the proposed decision to authorise a GM crop 
on the market, the problem could lie with the quality or robustness of this 
assessment. We see this technocratic tendency reflected in the reasons MS 
give for abstaining from voting: ‘uncertainties in risk assessment’, ‘safety 
concerns for the environment’ and ‘the lack of comprehensive data on long-
term potential impact of GMOs’. At a first glance, these are issues that science 
could solve or contribute to solving.
3 See for example Joined Cases C-58/10 to C-68/10 of Monsanto and others against emergency 
measures in France, Case 111/19 of the Confédération paysanne and Others versus Premier ministre and 
Ministre de l’Agriculture, de l’Agroalimentaire et de la Forêt about the legal status of mutagenesis in the 
GMO regulations, Case C-165/08 Commission v Poland which dealt with the prohibition on placing on 
the market of GMOs based on ethical and religious grounds, joined cases C-439/05 and C-454/o5 land 
oberosterreich and Austria v Commission about a temporary ban on the use of GMOs in Upper Austria to 
protect organic agriculture, Case 1582/2014/PHP regarding a joint complaint of several applicants at the 
European Ombudsman about the delayed European authorisation procedures and WTO dispute DS291 
about the EU violating international trade by blocking the import of GM crops. A last example of regulatory 
differences are unilateral decisions of EU member states (Sweden, Finland, the UK, Germany, Belgium) 
to exempt certain GMOs from their legislation, based on their own interpretation of the EU definition of a 
GMO, for an overview see Eriksson (2018). 
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Technocratic strategies seem to be based on the assumption that better science 
and more knowledge (and reducing uncertainties) will lead to better decision-
making. Technocratic strategies are usually directed at framing the problem 
as a more technical one, so it can be ‘solved’ from a scientific or technical 
perspective (Newman & Head 2017). Pielke (2007) connects this view to a linear 
model of science, where ‘agreement on scientific knowledge is a prerequisite 
for a political consensus to be reached and policy action to occur’ (p.13). 
Technocratic responses seem to have become an automated status-quo type of 
reaction to problems about technology applications. In the next sections I will 
discuss and evaluate three examples that cover commonly used technocratic 
strategies in the conflict about GM crops: 1) reducing uncertainties with 
scientific knowledge or additional research, 2) including scientific expertise 
in policy- and regulatory decision-making and 3) proposing technological 
solutions. Together these strategies give a general overview of the value and 
limitations of technocratic approaches.
2.1.1 REDUCING UNCERTAINTIES 
Scientific research and data requirements to reduce the uncertainty of risks 
related to GM crops have been one of the most common strategies to mitigate 
the conflict about GMOs. First, I describe the use of this type of technocratic 
strategy in the policy and regulatory arena and then I will place this strategy 
in a theoretical perspective. 
To start with, the environmental and food safety assessment of GM crops 
in itself can be viewed as a technocratic strategy. This process only takes 
into account safety aspects and does not look at potential benefits or socio-
economic impacts. It aims to reduce the risk that unsafe products enter the 
market. A risk assessment for GMOs is standard practice worldwide, so this 
is a common strategy. However, Europe is mentioned as having one of the 
strictest regulations with extensive data requirements and a strong focus on 
precaution (e.g. Amman 2014, Smart et al. 2015, Punt & Wesseler 2015 and 
Tagliabue 2017). 
The EU risk assessment should take into account all direct and indirect, 
immediate or delayed effects, including potential cumulative long-term 
effects associated with the interaction of the GM crop with other GMOs and 
the environment. Annex II of Directive 2001/18/EC describes in detail the steps 
involved in the environmental risk assessment, while Annex III describes the 
data requirements. Additional requirements for a food a food safety assessment 
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can be found in Regulation (EU) 503/2013. The decision to maintain the 
mandatory rodent feeding trials in this regulation (see Chapter 1, Section 5), is 
exemplary of the European focus on reducing uncertainties, as illustrated by 
the Commissions’ response to the GRACE project:
‘The Commission explained that developments in scientific knowledge on 
replacement, reduction and refinement of animal use in scientific procedures 
are not at present sufficient to allow for the replacement of the 90 day feeding 
study in rodents by alternatives. In addition, there remain difficulties to define, 
with the necessary precision, the level of uncertainties in the application safety 
data package which would trigger the requirement for the 90-day studies on a 
case by case basis.’ (European Commission 2017a, A.03)
The question that the Commission does not answer here is when scientific 
knowledge would be sufficient and what level of uncertainties should trigger 
feeding trials. The (continuing of the) mandatory animal feeding trials has been 
criticised because it would undermine the credibility of the risk assessment 
process. Amongst others, Devos (2019) and EuropaBio (2018a,b) have argued 
that when the Commission emphasises uncertainty without a strategy to solve 
it, this undermines its own existing regulatory system. 
Uncertainties are acknowledged to be an inherent part of science and risk 
assessment on the one hand, but at the same time authorities try to manage, 
reduce and control them. EFSA even issued guidance documents on uncertainty 
analysis (EFSA 2018) and communicating uncertainties (EFSA 2019a). 
These and other guidance documents by EFSA provide further detail to the 
regulations and their requirements. Over the years, EFSA published more than 
20 scientific guidance documents[4] to aid applicants who want to apply for a 
market authorisation of GM crops to compose an application dossier. These 
documents describe in detail what kind of information and data is needed 
for the environmental and food safety assessment in general, and separate 
guidance documents have been published for specific components of the 
risk assessment (e.g. molecular characterisation, agronomic and phenotypic 
characterisation, allergenicity, monitoring) or for specific GM organisms (e.g. 
animals, mammals, birds, fish, insects). Besides ex-ante data requirements, 
ex-post measures are applied to reduce uncertainties regarding risks. European 
regulations require annual monitoring reports and an authorisation renewal 
4 For an overview, see http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/applications/gmo/regulationsandguidance 
(Accessed 15 July 2020)
65
2
after ten years. In comparison: most countries outside of the EU de-regulate 
a GM crop once it has been assessed for safety and approved for commercial 
release. The characteristics of the EU risk assessment procedures illustrate 
the way Europe strives to reduce uncertainties. However, the increasing data 
requirements and precautionary measures have not led to expeditious decision-
making on market authorisations of GM crops.
The strategy of more research and data production to reduce uncertainty can 
also be recognised in the standard policy response to ‘alarming studies’. A 
common response from the government and from the scientific field is to 
review the study’s methodology to judge its scientific rigor. However, despite 
the scientific review of the EFSA and several MS authorities, the discussion 
lingered on and the EC eventually commissioned additional research to get 
more certainty on the outcomes of these feeding trials. As illustrated in 
Chapter 1, this did not resolve the discussion on alarming studies and the food 
safety of GM crops. Reducing uncertainty through more research and other 
characteristic governance responses to alarming studies are analysed in more 
detail in Chapter 5. 
When we put the strategy of reducing uncertainties by adding scientific 
research in perspective of academic literature, the findings about their limited 
success are not surprising. Collingridge & Reeve (1986) concluded that scientific 
knowledge is insufficient to advance rational policymaking. They noted that 
when science is used in policy, it will always encounter either an under-critical 
or an over-critical environment, reducing its impact on policy decisions. 
Another prominent author on the role of science in policy, Daniel Sarewitz, 
emphasized that scientific uncertainty is not ‘a lack of scientific understanding’ 
but a ‘lack of coherence among competing scientific understandings’ (Sarewitz 
2004, p.386). He introduced the term ‘excess of objectivity’ to explain that 
given the enormous and diverse body of scientific information, facts, theories 
and hypotheses, basically any value-based position in a controversy can be 
substantiated by ‘a supporting set of scientifically legitimated facts’ (p.389). 
The abundance of scientific facts and its use in policy and politics to defend 
different and often conflicting views has also been pointed out by other scholars 
such as Levidow (2001), Pielke (2004) and Daviter (2017). They emphasize that 
science cannot provide definite answers to policy questions.
Academic literature also addresses the role of communication and transparency 
about uncertainties. On the one hand scholars emphasize the importance of 
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communicating transparencies because this could increase understanding 
on how experts use evidence in their assessments and the limits thereof 
(Frewer 2002 and Miles & Frewer 2011). In addition, transparency and open 
communication could help build trust among the broader public in science 
and science-based decisions. EFSA acknowledged this, but also points out the 
potential downside of being transparent about uncertainties, which may result 
in crumbling trust of a science that fails to provide certainties (EFSA 2018, 
2019a).[5] 
Research has shown that transparency about uncertainties doesn’t necessarily 
end debates and may even fuel them. Since complex issues will inevitably 
involve certain levels of uncertainty, both the knowns and unknowns can be 
contested as an argument in the discussion. Böschen et al. (2010) discussed 
the political use of science based non-knowledge. In line with Sarewitz, he 
argues that scientific nonknowledge (i.e. uncertainty) is not a certain state of 
knowledge waiting to be uncovered but that it results from science itself and 
that it is ‘multifaceted’ and ‘socially constructed and negotiated’. He argues 
that societal conflicts over the correct assessment of what is known and not 
known cannot be resolved by the routine appeal to available evidence. He 
illustrates this with an example of the risks of GM plants: 
‘When we find, for instance, no empirical facts indicating harmful effects of a 
certain GM plant, this situation can be evaluated in two contradictory, yet equally 
reasonable ways: either in terms of reliable knowledge that there actually are 
no harmful consequences or in terms of possible unknown unknowns—which 
means that we are unsuspecting where, when, and how hitherto unforeseen 
effects might occur’ (Böschen et al. 2010, p.786). 
This is a striking example reflecting the tension between knowns and 
unknowns playing a recurring role in the discussion over the safety of GM 
crops. Uncertainties are often highlighted to emphasize potential risks and 
consequently, promote a precautionary approach for the use of GM crops. See 
for example Myhr & Traavik (2002) who conclude that ‘the obvious lack of data 
and insufficient information calls for application of the precautionary principle 
(PP) in the decision-making process’ (p.74). In other words, uncertainties are 
used as an argument to halt the development of GMOs. NGOs opposing GMOs 
5 EFSA (2019) ‘will trust increase because EFSA is open and transparent about its conclusions or would 
such openness have the opposite effect, because people may wrongly infer that the conclusions of EFSA 
are not reliable?’ (p.51).
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(e.g. GM Watch, Testbiotech, Greenpeace) often emphasize that absence of 
proof is not proof of absence, suggesting that the absence of GMO risks can 
be proven through more scientific data. Searching for closure of the debate 
through more (reliable) data can however turn into an infinite process, since 
scientific uncertainty is endemic and the absence of risks cannot be proven. 
Therefore, more scientific data is unlikely to resolve the debate or remove all 
uncertainties.
2.1.2 USE OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE
It has been common practice to use scientific expertise in European policy and 
decision-making processes. In an analysis on how scientific experts frame 
the discourse in European policy discussions, Gornitzka & Sverdrup (2008) 
have shown a strong increase in Commission-organised expert groups since 
the nineties.[6] First, I will show how this approach is used in the GM crop 
regulatory arena and then I will place this technocratic strategy in a theoretical 
perspective. 
The use of expert knowledge is called upon in situations where complex 
interdisciplinary research with a high level of uncertainty or data needs to be 
assessed. With regard to biotechnology and GM crops, scientific experts have 
come to play a significant role in the decision-making process, both on a MS 
level and the European Level. 
The GMO expert panel at EFSA performs a risk assessment of GM crop 
authorisation applications. An equal process takes place on a MS level, where 
national food and environmental safety authorities and scientific advisory 
bodies assess the applications. They send their comments and conclusions to the 
EFSA who uses this input to finalise her opinion for the European Commission. 
Given the complexity, interdisciplinarity and size of GM crop authorisation 
scientific dossiers, there is inevitable room for variation of judgement. For 
example, the submitted comments by MS and the EFSA response illustrate 
differences on the data and the level of detail and certainty needed in the 
GMO risk assessment (see for example Annex G of EFSA 2019b). The EFSA 
(i.e. the GMO expert panel) also reviews new information on the risks of GM 
crops (brought to the fore by MS in safeguard clauses or by alarming studies 
in scientific literature). Several MS have invoked the safeguard clause based 
on new scientific information, which has been concluded to be unfounded by 
6 Gornitzka & Sverdrup (2008) counted 1237 expert groups in 2007, compared to 851 expert groups in 
2000 and 602 in 1990. 
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the EFSA expert panel. Here too, we see differences in expert judgement. In 
addition, these differences are used in the political arena e.g. resolutions from 
the EP on proposed market authorisations have moreover pointed out that 
critical MS comments had been insufficiently addressed by EFSA in her final 
opinion (see also Chapter 1, Section 4.3).
Besides reviewing applications and new scientific information, experts are 
involved in shaping policies and regulations. Various expert groups have 
been discussing the potential risks and legal status of new plant breeding 
techniques (NPBTs).[7] The first working group on NPBTs was active between 
2007 and 2011 and could not reach a consensus on the status of all techniques. 
In addition, the EFSA GMO panel adopted scientific opinions on the safety of 
three techniques (EFSA 2012d, EFSA 2012e). Over the years, more techniques 
were added to the list of NPBTs. Separate expert working groups on synthetic 
biology were set up upon request from the EC, focusing on the definition, risk 
assessment methodologies and safety aspects (SCENIHR, SCCS, SCHER (2014), 
SCENIHR, SCCS, SCHER (2015a), SCENIHR, SCCS, SCHER (2015b). However, 
neither of these processes and reports resulted in decision-making by the 
EC about the legal status of NPBTs (GMO or not?). Instead, more scientific 
expertise was brought to the table by consulting a newly established advisory 
body: the Group of Chief Scientific advisors (SAM) that provides independent 
advice to the EC to inform policy making and recommendations to improve 
the interaction between policy-making and scientific advice. They issued a 
scoping paper and explanatory note on NPBTs in 2016 and 2017 and a statement 
on the regulation of gene editing in 2018 (Scientific Advice Mechanism 2016, 
2017, 2018). As of 2020, decisions about the status of NPBTs haven’t been 
taken, and the Council of the EU has requested another study from the EC 
to clarify the legal situation of NPBTs after a ruling of the European Court 
of Justice on a technique called mutagenesis (Council of the European Union 
2019).[8] According to news site Euractiv (2019b) the Council argued that the 
ruling brought legal clarity, but ‘it also raised practical questions which have 
consequences for the national competent authorities, the Union’s industry, 
7 These techniques are more specific and precise compared to older techniques and cannot always be 
easily distinguished from plants created with conventional breeding techniques or natural variants. This 
triggered the question whether the resulting plants should be seen as GMOs from a legal and scientific 
perspective and whether they should require a risk assessment. 
8 Case No 111/18 ruled that organisms obtained by mutagenesis are GMOs and are, in principle, subject 
to the obligations laid down by the GMO Directive. For a legal analysis of this case, see Bergmans et al. 
(2020) or Vives-Vallés & Collonnier (2020).
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in particular in the plant breeding sector, research and beyond’ that need 
answering. Part of the proposed study includes stakeholder views on the use of 
NBPTs in the MS (see also participatory strategies in Section 2.2). The results 
of this study are expected in 2021. These examples illustrate that scientific 
expertise does not necessarily result in unambiguous and irrefutable advice.
The limitations of scientific expertise in regulatory decision-making have been 
extensively discussed in academic literature. The use of scientific expertise in 
the governance of GM-crops fits within the concept of so called ‘post normal 
science’ a term that was introduced by Funtowicz & Ravetz (1993) to describe 
the use of science in situations with high (scientific) uncertainty, disputed 
values, high stakes and the urgent need for decision-making. Here, regular 
applied science no longer suffices. This calls for professional consultancy 
and scientific expertise that goes beyond ‘simple’ knowledge provision and 
includes uncertainty management and transdisciplinarity (Funtowicz & Ravetz 
1993, Konig et al. 2017). Besides an exchange of knowledge between different 
fields of scientific expertise, this approach promotes extended peer review 
which is a process that also includes lay people and policy decision-makers. 
Although heralded at first, the concept later became criticised when it ‘failed’ 
to resolve complex policy issues in particularly environmental science (Ravetz 
2006, Goemine 2011). Others argued that post-normal science tended to turn 
into politics presented as a new way of doing science since the issues that 
require expertise are often closely linked to normative questions (Wesselink & 
Hoppe 2011). 
Academic literature also pointed out that scientific expertise cannot be inserted 
directly into the policy decision-making process. Firstly, because scientists 
and policy makers have a different perspective or scope: ‘policymakers seek 
certainties and solutions while scientists offer probabilities, uncertainties and 
multiple scenario’s’ (Spruijt 2014, p.17). This so called ‘science-policy gap’ has 
been discussed by scholars such as Bradshaw & Borchers (2000), Choi (2009) 
and Wellstead et al. (2018). Secondly, scientific expertise cannot produce 
decisive evidence on risks, while policymakers keep asking for conclusive 
evidence (pointed out by amongst others Levidow et al. 2005). Van Asselt & Vos 
(2006) called this ‘the uncertainty paradox’ (p.5). 
The changing and challenging role of science and scientists as experts in 
decision-making procedures under uncertainty has been reflected on by 
amongst others Jasanoff (1990) who argued that scientific expertise is 
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insufficient to resolve complex policy questions since they are too narrow-
focussed on science and not representative of broader societal values. Pielke 
(2007) and Weiss (2003, 2006) provided respectively four and five typologies 
of the roles experts can have in policy advising, varying in different levels 
of policy advocacy and uncertainty tolerance. Based on a literature review, 
Spruijt et al. (2014) identify the following factors that will influence an expert’s 
role: type of issue (uncertainty/complexity), type of knowledge (education, 
experience, objectivity); core values (normative beliefs); organisation; societal 
context and an expert’s ability to learn and change his or her viewpoint. These 
aspects indicate that adding scientific expertise in complex situations does 
not (automatically) lead to pure and objective conclusive answers or directions 
for a solution. It inevitably also makes experts vulnerable to questions about 
authority or political accountability in situations of controversy, an issue that 
has been discussed by amongst others Bijker et al. (2009) (i.e. ‘the paradox of 
scientific authority’) and Weingart (1999). When science advice changes from 
data driven and peer reviewed ’certainties’ to expert judgements, the experts as 
persons become vulnerable for criticism. This issue also plays a role in the field 
of GM crops, where experts reviewing authorisation applications or alarming 
studies are systematically criticised and questioned on their authority and 
integrity (see Chapter 4). Reflecting on the examples and academic literature 
in this section, it seems unlikely that adding scientific expertise will resolve 
the conflict over GM crop authorisations.
2.1.3 SEARCH FOR TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS
A technocratic strategy that searches for technological solutions is commonly 
known as a ‘technological fix’. It refers to the development of new products or 
applications to mitigate part of a problem. Here we do not necessarily talk about 
scientific knowledge, but also about applications that have been developed 
based on this knowledge. Scott (2011) notes that the term ‘technological fix’ 
was originally used as a recommendation for a positive course of action. It 
was introduced by Weinberg (1969) who characterised it as the solution to a 
problem that results from reframing a social problem as a technological one. 
According to Weinberg, ‘the availability of a crisp and beautiful technological 
solution often helps focus on the problem to which the new technology is 
the solution’ (Teich 1993, cited in Scott 2011, p.209). Later however, the 
term became used as a rhetorical tool to dismiss or criticise technologies or 
technological developments (Rosner 2004). Technological fixes and their 
criticisms can both be recognised in the field of agricultural biotechnology. 
This strategy is conceptually more complicated: in the policy and regulatory 
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arena one cannot label or mention this strategy as such, because that would 
automatically organise its opposition: therefore it cannot be explicitly found 
in the policy and regulatory arena. I will therefore combine its presentation 
with a theoretical perspective based on indications of and criticisms on certain 
developments that could be viewed as a technological fix. I will use two 
examples: NPBTs as a technological solution for the opposition to GMOs based 
on the argument of ‘naturalness’ and ‘Golden rice’ as a technological solution 
for the opposition to GMOs based on the argument that GMOs only serve the 
interests of industrial western agriculture.
The insertion of foreign DNA into an organism is considered as ‘unnatural’ by 
many opponents of GMOs. This problem can, from a scientific perspective, be 
solved by making only ‘naturally’ occurring changes to the DNA (i.e. by using 
DNA from related crossable species (i.e. ‘cisgenesis’) or making only very small 
changes without adding new DNA through (i.e. gene-editing, see Chapter 1). 
These techniques have been promoted by scientists and stakeholders from 
industry as an acceptable alternative to ‘real’ GMOs. Although this may be 
the case for some, this reasoning has also been criticised as a technological 
fix, as the use of scientific reasoning to resolve a moral argument. The 
‘technological fix’ has been criticised from a philosophical perspective because 
it misunderstands the relationship between humans and nature (Scott 2011). 
GMWatch (2019a) issued an article titled ‘Natural GMOs hype debunked’ in 
response to an article from the Alliance for Science (2019) titled ‘Many plants 
are naturally GMO’. Similarly, in the debate over the legal status of cisgenic 
plants, Van Hove & Gillund (2017) point at the complex socio-ecological, 
legal and political dimensions of technological development that should be 
taken into account, instead of just a technological perspective to determine 
whether a GM plant should be regulated or not. This view reflects the call for 
a broad and inclusive regulatory framework (see Section 2.3.2). In addition, 
argumentation to view certain GMOs as ‘natural’ is not only motivated from 
the viewpoint of normative acceptance of technology, but also has legal and 
economic implications (and stakes). Some stakeholders arguing NPBTs such 
as gene editing are ‘natural’ also hope to exempt these type of GMOs from the 
strict, costly and time-consuming regulations in Europe (e.g. EuropaBio 2019).
The second example of a technological fix concerns Golden rice, a GM rice 
variety that has high levels of beta-carotene. Scott (2011) identifies a second 
type of technological fix criticism that focusses on the practical side instead of 
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a philosophical perspective. Practical criticisms focus on the ambiguous nature 
of technological fixes, their inherent defects and limitations. The lack of GM 
crops that provide a benefit for consumers has been mentioned moreover as one 
of the reasons for opposition against GM crops. The majority of commercialised 
GM crops are herbicide tolerant or insect resistant, providing solely a benefit 
for the producer. Golden rice was supposed to contribute to solving an urgent 
nutritional problem in developing countries (Kettenburg et al. 2018). It has 
been presented as a form of responsible innovation, as it may contribute to 
solving malnutrition because it uses existing and available food crops (rice) 
with changed characteristics. Here I note that ‘responsible’ innovation also 
relates to moral values and what is considered ‘responsible’ by one, can be seen 
differently by others (see for example Biddle (2017) or McNaghten (2016) on 
the ambiguous relation between GM crops and innovation). The development 
of Golden rice has been heavily criticised, one of the arguments being that 
this is a technological fix that may alleviate a symptom of the problem 
(vitamin A deficiency) but not the root cause of the problem (food production 
and distribution). The example of Golden rice can be generalised in broader 
claims about biotechnology being an essential technology in solving the worlds 
agricultural and food production problems. These claims have been criticised 
pointing out the technology is not a ‘silver bullet’ solution (e.g. Parfitt & Dunn 
2013, Hoffman 2013).
2.1.4 IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOCRATIC STRATEGIES
In this section I have discussed three examples of technocratic strategies to 
resolve issues about GM crops. I have discussed examples of these strategies 
from the field of GM crops and discussed academic insights on their potential 
contributions and challenges in resolving conflict.
Summarising, the three technocratic strategies of reducing uncertainties, 
adding scientific expertise and searching for technological solutions (i.e. 
technological fixes), seem to be a standard response to situations of conflict 
about GMOs, whether they be about alarming studies, authorisation processes 
or the regulation of new techniques. But although broadly applied, their 
success seems to be limited. The debates about alarming studies remain and 
reignite when new ones are published, scientific expertise has not resulted in 
decisions about the regulatory status of NPBTs, nor have technological solutions 
provided generally accepted answers to questions about naturalness or benefits 
of GM crops. A strong focus on adding science can even have an adverse 
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effect, leading to discussions about reproducibility, integrity and legitimacy of 
science and scientific experts (i.e. ‘the science crisis’).[9] The discussion about 
uncertainties, objectivity or naturalness also illustrate the interrelatedness of 
scientific, normative and legal factors, providing an argument of why scientific 
input alone is unlikely to resolve the conflict on GM crops.
2.2 PARTICIPATORY STRATEGIES
In the voting procedures on GM crop authorisation, MS mentioned several 
reasons to reject or abstain from voting that were related to public and 
stakeholder perspectives such as ‘no agreed national position’, ‘negative 
public opinion’ and ‘risk of harm to the national agri-food industry’. Calls for 
public participation seem to suggest that taking stakeholders into account can 
result in a collective vision on the way forward, or at least a shared or common 
ground on which decisions can be built. A variety of different wordings is used 
to reflect a role for the broader public or specific stakeholders in technology 
development and decision-making, such as public participation, involvement, 
engagement, consultation, debate or dialogue. These terminologies are 
not always consistently used and may have different meanings in different 
contexts.
Although public consultation (e.g. on EFSA opinions) and stakeholder 
participation (e.g. EU projects discussed in Chapter 1) are part of the decision-
making process on GM crops, their role and function are not always explicitly 
defined or too diverse to distinguish them as separate strategies. However, 
public participation strategies have been extensively discussed in academic 
literature, also with reference to the GMO debate. Therefore, I will turn this 
section around and start with a reflection on participatory strategies from 
academic literature and I will use examples from the GMO debate to evaluate 
them.
First of all, broadening the level of participation in regulatory decision- or 
policy-making has not always been common practice. In academic literature on 
deliberative democracy, Dryzek (2010) and Ercan (2015) describe an evolution of 
deliberative strategies that have moved from a formal setting of constitutional 
9 Saltelli & Giampietro (2017) summarise the following causes of this crisis: the generation of new data/
publications at an unprecedented rate; the compelling evidence that the majority of these findings will not 
stand the test of time; a tension between good scientific practice and the desperation to publish (or perish); 




courts towards taking into account a broader forum and also to an expansion of 
legitimate speech styles (from rational arguments to storytelling or rhetoric). 
Nowadays, it is more common to use public participation processes to form 
new policies or regulations or to gather information on what ‘society’ wants 
or what stakeholders want regarding the use of technology. As pointed out by 
Stirling (2008) ‘Worldwide policy attention is refocusing on new frameworks 
and methods for fostering engagement with stakeholders and the public in the 
governance of science and technology’ (p.263). As such, there is a connection 
between participatory and regulatory strategies, since the first category of 
strategies contributes to the legitimisation of the latter. In other words, in 
democratic societies input from participatory activities can be seen to form 
the basis of regulations and policy decisions. They contribute to characterise 
notions of ‘goods’, ‘a good life’ and ‘a good society’[10] by identifying values, 
hopes and fears that may need to be addressed in regulations. These are 
characteristics of deliberative democracy, described by Bovenkerk (2012) as 
a political model in which political decisions are legitimate when they are 
reached through free and uncoerced debate between equals in the absence of 
power structures.
Different participatory strategies can be found that all have their basis in 
different forms and aims of participation and deliberation. Stirling (2008) 
summarises several aims of these strategies mentioning ‘inclusion’ (Brown 
2002), ‘discursivity’ (Dryzek 1990), ‘deliberation’ (Leib 2005), ‘pluralism’ 
(Bohmann 1996), ‘reflexivity’ (Voß et al. 2006), and ‘participation’ (Pellizzoni 
2001). Other goals of participation can be found in other literature, such as 
learning (e.g. Schön & Rein 1997, Hisschemoller & Hoppe 1995) or deepening 
and broadening of the problem (e.g. Poort 2012, Castle & Culver (2013). For 
the purpose of this thesis I do not need to discuss all of them in detail. With 
a focus on their potential contribution to the decision-making process about 
GM crops, I will limit myself to differentiate between participatory strategies 
with a focus on either consensus or dissensus (controversy) and I will merge 
other strategies. These may focus on inclusion, reflection or learning without 
a predefined outcome.
10 Van der Burg & Brom (2009) differentiated between three categories of the good: ‘goods’, ‘a good 
life’ and ‘a good society’. They argue that the state cannot be neutral with regard to conceptions of ‘goods’ 
(e.g. diversity of the cultural and natural environment) and ‘a good society’ (e.g. valuable ways of arranging 
a society), amongst others since these are to a certain extent reflected in the law, but the state should be 




2.2.1 INCLUSION AND ENGAGEMENT
Several scholars have been cautious towards the power of scientific expertise 
in policy processes, they warn this may to be too narrow to legitimise policy 
decisions in complex situations (the need for ‘socially robus knowledge’, e.g. 
Jasanoff 1990). The need for broadening of the decision-making process in 
cases of uncertainties about knowledge is also part of the post-normal science 
concept presented by Funtowicz & Ravetz (1993). In situations of scientific 
uncertainty, they identify a need for scientific expertise (Section 2.1.2), but also 
for what they call ‘extended peer review’. The trustworthiness of authorities 
to take decisions in complicated situations can be increased by an extension 
of public participation. They emphasize the need for multidisciplinarity and 
public participation as an extended peer review. 
What these typologies of participation have in common is that they do not 
seem to have an intended outcome of the participation in terms of consensus 
or dissensus. This is also in line with the learning strategy of Hisschemöller & 
Hoppe (1995) to cope with unstructured policy problems. Their ideas have been 
inspired by the concept of frame reflection from Schön & Rein (1994) and have 
been further investigated by amongst others Jelsma (2001) and Bovenkerk 
(2012) who argue that the inclusion of different viewpoints is initially more 
important than the aim of consensus. According to Bovenkerk public debate 
should not be restricted to expert committees or depoliticised bodies, but it 
should take place on different levels and should include a broad variety of 
different types of knowledge: not only values should be a topic of discussion, 
but also scientific evidence and the status of scientific knowledge. 
Public consultation is part of the regulatory framework for GM crops and can be 
seen as a way to include the broader public into the decision-making process. 
Public opinion is mentioned moreover in Directive 2001/18/EC and Regulation 
(EC) No 1829/2003 and EFSA opinions are open for public consultation. 
However, there is a restriction on the type of comments that are taken into 
account. Only comments that are within the scope of the relevant Directive or 
Regulation (i.e. environmental and/or food safety), are ‘considered’ and taken 
into account. Although this makes sense from a legal perspective, dismissing 
arguments based on emphasising boundaries between science/non-science can 
also be seen as a way not to deal with other/broader or difficult comments. Van 
Asselt & Vos (2010) refer to the restriction of arguments as ‘boundary work’ (a 
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concept of Gieryn (1999)).[11] The limitations of the public commenting option 
in the regulatory framework on GM crops has been criticised by amongst others 
Ferretti (2007), who argued it provides a false promise of public participation. 
With the entering into force of Directive (EU) 2015/412, other, non-safety 
reasons, can be invoked by MS to restrict or ban a GM crop for cultivation. 
However, this directive does not have an explicit option for public consultation, 
nor does it encourage MS to start a participatory process on a national level 
(a more in depth analysis of the deliberative potential of this Directive can be 
found in Chapter 6). In terms of inclusion, learning and multidisciplinarity, 
the current forms of public consultation do not seem to facilitate a broad and 
inclusive debate where different viewpoints and types of knowledge are taken 
into account. 
2.2.2 CONSENSUS BUILDING 
While some conclude that the involvement of stakeholders is in itself a goal, 
other forms of deliberation aim for consensus as the desired outcome of the 
process (e.g. Habermas 1989, Elster 1998, Cohen 1997). The importance of 
societal consensus came up in the 80s and resulted in a growing popularity 
of so called ‘consensus conferences’ (see Joss & Durant 1995 and Einsiedel et 
al. 2000). In these conferences, citizen panels are facilitated in gaining a basis 
understanding of the issue at hand, followed by interactive sessions with experts 
and amongst themselves to exchange views in order to form a substantiated 
view on the issue that is then discussed with policy- and decision-makers. The 
popularity of these conferences diminished over time and has been criticised 
based on both the methodology (system) and its users (the public). One of the 
main critiques was that consensus thriving masks differences in opinion as 
these are removed from the debate during the process (see amongst others 
Kelly 2003, Horst & Irwin 2010). This criticism has a focus on the system of 
consensus conferences, but there is also criticism on the public taking part in 
these participatory activities. Misconceptions about biotechnology and GMOs 
are often pointed at as one of the reasons that prevents consensus (scientific 
actors in particular tend to argue that if only people would understand the 
science, they would accept the technology). For example, McHughen (2010) 
acknowledges that not all anti biotech sentiments are based on the ignorance 
11 Van Asselt & Vos (2010) describe Gieryn’s notion of boundary work as a strategic and purposeful act 
in which boundaries are drawn between realms, for example, between science and non-science and 
between science and politics. Boundary work involves drawing and maintaining contrast through selective 




of agriculture or DNA, but points out a series of ‘real’ misconceptions on 
the topic.[12] He concludes that with the rise in technical knowledge and 
scientific literacy of European schoolchildren, ‘eventually knowledgeable 
and critical thinking consumers will make informed choices’ (p.727). In 
addition, Inghelbrecht et al. (2014) also emphasize that ‘consumers must better 
understand the process of agriculture and food production’ in relation to the 
controversy over GM crops (p.68). 
However, I note that even amongst knowledgeable and critical thinking 
scientists, arriving at a consensus based on scientific data is already a 
problem, let alone for the general public. Chapter 1 described the involvement 
of stakeholders in scientific research to reassess the food safety of GM crops 
and to evaluate the methodologies in conducting this type of research. 
Through stakeholder involvement, the project aimed to arrive at a consensus 
on the way this type of research can be done best and ideally, also agree on 
the results of the study (Schiemann et al. 2018). But this did not work out 
as planned and disagreement on the safety of GM crops remained. For this 
reason, Christiansen et al. (2017) even argue that involving the general public 
in participatory activities about controversial science is not supported from the 
perspective of democratic legitimacy. 
Most individuals in society are not trained to understand complex scientific 
studies or judge the quality of science. People’s views on risk and safety are 
formed thought different factors and in new situations, they in general seek 
information that adds to their existing view (i.e. confirmation bias). Scientific 
knowledge is often used in a different way than intended by scientists (see 
for example Daviter (2017) on the political use of knowledge) and scientific 
consensus is not necessarily embraced by societal actors in the same way (e.g. 
Kahan 2010). The other way around, Aklin & Upperlainen (2013) argued that 
scientific dissent can undermine public support for environmental policy. 
Summarising: participatory strategies with a focus on consensus building 
about GM crops seems an unlikely goal to achieve.
2.2.3 ACKNOWLEDGING CONTROVERSIES
One of the main critiques of consensus conferences has been that differences 
of opinion are removed from the debate, denying the presence of a pluralism 
12 McHughen (2010): ‘The genomes of many crop species, when analyzed, show remnants of DNA 
originating in other species, so the concept of an inviolable ‘natural species barrier’ is demonstrably, flatly, 
unequivocally, wrong’ (p.725). 
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of conflicting views in society. Amongst others Mouffe (1999) argued that 
consensus-seeking tends to exclude interests that are not seen as ‘rational’ 
from the perspective of ideal deliberative democracy.[13] These interests are put 
into the private sphere and set aside from the debate. In response, academics 
have also been investigating and promoting the opposite of consensus seeking: 
acknowledging controversies. 
The importance of pluralism and controversy has been extensively discussed 
by Mouffe (1999), who argues that a recognition of the conflict will do greater 
justice to the conflicting nature of pluralism. Work on strategies that focus 
on the acknowledgement of controversies has been done by amongst others 
Poort (2013) and Castle & Culver (2013). The main reasoning of Poort behind 
the emphasis on controversies is that value conflicts should not be silenced 
or removed from the debate, but should be acknowledged and used to rethink 
the problems at stake. In particular for intractable disagreements (i.e. wicked 
problems), acknowledgement of the conflict may help to establish a regulatory 
framework that manages disagreements instead of trying to control them or 
hide them under a veil of consensus. Castle & Culver (2013) argue that dissensus 
can be a better way for structuring policy problems, and developed a ‘method 
of contested exchange’: a strategy that aims to disclose the knowledge and 
values needed to structure policy problems. This suggest that contested or 
controversial problems can be structured and hat this could contribute to 
problem mitigation.
To my knowledge, there are no explicit or direct examples of this type of 
strategy that have been applied in the GM crop conflict. Examples of dismissing 
controversies from the debate can be found in the regulatory framework for 
GMOs. Individual differences in opinion are acknowledged in the EU regulations 
and operationalised through a labelling requirement for food containing 
GMOs. However, similar to consensus conferences, this action places broader 
non-safety arguments in the realm of individual choice and dismisses them 
in the overall decision making process. Similarly, Directive (EU) 2015/412 
acknowledges the existence of non-safety arguments about the cultivation 
of GM crops and allows MS to ban these applications. This too however, can 
be seen as a way to dismiss instead of deepening the understanding of the 
controversy, since these bans require no further deliberation or debate.
13 A consensus from the perspective of endorsers of ideal deliberative democracy (e.g. Habermas) should 
be built on rational arguments that are based on knowledge and values that are generally accepted by all 
people in society. 
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2.2.4 IMPLICATIONS OF PARTICIPATORY STRATEGIES
Defined in terms of contribution to regulatory decision-making processes, the 
success of participatory activities around biotechnology has been limited. They 
do not (and are not always intended to) result in a broad societal consensus 
providing a direction for decision-making. Participatory strategies aimed at 
involving stakeholders and the broader public to make an inventory of their 
opinions usually display a wide variety of different and conflicting viewpoints. 
The way these results are ‘considered’ or ‘taken into account’ often remains 
unclear or input is dismissed by concluding it is ‘outside of the scope’ of the 
regulations. The inclusion of stakeholders as a goal in itself risks to be part of 
the decision-making process as a ‘check-box’ instead of actually having an 
influence on the decisions that are made (e.g. Ferretti 2007, Weimer 2010).
In cases of conflict where stakeholders are involved with a predefined goal 
such as a consensus, they have shown to be unsatisfied with the process, 
those involved in the process or the outcome of it. Stakeholders sometimes 
refuse to participate, step out during the process or they eventually distance 
themselves from the results and present their own conclusions in a separate 
process. An example is the European GRACE project (see Chapter 1, Section 5), 
which involved stakeholders throughout the entire process (Schiemann 2014). 
Nevertheless, critique on the outcome and process remained and hampered 
broad support for the final conclusions (Woegerbauer 2016, Testbiotech 2015 
and GMWatch 2019). 
The challenges and difficulties of implementing participatory strategies have 
also been recognised in academic literature. Weingart (2008) criticised the 
notion of ‘socially robust knowledge’ for being too vague to be operationalised. 
Bovenkerk & Poort (2008) concluded that participation and deliberation are 
valuable and necessary in debates about controversial technologies, but are in 
themselves insufficient to arrive at decision-making. Participatory strategies 
can be used by policy makers to identify perceived hopes and threats of a 
technology in order to design new policies or adjust existing ones, but these 
will not result in ready-to-use directions on the way forward. Christiansen 
et al. (2017) criticise the use of public participation in controversial science 
in general because (1) it assumes that the public has (partially) shared and 
substantiated reasons to accept or reject technology and (2) it assumes that 
there is clarity on other aspects of technology use, such as its efficacy and 
safety. In the case of GM crops, there is no such a shared knowledge base that 
is broadly shared in the scientific field nor in other fields. 
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Despite the availability of experience and critical academic literature on public 
participation, the call for a broad societal consensus[14] is still emphasised 
in discussions about (new) contested technologies, especially in the field of 
biotechnology. Numerous initiatives, global observatories, dialogues etc. have 
been set up over the years, but viewpoints remain diverged and the (intended) 
use of the outcome of participatory strategies in decision-making on 
regulations and authorisations is often implicit, providing difficulty to identify 
or measure the positive results of participatory strategies. Finally, in my view 
mutual understanding or acceptance of different viewpoints is relatively easy 
when nothing is at stake. In reality, processes seem to go smoothly until actual 
decisions have to be made on a single course of action (e.g. a yes/no decision 
on the authorisation of GM crops). 
2.3 REGULATORY STRATEGIES
Regulatory strategies to mitigate the conflict on GM crops may focus on 
defining clear rules and boundaries on risk assessment or through legally 
acknowledging value disagreements regarding GM crops. When discussing 
regulatory strategies in this thesis, I am not referring to the process through 
which these regulations have been formed (in which participatory strategies can 
play a role, as mentioned in Section 2.2), but to the scope and implications of 
the (proposed) regulations themselves. The regulations themselves have been 
criticised and adapted moreover throughout the years to improve the conflict 
over GM crop authorisations in Europe and MS refer to the regulatory framework 
and its underlying principles (e.g. ‘the precautionary principle’) as a reason for 
abstaining from voting in the regulatory process. The precautionary principle 
(or PP) is a legal principle that plays an important role in discussions about GM 
crops. The PP is leading to conflict because of different interpretations on how 
it should be interpreted and used in a regulatory context (e.g. Stirling 2007, 
Steele 2006, Weimer 2010 and Tosun 2013). The first two regulatory strategies 
I will discuss should be understood against the background of these different 
interpretations. Therefore, a brief introduction is given on the background of 
the PP (see Box 1). 
14 For example, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine stated after the first 
international summit on human gene editing in 2015 that ‘It would be irresponsible to proceed with any 
clinical use of germline editing unless and until (i) the relevant safety and efficacy issues have been resolved, 
based on appropriate understanding and balancing of risks, potential benefits, and alternatives, and (ii) 




Box 1. The precautionary principle
The precautionary principle originates from German and Swedish law (Löfstedt 2004) and aims to 
enable policy makers to take regulatory action before risks materialise in order to prevent unnecessary 
harm (Eckley & Selin 2004). The PP was formally adopted with the Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty on 
the European Union (TEU) and is laid out in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
EU (TFEU). Originally the PP was focused on enabling precautionary action in the environmental 
field, but it now applies to all areas of human, animal or plant health and safety (Zander 2010). The 
main document that explains the EU’s approach to the PP is the ‘Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle’ from the EC (European Commission 2000b). According to this document, the PP is ‘relevant 
only in the event of a potential risk, even if this risk cannot be fully demonstrated or quantified or its 
effects determined because of the insufficiency or inclusive nature of the scientific data’. The document 
defines that precautionary measures shall (1) be proportional to the chosen level of protection, (2) be 
non-discriminatory, (3) be consistent with comparable measures already in place, (4) be based on 
a cost–benefit analysis of action and non-action, (5) be subject to review when new scientific data 
becomes available, and (6) facilitate the production of the scientific evidence necessary for a more 
comprehensive risk assessment. 
There is a significant amount of academic literature about the PP as a legal principle that will not 
exhaustively be discussed here. For this thesis it is important to be aware that the PP has different legal 
interpretations,[1] different uses in risk assessment practices (e.g. Myhr & Traavik 2002) and different 
uses in political-decision-making on GMOs (illustrated in this section). 
The PP is explicitly mentioned in Directive 2001/18/EC as an underlying principle for the 
environmental risk assessment of deliberate release of GMOs. Because there may be risks involved, 
GM crops need to be assessed for food and environmental safety. The PP is further embedded in 
amongst others the safeguard clause or emergency measures that can be invoked to ban authorised 
GM crops exemplify another use of precaution, the mandatory monitoring reports and the limited 
validity of market authorisations of 10 years. As an underlying principle, it allows for precautionary 
measures in case of overlooked, uncertain or unexpected indications of harm of GM crops. However, 
the European approach on the PP leaves room for a narrow and a broad interpretation of its use. 
The narrow interpretation emphasises the role of science in regulatory decision-making, including the 
inherent presence of uncertainties. In this view, uncertainties are acknowledged and should be reduced 
where possible, but they are not necessarily a reason to stop technological applications or decision-
making. The broad interpretation tends to use the PP to guide risk management choices in case-by-
case decision-making when encountering scientific uncertainty (see Weimer 2010, p.633, p.637 and 
p.656) or to refer to broader non-safety risks that should be included in regulatory frameworks.
1 Zander (2010), cited by Tosun (2013) identifies at least three: Sweden interprets the PP as a fundamental principle that 
compels governments to act in a precautionary manner. The UK uses it as an enabling principle that allows governments 
to act in a precautionary manner. Finally, the US uses it as a basis for regulatory action; in other words the fact that a risk 
assessment is required, reflects the use of the PP.
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Regulatory strategies, i.e. (proposed) adjustments of the regulatory framework 
or legal decision-making, seem to be based on the assumption that ‘better’ rules 
and regulations will facilitate better-decision-making. Regulatory strategies 
can be focused on stretching and challenging of the existing regulatory 
framework, or on establishing a novel or additional regime (Faulkner & Poort 
2017). Both types of adjustments can be recognised in (proposed and actual) 
changes that have been made to the current GMO regulatory framework. 
Interestingly, these (proposed) changes seem to follow two opposite directions; 
they either focus on a more science or evidence-based regulatory framework 
or they focus on a more precautionary & broader regulatory framework that 
includes non-safety aspects. These two goals of regulatory reform have been 
discussed by amongst others Skogstad (2003) in her analysis of the first 
regulatory reform that took place during the de facto moratorium (1998-2004). 
I will describe and illustrate both strategies based on examples from the GMO 
regulatory framework and place them in a theoretical perspective. Finally, I 
will discuss a third strategy that doesn’t focus on the GMO specific regulatory 
framework, but on the decision-making rules in the comitology procedures. 
2.3.1 AN OBJECTIVE SCIENCE-BASED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Several (natural) scientists and stakeholders (mainly from industry), but also 
scientific advisory bodies have emphasised the importance of evidence or 
science-based policy (EBP) and regulations. This view assumes that policies 
and regulations can be improved if decision-makers have access to better, more 
objective, information and were more likely to absorb this information (Stoker 
& Evans 2016). The European Commission’s Scientific Advice Mechanism 
(SAM) recently said:
“there is a need to improve EU GMO legislation to be clear, evidence-based, 
implementable, proportionate and flexible enough to cope with future advances 
in science and technology in this area,” (Euractiv 2019a). 
This narrow interpretation of the PP is strongly linked to a focus on evidence-
based policy or EBP. EBP originates from the field of medicine and refers to 
decisions that are informed by rigorously established objective (scientific) 
evidence (Cairney & Oliver 2017). This idea originates from the proposition 
that ‘reliable knowledge is a powerful instrument for advising decision-
makers and for achieving political success’ (Head 2010, p.78). The concept of 
EBP has been incorporated in the existing regulatory framework for GM crops, 
reflected in the environmental risk and food safety assessment that strongly 
rely on scientific evidence. Guidance documents have been developed by EFSA 
to provide detailed instructions on the type and form of scientific evidence that 
should be included in market applications (see Section 2.1.1). Comments from 
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the Member states and the broader public on EFSA opinions that relate to non-
safety aspects are dismissed arguing that these are outside of the scope of the 
regulations i.e. not science-based.
However, the role of scientific evidence is getting under pressure with the 
introduction of new techniques that allow to make genetic changes in plants 
that are no longer detectable. For some advocates of EBP, this is a reason to 
exempt these GMOs and their products from the regulations. For example, 
Amman (2014) and Davison & Amman (2017) reject the conception that GMOs 
are fundamentally different from other crops. As such, they condemn the 
justification of a precaution for GM crops in the regulations. Along the same 
line, Tagliabue (2017) and Tagliabue & Amman (2018) deem the term ‘GMO’ 
scientifically meaningless and semantically dubious. It should therefore be 
abandoned. They recommend a product-based approach for the GMO regulatory 
framework, which according to them is more science-based because it looks at 
the end product, irrespectively of how it is made.[15] A product based regulatory 
framework has been promoted by other authors as well, see for example 
Podevin et al. (2012, 2013), and Wolt et al. (2010, 2015). In addition, Ramessar 
(2010) highlights the coexistence regulations in Europe as too precautionary, 
irrational and scientifically unjustifiable.[16] He also suggests adopting the US 
and Canadian product based systems that are based on scientific principles. 
Masip (2013) also emphasises rationalising, evidence-based and science-based 
solutions to resolve EU’s problems in agricultural policies. Advocates of EBP are 
not necessarily of the opinion that other non-scientific arguments are invalid, 
but they belong in the realm of individual or political decision-making.[17] 
The concept of science-based policies and regulations has been criticised in 
academic literature. Cairney (2016) argues that because of bounded rationality, 
15 Tagliabue & Amman (2018) promote ‘a new crop legislation based on sustainability criteria that apply to 
all varieties regardless of breeding methods used. That is, instead of focusing on whether a crop has been 
developed through genetic modification or conventional breeding methods the legislation would departure 
from the values that are central to achieving a sustainable development within plant breeding.’(p51). With 
regard to broadening to regulatory framework, they point out that ‘In democratic societies, governed as 
regulated free markets, the preferences of groups can be expressed, also in terms of consumer choices, but 
such orientations should not become rules for everybody’(p.47). 
16 ‘Not only are the thresholds for adventitious presence far stricter than for conventional crops, but the 
isolation distances implemented to achieve such thresholds are arbitrary, excessive and appear to be 
politically motivated rather than to reflect scientific reality’ (Ramessar 2010, p.135).
17 In a news item of Euractiv (2014), Ann Glover, the former chief scientific advisor of the, at the time 
outgoing, president of the EC was cited saying “the incoming commission must find better ways of separating 
evidence-gathering processes from the ‘political imperative”.
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it is impossible to take all evidence into account. Saltelli & Giampietro (2017) 
refer to the myth of rationality from Collingridge & Reeve (1986) that 1) 
policy action can be predicated on the accumulation of facts and the taming 
of uncertainty; and 2) science has the power to provide dispassionate facts to 
adjudicate controversies (see also Sarewitz 2000 and Benessia et al. 2016). 
The limits of EBP is illustrated by amongst others Head (2010) who notes 
that a) a strong evidence base is not always available, b) policymakers and 
political leaders responsible for the implementation and decision-making, 
are influenced by many other factors and c) even where a scientific basis is 
available, this is usually not ‘fit’ to the practical needs of policy and program 
managers as it often encompasses detailed / expert knowledge. In addition, 
Saltelli & Giampietro (2017) warn that too strong a focus on scientific evidence 
may result in ‘a dramatic simplification of the available perceptions, in flawed 
policy prescriptions and in the neglect of other relevant worldviews of legitimate 
stakeholders.’ (p.62). They warn that science-based strategies such as EBP can 
be used instrumentally (see also Sarewitz’ excess of objectivity) or to exclude 
certain (normative) viewpoints that are not backed up by a strong scientific 
evidence base. In this light, a strong focus on evidence based regulations might 
worsen controversies instead of mitigating them. 
Finally, the argument that a product-based trigger for GMO regulations is 
more science-based than a process-based and should thus be the preferred 
option for a better regulatory framework does not necessarily hold up. In a 
policy report I wrote for COGEM in 2019, the possible implications of a product 
based regulatory framework for GM crops in Europe have been investigated 
based on desk research and interviews in The Netherlands and Canada. In the 
context of this thesis it is worth noting that the Canadian regulations apply to 
‘plants with novel traits’. Where Europe debates the question ‘What is a GMO?’ 
in Canada similar discussions arose about the question ‘What is a novel trait?’. 
Similar to discussions about what ‘naturally occurring changes’ to the DNA 
are, the Canadian situation triggers not only a scientific, but also a normative 
discussion about ‘novelty’. COGEM (2019) concluded that a simple change of 
the trigger for regulations, is unlikely to resolve the discussions about GM 
crops in Europe and would likely just exchange one discussion for another.
2.3.2 A PRECAUTIONARY AND INCLUSIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The notion of precaution is widely used in (academic) literature and policy/
political debates about biotechnology, often without specifying which 
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interpretation is followed. In a societal context the concept seems to be 
stretched beyond the legal interpretation to point out broader non-safety risks 
such as socio-economic risks or risks related to the loss of normative, religious 
or cultural values in agriculture. This illustrates the variety of interpretations of 
precaution that can easily get mixed up in debates and discussions. In addition, 
precautionary and inclusive in this section should be understood as extensions 
of each other and should not be confused with inclusive legal approaches that 
focus on participation. Regulatory strategies focused on a broad interpretation 
of the PP tend to use the principle as a decision rule and broaden the scope of 
the regulatory framework from scientific safety arguments to normative and 
value related aspects. 
Elements of a broader interpretation of the PP can be found in the existing 
regulatory framework for GM crop authorisations. For example, the two step 
process of a risk assessment and a voting procedure by the MS, leaves implicit 
room for additional considerations or different risk perceptions. In addition, 
since the initial risk based regulatory regime in the 1990s, a trend can be 
observed to include broader elements into the regulatory system. Over the 
years, regulations and guidelines have been implemented on food labeling 
(Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003), coexistence measures (Regulation (EC) No 
1829/2003, consideration 28, see also European Commission 2010a) and in 2015 
a directive was introduced that allows individual MS to ban GM crop cultivation 
on their territory based on non-safety arguments such as environmental or 
agricultural policy objectives, or other compelling grounds such as town and 
country planning, land use, socioeconomic impacts, coexistence and public 
policy (Chapter 6 provides a normative analysis of the background and impact 
of this Directive).[18] 
There is a tension between those supporting the view that only scientifically 
demonstrable differences in a GM crop should qualify to legitimise regulatory 
decisions (narrow focus on the PP and a strong focus on scientific evidence), 
and those that are of the opinion that the ‘process’ and broader (normative 
and/or socio-economic) implications of genetic modification should be the 
trigger and legitimisation for regulatory measures and decisions. 
18 A similar regulation was proposed (2015/0093 (COD) by the EC in 2015 on the import of GMO food 
and Feed, but this was rejected by the European Parliament. They expressed concerns this regulation would 
be unworkable, it would lead to conflicts with WTO or that it would lead to the reintroduction of border 
checks between pro- and anti-GMO countries. The EP rejected the proposal and called on the Commission 
to withdraw its position.
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For example, advocates of evidence-based regulations may reject the 
principle of labelling because it is not related to scientific safety (the labelling 
requirements facilitate freedom of choice). In addition, the diminishing 
detection possibilities for the use of NPBTs in GM crops (ENGL 2019) provides 
an argument to exempt these crops from the regulations from the perspective 
of evidence-based regulations. Advocates of the second strategy want the 
labelling requirements to be broadened to include products from animals 
(meat, eggs, and dairy products) that have been fed GMOs (e.g. Inf’OGM 2015, 
see also Moses & Brookes 2013). They argue this would be more in line with 
a process-based regulatory framework that reflects normative reasons to 
reject GM crops. To facilitate these preferences, some MS have acknowledged 
additional labelling initiatives: ‘gentechnikfrei’ (Austria), ‘ohne gentechnik’ 
(Germany) and ‘sans OGM’ (France).
Edvardsson Björnberg et al. (2018) illustrated that some EU MS have included 
wider socio-economic considerations in their national GM legislations in 
addition to the environmental risk assessment, such as Sweden, France 
and Norway. These regulatory provisions have been criticised because they 
would further delay the licensing process. Chapter 7 identifies a series of 
quantification and normative issues that illustrate the challenges of including 
socio-economic considerations in regulatory frameworks. Most regulatory 
measures that refer to broader non-safety aspects (such as ethical aspects, 
socio-economic considerations or sustainability) are non-mandatory, 
additional or optional to the main regulatory framework that is predominantly 
focused on a scientific risk assessment.[19] A GM crop can be allowed onto the 
market if it is considered safe, and in addition there are regulations facilitating 
producers’ and consumers’ choice to avoid these products based on other 
arguments. It places these arguments in the realm of notions of ‘a good life’ 
on an individual level, while some members of society are of the opinion these 
arguments should play a more prominent role in a view on ‘a good society’ on 
a collective level. 
The importance of inclusion of broader/non-safety arguments into the 
regulatory framework has been discussed by amongst others Carr & Levidow 
(2000) who emphasize the importance of acknowledging uncertainties as 
well as normative considerations, Myhr (2010) who promotes sustainability 
19 E.g. Considerations 9, 57, 58 and 60 of Dir. 2001/18/EC, consideration 42 of Regulation (EC) No 
1829/2003. See also Directive (EU) 2015/412
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as a normative standard for GM crops and Steele (2006) who argues that a 
precautionary approach appeals to ethical ideals associated with sustainable 
development. These perspectives criticise the regulatory framework for 
being too narrow and science based, while emphasizing that biotechnology 
has important moral, ethical and socio-economic implications that should 
be incorporated in the process. Tosun (2013) notes that the PP can facilitate 
transparent policy making as it requires policy makers to be explicit about 
their decisions and the extent to which these are driven by scientific evidence, 
economic or societal reasons. She also warns however, that a strong focus 
on the broad interpretation of the PP can set sail for an incredibly complex 
regulatory framework that takes into account an almost endless amount of 
factors that are difficult or even impossible to compare and balance due to 
normative differences, which can further complicate decision-making on GM 
crop authorisations. 
The integration of broader normative aspects in regulatory frameworks has 
also been discussed in legal theory (e.g. Black 1998, Van der Burg & Brom 2000 
and Poort 2013). These authors mainly focus on the importance of interaction, 
communication and dynamics in developing regulatory frameworks and 
less on the outcome of these regulations. This connects their work also to 
deliberative theories mentioned in Section 2.2. These authors emphasize that 
the development of legal frameworks should remain to a certain extent dynamic 
to leave room for norm development and problem reframing. In their view this 
approach does justice to a complex pluralist society and to rapidly developing 
technologies. While I sympathise with this perspective from a theoretical 
perspective, it seems unfeasible in reality. Regulatory strategies focusing on 
the process of design and problem formulation are best applicable when norm 
development is still ongoing, both in the legislative and in the implementing 
process. The difficulty, however, is that the phase of problem formulation for 
GMOs seems to be long past and the different positions are firmly established. 
In addition, the current regulatory framework for GMOs is also embedded in 
an international context, which limits flexibility and dynamics on rigorous 
changes. Nevertheless, in my view these dynamics will become more important 
when looking at the latest technological advances of biotechnology integrating 
with other technologies and in other fields (see Chapter 8). While the impact 
of biotechnology broadens to other working fields and applications, the 
‘scientific’ and ‘regulatory’ visibility of the GM-technologies diminishes as 
the use of the technology is no longer detectable or falls outside of the legal 
scope of the current GMO regulations. When GM technology gets integrated 
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in new converging technologies it develops characteristics that call for a more 
flexible and dynamic regulatory framework.
2.3.3 COMITOLOGY REFORM: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME
The last regulatory strategy I will discuss does not aim to provide a (re)solution 
for the disagreement about GM crops, but it aims to change the rules of the 
decision-making procedures in such a way that undecisiveness is no longer an 
option (in theory). 
In 2017 the EC submitted a proposal for an amendment of the Comitology 
procedures in Regulation 182/2011 (European Commission 2017c). The 
amendments are based on four measures: 1) making the voting positions of 
the MS in the appeal committee public, 2) discounting abstentions in the 
calculation of qualified majorities, 3) creating a higher-level variant of the 
appeal committee and 4) asking the relevant composition of the Council 
of Ministers for a non-binding advisory opinion. The proposal provides 
motivations of which some relate directly to the situation of GM crops: 
‘This initiative follows up on a statement by the President of the Commission 
in his State of the Union address to the European Parliament in September 
2016 when he said: ‘It is not right that when EU countries cannot decide among 
themselves whether or not to ban the use of glyphosate in herbicides, the 
Commission is forced by Parliament and Council to take a decision. So we will 
change those rules – because that is not democracy’ (European Commission 
2017c, context of the proposal)
‘On several occasions concerning the adoption of acts which are subject to 
the comitology procedure, the Commission has found itself in the past years 
in a situation where it is legally obliged to take an authorisation decision in 
the absence of a qualified majority of the Member States taking position 
(either in favour or against) in the committee. This ‘no opinion’ situation is 
in the Commission’s view particularly problematic when it concerns politically 
sensitive matters of direct impact on citizens and businesses, for instance 
in the field of health and safety of humans, animals or plants.’ (European 
Commission 2017c, context of the proposal)
According to Guéguen (2017), increasing transparency on the voting positions 
can reinforce MS political accountability for their decisions. The second 
amendment would push MS to take a position, since not doing this will have 
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their position ignored. Upscaling the political level of the appeal committee 
would already be possible under the current regulation, as the regulation 
does not specify the political level of the representatives. The last proposed 
amendment calls for a non-binding advisory opinion from the Council of 
Ministers which would push individual MS to make their national position 
explicit. As of 2020, the proposal still lies with the Council and the Parliament. 
It seems to be too early to draw conclusions on the implications of this strategy 
since the proposal has not yet been adopted. However, the fact that it already 
takes 3 years for the proposal to be discussed, might be another symptom of 
the ‘wickedness’ of the GM crop issue. In theory, if adopted, the measures 
could or are even likely to impose decision-making. However, as we have 
seen with other regulatory changes, there is nearly always a certain amount of 
leeway for alternative use. In addition, if users themselves to not stick to their 
responsibilities, regulations will not work as intended. 
Looking at the proposal, I can already think of a way the amendments could 
further delay decision-making instead of improving it: the last amendment 
would require a non-binding advisory opinion from the Council. This could 
stimulate national discussions and push for explication of national and collective 
positions of the MS. However, if this process is deadlocked or stalling, because 
MS are reluctant to discuss the sensitive issue on a national level, it will only 
add to the timeline for EU decision-making. 
2.3.4 IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATORY STRATEGIES
Regulatory strategies focusing on scientific evidence on the one hand and 
broader precautionary aspects on the other hand have been applied to change 
the regulatory framework. As a result, the current EU framework for GMOs 
has both characteristics of precautionary and evidence-based systems. 
The first two regulatory strategies promote different views on the type of 
knowledge[20] that is necessary for a ‘good’ regulatory framework. There is 
a tension between those that see science as the only legitimate source of 
knowledge for a regulatory framework and those that promote the inclusion of 
other perspectives (such as contextual, political, cultural, and socio-economic 
factors). The current regulatory framework seems to aim to satisfy both needs 
at the same time, leading to a situation that dissatisfies both sides. Promotors 
20 Faulkner & Poort (2017) define regulatory knowledge as: ‘relevant knowledge for deciding about 
appropriate new assessments and measurements of emerging biotechnologies’. These contain ‘besides 
scientific knowledge, also knowledge about the perceived moral desirability of a new technology, 
knowledge about the broader policy setting, procedural knowledge about political processes and cultures, 
knowledge of the economy and industrial sectors, and relevant social values’ (p.227).
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of the first type of strategy will find the current framework too vague and 
precautionary while those endorsing the second strategy argue the system is not 
precautionary enough and too focused on ‘hard science’. Choosing either one 
of these strategies does not seem like a constructive solution. While the value 
of objective and science-based facts for policymaking and law development 
seems evident, too much emphasis on scientific evidence tends to simplify the 
problem by separating scientific, fact-based arguments from broader ethical, 
socio-economic and other arguments. More or less: an evidence-based focus 
says: back to the (scientific) facts! But with that, it also directly or indirectly 
dismisses other arguments. A focus on a broad precautionary framework that 
takes into account non-safety arguments may lead to a complex framework 
that takes into account factors that are difficult or impossible to measure and 
compare due to normative differences. 
Stirling (2007) argues that the dichotomy between purely ‘sound science’ and 
precaution is smaller than often assumed and ideally, they could complement 
each other. However, I note that while both precaution and scientific evidence 
are emphasised and incorporated in the regulatory framework, they do not 
seem to complement each other. Instead, these concepts seem to be used as 
ammunition against each other in regulatory science, political and stakeholder 
debates. Van Asselt & Vos (2006) argue the PP easily becomes politicised when 
used either to amplify or attenuate uncertainty in order to further their own 
interests. Along this line of reasoning, Weimer (2010) argues the EU has fallen 
into an ‘extreme of combining a non-functioning ideal of purely science-based 
decision making with a decision-hampering highly politicized precautionary 
rhetoric’ (p.626). 
Lastly, both strategies encounter practical challenges on implementation. 
Science-focused regulatory frameworks are based on the assumption that 
1) there is sufficient scientific evidence and 2) there is agreement about this 
evidence. As we have seen in the previous section on technocratic strategies, this 
is not necessarily the case. The same holds for a broader regulatory framework 
and agreement on normative aspects such as sustainability and socio-economic 
aspects and how to include them into the framework. Therefore, it seems that 
regulatory strategies in themselves, but also in combination with technocratic 





In the first chapter a problem description has been provided for the European 
authorisation process of GM crops: decision-making on these authorisations is 
delayed or even stalling. Based on the characteristics of the discussions about 
GM crops the issue has been classified as a wicked problem. These type of 
problems are considered extremely difficult or even impossible to resolve. 
Nevertheless, mitigation strategies have been suggested and applied to resolve 
the conflict. In this chapter I have discussed and evaluated three types of 
strategies that are directed at improving the scientific, societal and regulatory 
aspects of the decision-making process about the authorisation of GM crops. 
They aim at creating more certainty about the risks from scientific research, 
at finding a common ground in the societal and stakeholder debate and at 
providing a fit-for purpose regulatory framework which protects rights and 
liberties of producers and consumers of GM crops and those that prefer to 
avoid them.
An extensive amount of theoretical and applied research has been performed 
on technocratic, participatory and regulatory strategies. Scientific research 
continues to produce more data on the environmental risks and food safety 
of GM crops, but arguments that refer to scientific uncertainty persist and 
continue to be brought forward to reject GM crops. Academic literature has 
extensively discussed the need and methodologies for participatory processes 
that include the general public and stakeholders, but despite their potential 
and application, a plurality of conflicting views remains. Regulations have been 
adapted and proposed to reflect a legal framework that facilitates objective 
and science-based decisions on the one hand, and acknowledges broader non-
safety arguments on the other hand. 
Overall, despite valuable insights that can be derived from these strategies, 
there haven’t been substantial improvements in the decision-making process 
on the authorisation of GM crops since the late 90s. This is illustrated by the 
continuing delays in market approvals, the voting outcomes that systematically 
result in ‘no opinion’ and a continuous pattern of requests for more scientific 
research, regulatory reforms and public participation. 
This brings me to the following research question for this thesis: 
Why is there a deadlock in decision-making on the authorisation of GM crops 
in Europe and how can it be addressed?
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To provide an answer to this question, the following sub questions need 
answering:
I. What kind of problem is the deadlock in decision-making about GM 
crops and why? 
      (Addressed in Chapter 1, 4 and 5) 
II. Why is the deadlock in decision-making a problem? 
      (Addressed in Chapter 1, 7, 8, 9) 
III. Has the issue been addressed and how? 
      (Addressed in Chapter 2, 6 and 7) 
IV. Did this resolve the issue and why (not)? 
      (Addressed in Chapter 2, 3 and 9)
V. How can the issue be addressed to improve the situation? 
      (Addressed in Chapter 9)
4. OUTLINE
I have now concluded the first two chapters of my thesis providing a general 
introduction, problem description and analysis and research question. These 
provide the theoretical background against which the subsequent chapters 
should be seen. In Chapter 3 I will build my hypothesis and as such, this 
chapter can be seen as an overarching argumentation of Chapters 4-8 which 
add to exploring and deepening my argumentation for the hypothesis. These 
chapters consist of published articles based on a mix of methodologies ranging 
from empirical research, literature reviews and legal analysis. An outline of 
Chapters 3 – 9 will be provided below. 
Chapter 3 GM crop authorisations: indecisiveness caused by political conflict
In this chapter I will deepen the problem analysis and develop a hypothesis on 
why decisions on EU level about the authorisation of GM crops are problematic. 
I will do this through a normative analysis of the contributions from scientific, 
participatory and regulatory input in the decision-making process. After 
looking into the general characteristics of decision-making and the type of 
decisions that can be identified in the authorisation process of GM crops in 
Europe, the role and limitations of each of these decision-making steps is 
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evaluated. I will argue why technocratic, participatory and regulatory strategies 
alone or combined cannot be sufficient to arrive at decision-making about the 
authorisation of GM crops (partially answering sub question IV of this thesis 
whether proposed strategies resolved the issue and why (not). 
Finally, I will present my hypothesis that a lack of political judgement in 
the decision-making process on the authorisation of GM crops could be an 
underexposed bottleneck in the problematisation of GM crops. I will explore 
the role of decision-making in a political context and identify indicators of the 
political character of the conflict over the authorisation of GM crops.
Chapter 4 Ethics of dissent: a plea for restraint in the scientific debate about the 
safety of GM crops
Published article / Authors: Mampuys R & Brom F.W.A. / Journal: Journal of Agricultural 
and Environmental Ethics 28, 903-924 (2015)
This chapter provides an in depth overview of the different arguments and 
conflicting values that are at stake in the agricultural biotechnology debate. 
Through a discourse analysis of the debate that follows after publication of 
alarming studies, it illustrates the underlying values and broader arguments 
that play a role in a seemingly scientific debate. The chapter is based on a 
series of case studies of ‘alarming studies’ published between 1998 and 2015. 
The timespan shows that over and over, the same type of arguments play a role 
in the debate. Three main categories of argument types can be found: specific 
arguments related to the methodology, results and conclusions of the study, 
contextual arguments about GMOs and their benefits and risks in general 
and arguments that focus on the credibility of the stakeholders involved. The 
case studies illustrate that the debate about GM crops usually takes place in 
the context and language of science, while it actually goes beyond safety and 
scientific facts. The analysis in this chapter contributes to the characterisation 
of the GM crop issue as a wicked problem and provides a more in depth answer 
of sub question I of this thesis (what kind of problem is the deadlock in 
decision-making about GMOs and why?).
Chapter 5 Governance strategies for responding to alarming studies on the 
safety of GM crops 
Published article / Authors: Mampuys R & Brom F.W.A. / Journal: Journal of Responsible 
Innovation 2(2) 201-219 (2015)
This chapter analyses the governance of alarming case studies as strategies 
to mitigate the conflict over GMOs. These strategies have a strong focus on 
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science: more research, more facts and less uncertainties. The analysis shows 
that science alone is not sufficient to resolve conflicts about alarming studies. 
Despite being dismissed on a scientific basis by peers, competent authorities, 
governmental advisory bodies and representatives on a MS and EU level, these 
studies continue to revive the debate or block decision-making about GM crops. 
This analysis adds to the problematisation by illustrating that focusing on the 
science component from a governance perspective is not a fruitful strategy 
to arrive at decision-making on GM crops. Alarming studies are a recurring 
issue in the biotechnology debate and more science will not provide a definitive 
answer. This chapter contributes to answering sub question I in more depth to 
characterise what kind of issue the GM crop conflict is. 
Chapter 6 Controversy first: factors limiting the success of Directive (EU) 
2015/412 for national decision-making on the cultivation of GM crops
Published article / Authors: Mampuys R & Poort L.M. / Journal: Journal of Law, 
Innovation and Technology 11(2), 175-202 (2019)
Chapter 6 provides an in depth normative analysis of a regulatory strategy to 
mitigate the GMO conflict (contributing to answering sub question III of this 
thesis). It is a normative analysis of Directive (EU) 2015/412 that was supposed 
to improve decision-making on GM crops. By creating the opportunity for MS 
to ban GM crops based on non-safety arguments in addition to the market 
authorisation process that focusses on safety, the EC tried to separate scientific 
arguments from other, broader arguments. It hoped that MS would be able 
to arrive at a consensus on safety when they had the option to ban a GM 
crop on their territory. Thus far, the new directive is only used by MS as an 
additional means to block the decision-making process on GM crops. The 
analysis illustrates why adjusting the regulations does not necessarily provide 
a solution for the conflict and disagreement on biotechnology, even if the 
regulation in itself seems fit and reasonable. 
Chapter 7 Socio-economic Considerations in Regulatory Decision-making on 
Genetically Modified Crops
Published article / Author: Mampuys R / Journal: Collection of biosafety reviews 10 
(2018)
The growing adoption of GM crops worldwide can have socio-economic 
benefits for society and farmers, including increased farm profitability, income 
stability and ease of operation, along with decreased labor and pesticide use, 
crop losses, and exposure to toxic chemicals. Thus, in addition to national 
and international regulations on biosafety, countries are increasingly aware of 
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the importance of formalising the inclusion of socio-economic considerations 
(SECs) into regulatory decision-making. In practice, the complex and varied 
character of SECs can lead to technical and procedural challenges, which 
can further complicate the current conflict in GM crop decision-making. 
The potential and the challenges of SECs regulatory systems contribute to 
answering sub question II and III in more depth. Market introductions of 
biotechnology products have inherent microeconomic and competitive benefits 
and drawbacks. Socio-economic impacts can be positive or negative: in most 
cases, both occur but are not necessarily specific to GM crops. Socio-economic 
analyses generally compare the resources used or gained by a project with 
either (1) the prevailing situation or (2) an alternative scenario to determine the 
better option. SECs are highly dependent on context, especially the type of GM 
crop, the geographical location of use and the type of users. The distribution of 
benefits and costs amongst growers, consumers, food manufacturers, retailers 
and technology developers can make impact assessment rather complex. 
Modern biotechnology and its regulation are subject to public and political 
debate in many parts of the world. On top of environmental safety assessments, 
socio-economic assessments can contribute to balanced decision-making 
on market releases, future investments in research and development, and 
technology deployment. However, systematic and clearly outlined procedures 
and data/information gathering are needed to guide policy formulation and 
decision-making on biotechnology applications. This article (1) reviews the 
role of SECs in biosafety decision-making and (2) discusses the opportunities 
and challenges of integrating SECs into regulatory decision-making.
Chapter 8 Emerging crossover technologies: how to organise a biotechnology 
that becomes mainstream?
Published article / Authors: Mampuys R & Brom F.W.A. / Journal: Environment Systems 
and Decisions 38, 163-169 (2018)
Chapter 8 highlights the urgency of decision-making about agricultural (and 
other) biotechnological applications, contributing to answering sub question 
II of this thesis. It illustrates that undecideability in the EU will not stop the 
developments in an international setting. This descriptive analysis adds another 
layer of complexity to the problem characterisation of the biotechnology debate. 
It illustrates how biotechnology and its applications no longer fits within its 
strictly defined borders but integrates horizontally and vertically within other 
techniques and fields of application. As a consequence, the legal governance 
component of regulations no longer fits the scientific state of the art. 
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Science will continue to create new opportunities and challenges for itself (with 
more knowledge also come new questions and uncertainties), for societies 
(public opinion) and for the regulatory framework (fit for purpose and future 
proof?). This further emphasizes the role politics and political decision-making 
should play when uncertainties and disagreement will remain and regulatory 
frameworks in itself are insufficient to compel decision-making.
Chapter 9 European decision-making on GM crop authorisations: 
repoliticisation is evaded but needed
In this final chapter I substantiate my claim that repoliticisation of the 
biotechnology issue is needed in Europe to mitigate the problems with decision-
making (providing an answer to sub question V). This chapter revisits the 
initial problem analysis of biotechnology as a wicked problem and zooms in 
on the role of political judgement and decision-making. Or in my view: the 
avoidance of political judgement in the current decision-making processes on 
GM crops. 
In the absence of political urgency, evading decision-making on complex 
issues could be justified from a strategic political perspective. However, in 
view of the normative nature of the conflict about GM crops and the role 
and responsibility of the political decision-making actors, I will argue that 
avoiding decision-making on GM crops does not do justice to either GM crop 
opponents or proponents from a democratic perspective. This substantiates 
my hypothesis that repoliticisation of the decision-making process is needed 
to resolve the deadlock in decision-making about GM crops. I conclude with a 
brief reflection on the implications of repoliticisation of decision-making about 
GM crop authorisations with a focus on the importance of issue ownership and 
political priority.
Finally, in this chapter I will revisit and answer my research questions and 
formulate recommendations on future research. I argue that decision-making 
on GM crop authorisations in Europe is a wicked problem by design in which 
decision-making is evaded through delegating responsibilities to scientific, 
societal and legal actors and systems. Whilst science, participatory activities 
and a regulatory framework each contribute to the decision-making process, 
political judgement and decision-making are eventually needed decide in cases 
of conflict. Not doing so and upholding the illusion of a working system, does 














Based on the strategies that have been discussed and evaluated in Chapter 
2, the systematic problems in regulatory decision-making on GM crops may 
point out that a) academic literature has not been (sufficiently or correctly) 
translated into practice; or b) the proposed insights and applied strategies are 
not the right ones to resolve the issue; or c) the problem does not (solely) lie 
within the technocratic, participatory or regulatory arena.
An exhaustive evaluation of whether and how all of the approaches have been 
applied, might be informative but is unfeasible within the context of this 
thesis. Based on the current situation however, it is possible to draw some 
general conclusions on their outcomes and success. In practice, there has been 
a strong focus on science and regulations to mitigate the conflict. Most changes 
or attempts to mitigate issues on GM crops that have been implemented focus 
on additional (technical) scientific research and adjusting or designing new 
regulations. Science can feed into the decision-making process by providing 
information on safety or risks, but as we have seen, science is also inherently 
uncertain and produces an excess of objectivity. Regulations and changes to 
them can directly influence decision-making (rules), but there are conflicting 
perspectives on the ‘right’ type of regulations. Participatory strategies have also 
been employed, but mostly without directly measurable outcomes with regard 
to decision-making on GM crop authorisations. Participation processes often 
involve a broad variety of (different) viewpoints, concerns and demands, and 
while these may inform decision-making processes, they do not dictate how or 
which decision is best. Given the endurance of the GMO conflict since the 90s 
and the broad variety of strategies that have been proposed and applied over 
the years, I don’t consider it fruitful to add new variations to these categories. 
I choose to take a different approach and will zoom in on the specific role of 
decision-making, because this specific element seems to be problematic. In 
this chapter, I will analyse the types of decisions that are being exercised in a 
scientific, societal and regulatory context. From there, I will elaborate on how 
they can contribute to decision-making about the authorisation of GM crops to 
explore if and which factor(s) are missing in this process.
First, I will provide a brief overview of some general characteristics of decision-
making and discuss the contributions and limitations of scientific, societal and 
regulatory input into the decision-making process.
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Second, I will investigate why the mitigation strategies focussing on these 
inputs have been insufficient with an analysis of the normative role and limits 
of decision-making in a scientific, regulatory and societal context. This can 
teach us something about the extent to which solutions proposed in each 
of these fields can, in theory, contribute to improve decision-making. The 
analysis sheds light on whether there is a problem with the input into the 
decision-making process (science, public opinion) or the rules of the process 
(regulations) or with the execution of the decision-making process. I will 
argue that the technocratic, regulatory and participatory strategies contribute 
to the decision-making process but are by themselves or together insufficient 
to arrive at explicit and effective decision-making on a European level. 
Third, I will present my hypothesis that the role of politics may be an overlooked 
element in the problematic decision-making about the authorisation of GM 
crops. In the last part of this chapter I discuss the role of politics in the 
decision-making process about the authorisation of GM crops in Europe and 
point out a series of indicators that add to the plausibility of my hypothesis. 
2. DECISION-MAKING ON GM CROPS
First, the concept of decision-making has to be clarified with relevance to this 
thesis. The characteristics of a decision can relate to the grounds on which 
it is taken, its content or its consequences. Decisions can be characterised as 
digital or non-digital (0-1 or yes/no versus multiple alternatives and/or based 
on certain terms and conditions.), simple or complex (unambiguous, discrete 
and bounded versus conflictual and multi-outcome), objective or subjective 
(facts versus values), certain or uncertain (predictable versus unpredictable 
outcomes). In addition, decisions can be legitimate, justified or proportional or 
not, and from a normative perspective decisions can also be good or bad. The 
last distinction begs the question what are good or bad decisions and who is 
the judge of that? And what kind of decisions play a role in the authorisation 
process of GM crops? The decisions that are made in science are of a different 
nature than the ones made in society or in a legal setting. This section briefly 
looks into some of those differences. 
2.1 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CHARACTERISTICS OF DECISION-MAKING
Lasswell & Kaplan (1950), described decision-making as ‘forward looking, 
formulating alternative courses of action extending into the future, and 
selecting among alternatives by expectations of how things will turn out’ 
(cited by Pielke 2007, p.54). From this perspective, decision-making seems 
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to be straight forward and objective, influenced by factual information and 
(legal) boundaries that can be extrapolated to potential decisions in the future. 
Pielke (2007) adds a normative element to decision-making by describing 
good decisions as ‘those that more reliably lead to desired outcomes. But as 
there are a multitude of interests and perspectives: there is rarely a consensus 
on desired outcomes and the means to achieve those outcomes’(p.29).
This indicates decision-making requires a certain direction or preference of 
the type of future one is looking for. This can be a view on a good life, a 
view on good agriculture or food production, but also views on good scientific 
research or regulations. As such, the definition of Lasswell & Kaplan doesn’t 
explicitly address the point of intentionality. We need to know where we want 
to go in order to form a judgement about the options for decision-making. 
Intentionality is a first characteristic that is of importance for decision-making, 
and one that also adds a normative element. Decision-making is not only 
influenced by the status of objective information, societal consensus and legal 
boundaries, but also by conflicting and dynamic values (such as those expressed 
in society) and diverging perspectives on what the future should look like. 
Secondly, decision-making marks a specific point in time where alternatives 
to the decision are left behind. Hisschemöller & Hoppe (1995) argue that by 
making a decision or choice, policy makers close the process of structuring and 
participation: ‘although a decision is always necessary to prevent the political 
process from becoming paralyzed, there always remains a tension between the 
tendency to decide and the desirability to further integrate alternative views 
and contradictory information about the problem’ (p.65). Third, the element 
of exclusion is what characterises decision-making as a political process. The 
political character of decision-making has been discussed by amongst others 
Mouffe (2000), Laclau (1996) and Poort et al. (2013). It presumes the decision-
maker has the power or mandate to make a choice that also has a normative 
element (one thing is chosen over another). Fourth, Laclau (1996) notes that 
deciding requires a situation ‘where discourses are articulated in particular 
ways and discursive struggles are waged, leading to particular outcomes’ 
(p.92), indicating that decision-making requires argumentation.
Summarising, decision-making requires input of different sources of 
information, a sense of direction (aim or goal of the decision) and should 
ideally be substantiated by argumentation. In addition, in a formal or legal 
setting it also requires a predefined process to arrive at a legitimate decision. 
In other words, functional decision-making requires clear guidelines on who 
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is mandated to decide about what and based on what conditions and terms. 
With this in mind, we take another look at the decision-making process in the 
authorisation procedures of GM crops.
2.2 CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF DECISION-MAKING IN A SCIENTIFIC, 
SOCIETAL AND REGULATORY CONTEXT
The regulatory framework and the decision-making procedures for GM crops 
have been described in Chapter 1. Each Directive or Regulation has an objective 
which defines what it aims for, and lists the requirements or rules on how, 
based on what grounds, this objective should be met. Together, these reflect 
what a legitimate decision is in the context of the particular Regulation or 
Directive. 
The European regulatory framework has been proposed and approved though a 
co-decision or ordinary legislative procedure by the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council of ministers, representing respectively 
Europe (the executive), European citizens and the governments of the 27 EU 
countries. In the European parliamentary democracy, these actors have the 
power and responsibility of decision-making that should reflect a broadly 
shared view on ‘goods’ and ‘a good society’. 
The GMO regulations have also been subject to this process. As such, based on 
the objectives of the regulatory framework for GM crops, legitimate decisions 
are those that ensure safe applications for humans and the environment as well 
as the effective functioning of the internal market while facilitating national 
and individual freedom of choice (see Chapter 2, Table 1). The following key 
decisions and responsible actors can be identified in the regulatory framework 
for GM crops (see Figure 1).
The good news is, at first sight there is a regulatory system in place that 
facilitates clear (i.e. there is a single definition of a GMO and lists of techniques 
that result or do not result in a GMO) – objective (i.e. there are legal requirements 
for authorisation based on scientific evidence and quantifiable traceability and 
labelling) - digital (i.e. the outcome is a simple yes/no) decision-making about 
the authorisation of GM crops. The intended outcome of the authorisation 
process of GM crops should be ‘yes’ (authorised for market release) if the 
objectives of the regulations are met and ‘no’ (rejected) if they are not. 
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However, this decision is preceded by a series of other steps that also involve 
decision-making. These are decisions related to scientific, societal and 
regulatory matters. In Chapter 2 I have discussed technocratic, participatory and 
regulatory strategies for mitigation of the GM conflict, concluding that these 
strategies have not led to definitive answers or directions for decision-making 
Figure 1: Key questions in EU regulatory decision-making on GM crops. If these questions are all 
answered with a ‘yes’, they will result in a final decision on the authorisation of a GM crop application.
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with regard to safety, agriculture & food production or regulatory frameworks. 
The question is whether such definitive answers are feasible in the first place. 
In the next sections I will discuss the characteristics of decision-making in a 
scientific, societal and regulatory context based on an ideal typical perspective. 
Using examples from the case of GM crops, I will reflect on what we can and 
cannot expect from their contributions in the overall decision-making process. 
2.2.1 SCIENCE DOES NOT COMPEL ACTION
Science can be described as the systematic pursuit of knowledge. Ideal typically, 
science follows objective rules and guidelines (the scientific method) and tries 
to separate facts from opinions by investigating hypotheses and theories (e.g. 
McNaughton 1999, Kreutzberg 2004). Science informs expectations about 
choices and their possible outcomes. It can draw conclusions on the likelihood 
of hypotheses being true or false, but in general it will not tell us what to do 
based on that conclusion. Regulatory science or scientific advice may take it 
a step further, but is usually still separated from political decisions.[1] This 
means science does not compel action; no matter how objective and convincing 
scientific conclusions may be, they will usually not point in the direction of the 
‘right’ regulatory decision. 
Regarding risks, decision-making requires a normative judgement based on 
what is seen as an acceptable level of harm or risk (e.g. Pielke 2004, Oreskes 
2004, Jasanoff 1987 and Wynne 1991). Therefore, decisions about authorising or 
rejecting GM crops depend on where one wants to go with regard to agriculture 
and food production, on what is perceived as worth protecting and what risks 
are worth taking. In addition, scientific evidence about risks always involves 
a level of uncertainty. In an analysis of the role of science in public policy, 
Oreskes (2004) pointed out that science ‘does not produce logically indisputable 
proofs about the natural world. At best it produces a robust consensus based 
on a process of inquiry that allows for continued scrutiny, re-examination, 
and revision’ (p.369). Scientific information provides an ‘excess of objectivity’ 
that can be used as an endless resource to substantiate or argue for a variety of 
decisions. As such, scientists’ influence on the use of their knowledge is limited 
(e.g. Daviter 2015 and Böschen et al. 2010). Finally, science is not value-free. 
The characteristic ‘true or false’ distinction of scientific hypothesis is based 
on what ‘good’ science is. As pointed out by Carr & Levidow (2000), ‘science-
based decisions are not value free. For example, value judgements are involved 
in deciding what impacts to include and leave out of the risk assessment, and 
1 E.g. EFSA may conclude there are no significant risks for human health or the environment associated with 
a GM crop, but it does not advise or take the decision to authorise the crop.
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what counts as environmental harm’(p.32). And here, there are differences of 
opinion as illustrated by the case of alarming studies in Chapter 1. In addition, 
scientists are increasingly expected to interact and cooperate with society, the 
private sector, policy makers and politicians. A conflict arises when science 
is expected to be value free and objective on the one hand, and justified and 
accountable on the other hand. 
For these reasons, science will not provide an unambiguous objective answer 
that dictates political decision-making on GM crops, illustrated by Newman 
& Head (2017) who argue that ‘political dynamics […] cannot be neutralised 
by a dose of evidence, no matter how relevant or powerful’ (p.419). With 
regard to decision-making itself, Head (2010) noted that ‘in a democracy, 
evidence cannot make those policy choices on the deliberators’ behalf (p.80.). 
Nevertheless, there are many examples where policy makers and politicians 
turn to science to reduce uncertainty and provide a clear line of action, such 
as the debate about global warming (discussed by amongst others Rayner & 
Malone 1988, Sarewitz & Pielke 2000 and Lempert 2000), pesticides (Tosun 
et al. 2018, Bazzan & Migliorati 2020 and Arcuri & Hendlin 2020) and GMOs 
(Chapter 1, Section 5).
2.2.2 PUBLIC OPINION COMPELS VARIOUS AND CONFLICTING ACTIONS
Society can indirectly influence regulatory decision-making through the 
expression of their opinion and through supporting, rejecting or protesting 
technology applications. Individuals, groups and society as a whole can 
express their opinion in their actions trough consumer behavior, organising 
themselves in groups to use collective effort to highlight issues to fellow 
citizens,[2] industry, policymakers or politicians.[3] This input can be used as 
a resource for marketing or lobbying goals, to defend political standpoints or 
to motivate or justify policy changes and decisions. Vice versa, governmental 
actors can actively engage the general public to express their opinion through 
public engagement activities. Society can also influence technology decisions 
by objecting (e.g. public consultations on EFSA opinions) or protesting them 
(e.g. the March against Monsanto, see an article in newspaper The Guardian 
(2015)) and in extreme cases, by using vandalism (such as the destruction of 
GM crop field trials, see for example Kuntz 2012 or Romeis et al. 2013). 
2 E.g. NGO websites opposing or expressing critical views on biotechnology/genetic modification, such 
as GMWatch, GMFreeze, Testbiotech, Friends of the Earth, ETC Group, GMO free Europe etc. 
3 The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) is a European Union mechanism aimed at increasing direct 
democracy by enabling EU citizens to participate directly in the development of EU policies, introduced 
with the Treaty of Lisbon.
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The question is when there is (in) sufficient societal support for a regulatory 
decision? This also depends on how policy-makers take public views into 
account. Christiansen & Gunnar-Hallsson (2017) describe three perspectives 
on how public views should be taken into account in decision-making that 
may result in different outcomes of those decisions: 1) public policy should 
be responsive to the preferences of citizens, 2) policies should be reasonably 
acceptable for all those subject to them or 3) public should directly participate 
in policy making through public deliberation. 
Different views on public involvement also contribute to the GM crop conflict. 
The EC may reason that the regulations are reasonable and responsive to the 
preference of citizens who want to avoid GM food by providing labeling of food 
products. GMO opposing NGOs may be of the opinion that the general public 
should have a more explicit and direct influence on GM crop authorisations, 
as illustrated by their own initiative of creating GMO-free regions (for an 
overview and analysis of the GMO-free Regions network see Tosun & Shikano 
2015). This initially small-scale initiative grew out to an international network, 
illustrating how public actors aim to influence or oppose decisions on GM crops.
Society can be described as a community of people living in a country or region 
having shared customs, laws, and organisations. At the same time ‘the society’ 
or ‘the public’ is not a singular or uniform entity. Individuals in a society are 
heterogeneous and can hold a wide variety of values and beliefs with regard 
to views on goods, a good society and a good life. Individuals in society can 
take decisions that suit their interests as long as they fit within the regulatory 
framework on what is considered acceptable and desirable. However, society 
can’t make decisions as an entity, because it is a collective of individuals with a 
broad spectrum of different and often conflicting views, as is the case with GM 
crops.[4] Therefore, a collective agreement or consensus on the authorisation or 
rejection of GM crops seems unfeasible.
2.2.3 REGULATIONS DO NOT DETERMINE THE OUTCOME: LAW IN BOOKS # LAW IN ACTION
The regulatory system determines the outline or borders for decision-making 
in society. The law can be described as a system of rules which a particular 
4 There has never been an overwhelming majority in favor or against biotechnology. A 2019 Eurobarometer 
indicates that the level of concern of EU citizens about genetically modified ingredients in food or drinks 
is on average 27% (similar to food hygiene concerns (32%), food poisoning (30%) and animal disease 
(28%) and varies from 45% in Lithuania to 13% in Finland (European Commission 2019). These numbers 
also change over the years. For a similar question in a 2010 Eurobarometer, 66% of respondents were very 




country or community recognises as regulating the liberties, rights and actions 
of its members. Regulations contribute to decision-making by assigning 
responsibilities to who decides about what and on which grounds. Regulatory 
decisions reflect views on goods and a good society based on a parliamentary 
democratic majority. However it can’t possibly reflect all conceptions of a 
good life when these are conflicting in nature. Regulations have (limited) 
flexibility in terms of scope, pacing and language. Flexibility within the scope 
of regulations may vary and has both benefits and downsides. Very strict and 
detailed definitions makes regulations prone to be overhauled by scientific 
developments (e.g. NPBTs, see also Chapter 8)[5] while a broad definition 
makes regulations vague providing leeway for legal disputes. In addition, 
language differences between different disciplines[6] and nationalities[7] may 
lead to ambiguities in the interpretation of and execution of regulations in the 
form of decisions.
Most importantly, regulations do not determine the outcome of its execution, 
i.e. they don’t determine the outcome of the decision. They can define the type 
of decisions which can be made within the scope of a regulation (i.e. safe or 
not, authorised or not, no opinion) or who can overrule who in the decision-
making process (i.e. the power of the EC, Council, EP, standing or appeal 
committee to intervene or veto a decision). But eventually, a legal framework 
on its own will not be sufficient to arrive at its intended outcome without 
commitment and appraisal from those who are assigned the responsibilities 
to do so. The intended use of regulatory frameworks cannot be enforced if 
its users decide not to stick to the rules or use whatever leeway room there 
is in the regulations to avoid or delay decision-making (e.g. abstaining from 
voting, upholding bans, delaying voting procedures). 
5 In this chapter Brom and I illustrate how scientific developments stretch the boundaries of law, and at the 
same time put pressure on a broader debate on how to organise innovation, safety and societal embedding 
of a contested technology.
6 The regulatory definitions of a GMO and techniques leading to GMOs are legal/scientific constructs 
which may lead to differences in interpretation by scientific and legal experts or even between experts 
from the same field. Some MS unilaterally exempted experimental introductions into the environment (field 
trials) for new techniques from the national GMO legislation, based on their scientific interpretation of the 
EU regulations (see Eriksson 2018). The ECJ ruling of 2018 (Case C-528/16) reversed/overruled some of 
these decisions.
7 The European regulations apply to 27 Member States and are translated into 24 languages. This may 




3. UNDECISIVENESS ABOUT GM CROPS AS A POLITICAL CONFLICT
In the previous section I have reflected on the contributions that can be 
expected from science, society and regulatory frameworks in the decision-
making on the authorisation of GM crops. I have argued that these sources 
of input can directly and indirectly inform the decision-making process, but 
they don’t compel the singular action (either yes or no) that is needed for 
the decision on GM crop authorisations. At best, they provide arguments. 
Arguments that need to be weighed and balanced in one way or another to 
justify a political decision. Without such a decision, the process remains in a 
deadlock. I will defend that this makes clear that there is an essential role for 
political judgement in regulatory decision-making. In the last section of this 
chapter, I will take a next step in building my hypothesis by providing and 
discussing indicators illustrating it is the political nature of decision-making 
that is an overlooked or underexposed factor in the conflict about GM crop 
authorisations. I aim to illustrate and argue that the most commonly proposed 
and used strategies that focus on science, participation and regulatory reform 
even contribute to avoiding political judgement. These indicators substantiate 
my hypothesis that the GM crop conflict is (also) a political one that cannot be 
resolved by scientific, regulatory or societal input alone.
3.1 POLITICS = DECISION-MAKING IN CASES OF CONFLICT
Political decision-making means decision-making in cases of conflict. After 
all ‘if citizens had the same values and preferences, collective decisions would 
be easily achieved and the institution of complex democratic procedures 
would be redundant’ (Biale & Liveriero 2017, p.580). The purpose of politics 
is generally described as to enable the members of a society to collectively 
achieve important human goals they cannot otherwise achieve individually. 
For example, it would be impossible for individuals to assess the safety of 
GM food or to test whether products contain GM ingredients. Therefore, these 
decisions are organised on a collective level. In Europe, decisions have been 
made to reflect different views on biotechnology (applications) in a system 
where decisions are taken on a collective (governmental) level to ensure safe 
applications and where individual preferences are facilitated through measures 
providing transparency (such as labelling). 
Political actors use different types of knowledge and input to argue, negotiate 
and bargain to move towards a desired change, to reject or resist change and 
uphold the status quo. This seems straight forward, but the reality of politics 
is complicated, or as several authors have phrased it ‘messy’ (e.g. Weible & 
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Cairney 2018,[8] Sarewitz 2004). Political decision-making actors often have to 
make simple, digital decisions on complex matters, based on a broad variety 
of input from both objective and subjective sources and in a situation with a 
variety of interests and uncertainties. This is exemplified by the decisions on 
GM crop authorisations: the decision is simple (authorise or reject), but the 
information and circumstances preceding that decision are not. I will briefly 
discuss two factors that illustrate the complicatedness: bounded rationality 
and the ambiguity of national interests. 
As pointed out by amongst others Millstone et al. (2015) and Daviter (2015), 
scientific knowledge is used differently in a policy and political context[9] than 
it is in a scientific context. But aside from that, given the extensive amount of 
scientific evidence and other sources of knowledge that can be used as input into 
the decision-making process, it is inevitable that policy-makers and politicians 
face ‘bounded rationality’ (Cairney & Weible 2017).[10] This limits their ability 
to pay attention to, understand, and respond to the policy problems for which 
they are responsible. There is simply too much and complex information, 
resulting in ignoring most of the available information. This could also explain 
why adding complex scientific research has had limited influence on decision-
making processes about GM crop regulations and authorisation decisions (such 
as rodent feeding trials). 
Political decision-making actors operate in an environment where the input 
from society and science and the boundaries of the legal framework are used 
creatively and strategically to serve national, political and sectoral interests. 
To complicate things further, these interest are dynamic over time and are not 
necessarily understood or represented in the same way at different political 
levels. In an analysis of MS voting behavior on GM crop authorisations 
Mühlböck & Tosun (2017) address these different notions of national interests, 
starting from the formal position that the Council represents the Member 
8 Weible & Cairney (2018): ‘the policy process is inherently messy and marked by a sticky resistance to 
change. It is also diverse across contexts and constantly evolving over time’ (p.194).
9 To differentiate between politics and policymaking, political representatives decide on the goals of 
policies, after which it is up to policy-makers to implement and execute / translate these decisions into 
policies or proposals for (adjustments of) regulations. While the politics (deciding) versus policy-making 
(doing) seems clear, the boundaries between them cannot always strictly be made.
10 Cairney & Weible (2017): ‘there can be no ‘comprehensive rationality’ in which policy makers can 
understand their context fully and process all policy-relevant information, to turn their values into a coherent 




States (TEU, Article 10). Mühlböck & Tosun cite Benz (2003, p.83) who argues 
this implies there should be an ‘unbiased transmission’ of the interests of 
Member States from a national to a European level through the governmental 
representative (in the Council this is the Minister responsible for the specific 
dossier). The question is however, what or better which, interests are meant 
here. Hagemann et al. (2016) interprets national interests as representing 
public opinion, while Treib (2010) sees party-political actors in national 
governments as representative of the national interests. Moravcsik (1998) 
and Scharpf (1996) argue that sectoral interests determine national interests. 
In their article Mühlböck & Tosun illustrate that each of these interests, in 
different national constituencies play a competing role in voting behavior. 
Given the economic, political, societal and cultural differences in European 
MS, this inventory of different views on the meaning of interests may also to 
a certain extent explains the differences in MS voting behavior on GM crops. 
3.2 INDICATORS OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
Based on the above mentioned challenges of political decision-making, I will 
discuss a series of indicators which in my view substantiate that not science, or 
societal factors or regulations need change in the regulatory decision-making 
about GM crops, but political judgement. In other words, these indicators 
illustrate the political nature of the conflict on GM crops.
The first indicator of political conflict on GM crops is the difference between 
decisions on importation and cultivation. Both types of application go through 
the same regulatory system and require an environmental and/or food safety 
risk assessment. Both types of application are assessed positively by EFSA and 
put through the same voting system, which for both systematically results 
in ‘no opinion’. Only one GM crop has ever been authorised for cultivation in 
Europe. No decisions are taken in the comitology procedures about cultivation. 
However, the situation for importation is different and the EC eventually 
approves importation authorisations in the absence of a qualified majority by 
the MS. This may have more than one reason, some of which are legal (the EU 
can face legal issues with the WTO for protectionism if she refuses to allow 
GM crops that are scientifically considered safe), as well as economic (the EU 
heavily depends on the importation of soy and maize for animal feed). Overall, 




Similar differences in the authorisation of agricultural and medical 
biotechnology applications provide a second indicator of political conflict. 
Medical therapies that contain GMOs (such as gene therapies and vaccines) 
require a risk assessment for both patient and environmental safety. Market 
authorisations of these products (called Advanced Therapeutic Medical 
Products or ATMPs) also follow European procedures for risk assessment (by 
the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and national authorities of the MS) 
and go through the comitology voting procedures for implementing acts. The 
voting procedures for ATMPs typically follow the scientific advice that inspired 
the draft proposal of the EC. This difference may be explained by a shared vision 
on the benefits of medical products while a goal and the means of reaching 
that goal in agriculture is more divided amongst MS (who have different views 
and interests in agriculture and food production). A balancing of benefits and 
risks is also typically one that requires political judgement. 
A third indicator can be found in decisions by MS on a national and European 
level. Interestingly, some countries that oppose market authorisations of GM 
crops on a European Level, do authorise the deliberate release of GM plants 
on their territory (for example Switzerland, see Science Magazine (2013)). 
Deliberate release of GM plants concerns field trials for the purpose of scientific 
research. A possible explanation might be that deliberate release applications 
are less centralised (national level, not EU) and less political (deliberate release 
applications are assessed and approved by a national competent authority). 
Finally, the avoidance of political behavior itself can be seen as a fourth 
indicator of political conflict. Although the controversial character of GM 
crops would ultimately qualify the topic for political discussion, it seems that 
systematically, strategies are chosen where political judgement is avoided. In 
other words, the situation is being ‘depoliticised’ (e.g. Poort et al. 2013) by 
delegating the issue to other contexts such as science, society or regulations. 
First, the main regulations on market authorisation themselves can be seen 
as avoiding political judgement. GM crops that are considered safe after an 
environmental and food safety assessment can be authorised for market 
release. There is no appraisal for small, moderate or big risks if for example 
these applications would offer significant benefits. Still however, differences 
of opinion exist on what is safe (enough), indicating this too is a normative 
decision that requires political judgement. 
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Other regulations applicable to GM crops do acknowledge and facilitate 
normative decisions, but these are optional and generally delegate decisions 
and responsibility to a lower (political) or individual level. Directive (EU) 
2015/412 that allows MS to ban or restrict GM crop cultivation acknowledges 
non-safety arguments, but can also be seen as putting these on a side track 
and dismissing them from the European discussion. 
In the regulatory procedures, a significant part of the decision-making seems 
to be delegated to science. The EFSA provides the basis for regulatory decision-
making about the market authorisations of GM crops. The political decision-
making process that is ‘left’ is limited to a digital decision that is restricted 
to a voting procedure under the comitology procedures. Since the Lisbon 
Treaty (2011) an appeal committee replaces the Council (of Ministers) for a 
second voting when the first round results in ‘no opinion’. With this change, 
the voting system has been downgraded from higher level politics (Ministers 
as representatives) to lower level politics (MS representatives and experts). 
In addition, the influence of the EP has also been reduced since the Lisbon 
Treaty (Georgiev 2013). The EP has can only issue non-binding resolutions 
against draft authorisation decisions. The fact that these resolutions have 
been systematically submitted but ignored, also indicates a political conflict. 
The comitology system has been criticised moreover because it would move 
decisions towards the Commissions preferred outcome instead of those of the 
Council (Ballman et al. 2003). On the other hand, Böhling (2009) notes that there 
is no ideal way for the EC to safeguard MS interests in policy implementation, 
since the preferences and interests of MS differ significantly. Since 27 political 
cultures in Europe unavoidably complicate political agreement on decisions, 
this may explain to an extent why the EC seems to avoid political behavior 
when possible. 
Nevertheless, in this thesis I argue there is an essential role for political 
judgement in regulatory decision-making about GM crops. In my view, the EC 
has exhausted scientific and legal means to resolve the conflict on GM crops. 
More scientific research, scientific and legal working groups, expert advice and 
even court cases have not led to decision-making on EU level. Neither science, 
nor public opinion, nor overarching regulatory frameworks can overcome 
the differences in political culture. This requires acknowledging the political 




The authorisation of GM crops is problematic in Europe, resulting in stalling 
decision-making on a top down governance level. Over time, several strategies 
to mitigate this issue have been proposed and applied. These have mainly 
focused on technocratic, participatory and regulatory strategies. These 
strategies have contributed in different ways, but they have not significantly 
improved eventual decision-making on the authorisation of GM crops. This is 
problematic because biotechnology developments outside of Europe continue, 
and pose increasing challenges for Europe to uphold its current regulatory 
framework and justify the outcomes. In addition, the lack of decision-making 
is at conflict with several basic legal principles such as legal certainty for 
developers, and results in international conflicts about trade and scientific 
innovation. In this chapter I have argued that technocratic, participatory and 
regulatory strategies by itself or altogether have not been sufficient to mitigate 
the conflict on regulatory decision-making about GM crops. And even if these 
strategies would have been perfectly executed, they could not have resulted 
in a singular action or direction for decision-making. Besides technocratic, 
regulatory and societal input into the decision-making process, political 
judgement is needed in cases of conflict. This is an underexposed factor in the 
deadlock in decision-making about the authorisation of GM crops.
Based on the problem analysis and first steps in answering my research 
questions, I arrive at the following hypothesis: 
Technocratic, participatory and regulatory input in the decision-making 
process are insufficient if political actors renounce or are unable to take up 
their own role in the decision-making process; which is to decide in case of 
conflict. An explicit repoliticisation of the decision-making process about GM 
crops is needed to get out of the current deadlock.
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The use of genetically modified (GM) crops within Europe has been subject 
to regulations since 1990.[1] These regulations originate from the scientific 
consensus that GMOs could potentially present a risk to humans and the 
environment and should be regulated (Berg 2008). The European and most GMO 
regulations in other countries mainly focus on safety aspects, whereas other 
issues (such as principal, ethical or socio-economic aspects) are considered an 
individual or market choice. These aspects are covered by European Labelling 
regulations for GM food and feed.[2][3]
Companies, universities and research institutes are investigating the risks 
and short- and long-term effects of existing and new GMOs on humans 
and the environment (Nicolia et al. 2014). The results of this research, 
whether published in scientific literature or not, form the basis for safety 
assessments carried out by regulatory bodies such as the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA). Market approvals for GM crops are subject to an extensive 
environmental and food safety assessment prior to commercial approval (EFSA 
2010). Following market approval, monitoring is implemented to identify any 
indirect or unanticipated adverse effects on the environment. The dominant 
consensus in the biotech sector and regulatory community is that the current 
risk assessment practice is adequate and that GM crops that are approved for 
market release are safe. However, among scientists, the nature and status of 
this consensus is a recurrent topic of discussion (e.g.Hilbeck et al. (2015)). To 
date there have been no confirmed incidents in which GM crops approved for 
market release have caused direct harm to the environment or to human health 
(Nicolia et al. 2014). 
1.1. ALARMING STUDIES CHALLENGE THE CURRENT RISK GOVERNANCE
The regulatory consensus on the safety of GM crops is challenged by studies 
which conclude that certain GMOs do cause harm to human health or the 
environment. The authors of these studies suggest that the current assessment 
procedure might overlook fundamental problems regarding the safety of 
1 Council Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into the environment of 
genetically modified organisms.
2 Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified 
organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms 
and amending Directive 2001/18/EC.




GM crops (e.g. (Carman et al. 2013; Séralini et al. 2012)). We propose to call 
those studies ‘alarming studies’ because they alarm scientists, risk assessors, 
governments and the broader public of unknown risks that are possibly being 
disregarded in the existing system. 
As pointed out by Thompson (1997), developments in food biotechnology 
are not just the concern of scientists and manufacturers. Recent decades 
have shown a significant increase in frequency and scope of ethical debates 
surrounding science and technology (Brom et al. 2015). The European debate 
on GMOs in agriculture is a well-documented example of the ‘ethicization’ of 
the public discourse on science, technology and innovation (Bovenkerk 2012).
Although alarming studies usually are (scientific) publications directed at the 
scientific community, they are characterised by the fact that they also address 
a broader public and a wider set of issues. These wider issues revolve around 
the topic of GMOs and they actively come into play when an alarming study 
is published. The concatenation of texts on GMO safety over time has created 
a public (and counterpublic) with a specific discourse that is addressed by 
alarming studies (see also (Warner 2002)). 
The discussion following publication of these studies is usually handled as a 
problem that fits within the current governance structure and discourse of risk 
assessment. The publications are responded to by a standard procedure of the 
responsible governmental agencies: they ask their scientific advisory bodies to 
reassess the study and decide whether the results justify revising their opinion 
about a GM crop (EFSA 2012c; FSANZ 2013; BAC 2012; NVWA 2012). Until 
now, regulatory bodies have not been convinced that a revision in response 
to an alarming study was necessary. For those who endorse the current risk 
assessment practice this signals the end of the debate, but not for those who 
are of the opinion that important issues (e.g. long term effects, effects of GM 
crop associated herbicides, socio-economic impacts and power structures of big 
agricultural companies) are disregarded in the current decision making system 
for GM crops. Consequently, the debate continues with undiminished vigour. 
The discussion will fade over time, only to be reignited by the appearance of 
the next alarming study. 
1.2. ALARMING STUDIES
In this article, we propose to define an alarming study in general as a scientific 
or other study, claiming that a technological innovation (e.g. GM crop) poses a 
threat to human health or the environment which has not been acknowledged 
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by the existing governance system. We emphasize that the term ‘alarming 
study’ refers to the claim made and does not say anything about the veracity 
or otherwise of the study. Not all case studies in this paper originate from 
peer reviewed research articles, they also include a personal letter of concern 
and a retracted and republished study. We will illustrate that regardless of 
the validity or status of the claims, alarming studies provoke fierce debates 
which leads to considerable upheaval and anxiety. Despite the lack of scientific 
rigour we believe that these studies, claims and letters are an important part of 
the debate outside of the scientific community. Furthermore, from a scientific 
point of view it cannot be excluded that some of these ‘early warnings’ may 
turn out to be valid after all. This does not mean that every claim or shout out 
should trigger governmental action. It means that the scientific status of a 
letter/paper/journal or the reputation/background/previous work of a scientist 
should not play a determining role in the decision for further investigation. 
Alarming studies about the safety of GM crops have been appearing since GM 
crops were authorised for placing on the market (Ewen and Pusztai 1999). 
Because discussions about the value and position of these studies are open-
ended, they re-occur and accumulate in the debate whenever new ‘alarming 
studies’ make the news. They are therefore one of the main triggers to reignite 
the GM debate. 
A key example of an alarming study is a paper by a French scientist about 
the health effects of the consumption of GM maize (Séralini et al. 2012). The 
Journal Food and Chemical Toxicology published the results of a study in which 
rats were fed GM maize and various concentrations of a glyphosate containing 
herbicide for a period of two years. Séralini and his team concluded that the 
rats fed with the GM maize and herbicide developed more and more serious 
tumours than the control group, and they developed the tumours earlier in 
their lives. Because the GM maize variety they used has been on the market 
for several years, the publication led to an international debate and several 
national authorities and scientific advisory bodies looked into the results to 
see if there was a need to revise their opinion that this GM maize was safe for 
consumption. 
They concluded that the study contained methodological shortcomings and 
that the conclusions could not be justified. Although the study was dismissed 
as unsound and incorrect by advisory bodies and the EFSA (2012c), several 
NGOs and scientists disagreed and the debate in Europe continued. Eventually, 
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the Séralini paper was retracted by the editor and later it was republished in 
another journal (RetractionWatch 2014). Despite the formal outcome, this study 
is moreover referred to as proof that the consumption of herbicide tolerant GM 
maize causes cancer and other adverse effects (GMOSeralini 2014). 
We will analyse the discussion about the Séralini paper and use examples 
of other studies regarding the safety of GM crops to illustrate the repetitive 
character of the debate about these studies over time (Ewen and Pusztai (1999), 
Rosi-Marshall et al. (2007), Huber (2011), and Carman et al. (2013) (Table 1).
Table 1: Examples of alarming studies and their publication status
Authors Effect claimed Status
Ewen S.W.B. and 
Pusztai A. (1999)
Rats fed diets containing GM potatoes 
expressing the lectin Galanthus nivalis agglutinin 
(GNA) had variable effects on different parts 
of the rat gastrointestinal tract, such as the 
proliferation of the gastric mucosa.
Peer-reviewed research 





Feeding caddis fly larvae Bt maize in laboratory 
tests resulted in growth reduction and increased 
mortality rate.
Peer-reviewed
Huber D. (2011) A new pathogen originating from glyphosate 
tolerant GM crops causes plant infections and 
infertility and fetal losses in cattle fed GM feed.
Personal letter to 
US secretary of 
Agriculture - scientific 
paper announced - no 
publication as of 2015
Séralini G.E. et al. 
(2012)
Rats fed GM maize and various concentrations 
of a herbicide for a period of two years 
developed more and more serious tumours than 
the control group, and developed the tumours 
earlier in their lives.
Peer-reviewed, retracted 
& republished in other 
journal
Carman J.A. et al. 
(2013)
Pigs fed with GM maize for several months 
developed significant higher levels of stomach 
inflammation and some had an enlarged uterus.
Peer-reviewed
1.3 ATTEMPTS TO SEPARATE FACTS AND VALUES FUEL THE DEBATE 
Governments attempt to isolate the discussion about facts (the ‘scientific’ 
discussion) from the discussion about values (the ‘political’ or ‘societal’ 
discussion) by treating the debate about alarming studies as ‘simple’ or 
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‘structured’ problems (Hisschemöller and Hoppe 1995). However, in the 
debate regarding GM crops ‘political values’ and ‘scientific facts’ are strongly 
intertwined. Separating them and only taking ‘scientific facts’ into consideration 
when it comes to decision-making fuels the ongoing discussion. Consequently, 
the debate about GMOs escalates and becomes polarised. A seemingly simple 
discussion about a scientific study (e.g. the Séralini paper) that goes against 
the existing safety evaluation of a GM crop develops into a chaotic debate that 
goes far beyond scientific research. We believe that further analysis is needed 
to investigate if and how it is possible to get past this repetitive cycle. 
We use an overview and qualitative analysis of arguments used between 1999 
and 2013 by stakeholders in a selection of representative alarming GM crop 
case studies to illustrate this pattern. We analyse the dynamics and interaction 
of the arguments to illustrate that there is and probably will be a permanent 
difference in viewpoints because there is disagreement about facts as well as 
values and their interconnectedness. Therefore, the situation cannot be solved 
by reassessing the study or conducting more research because this will only 
create more facts while the value conflict remains. The focus of the debate 
should be on these fundamental differences about values and making them 
explicit and manageable in the discussion. 
2. ARGUMENT ANALYSIS
Discussions following the publication of an alarming study roughly follow 
the same pattern. After publication, the discussion starts within the 
scientific community with detailed arguments about the research design and 
methodologies used. Soon however, the audience widens and the discussion 
drifts off towards arguments about GMOs in general and their role in 
agricultural practice (Bovenkerk 2012). Finally, prejudices, personal attacks 
and accusations about conflicts of interest start to increasingly influence the 
debate that ends in a deadlock without a definitive outcome. 
Based on an overall inventarisation we identified three broad categories of 
arguments that play a role: specific arguments about the alarming study 
or publication; contextual arguments relating to the underlying discussion; 
and arguments about personal credibility. From there, we found twelve re-
occurring subcategories of arguments (Figure 1). 
The research in this paper is based on a content analysis of arguments used in 
scientific papers, opinion pieces, news articles, blogs and comments regarding 
alarming studies (Table 1). Citations were identified by means of a systematic 
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English search engine query based on the study’s author name and snowball 
search sampling to get a representative image of the debate from different 
sources.[4] 
Clustering of arguments in this article is an ideal-type[5] one and it should 
be noted that many citations contain elements from specific, contextual and 
personal arguments and the subcategories within these categories (Figure. 1). 
The arguments were categorised according to the degree to which they are 
representative of a certain type of argument. Additionally, the categories to 
which the arguments are assigned do not imply any judgement about their 
veracity. The goal of the classification is to draw conclusions about the influence 
of different arguments on the course of the debate. Personal details, company 
names and GMO variety specifications have been anonymised. Furthermore, 
the list of citations is not exhaustive, but provides an indication of the 
arguments that play a role in the debates about alarming studies. An extensive 
list of citations can be found in the appendix of a report of The Netherlands 
Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM 2013). Ongoing research in view 
of this article resulted in an extension of the existing list.
4 The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods pp. Atkinson and Flint (2004): snowball 
sampling.
5 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. pp. Max Weber (5.2: Ideal Type).
Figure 1: Clustering of arguments: the arguments in the discussion about alarming studies can be 




Specific arguments contain research details of the alarming study. These 
arguments focus on the experimental design, hypothesis and methods used, but 
they also discuss the scientific and administrative procedures surrounding the 
publication of research results in (peer-reviewed) journals. Specific arguments 
theoretically appeal to scientific facts and the practice of scientific research, 
but they also entail an underlying discussion about ‘good science’. We divided 
specific arguments into five subcategories: methodological, peer review, early-
warning, data availability and long-term effect arguments. 
2.1.1 METHODOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS; THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Methodological arguments are an important element in the initial debate 
following publication. The aim of these arguments is primarily to verify the 
scientific validity of the results and evaluate, confirm or refute the scientific 
credentials of the research and lead researcher(s). This usually results in a 
detailed discussion about the methodological setup of the experiments, as 
illustrated by two examples from the Séralini paper which was both criticised 
and defended: 
The [author] article claims to address the toxicity of herbicide-tolerant GM 
maize in the diet, with or without Roundup herbicide, and of Roundup alone 
when administered in drinking water at levels equivalent to 50 ng/L, 400 and 
2,250 mg/L of glyphosate. Since the water consumption was not measured 
it is not possible to calculate the real exposure to glyphosate from these 
concentrations. (Arjo et al. 2013)
We have replicated, extended and thus improved the experiments conducted by 
[author] and colleagues by measuring outcomes from 3 instead of 2 feed doses 
and more crucially for a period 8 times longer in duration (…) with 11 blood and 
urine measures of around 50 parameters, 34 organs instead of 17, etc., in order 
to ascertain if the statistical findings (…) were biologically relevant or not in the 
long term. (Séralini et al. 2013)
A Similar exchange of arguments can be found in the other alarming case 
studies mentioned in Table 1. An illustrative overview of arguments per type 
and per case study can be found in Additional table 1.
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2.1.2 PEER REVIEW ARGUMENTS: SCIENTIFIC QUALITY
Peer review arguments are used to emphasise, verify or evaluate the scientific 
quality of a publication. Both the value and limitations of peer review have 
been profoundly discussed in literature (Jennings 2006; The Economist 2013; 
Bohannon 2013; Nature 2006). Peer review is considered by both proponents 
and opponents of alarming studies to be a hallmark of good research, but they 
draw different conclusions. As a result the peer review system itself becomes 
part of the debate; proponents say the research was peer reviewed and thus 
good, whereas opponents say the peer review process was flawed and the study 
should be retracted, as illustrated by the following citations from the Séralini 
case (citations from the other cases, see Additional table 1):
A dangerous case of failure of the peer review system, which threatens the 
credibility not just of the journal but of the scientific method overall. (Reuters 
2012)
More than 26 international scientific peer-reviewed papers by the team with 
the lead author on the topic in the last 5 years, and 11 in toxicological journals 
on the same period only in PubMed.…None of the papers was considered as 
flawed by the scientific community. (Séralini et al. 2013)
2.1.3 EARLY-WARNING ARGUMENTS: SERIOUSNESS OF THE FINDINGS
A third specific argument focuses on the seriousness of the findings. These 
early-warning arguments highlight the effect and can have a major impact 
particularly in the public domain. This differs from the scientific domain where 
emphasis is usually placed on the methodological underpinnings, probability 
and validity of the claims. The ‘early-warning potential’ of arguments is also 
politically important in terms of policy response because ignoring potentially 
severe effects could have major consequences. Early-warning arguments 
create a sense of urgency. By stressing the seriousness of the situation (and 
broadening its scope) the sense of urgency to take action can be heightened. 
These arguments are likely to be magnified by media releases with shocking 
images, such as photos of rats with enormous tumours as an acclaimed result 
of GM food consumption (photos from the Séralini et al. (2012) paper were 
moreover reproduced in news articles e.g. CBSNews (2012)). The following are 
examples of early-warning arguments from the Séralini case (citations from 
the other cases, see Additional table 1):
Study linking GM maize to cancer must be taken seriously by regulators. Trial 
suggesting a GM maize strain causes cancer has attracted a torrent of abuse, 
but it cannot be swept under the carpet. (Vidal 2012d)
4
127
This is the main cause of your and your kids health problems and the monstrous 
obesity in the country. So if we do not start educating ourselves on GMO and 
do not demand our government now to stop pretending that they have no 
idea about what is going on with the notorious biotech industry, which is 
exterminating the US citizens as they do with their masterpieces super-weeds 
or super-bugs, then your kids and your grandchildren lives are in the greatest 
danger ever in the entire history of the planet Earth. (GMOSeralini 2013)
2.1.4 DATA AVAILABILITY ARGUMENTS: TRANSPARENCY
The availability of data provided in the publication is a recurring argument 
in the discussion about alarming studies on the safety of GM crops. One of 
the aims of these arguments is to remove uncertainty where possible and to 
verify and validate the conclusions of the research. It is ostensibly a factual 
discussion suggesting that the solution can be found by providing the missing 
data, but there may also be an implicit accusation that the owner of the data 
has something to hide or does not want the data to be checked by third parties. 
In practice, more data does not necessarily result in a final outcome; it can 
also reignite the (same) discussion. Here, we illustrate two examples of data 
availability arguments from the Séralini case (citations from the other cases, 
see Additional table 1): 
At this level, a full debate is biased if the toxicity tests on mammals of [GM crop 
variety] and [herbicide] obtained by [name] Company remain confidential and 
thus unavailable in an electronic format for the whole scientific community to 
conduct independent scrutiny of the raw data. (Séralini et al. 2013)
Following a written request by Professor [name], [regulatory agency] has today 
given the researcher access to all available data relating to the Authority’s 
evaluation of genetically modified (GM) maize [variety] carried out in 2003 
and 2009. (EFSA 2012a)
2.1.5 LONG-TERM EFFECT ARGUMENTS: UNQUESTIONED
The long-term effect argument is theoretically irrefutable. These arguments 
are a given in the debate about GM crops and other controversial technologies: 
long-term research is useful and important because it can provide more 
certainty about the safety of a new application. The long-term effect argument 
emphasises the importance of long-term research and usually points out the 
shortcomings of current safety research. Consequently, these arguments 
are used to disqualify the results of studies presented in the regulatory risk 
assessment of GM crops. They cast doubt on the value of existing findings 
and current standard in the risk assessment process. Interestingly, long-
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term effect arguments are often used in a self-evident way while remarks 
on the design complexity, interpretation and the use of the results of these 
experiments are seldom addressed in discussions about alarming studies. We 
illustrate two examples of long-term effect arguments from the Séralini case 
(citations from the other cases, see Additional table 1):
[Author]’s is the first long-term peer-reviewed toxicity study on the health 
impacts of GM [variety] maize and the commercial herbicide formulation it is 
engineered to be grown with. GM food crops are authorized on the basis of short 
(a maximum of 90-days) feeding studies, usually carried out in rats. Long-
term studies are not required by regulators anywhere in the world. (…) This 
shows that the 90-day tests routinely done on GM crops are not long enough to 
detect serious health effects that take time to develop, such as cancer and organ 
damage. (GMOSeralini 2012)
A point that I keep bringing up…is that every research animal in the US has 
been eating GMOs for well over a decade. These animals are closely monitored 
in animal colonies by trained professionals that include veterinarians and 
pathologists and biomedical researchers. If there were problems in their food, 
that would be obvious. (Worstall 2012)
Specific arguments are an essential part of the scientific discussion and valid 
within their scientific context, but they do not provide an answer to contextual 
or personal arguments (Section 2.2 and 2.3) that are triggered by alarming 
studies. Furthermore, arguments about peer review or long term effects also 
illustrate that the contents of what ‘good science’ entails, is not set in stone. 
This underpins our claim that science on its own cannot provide answers about 
the safety or desirability of GMOs.
2.2 CONTEXTUAL ARGUMENTS
The second category of arguments is focused on GMO related themes, such as 
the safety in general and other more fundamental issues (Marris 2001). We 
classify them as contextual arguments. They include wider issues based on 
the political, cultural and moral consequences of GM technology. Contextual 
arguments often say something about the direction in which society should 
be heading and are partially subject to personal preferences. Facts and values 
are strongly intertwined in this category. Therefore, issues relating to these 
arguments are usually not addressed in legislation. The government limits its 
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role to ensuring safety and freedom of choice (e.g. labelling in the EU). Wider 
issues are thus privatised and placed in the realm of individual responsibility 
(Swierstra and Te Molder 2012). The arguments in this category are about topics 
such as sustainability, biodiversity and naturalness, but also monopolisation 
of the food supply chain and the power of biotechnology companies. There 
are several types of contextual arguments; in this article we highlight three 
subcategories: generalisation, risk-benefit and burden-of-proof arguments. 
2.2.1 GENERALISATION ARGUMENTS: BEYOND THE DETAIL
Generalisation arguments increase the sense of urgency by broadening the scope 
of alarming studies and those affected by it. From a scientific perspective, an 
individual study on a GM crop only says something about that specific crop, or 
at most something about GM crops containing the same genetic modification 
induced by the same genes. The results of such studies are therefore not per 
sé representative for all GMOs. However, both proponents and opponents 
frequently draw opposite conclusions from the same results – namely that all 
GM crops are good/bad or safe/unsafe. In the public domain, it is difficult to 
make a distinction between specific and generic conclusions, in part because 
news reports often already include an element of generalisation. They stretch 
the implications of research findings beyond their original context. For 
example, some media extrapolate the results of feeding studies with animals 
to effects on humans and speak of GM crops in general instead of the specific 
GM crop. The scientific data are lifted out of the modelled context of science 
and dropped into the everyday world as a generally applicable finding. In the 
process, the findings are stripped of some or all context in which they were 
valid (COGEM 2005). This is illustrated by citations from the Séralini case 
where the entire regulatory system is dismissed or it is generally emphasised 
that ‘all’ GM foods are safe (citations from the other cases, see Additional table 
1):
[Author]’s findings revealed that industry and regulatory claims of biological 
irrelevance of effects found in 90-day tests are invalid. They showed further 
that the regulatory system for GM foods is inadequate and cast into question 
the safety of all commercialized GM foods. (Robinson 2013)
(…) that concluded the opposite about the effect of GM foods on animals: 




2.2.2 RISK-BENEFIT ARGUMENTS; BROADER CONTEXT
People use risk-benefit arguments to point out the wider consequences of a 
technology and the balance between risks and benefits. The use of risk-benefit 
arguments broadens the debate beyond issues that can be solved by the specific 
alarming study alone. Stakeholders make selective use of scientific reports 
on GM crops to demonstrate either the benefits or the lack of them. These 
arguments can be linked to the generalisation argument: either the benefits 
and safety of GMOs in general are emphasised, or all GMOs are said to be 
harmful and pose risks to humans and the environment, as illustrated from 
the Séralini case (citations from the other cases, see Additional table 1):
But my bigger concern is the well-established environmental downside of GMO 
crops. Biodiversity is damaged and pesticide resistance increases. (…) Far from 
enabling us to produce more food with less environmental damage the opposite 
is proving to be the case. (Entine 2012)
As for genetic manipulation – that’s got lots of potential benefits for food and 
feed production. The number of mouths to feed is increasing rapidly and the 
capacity to feed them, given climate change, is dropping. (Vidal 2012b)
2.2.3 BURDEN-OF-PROOF ARGUMENTS: INDEPENDENT RESEARCH
Burden-of-proof arguments question the independence of GM safety research. 
These arguments disqualify the opposition as a reliable discussion partner 
and trusted supplier of information, and often overlap with arguments 
about personal credibility (Section 2.3). The burden-of-proof issue in GM 
safety research seems to be a fundamental sticking point in the debate. The 
(political) decision to make companies legally responsible for demonstrating 
product safety has proved to be contentious. Obviously, the company given this 
responsibility has an interest in the approval of the product. At the same time, 
it can be argued that companies have nothing to gain by placing an unsafe 
product on the market, because there is a fair chance they will eventually 
receive claims for damages. Nor would everyone be in favour of the taxpayer 
footing the bill for safety studies of GM crops, especially those who have moral 
objections towards the technology itself. The burden-of-proof argument is 
used against biotech companies, but also against scientists who are considered 
as anti-GMO. Inevitably, these arguments have a strong link with ad hominem 
arguments (Section 2.3.3). We illustrate two examples of burden-of-proof 




We recall that in the regulatory assessment of GMOs, chemicals and medicines, 
tests are conducted by the applying companies themselves, often in their own 
laboratories. As a result, conflicts of interest exist in these cases. (Séralini et al. 
2013)
[Regulatory agency] had recommended approval of [company] Roundup-
tolerant maize in 2009 without first conducting or insuring any independent 
testing. They admitted in their official journal that they relied on ‘information 
supplied by the applicant’(…). (Engdahl 2012)
Contextual arguments are equally important and valid as scientific arguments. 
They address society and say something about the direction in which we should 
be heading and how decisions about (technological) developments should be 
made and by whom. At the same time, perspectives about society and the role 
of technology differ and are influenced by factors such as cultural, religious 
and personal preferences as well. Therefore, they belong in a sociopolitical 
context instead of a scientific debate about the safety of a specific GMO. 
Interestingly, there seems to be no designated platform for these discussions 
and governments usually employ safety as the only criterion for market release. 
2.3 ARGUMENTS ABOUT PERSONAL CREDIBILITY
The last overarching category is formed by arguments about personal 
credibility. These arguments focus on the opponent in the discussion, often 
resulting in a strong pro-contra debate. From this point on, the discussion is 
likely to derail into a fierce and personal discussion that is no longer related 
to the specific question (the validity and consequences of an alarming study). 
The fact that several participants have been active in the GM debate for many 
years easily reignites old accusations and suspicions. We identify four subtypes 
of arguments in this category: tu quoque, authority, ad hominem and conspiracy 
theory arguments. 
2.3.1 TU QUOQUE ARGUMENTS: YOU TOO
Tu quoque arguments (‘you too’) are used to bring the opponent down to 
the same level by pointing out that they have acted in the same way and 
are therefore no better. These arguments avoid discussing the substance of 
the issue in detail and seek to disqualify the discussion partner. Tit-for-tat 
accusations exacerbate the polarisation and uncompromising nature of the 
debate. Tu quoque arguments are widely used and often intertwined with other 
arguments, as illustrated by these citations from the Séralini case (citations 
from the other cases, see Additional table 1): 
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If we argue that [author]’s study does not prove that the GM food tested is 
dangerous, then we must also accept that industry studies on GM foods cannot 
prove they are safe. (GMOSeralini 2013)
[Website] is one of the most rabidly anti-GM sites out there, so I don’t think 
they’re anyone to be pointing fingers and accusing people of not being 
‘impartial judges’. (Vidal 2012a)
2.3.2 AUTHORITY ARGUMENTS: EXPERT OPINION
The effect of the authority argument is ambiguous. Authority arguments are 
used initially to increase the value of an opinion given by a person, organisation 
or journal. However, an inherent problem with the authority argument is that 
discussions should be foremost about what someone says and not who says it. 
Then again, the authority of experts in a certain field does play a role in the 
debate. Their views deserve to be given more weight and recognition in the 
debate than those of others, not only because they have relevant qualifications 
or experience, but because they have demonstrated that they deserve this 
authority in their field (Slob 2006). A point that should be made on authority 
claims is that specialists from different areas of expertise weigh evidence 
differently and this can lead to diverging conclusions from authorities which 
cannot be compared easily (Sarewitz 2004; Oreskes 2004). Authority can also 
be compromised and parties involved usually have some sort of interest which 
shapes their response to evidence. Therefore it is legitimate to inquire into 
those interests (Oreskes 2004; Etzkowitz 1996). However, if a debate is already 
polarised, it will be almost impossible to invoke authority unchallenged. 
Consequently, these arguments are employed to improve one’s own stature or 
to dispute the authority and expertise of the discussion partner, as illustrated 
by the Séralini case (citations from the other cases, see Additional table 1):
He’s not a toxicologist and hasn’t studied or published any papers on the health 
effects of GMOs, so I am not sure how he is qualified to comment on a study by 
[author]’s team, who have published many such studies. (Vidal 2012c)
The journal, one of the best toxicological journals, did not retract the study, 
despite relentless pressure to do so. (CRIIGEN 2013)
2.3.3 AD HOMINEM ARGUMENTS: PLAYING THE MAN
Ad hominem arguments or ‘playing the man, not the ball’ cast suspicion on 
other stakeholders in the debate. It is an umbrella argument that is often 
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intertwined with other arguments, from methodological and peer review 
arguments to burden-of-proof and authority arguments. Ad hominem 
arguments do not address the substance of the criticism, but cast doubt on 
the right of the other party to make a comment at all. Ad hominem attacks are 
considered a disturbing trend in the GMO discussion (Arjo et al. 2013). The aim 
of ad hominem arguments is to disqualify the opponent as a discussion partner 
and to divert attention from the matter at hand. They encourage tit-for-tat 
accusations, leading to a polarised debate. Here, we illustrate two examples of 
ad hominem arguments from the Séralini case (citations from the other cases, 
see Additional table 1):
Since [person] is tied in closely with GM corporations he is not an impartial 
judge of [author]’s study. (Vidal 2012c) 
Towards the end of September, shocking headlines ricocheted around the 
world, claiming eating GM food caused cancer. But the truth is much darker: an 
anti-GM scientist overtly manipulated scientific process and the media to get 
those headlines. (Finkel 2012)
2.3.4 CONSPIRACY THEORY ARGUMENTS: DISTRUST THE SYSTEM
Conspiracy theories attribute an event to the actions of powerful people or 
organisations that are said to be trying to hide their involvement from the 
outside world (Sustein 2009). Although it cannot be excluded that some 
stakeholders in the field of GM technology have coordinated their activities, 
there are usually no direct sources to confirm this and commentators tend 
to repeat each other’s claims in blogs and social media. More importantly, 
conspiracy theories divert the attention from the social, scientific and political 
issues and above all generate mistrust of the parties involved (Van der Linden 
2013). We illustrate two examples of conspiracy theories that were mentioned 
in the Séralini case (citations from the other cases, see Additional table 1):
This revolving door of corrupt ties between powerful private industry lobby 
groups and the EU Commission was in full view recently with the ruling of the 
[regulatory agency] trying to discredit serious scientific tests about the deadly 
effects of a variety of [company] GMO corn. (Engdahl 2012)
It is much better for the economy to have both GMO and GMO chemical sales 
AND the cost of curing the impact from the GMOs. That becomes the sticky issue 
in all this because German & Swiss pharmaceutical giants are heavily invested 
in cancer technology. Almost a conflict of interest. (Bardocz et al. 2012)
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Arguments about personal credibility have become a persistent part of the 
GMO discussion (Arjo et al. 2013). Instead of contributing to a constructive 
debate about a scientific or sociopolitical issue, these arguments usually have 
an opposite effect. They result in a ‘blame game’ that reduces trust in all 
parties involved and increases polarization and escalation of the debate.
3. DYNAMICS OF THE DISCUSSION ABOUT ALARMING STUDIES
Based on the argument analysis in Section 2, we conclude that a selection 
of arguments is used repeatedly in the discussion initiated by alarming GM 
crop studies between 1999 and 2013. These dynamics are also seen in other 
applications of genetic modification such as animal biotechnology (Meijer and 
Brom 2009). From our analysis, conclusions can be drawn on the influence of 
the arguments on the direction of the discussion. 
3.1 A HOTCHPOTCH OF ARGUMENTS
The GM debate is characterised by multi-level disagreements about definitional, 
factual, scientific, interest-based, value-based, moral and metaphysical 
aspects (Bovenkerk 2012). Disagreements about definitions and facts have 
been attributed merely to science, whereas interest-based, value, moral and 
worldview disagreements belong to the realm of politics and the public domain. 
In practice however, scientific disagreements are usually not solely about facts 
and political disagreements do not strictly originate from values. But even 
after years of recurring debates about alarming studies science is still pointed 
at to provide a final solution. 
Although a theoretical distinction can be made between the various arguments 
1) most of them contain a mix of elements from several types, and 2) the same 
arguments are often used by different parties from a different perspective (e.g. 
peer review arguments, seriousness of the findings, authority arguments). 
Some of the arguments have a clear purpose in the discussion; they aim to 
reassure, alarm, make value judgements or convince the opponent. Other 
arguments however, do not link directly to the specific alarming study. In 
this article, we identify them as contextual or personal arguments. We argue 
that these arguments are important indicators for the underlying debate 
about values triggered by new technologies. In our opinion, the recurrence of 
contextual arguments points towards urgent questions about food production 
and agriculture in general. The question is whether they belong in this debate 
about specific alarming studies or in a broader debate about what sort of society 
we want and which technologies are desirable to get there.
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3.2 CONTEXTUAL ARGUMENTS HAMPER DECISION MAKING
The debate about alarming studies is hampered by contextual arguments 
that address wider issues such as risk-benefit, socio-economic aspects and 
issues relating to burden-of-proof. Because a solution for these wider issues 
cannot be found within the specific situation these arguments make it more 
complicated to reach an agreement on the significance and consequences of an 
alarming study. 
In the debate about GMO safety, arguments about personal credibility appear 
to be on the increase in both the scientific and the social domain. These 
arguments divert attention from the main issues and are foremost geared to 
disqualify the opponent as a discussion partner (Slovic 2000). They do not 
contribute to the discussion and lead to polarisation, a hardening of attitudes 
and escalation of the debate.
3.3 GOVERNANCE SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE BOTH FACTS AND VALUES
In the political and policy-making domain, the tensions and discrepancies 
between the different stakeholders and arguments are a focus point. It is a 
political task to evaluate all arguments and decide on actions to be taken. The 
outcome must be based on the appropriate expertise and facts but it should 
also do justice to wider concerns raised among the public. Mampuys and Brom 
(2015) provide an in depth analysis of governance options for dealing with 
alarming studies. 
The current governance structure attempts to separate the ‘scientific’ discussion 
about ‘facts’ from the ‘political’ discussion about ‘values’. We have shown in 
our argument analysis that this separation cannot be made and that scientific 
facts won’t provide a solution as long as there is an underlying discussion 
about the values that form the foundation of the risk assessment framework. A 
vicious cycle has arisen partially because governments keep pointing at science 
to provide final answers. 
3.4 STRUCTURING MULTI-LEVEL DISAGREEMENTS
Hisschemöller & Hoppe (1995) presented a distinction into four types of 
problems based on the level of agreement about the facts and values: agreement 
about facts and values (structured problem), agreement about one of them 
(moderately structured problem – either technical (agreement about the 
problem, not the solution) or merely political (agreement about the solution, 
not the problem)) – and agreement about neither (unstructured problem) 
(Hisschemöller 1993; Hisschemöller & Hoppe 1995). Our classification of 
specific, contextual and personal arguments can also be attributed to these 
categories (Table 2). 
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For each type of problem, a different solution is suggested by Hisschemöller 
& Hoppe (1995). Stakeholders approach the GM debate persistently as either 
a structured problem or a semi-structured problem where science will 
remove uncertainties and provide pragmatic solutions that will lead to a 
definitive outcome. Other aspects that relate to underlying values, morals and 
worldviews are directed to individual choices. Our argument analysis confirms 
the conclusion that GM crops are a wicked or unstructured problem (Termeer 
et al. 2013). A wicked problem can be defined as a dynamic problem without 
clear demarcation or definition which is continually redefined and reproduced, 
making previous solutions no longer workable while defining new problems 
Table 2: Characterisation of problems based on scientific and normative consensus. Adapted from: 







Structured problem Moderately structured problem
Agreement about means & ends Disagreement about ends (agreement 
about solution)
Focus on specific publication related 
arguments
Contextual AND specific publication 
related arguments
Experts or bureaucrats Consensus conferences
NO 
CONSENSUS
Moderately structured problem Unstructured problem
Disagreement about means 
(agreement about problem)
Disagreement about means & ends
Specific publication related AND 
contextual arguments
Specific publication related AND 
contextual AND personal arguments
Expert committees Socio-political debate
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and questions (Rittel & Webber 1973; Batie & Schweikhardt 2009). Additional 
research and more data production will fuel this process. 
The situation can only improve if an explicit discussion is facilitated about the 
value framework in which the scientific assessment has to function. If this 
value framework is 1) articulated and 2) endorsed and defended by political 
actors, science can play its role in the response to alarming studies. However, 
given the many different levels of disagreement about GM technology, it seems 
unlikely that an agreement can be found any time soon. A broader conversation 
about the value framework regarding agriculture and food production is needed 
but won’t solve the issue of alarming studies because the value question of GM 
crops will continue to differ on an individual level. 
4. DISCUSSION & CONCLUDING REMARKS
Alarming studies about the safety of GMOs have reignited national and 
international debates because they constitute a public (Warner 2002) that’s 
overflowing with issues that cannot play a formal role in the current decision 
making process for GM crops. Scientists, risk assessors, companies, NGOs, 
citizens, politicians and policymakers compete for attention in a wide variety 
of arguments expressed in scientific papers, statements, news reports, blogs 
and comments. 
The dynamics and characteristics of these debates on the safety of GMOs are 
not unique. Similar debates take place about other controversial technologies 
or developments that affect social values. Examples are shale gas, nuclear 
energy or vaccination programs. Drawing on several GMO case studies, this 
article presented an overview of the arguments used in these debates: specific, 
contextual and personal arguments. We have shown that the debate about 
these studies follows a similar and recurring pattern. Based on the analysis of 
these case studies, we believe that alarming studies will continue to reignite 
the GMO debate because there are different viewpoints on both the scientific 
process and the context of application of GMOs in agriculture. 
4.1 ADDITIONAL SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT NO REMEDY
Our analysis has shown that the current regulation of GM crops does not 
(sufficiently) take into account the fact that the implementation of this 
technology in society is an unstructured problem. Stakeholders point at 
scientific uncertainties as the core of the problem and scientists are expected 
to remove these uncertainties. This causes a shift in political decision making 
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towards the scientific domain, making it part of the wider debate about GM 
crops. This wider debate can’t be solved by science alone. 
Worldwide, national and international governments evaluate the safety of GM 
crops. The dominant regulatory consensus is that so far there are no reasons to 
doubt the possibility of applying GM crops in agriculture with a negligible risk 
to humans and the environment. Despite the recurrence of alarming studies, 
to date there have been no confirmed incidents with GM crops approved for 
market release (Nicolia et al. 2014). Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that 
the current regulatory consensus on the risk assessment procedures is valid. 
We want to emphasise the importance of continuous and critical validation of 
the status quo in risk assessment procedures. It is not possible to determine 
straight away whether the results and claims of alarming studies are valid. 
We are of the opinion that these studies should always be investigated from a 
scientific point of view. This fits the regular model of scientific developments 
being confirmed, refuted or corrected by additional research and building 
a body of evidence for a specific finding. Therefore, it is important that 
regulatory actors are vigilant of the risk of bias towards the validity of new 
research findings. To a certain extent, definitional, factual and scientific 
disagreements can be solved here. However, it also means that those involved 
will have to accept disagreement on the wider issues relating to GMOs and 
restrain themselves in the specific discussion about alarming studies. 
4.2 ADDRESSING WIDER ISSUES OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
We emphasize that the scientific assessment is ‘only’ a part of the political 
and public debate about the desirability of GMOs. Therefore, stakeholders 
should be hesitant to look solely at scientific research to provide answers in 
the GM debate (Blankesteijn et al. 2014). The scientific risk assessment may 
deal with the safety issues, but interest-based, value, moral and worldview 
disagreements play an important role in the discussion about GMOs as well. 
Our analysis of the debate surrounding alarming GM crop safety studies makes 
clear that the safety debate is fueled in a non-productive way by contextual 
issues. Although these studies trigger a broader debate on social and political 
elements of GM technology, they are unsuitable vehicles for a wider democratic 
debate. We believe that these issues should not be addressed in an ad hoc way 
in response to alarming studies, but during the normal course of research and 
development and as part of the ongoing debate about what kind of society we 
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want and what kind of technologies can contribute. The underlying discussion 
about food production and agriculture involves a multitude of values that 
go beyond GM specific arguments and these require a separate discussion. 
Governments can play an important role in facilitating this discussion, but 
they don’t necessarily carry sole responsibility for the outcome. There are 
valid reasons for placing certain decisions regarding the production of food in 
the private domain, since they involve personal preferences that permanently 
differ between individuals, groups, religions, nationalities and cultures. As a 
final conclusion we want to emphasize the importance of making fundamental 




GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO ALARMING 




This chapter was published as: Mampuys R & Brom F.W.A. (2015). Governance strategies for 
responding to alarming studies on the safety of GM crops. Journal of responsible innovation 
2(2): 201-219






Alarming studies initially highlight a specific technological risk that is 
possibly being disregarded in the existing governance system. Governments 
therefore usually address the issue as a structured and case-specific scientific 
problem. Secondly however, these studies trigger a broader debate on the 
social and political elements of the technological debate. These issues cannot 
be addressed in the context of a response to the alarming study. In this paper 
we analyse government responses to cases of alarming studies to underpin 
our claim that alarming studies are unsuitable vehicles for a wider democratic 
debate about technology. We identify a series of recommendations on how to 
respond to alarming studies within the current governance structure, while 
our main and overarching point is that that other platforms are needed to 
enable conversations about responsible innovation. 
The dynamics of the debate ignited by alarming studies are not technology 
specific; there are strong similarities in the debate around different controversial 
technologies such as shale gas, nuclear energy, genetically modified (GM) 
crops or vaccination programmes. In this paper, we will use GM crops as our 
main subject.
The use of genetic modification in agricultural applications has been subject 
to strict safety regulation for a long time. These regulations originate from 
the scientific consensus that genetically modified (GM) crops could potentially 
present risks to humans and the environment. The European regulations 
therefore focus on safety aspects, whereas other aspects (such as principal, 
ethical or socio-economic aspects) are considered an individual or market 
choice and are therefore secured by European labelling regulations for GM food 
and feed.[1] It should be noted that this article is written from within continental 
Europe and our analysis conclusions will therefore be more relevant in this 
context than outside of Europe.
Companies, universities and research institutes look into the potential risks 
and short- and long-term effects of GMOs on humans and the environment 
(Nicolia et al. 2014). The result of this research, whether published in scientific 
literature or not, forms the basis for the safety assessments by licensing 
authorities. Market approvals for GM crops are subject to an extensive 
1 Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified 
organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms 
and amending Directive 2001/18/EC.
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environmental and food safety risk assessment before being approved or 
denied for commercial release (European Commission 2001, 2003). After 
market approval, monitoring is implemented as an additional safety net to 
identify any indirect or unexpected adverse effects on the environment. The 
dominant consensus in the biotech sector and regulatory community is that 
the current risk assessment practice is adequate (or even too strict) and thus 
that GM crops that are approved for market release are safe. Among scientists, 
the nature and status of this consensus are recurrent topics of discussion 
(e.g. Hilbeck et al. (2015)). To date there have been no incidents confirmed by 
governments or competent authorities in which GM crops approved for market 
release have caused direct harm to the environment or human health (Nicolia 
et al. 2014). This consensus is extended and reconfirmed by enlarging the body 
of evidence about the safety of GM crops through ongoing research. 
1.1 ALARMING STUDIES REIGNITE DISCUSSION 
Although the vast majority of research indicates that no significant adverse 
effects can be expected from the use of GM crops approved for commercial 
release, studies concluding that certain (approved) GMOs do cause harm to 
human and animal health or the environment do crop up occasionally. We 
propose to call those ‘alarming studies’ because they alarm other scientists, 
risk assessors, governments, companies and the broader public of unknown 
risks that are possibly being disregarded in the existing system. Although 
these (scientific) publications seem to be directed at the scientific community, 
they are characterised by the fact that they address a broader public (and set 
of issues). This public evolves around the topic of GMOs but actively comes 
into ‘existence’ when an alarming study is published. The concatenation of 
texts on this subject over time has created a public (and counterpublic) with 
a specific discourse that is addressed by alarming studies (see also Warner 
(2002). Alarming studies provoke fierce debates and can lead to considerable 
disquiet and anxiety. More importantly, the debates are open-ended because 
those involved ultimately cannot agree on the significance of these studies or 
the consequences that should be attached to them. 
Governments have a duty to safeguard human and environmental safety, 
which means that society expects them to respond to reports that one of 
these is at risk. In other words: governments must respond in one way or 
another to alarming studies. This is usually done by a reassessment of the 
study by scientific advisory bodies. However, the acceptance of the outcome 
of the assessment is severely hampered by the fact that the appearance of 
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an alarming study will also reignite a broader discussion about the value of 
GM technology. Disagreements about these aspects will not and cannot be 
solved by reassessing an alarming study. Thus, underlying questions remain 
unanswered and the answers provided are not acknowledged, resulting in 
frustration for all stakeholders involved. As a result, the status quo in the GM 
debate seems to get worse. 
1.2 BIOTECHNOLOGY DEBATE CHARACTERISED BY MULTI-LEVEL DISAGREEMENTS
Despite the dominant consensus, not everyone agrees with the current 
governance structure for GM crops. The debate about the implementation of 
GM crop technology in society is characterised by multi-level disagreements 
about definitional, factual, scientific, interest-based, value-based, moral and 
metaphysical aspects (Bovenkerk 2012). Definitional, factual and scientific 
disagreements have been classified to be merely attributed to science, whereas 
interest-based, value, moral and worldview disagreements belong to the realm 
of politics[2]. In practice however, these elements are strongly intertwined in 
discussions about GM technology. We would like to add, perhaps redundantly, 
that scientific disagreements are usually not solely about facts and political 
disagreements don’t strictly originate from values. The roots of these multi-
level disagreements are based on differences in views on science, society, 
nature and food production. This has been illustrated amongst others by a 
report of the Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM 2013). 
The report illustrates that there is no general agreement about the facts or 
about the values regarding GM. Neither is there agreement about the goal this 
technology could serve or about the means that should be used otherwise to 
reach this goal.
For the purpose of this article, we integrate the broader means / ends separation 
with a commonly used distinction between four types of problems. It is based 
on agreement about the facts and values (structured problem), agreement 
about one of them (moderately structured problem – either technical or merely 
2 When referring to politics in this paper, we address both the socio-political debate in the public realm 
on the impact of GM-technology as well as the regulatory-political debate related to the governance of 
GM-technology. Based on the description of Jeremy Waldron (‘that the felt need among members of a 
certain group for a common framework or decision or course of action on some matter, even in the face of 
disagreement about what that framework, or decision or course of action should be, are the circumstances 
of politics’(Waldron 1999) and Chantal Mouffe (‘to envisage politics as a form of ‘agonistic pluralism’ in 
order to stress that in modern democratic politics, the crucial problem is how to transform antagonism into 
agnonism’ (Mouffe 2000), we are of the opinion that the ‘regulatory-political debate’ cannot be untangled 
from the ‘public socio-political debate’ that takes place outside of the regulatory framework. Wherever we 
refer to one of those in particular, this will be made explicit in the text. 
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political – and agreement about neither (unstructured problem) (Hisschemöller 
1993). Furthermore, depending on the type of problem, different solutions are 
proposed to best fit the characteristics of the dispute (Hisschemöller & Hoppe 
1995) (Table 1). 
The rhetoric of the debate about GM crops should be understood as an 
unstructured problem (Mampuys & Brom 2015a). From a European perspective, 
we will show that stakeholders persistently keep approaching the problem 
as either a structured problem or a moderately structured problem in which 
scientific experts or expert committees will remove uncertainties and provide 
pragmatic solutions that will lead to a definitive outcome. The reigniting 
discussion after the publication of so-called ‘alarming studies’ about the safety 
of GM crops proves over and over that this is not the case.
We think that further polarisation and escalation of the debate have to be 
prevented in order to give future discussions about the value of GM technology 
a chance. Therefore, we investigate potential improvements in responding to 
alarming studies from a governance perspective. In this article we look into the 
Table 1: Characterisation of problems based on scientific and normative consensus Adapted from: 







Structured problem Moderately structured problem
Agreement about means & ends Disagreement about ends (agreement 
about solution)
Experts or bureaucrats Consensus conferences
NO 
CONSENSUS
Moderately structured problem Unstructured problem
Disagreement about means 
(agreement about problem)
Disagreement about means & ends
Expert committees learning strategy / public debate
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options for action (such as monitoring, initial response, adopting measures, 
selecting experts/advisory bodies, national and international alignment, 
follow-up actions and communication) open to governments and advisory 
bodies in response to the appearance of an alarming study. The options each 
have their own benefits, risks and pitfalls, from which lessons and pointers 
can be drawn. These are looked at in more detail and recommendations are 
made on how to respond to alarming studies with a focus on doing justice 
to both the facts and the values that play a role in the debate and the role of 
political decision-makers vis-á-vis the societal political debate. With these 
recommendations, we aim to at least restrain the widening gap between the 
different frames of facts and values about GM technology. 
2. ALARMING STUDIES
We propose to use the term ‘alarming study’ for a scientific or other study, 
the results of which may or may not have been published in a peer-reviewed 
journal, from which it can be concluded that a technological innovation 
(such as a GM crop) poses a threat to human and/or animal health and the 
environment. The term ‘alarming study’ refers only to the claim made and 
does not say anything about the veracity or otherwise of the study. 
Alarming studies have been appearing since the first GM crops were authorised 
for placing on the market. We concluded before that the GM debate should be 
understood as an unstructured problem, leaving discussions about the value 
and position of alarming studies open-ended. Consequently, the names of 
these studies recur and accumulate in the debate whenever new ‘alarming 
studies’ make the news. In terms of Warner (2002), these studies address 
both a scientific and regulatory public as well as a broader (counter)public 
consisting of other stakeholders such as companies, NGOs, citizens and 
consumers. Alarming studies are therefore one of the most important triggers 
to reignite the GM debate and that is why we analyse them to assess the effect 
of governance response strategies on the GM debate. A key example of an 
alarming study is a paper by a French scientist about the health effects of the 
consumption of GM maize (Text box 1).
Other examples of alarming studies that we analysed for the purpose of this 
article are Ewen & Pusztai (1999), Rosi-Marshall et al. (2007), Huber (2011) and 
Carman et al. (2013) (Table 2).
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The discussion following the publication of an alarming study appears to have 
a repetitive character that can roughly be described as follows: the author(s) 
and opponents of GMOs point to the alarming publication as proof that GM 
crops pose a risk and some argue that measures should be taken (immediately). 
Governments usually respond in a procedural manner by referring the study 
to their scientific advisory bodies. These assess the publication according to 
the agreed research protocols and methods based on EU and international 
regulations and come to the conclusion – so far – that the research does not 
pass the test of scientific credibility and that there is no reason to revoke or 
postpone authorisations for GM crops: 
Taking into consideration Member States’ assessments and the authors’ 
answer to critics, EFSA finds that the study as reported by Séralini et al. is of 
insufficient scientific quality for safety assessments. EFSA concludes that the 
currently available evidence does not impact on the ongoing re-evaluation 
of glyphosate and does not call for the reopening of the safety evaluations of 
maize NK603 and its related stacks. 
EFSA statement on final review of Séralini et al. (EFSA 2012c).
Box 1. Example of an alarming study
In September 2012 the Journal Food and Chemical Toxicology published the results 
of a study by Séralini et al. (2012) in which rats were fed GM maize and various 
concentrations of a glyphosate containing herbicide for a period of two years. Séralini 
and his team concluded that the rats fed with the GM maize and herbicide developed 
more and more serious tumours than the control group, and they developed the tumours 
earlier in their lives. Because the GM maize variety used in this research has been on 
the market for several years, the publication led to an international debate and several 
national authorities and scientific advisory bodies looked into the results to see if there 
was a need to revise their opinion that this GM maize was safe for consumption. 
They concluded that the study contained methodological shortcomings and that the 
conclusions could not be justified. Although the study was dismissed as being unsound 
and incorrect by advisory bodies and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA 
(2012b)), several NGOs and scientists disagreed and the debate in Europe continued. 
Eventually, the Séralini paper was retracted by the editor and later it was republished in 
another journal (RetractionWatch 2014). Despite the discussion and formal outcome, this 
study is moreover referred to as proof that the consumption of herbicide-tolerant GM 
maize causes cancer and other adverse effects (GMOSeralini 2014b).
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Overall, the data presented in the paper are not convincing of adverse effects 
due to the GM diet and provide no grounds for revising FSANZ’s conclusions 
about the safety of previously approved glyphosate-tolerant and insect-
protected GM corn lines and glyphosate-tolerant GM soy lines. 
Australia New Zealand Food Standards’ response to a feeding study in 
pigs by Carman et al. (FSANZ 2013).
For the government and those in the scientific community who endorse the 
current risk assessment frame, this appears to be the end of the matter. 
However, those who are of the opinion that the results are (another) reason 
to ban GM crops are disregarded and they continue to pursue the debate 
with undiminished vigour. Characteristic for this discussion on GMOs is the 
broadening of the debate to wider issues like the safety of GM crops in general, 
distrust in biotech companies, the power of multinationals over global food 
production and the desirability of current practice in agriculture (Marris 2001). 
Implicitly and explicitly, multi-level disagreements come to the surface. Some 
examples of arguments in this debate are:[3] 
With regard to biodiversity, there have been too few long term, properly 
controlled studies of the effects of GM crops to make much comment. 
Rosi-Marshall case (Fitzsimons 2009).
Séralini’s findings revealed that industry and regulatory claims of biological 
irrelevance of effects found in 90-day tests are invalid. They showed further 
that the regulatory system for GM foods is inadequate and cast into question 
the safety of all commercialized GM foods.
Séralini case (Robinson 2013).
3 A systematic overview of the arguments used in the debate can be found in a report of the Netherlands 
Commission on Genetic Modification: COGEM report CGM/131031-01.
Table 2: Examples of alarming studies.
Author Alarming effect claimed
Ewen and Pusztai (1999) Rats fed GM potatoes show abnormalities 
digestive tract
Rosi-Marshall et al. (2007) Harmful effects of GM maize in aquatic insects
Huber (2011) New pathogen from GM crops
Séralini et al. (2012) Rats fed GM crops develop cancer
Carman et al. (2013) Pigs fed GM feed show harmful effects
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This is highly sensitive information that could result in a collapse of US soy 
and corn export markets and significant disruption of domestic food and feed 
supplies. On the other hand, this new organism may already be responsible for 
significant harm. 
Huber case (Huber 2011).
There are a lot of things that are wrong with GMOs, but not on a biological 
level. Rather, it’s the question of intellectual property and patent laws that are 
a huge disadvantage to small farmers. 
Carman case (Gorski 2013).
There is a real problem for us here, and that is that you say that it is not right 
to discuss unpublished work; as I understand, all of the evidence taken by the 
advisory committee in that report comes from the commercial companies, all 
of that is unpublished. 
Ewen and Pusztai case (Williams (1999). 
Similar (underlying) arguments are described by Sarewitz (2004) with regard 
to a ‘vicious’ debate that unfolded after the publication of Quist and Chapela 
(2001) about the introgression of transgenic DNA into traditional maize 
events in Mexico. This case could also be considered an alarming study. Under 
current policies, the debate on the authorisation of GM crops concentrates 
on demonstrating their safety. Although the existence of uncertainties in the 
environmental risk assessment is acknowledged, governments urge scientists 
and advisory bodies to come up with answers that can dispel these uncertainties 
(Van Asselt and Vos 2010, Wardekker et al. 2008). A standard model is that 
if uncertainties are removed, the correct course of action will be apparent 
(Sarewitz 2004). This suggests that governments assume that uncertainties 
about risks lie at the heart of the public debate on GM crops (Marris 2001), and 
it hopes that removing these uncertainties will settle the debate. Two issues 
can be identified in this approach. 
Firstly, it disregards the diversity in scientific disciplines resulting in different 
and sometimes competing views on science and nature, as also demonstrated by 
Sarewitz (2004). According to Sarewitz, these differences reflect the “richness 
of nature, and the consequent incapacity of science (…) to develop a coherent, unified 
picture of “the environment” that all can agree on”. He concludes that “uncertainty 
is in part a manifestation of the disunity of science and the plurality of institutional and 
political players (…) involved in the conduct and interpretation of scientific research” 
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(Sarewitz 2004). Therefore, even ruling out conflicts of interest and ideological 
commitments to look at “what the science is really telling us” can be a meaningless 
exercise” (Sarewitz 2004).
Secondly, governments limit their role to ensuring public health, environmental 
safety and freedom of choice (e.g. labelling in the EU). This means that they 
hardly take non-safety issues into account in decision-making on GMOs, 
whereas the sentiment is largely concerned with just these issues. This 
changes the focus of the safety aspect, because scientific research and risk 
assessment themselves become the subjects of a critical political discussion in 
which broader arguments are intertwined with safety issues.
Given the recurring debate about GM crops, it seems that the current (risk) 
assessment framework and governance structure is controversial because it 
does not take into account broader issues that relate to environmental concerns 
and food production. We think that other platforms are needed to enable 
conversations about responsible innovation. However, a definitive solution 
that will settle all levels of disagreement does not seem close on the short 
term, if possible at all. Meanwhile, some practical solution has to be found 
within the current governance frameworks. Therefore, we identify a series of 
recommendations on how to respond to alarming studies within the current 
realm of technical debate about alarming studies. 
3. GOVERNANCE OPTIONS 
Within the force field of different arguments that are put forward in response 
to an alarming study, national governments are looked at for a solution. Given 
their responsibility towards those who rely on the existing framework such as 
consumers, but also companies, researchers and investors, governments have 
to respond to alarming studies the best they can. This is a challenge, because 
those involved have different ideas about the knowledge and actions necessary 
to solve the problem (Sarewitz 2004, Wynne 1989). Experiences from cases 
of alarming studies from the past can throw light on the effect of various 
options open to government and advisory bodies as a learning opportunity for 
the future. The government’s response will depend on various factors, such as 
the status of the research, the nature and intensity of the debate and the stage 
it is in.
In this article, we distinguish four phases (I – IV) in which the government and 
advisory bodies have an opportunity to make choices: preparation (monitoring), 
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first response (timing and opening gambit), obtaining advice (gather expertise 
and data) and finally the phase of response (communication and follow-up 
actions) (Table 3). For each phase, we will discuss the possible consequences 
of government actions and we will identify pointers and pitfalls.
3.1 MONITORING (I)
Preparing for discussions about alarming studies is usually done by means of 
monitoring via civil servants, assessment agencies and advisory bodies. Through 
their work and (inter)national networks they are naturally informed of new 
developments and ongoing research. By monitoring scientific developments, 
governments can avoid being confronted unexpectedly with an alarming study 
making the news and they will be able to respond rapidly. Monitoring can also 
support a learning process on recognising emerging discussions. A possible 
pitfall for agencies interpreting monitoring results is that results that go against 
the dominant scientific consensus are not picked up as quickly after repeated 
false claims (by the same author). This makes it important to remain open to 
new developments and unconventional research methods. Another possibility 
is that researchers themselves inform governments about ‘alarming’ results at 
an early stage. Regardless the veracity of alarming results, the course of the 
debate and monitoring thereof can also influence the decision and timing for a 
response from the government. 
3.2 TIMING AND OPENING GAMBIT (II)
After publication of an alarming study, governments have to decide about their 
(initial) response to the event. First, relevant questions have to be answered 
such as: What is the status of the publication and are immediate measures, such 
as a moratorium, justified? Answering these questions is difficult, especially 
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when there are uncertainties about the scientific value of the publication. 
Ignoring an alarming study or responding too late can lead to suspicion and 
dissatisfaction with the conduct of government, but an ad hoc response from 
governments invoking precautionary measures will give the impression that 
the situation must be serious, which can also lead to a (possibly unjustified) 
escalation of concern. 
3.2.1 INITIAL RESPONSE
Alarming studies can lead to national or international debates about the safety 
of GMOs, and in most cases it is not possible to determine straight away 
whether the results and claims in such studies are valid, regardless whether 
the study is published in a peer reviewed journal or not (Text box 2). 
In the already polarised debate about GMOs, alarming studies are very likely 
to make the news. With the chances of considerable media attention, the 
EFSA decided to respond instantly to the publication of the Séralini paper 
(EFSA 2012a). In a statement, EFSA acknowledged the existence of the study 
and announced an assessment of the paper’s relevance. The fast response 
demonstrated an effective monitoring of scientific developments. On the other 
hand, to those who are less familiar with the regulatory framework it can also 
invoke questions about the working methods and function of the organisation 
such as: are there GMOs in our food and are they safe? Is this the first time that 
EFSA looks into the safety of this maize? 
Box 2. Peer review as a criterion for assessment.
Several alarming studies have put forward the question whether the government should 
respond to peer-reviewed studies only or to unpublished but alarming research results as 
well. Peer review is considered by both proponents and opponents of specific studies to 
be a hallmark of good research, but they draw different conclusions: proponents say the 
research was good, whereas opponents say the peer review process was flawed. Both 
the value and limitations of peer review have been profoundly discussed in literature 
(Bohannon 2013, Jennings 2006, Nature 2006, The Economist 2013). In addition, it 
should be noted that applications for marketing authorisation of GM crops can also 
contain unpublished and non-peer-reviewed information. Although these studies 
undergo a type of review in the form of appraisals by competent authorities and advisory 
bodies this could become a pitfall that makes the government come across as biased. 




Governments and governmental bodies usually limit their role to ensuring 
certain requirements are met, such as safety standards and (specifically for 
Europe) freedom of choice with regard to food products by means of labelling. 
The underlying objectives and methods for decisions about these issues are 
often implicit or largely unknown to the public. This goes in particular for 
choices that have been made before alarming studies gather media attention, 
such as the regulatory approval of GM crops. If people are not aware of the 
existence of safety regulations for the commercialisation of GM crops, the 
acknowledging statement mentioned above may not have the contemplated 
effect. The decision making process of GM crops in Europe has moreover been 
deemed indistinct and complicated by scientists, companies and (non-EU) 
regulators / policymakers (Dunwell 2014, Masip et al. 2013). Besides a lack of 
transparency, these complexities have led to several problems in international 
trade (Meester, Berkhout and Dries 2013). This likely makes it even more 
difficult for people to get a grasp on who decides when about GM crops and 
based on what kind of data and considerations. 
Studies about consumer attitudes to GM food support the idea that providing 
clear and convincing information about managing the risks of a technology is 
more effective than promoting the benefits (and thereby ignoring concern about 
potential risks) (Durant & Legge Jr 2006, Hess et al. 2013). The availability of 
transparent and understandable information about procedures and regulations 
could therefore be helpful to answer relevant basic questions the moment 
an alarming study hits the news. Obviously, the more complex or political 
procedures are, the more difficult it will be to translate this information outside 
a group of experts involved in the regulatory framework itself. 
3.2.2 MORATORIUM
Based on the results of an alarming study, governments have to decide 
whether or not immediate (precautionary) measures should be taken, such as 
a moratorium on the import and/or cultivation of a GM crop or even retrieving 
products from the supermarket shelves. Changing existing procedures or 
declaring a moratorium are only possible if there is a justifiable ground for 
concern regarding human or environmental safety. However, in the early 
stages of a study that goes against the dominant regulatory consensus, there 
are usually several uncertainties about the seriousness of the situation. Given 
the body of evidence about the safety of GMOs that have been approved for 
market release, a single alarming study or publication will seldom provide 
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indisputable evidence of an acute risk that justifies immediate action. 
Additionally, a moratorium can have far-reaching consequences for political 
relations and commerce. For these reasons, the various interests at stake and 
the risks involved have to be carefully considered before taking restricting 
measures. 
However, it should be noted that in risk perception, the seriousness of the 
effect is often considered of greater importance than its probability. While 
this can be a sign of ‘irrationality’ (‘probability neglect’ (Sustein 2005)), it 
may be morally justified. For example in the case of a catastrophic risk such 
as a nuclear meltdown, the consequences can be enormous, even though the 
chance of occurrence is low. This can justify that people find it an unacceptable 
risk (Roeser 2002); also given that risk estimates involve uncertainties 
(Hansson 2004, Slovic 2000). Feelings of concern regarding food safety can 
incur emotions that are likely to be magnified by media releases with shocking 
images, such as photos of rats with enormous tumours as an acclaimed result 
of GM food consumption (photos from the Séralini et al. (2012) paper were 
moreover reproduced in news articles e.g. Castillo (2012)). Emphasising the 
safety of a GM crop and pointing towards the existing safety assessments for 
market approval are unlikely to contribute to the acknowledgement of these 
emotions. 
Besides national or European measures such as a moratorium, there are other 
ways to enable people to act according to feelings of concern in relation to 
GMOs. In the EU, GM labelling in food provides a means for people to choose 
whether to consume GMOs. The effectiveness of these measures lies in the 
availability of transparent and understandable information about regulations 
such as those for labelling and traceability (Section 3.2.1).
3.3 EXPERTISE AND DATA (III)
In most cases, the government will only be able to make a decision about any 
measures to be taken after establishing with sufficient certainty if the study 
justifies these actions. In the current assessment framework of GM crops, this 
is usually done by having the study reviewed by scientific advisory bodies.
3.3.1 CHOICE OF ADVISORY BODIES
Various (inter)national advisory bodies are appointed to assess the 
environmental and food safety aspects of GMOs and provide advice to their 
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government. Therefore, it seems evident to ask them for a reassessment. 
However, asking the same bodies that have assessed the GM crop in the first 
place for advice on an alarming study about that same crop can incur resistance 
because of the possibility of bias or prejudice (GMWatch 2012a). This is one 
of the reasons why the Belgian Biosafety Council chose to install an ad hoc 
advisory committee to examine the Séralini study (Belgian Biosafety Advisory 
Council 2012). The decision to either lay down the request with the appointed 
advisory body or install an ad hoc committee each has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. 
Appointed advisory bodies have relevant expertise and experience and the 
resources to respond rapidly. Additionally, their visibility and ‘raison d’être’ 
are enhanced in the process. However, the provision of advice by the established 
advisory bodies also has pitfalls. The ability to remain sensitive and alert to 
new research methods and or results may be constrained, because established 
bodies usually work with specific research protocols and methods, based on EU 
and international regulations. Moreover, in the interests of consistency and 
reliability, professional organisations may be reluctant to retract earlier advice, 
given that their reputation and credibility is an important factor in how their 
advice is regarded. Scientific knowledge is subject to change, whereas a certain 
degree of consistency is also important in risk assessment and evaluation. 
Constantly changing the risk assessment can lead to a loss of confidence 
among companies (legal certainty) and other stakeholders, whereas waiting 
too long to make changes can also damage confidence. Furthermore, when 
advisory bodies become (or are seen to be) part of the established system that 
represents a dominant but disputed paradigm, their advice may not provide 
useful input, and may even exacerbate the controversy (GM-FreeCymru 2012, 
GMWatch 2012b). 
Obtaining advice from a different or ad hoc advisory body can provide a fresh 
perspective and may be more easily accepted. However, by establishing an ad 
hoc committee the government also risks putting the value of the acknowledged 
advisory bodies in doubt. It could even disqualify them in the eye of the public. 
Furthermore, putting together an ad hoc committee is time-consuming and 
there is a risk that the government will be accused of cherry picking from the 
pool of available expertise to influence the outcome. The decision to consult an 
established advisory body or an ad hoc advisory body is namely a political one. 
5
157
3.3.2 COORDINATION WITH NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN ADVISORY BODIES
Where food and environmental issues surrounding GMOs have international 
ramifications it is customary to consult with other (inter)national advisory 
bodies about the quality and availability of the research data (Text box 3) and 
the validity of the conclusions (EFSA 2012c, NVWA 2012). 
The advantage of (international) consultation is that use can be made of a wide 
variety of available expertise. If it is possible to come to a common position, 
coordination has the potential to achieve international agreement, which can 
in turn increase acceptance and support for the outcome. 
A risk of (international) coordination is that the agreements made will look 
like consensus while they are in fact a compromise. Given the different 
positions within Europe about the authorisation of GM crops, some points 
will be subject to negotiation: the evaluation and measures proposed may be 
too cautious for some and too rigorous for others. Presenting compromises in 
a consensus document can be conceived as a selective form of transparency 
in which minority opinions are not visible. Furthermore, there is a risk of 
tunnel vision among those in agreement. A risk of limiting consultations to 
national coordination is that the final outcome may not be in agreement with 
international (EU) policy or that different outcomes fuel the GM debate leading 
to further polarisation.
Box 3. Availability of research data as a criterion for assessment.
The availability of (raw) research data of alarming studies as well as safety assessment 
data from biotechnology companies is a recurring topic in the GMO discussion. While 
we will not elaborate on this point in detail here, we want to point at the limitations 
of the persuasive power of data. Interpreting third-party raw data is difficult and time-
consuming and if, after all the hold-ups and delays to provide this data, this does not lead 
to a definitive judgement about an alarming study, stakeholders may not be forgiving 
(given the sense of urgency and concern). Furthermore, the data debate suggests that 
providing missing information will lead to a final solution and that there is a single truth 
waiting to be uncovered. It should be noted that the disagreement about GMOs is not 
solely about the data itself but merely about the interpretation and relevance of these 
data (and who provides it).
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To the broader public, international coordination can be seen as an obscure 
process, making it easy for critics to dismiss it as a conspiracy or orchestrated 
response (GM-FreeCymru 2012). In addition, it may increase a defensive 
position of the authors of the paper and decrease the possibility to have an 
open and fruitful discussion. The integrity and authority of the negotiators is 
therefore of importance during international coordination. As borders fade, 
international orientation and coordination is often essential (or even obligatory 
within the EU), but it does not relieve national governments of the duty to 
explicitly form their own judgement.
3.4 COMMUNICATION AND FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS (IV)
Once the assessments by scientific advisory bodies are carried out, governments 
have to decide on the value of the alarming study and any consequences that 
should be attached to it. Sometimes, politics invoke scientific uncertainties 
as a reason to justify taking or not taking action in relation to controversial 
technologies when in fact underlying issues or values play a role (Sarewitz 
2004). A recent article by Holbrook and Briggle (2014) also elaborates on the 
complicated relation between knowledge and action. Amongst others, they 
underline the importance of addressing or even confronting the underlying 
values as an essential part of responsible innovation and decision-making. 
This puts up the question whether and which other arguments apart from 
science the government should consider and what channels they should use to 
communicate their view on an alarming study. 
3.4.1 COMMUNICATING ABOUT THE ASSESSMENT OF ALARMING STUDIES
In the first instance, alarming studies about the safety of GMOs have a bearing 
on safety policy. Governments respond by asking their advisory bodies to 
investigate whether the results of the study are accurate and valid. After a 
scientific assessment, they will have to make a statement why they will or will 
not take measures.
These statements usually reconfirm the dominant consensus about the safety 
of GM crops approved for market release. So far, it was concluded that there 
is no reason to revoke or postpone authorisations for GM crops based on the 
results of the alarming study. On the one hand, this response addresses the 
primary question about the initial trigger for the discussion: the alarming 
study. On the other hand, it does not clarify which arguments are considered 
in the formal decision-making on GMOs (e.g. biosafety) and which are not 
(wider issues) and why. Usually, communication is limited to pointing out the 
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relevant procedures (‘we have asked our advisory bodies to assess or reconsider 
the study’) and issuing a press release on the findings of these advisory bodies. 
While this is relevant and important, it all too easily comes across as ‘these are 
the facts and you’ll have to accept them’ (Te Molder 2011). It remains unclear 
why other arguments, for example in a broader debate on agriculture and food 
production, are not taken into account. 
Contextual arguments regarding GMOs are part of the political debate about 
the type of society we want and the technologies we need to get there. They 
concern topics such as sustainability, biodiversity and naturalness, but also 
monopolisation of the food chain and the power of biotechnology companies. 
These arguments frustrate the dialogue because a solution to these wider 
problems cannot be found within the specific situation of an alarming study. 
Ad hoc situations, such as the appearance of an alarming study, are therefore 
by definition unsuitable vehicles for these arguments and discussions. 
Nevertheless, political arguments are out of necessity triggered by the 
appearance of alarming studies because they cannot be addressed elsewhere. 
Platforms that enable conversations about responsible innovation are urgently 
needed and the government can reinforce its position as a public’s source of 
information by establishing a platform where political arguments regarding 
GMOs can be aired. However, the responsibility to establish these platforms 
is not confined to the government. There are different options for the form 
this platform could take, such as forums, ‘thinking laboratories’ (a cross 
between closed expert committees and open public debates) (Ruivenkamp 
and Jongerden 2010) or a broader (inter)national debate on food production 
in general. We emphasise that addressing wider issues involves more than 
setting up a discussion forum; it also obligates those involved, including 
government, to take the outcome serious and act on the results. Moreover, 
contextual arguments and wider issues are in fact a political discussion in 
which the role of public policy including regulation is at stake. 
3.4.2 FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS
Alarming studies present new results that go against the dominant consensus 
on the safety of GMOs. The usual response to contradictory results is to 
establish whether they can be confirmed or refuted by existing studies or by 
conducting further experiments. However, if the experimental design and 
method differ from standard tests and broadly recognised research protocols, 
it proves difficult to find studies to compare results with (DeFrancesco 2013). 
Moreover, when the majority of scientists in the field consider a study to 
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be methodologically flawed or incorrect, repeat studies will always lead to 
further discussion. Furthermore, from a scientific point of view a biased or 
methodologically dubious safety study (accidentally or on purpose) should 
not be an incentive to conduct further research with public sector funding 
(Text box 4). In such cases, the responsibility should lie with the researchers 
themselves to improve and rectify their study. This can be problematic because 
it is not always unequivocally clear whether a study is scientifically sound or 
not or whether the findings are unreliable due to misconduct or honest error 
(Hayes 2013). 
Undertaking further research confirms that the issue is taken seriously and 
it can bring an element of calm to the debate, at least temporarily. On the 
other hand, commissioning further research may also cause a public stir, 
because then there is ‘apparently’ reason for concern. Referring to existing 
and repeatedly confirmed research results is faster and can emphasise the 
existing body of evidence. However, because comparative research results are 
not abundant, there is a risk that the government and advisory bodies will be 
accused of cherry picking the results that suit them. It should be noted that 
study designs for complex research such as feeding trials differ to varying 
degrees. This will easily ignite another discussion about methods, execution 
and results. 
If repeat or follow-up research is being undertaken, stakeholders will probably 
try to influence the design of the additional studies and the composition of 
the research team. More importantly, they may withdraw support during the 
process if they disagree with the chosen approach. These situations already 
occurred with follow-up research of the findings of Séralini et al. (2012), initiated 
Box 4. Time & funding as a criterion for follow-up research
Government funding for replicating a study branded by the scientific community as being 
methodologically weak can meet with incomprehension and resistance from the scientific 
field. Furthermore, counter-research into safety studies of GMOs found to be safe for 
placing on the market is not interesting for most researchers because of the high costs and 
limited publication potential. Additionally, it can be regarded as a waste of time, money 
and experimental animals. The compulsory post-market monitoring of GM crops should 
be sufficient to bring to light any unanticipated adverse effects following marketing 
authorisation. Furthermore, commercial activities may be put on the backburner as a 
precaution when follow-up research is initiated.
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by the French government (GMOSeralini 2014a) and the EU GRACE project.[4] 
If involvement of important stakeholders is lost, support for the final outcome 
of the research will also crumble. Given the polarised discussion about GMOs, 
there is a significant chance that when the results of additional research are 
published, the debate will reignite and escalate all over, whatever the results 
(Bauer-Panskus and Then 2014, Schiemann 2014). Points to consider when 
referring to already existing research results include identifying clear criteria 
or a quality model for selecting alternative studies to refute or confirm the 
alarming study. Things that require careful attention when commissioning 
further research include the choice of researchers and the transparency of the 
decision-making process. 
There seems to be no ‘right choice’ in conducting additional research or 
not. If no repeat studies are carried out and no comparable results can be 
found, the study will remain unique and, despite the criticisms, references 
to the results will remain. It may therefore be advisable to repeat studies to 
overcome the limitations of the previous one. Although this will not solve the 
issue indefinitely, the potential for scientific improvement remains open and 
communication between stakeholders is encouraged.[5]
4. DISCUSSION & CONCLUDING REMARKS
The lack of and focus on consensus about the significance and consequences 
of alarming studies makes these events important catalysts in the recurring 
debate about GMOs. They reignite a broader discussion about GMOs where 
conflicts of interest, quality of scientific research, government responsibility, 
transparency of safety research, influence of biotechnology firms and 
monopolisation of farming practices play an important role. There are multi-
level disagreements about the value and contribution of GM technology to food 
production. 
With the analysis of government responses to alarming studies, we have shown 
that the scientific assessment is part of the regulatory and socio-political debate 
about the safety or desirability of GMOs but it does not cover all its aspects. 
We consider it important to emphasize that scientific research on the safety 
of GMOs including follow-up studies will never produce indisputable proof. In 
this context, we would like to acknowledge two authors who have paraphrased 






can at best produce “a robust consensus based on a process of inquiry that allows 
for continued scrutiny, re-examination and revision”. Sarewitz (2006) describes 
science as an excess production of objectivity: “Science seeks to come to grips with 
the richness and complexity of nature through numerous disciplinary approaches, 
each of which gives factual, yet always incomplete, views of reality”. It is ultimately 
up to politicians to decide at what point science provides a sufficient basis to 
make a decision and to accept responsibility for this (Sarewitz 2004). 
In practice, the formal process determining decision-making about GM 
crops strongly focusses on depoliticising the issue at hand and treating it as 
a technical ‘scientific’ or structured ‘factual’ problem. There is an extensive 
framework for the (risk) assessment of GMOs in Europe, but it seems that 
despite broad agreement amongst part of the stakeholders, others disagree 
with this governance structure. The recurrence of alarming studies and current 
response strategies of EU governments leads to further polarisation and 
hardening of the GM debate.
From the recurrence of alarming studies, it becomes clear that the current 
framework is controversial, but a quick fix for the complex problem of GM 
technology is not nearby. Given the complexity and duration of the GMO 
debate, it seems clear that there is no ideal recipe or roadmap on how to handle 
alarming studies about the safety of GM crops. Therefore, solutions have to be 
found within the existing framework and governance structure. To restrain 
and limit the widening gap of the facts & values discussion about GM crops, 
governments should improve their response strategies. This article discusses 
the various options for governments and advisory bodies in responding 
to alarming studies about the safety of GMOs. Based on an analyses of the 
dynamics of past debates, lessons, pointers, risks and pitfalls are identified 
that can help the government prepare for and anticipate future situations 
(Tables 4- 6).
Our first conclusion is that alarming studies about the safety of GMOs will always 
make the news because the GM debate has never settled due to multi-level 
disagreements about facts and values. Scientific and political disagreements 
both play a role amongst the public, including the regulatory framework and 
among scientists themselves. To prevent unexpected confrontations with 
alarming studies, governments should monitor the developments in scientific 
research by means of their network of civil servants, assessment agencies and 
advisory bodies. Providing insight into the rules and regulations regarding 
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safety of GMOs after an alarming study hits the news, will not be embraced 
easily or even be regarded with suspicion. Therefore, it is important that 
transparent and understandable information about both the scientific and 
political procedures regarding decision making of GMOs is already available. 
This kind of continuous transparency and disclosure gives structure to the 
debate and provides a better background to understand the actions taken or 
not taken as a consequence of an alarming study.
Secondly, because it is not possible to determine straight away whether the 
results and claims in alarming studies are valid or not, their credibility and 
validity will always have to be investigated. An instant response or statement 
that the government is aware of the situation and visualisation of their priorities 
in responding to the alarming study can contribute to transparency and trust. 
Additionally, governments could redirect questions to existing information 
sources about food & environmental safety of GMOs and the decision-making 
process. 
Given the polarised discussion on GMOs and the strong pro-/contra 
atmosphere, advisory bodies must beware of rigid thinking and tunnel vision 
and keep an open mind towards new or unconventional research methods and 
results. Governments should be aware of both a potential bias of conventional 
advisory bodies as well as the risk of disqualifying them by installing an ad 
hoc commission by establishing criteria for a second opinion in addition to the 
advice from the formally responsible bodies. This should make sure that the 
second opinion adds to the credibility of the system instead of discrediting it. 
In addition, advisory bodies and governments should be aware of the effect of 
international alignment on the escalation and polarisation of the debate. 
Third, a (re)assessment by scientific bodies of the study or the GMOs concerned 
is not sufficient to bring the debate to a satisfactory closure. In the process, 
we claim it would be advisable to make a distinction between the information 
Table 4: Governance of alarming studies: preparation
Phase Lessons & pointers
I Preparation
• Monitor scientific developments
• Remain alert and open to new or even unconventional research
• Ensure access to information about decision-making GMOs
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and communication needs of the different stakeholders, which will help 
the government and advisory bodies to devise appropriate communication 
strategies for different stakeholders. This also means the public sector must 
have in-house expertise on science and science communication to ensure that 
it can meet the information needs of the various stakeholders. Furthermore, 
communication should not start when an alarming study is published, but 
beforehand. That is part of what responsible innovation entails in our opinion. 
Responsible innovation means integrating societal and ethical considerations 
in science and technology research and development (Van Oudheusden 2014). 
Therefore, governments should not only communicate the safety issues in 
their response. Such a procedural reaction does not do justice to the political 
discussion about the context of GMOs that is brought to the table repeatedly. 
Although an (unmanageable) broadening of the debate could hamper the 
chance of reaching a consensus on the scientific value of the alarming study, 
government should acknowledge the position and role of both scientific and 
political aspects in decision-making. 
Furthermore, although more research will unlikely solve the issue of alarming 
studies and GM technology indefinitely; repeating a study to overcome its 
limitations keeps the potential for scientific improvement open. Despite 
the different viewpoints, communication between stakeholders should be 
continuously encouraged and an effort should be made to prevent withdrawal 
of important stakeholders from the process. 
We think that the reigniting discussion about alarming studies on GMOs is 
an indicator in a broader debate about agriculture and food production, given 
the fact that many contextual arguments are not GMO specific. Governments 
should therefore continue to monitor social trends and developments and 
Table 5: Governance of alarming studies: response and advisory requests.
Phase Lessons & pointers
II First response
• Respond
• Acknowledge situation and explain governmental priorities
• Redirect to existing and understandable information sources
• Emphasise importance of openness towards research results
III Advice
• Establish criteria for a second opinion
• Visualise individual positions in international alignment
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remain cognisant of the contextual arguments about GMOs. Forcing the 
discussion into a safety debate format leads to frustration and dissatisfaction. 
For various reasons, some cannot accept the conclusion that GMOs authorised 
for market release are found to be safe by scientific advisory bodies. At the 
same time, governments and scientists become frustrated because the public 
will not accept ‘the facts’ about the safety of GMOs. 
It is essential to indicate which arguments will be considered in the decision-
making on GMOs and which will not. More importantly, it should be made 
clear where these other arguments may contribute to policy making, for 
example in a broader debate on agriculture and food production. This could 
partially discharge the scientific debate from normative questions regarding 
the desirability of GMOs. The first steps towards such a system were already 
taken in 2010 when the European Commission announced plans to give 
individual member states the freedom to veto cultivation of GM crops in their 
country (European Commission 2010a). In 2015, this resulted in an amendment 
of Directive 2001/18/EC aiming to combine a community authorisation system 
regarding safety with additional freedom for Member States to decide whether 
they wish to cultivate GM crops on their territory based on non-safety 
arguments[6]. 
It is ultimately up to politicians to decide when scientific evidence is ‘good 
enough’ to make a decision and stand for it. With this, the debate should shift 
towards the issues that are really at hand in the GMO discussion. Aside from 
procedural decisions, we conclude that it is necessary to put the political debate 
back on the agenda with regard to unstructured problems such as GM crops. To 
cite Sarewitz & Pielke Jr (2000). 
6 Directive (EU) 2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 amending 
Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation 
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in their territory.
Table 6: Governance of alarming studies: response and follow-up.
Phase Lessons & pointers
IV Response
• Acknowledge both specific and contextual aspects
• Make explicit which issues are not addressed and why
• Repeat and improve study to overcome limitations
• Be realistic about the outcome
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“No longer able to hide behind scientific controversy, politics would have to 
engage in processes of persuasion, reframing, disaggregation, and devolution, 
to locate areas of value consensus, overlapping interests, or low-stakes options 
(…) that can enable action in the absence of a comprehensive political solution 
of scientific understanding”. 
Transparency and visibility of political decision-making is crucial, as scientific 
information alone will never rule out all uncertainties. In the introduction of 
this article, we classified GM crops as an unstructured problem characterised 
by disagreement about both facts and values, and about both the means and 
the ends of the technology. As probable solutions to this type of problem, a 
learning strategy and public debate were proposed (Table 1). We conclude that 
(formal) political debate should be added to this list. Based on the findings of 
this article, we endorse the claim of (Van Oudheusden (2014)), who emphasized 
the (leading) role of politics in responsible innovation. Finally, we note once 
more that the dynamics and characteristics of the debate on the safety of GMOs 
are not unique. Similar debates arise around other controversial technologies 
or developments that affect social values (e.g. shale gas, nuclear energy or 
vaccination programs). The pointers and pitfalls identified in this article can 






CONTROVERSY FIRST: FACTORS LIMITING THE SUCCESS OF 
DIRECTIVE (EU) 2015/412 FOR NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 




This chapter was published as: Mampuys R. & Poort L.M. (2019). Factors limiting the success of 
Directive (EU) 2015/412 for national decision-making on the cultivation of GM crops. Journal of 
Law, Innovation and Technology 11(2): 175-202






The use of genetically modified (GM) crops within Europe has been subject to 
regulation since 1990.[1] The regulation originates from the scientific consensus 
that genetically modified organisms (GMOs) could potentially present a risk 
to humans and the environment (Berg 2008). The resulting legal framework 
is based on an extensive environmental and food safety risk assessment. To 
date there have been no incidents confirmed by governments or competent 
authorities in which GM crops approved for market release have caused direct 
harm to the environment or human health (Nicolia et al. 2014). Nevertheless, 
among scientists, politicians and the broader public, the nature and status of 
the adequacy of the regulatory assessment remain topics of ongoing discussion. 
Recurring alarming studies[2] on the food and environmental safety of GM 
crops trigger the existing conflict about GM crops. Additionally, consistently 
more general concerns have been expressed regarding GM crop cultivation, 
such as those related to industrial agriculture and the use of pesticides. The 
divergent views on scientific, ideological, political, social and cultural elements 
classify the GM crop discussion as an intractable conflict or wicked problem 
(Schön & Rein 1994, Rittel & Webber 1973 and Mampuys & Brom 2015b). As a 
consequence, decision-making about the cultivation of genetically modified 
(GM) crops in the European Union (EU) has become a laborious process (Smart 
et al. 2016 and Mühlböck & Tosun 2017). 
Commercialisation of GM crops in Europe requires a market authorisation 
approval on a European level for both importation and cultivation.[3] GM crops 
have to 1) pass a risk assessment procedure and 2) be approved by the Member 
States (MS) based on qualified majority voting or by the European Commission 
(EC). 
Decision-making on the authorisation of GM crops for cultivation in Europe 
has been troubled for many years, because MS are unable to reach a qualified 
majority either in favour of, or against, the market authorisation (step 2). In 
all cases, the application had already passed the risk assessment procedure 
with a positive result i.e. it was concluded that the GM crop is safe for humans 
1 Council Directive 90/220/EC of 23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into the environment of 
genetically modified organisms.
2 A scientific or other study claiming that a technological innovation (e.g. a GM crop) poses a threat to 
human health or the environment which has not been acknowledged by the existing governance system (see 
Mampuys & Brom 2015).
3 Directive 2001/18/EC and Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003.
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and the environment (step 1). Although the EC is mandated to autonomously 
take a decision in these cases, it seems hesitant to do so because of the political 
sensitivity of this topic. As a result; decision-making on the cultivation of GM 
crops in Europe came to a halt and applications are piling up. The discussion 
is deadlocked and both MS who want to cultivate GM crops as well as MS who 
want to legally restrict cultivation cannot have their way. 
The EC concluded that the safety framework might be (mis-)used to object 
to licensing because there was no framework available to express other, 
national concerns that relate to non-safety issues associated with GMOs.[4] 
In 2015 Directive (EU) 2015/412 (hereafter: Directive) was adopted which – in 
addition to and separately from the safety assessment - enables MS to restrict 
or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their territory based on considerations 
other than safety. The new Directive was supposed to remove the deadlock in 
decision-making on the EU market authorisations of GM crop cultivation and 
give individual MS autonomy to legally restrict cultivation of these crops. 
As of 2018, however, it seems that this new approach has not worked out 
in the way it was intended. A majority of MS did use the new Directive to 
opt-out from GM crop cultivation on their territory[5], but at the same time 
this did not change the voting behaviour of MS regarding the overall EU 
market authorisation process. The last voting in March 2017 on two pending 
cultivation applications and one renewal did not result in a qualified majority 
either in favour of, or against, the GM crops (European Commission 2017). Was 
it a faulty solution to the actual problem? Or a solution to the wrong problem? 
Or both? 
In this paper, we argue that the new European Directive 2015/412 could function 
adequately if it would do more justice to the deeply rooted conflict about GMOs. 
To illustrate this, we use an alternative lens of an ‘ethos of controversies’, that, 
in a nutshell, emphasises that decision-making builds on temporary political 
agreement, and, thus, not necessarily signals the end of ideological, religious 
or cultural conflict. This approach claims that even when dealing with value-
4 Directive (EU) 2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 amending 
Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation 
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in their territory.
5 European Commission ‘Restrictions of geographical scope of GMO applications/authorisations: 
Member States demands and outcomes’ <http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/authorisation/
cultivation/geographical_scope_en> Accessed 16 April 2018.
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orientated disagreements it is in theory possible to come to an adequate and 
reasonable regulation. Structuring the issue by exploring and acknowledging 
the controversies, does more justice to the diverging viewpoints and can be a 
first step towards decision-making on intractable disagreements such as GM 
crops.
We start by exploring the European struggle for a comprehensive assessment 
framework for GM crops (Section 2) and will zoom in on the latest attempt of 
the EC to end the deadlock on decision-making about the market authorisation 
of GM crop cultivation (Section 3). Then we will introduce and explain the 
theoretical framework of an interactive legislative approach (Section 4). This 
approach can be understood in the context of the interactionist paradigm 
of law-making (Van der Burg 2014). The interactionist paradigm contains a 
gradual shift from top-down law-making towards law-making building on 
co-operative effort in which law is made by various stakeholders (Van der 
Burg 2016). Poort’s approach claims that even when dealing with value-
orientated disagreements it is in theory possible to come to an adequate and 
reasonable regulation (Poort 2013). By using an ethos of controversies, this 
approach structures a first step towards decision-making by exploring and 
acknowledging the controversies that characterise the issue.
We will use this theoretical lens to identify several factors that limit the 
potential success of the new Directive on GM crop cultivation (Section 5). 
This Directive provides a unique example of how the existing controversies 
are not only acknowledged, but how non-safety considerations are also given 
an explicit legal status in regulatory decision-making. Finally, we propose a 
strategy, using an ethos of controversies, which could unlock the potential of 
the new Directive as a window of opportunity for decision-making about GM 
crop cultivation.
2. THE EUROPEAN STRUGGLE ON GM CROP CULTIVATION 
AUTHORISATION
Market authorisation of GM crops (import and/or cultivation) is regulated 
Europe-wide and based on an assessment of food/feed and environmental 
safety and decided on by means of a qualified majority voting by the MS. In 
brief, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) conducts an environmental 
and food safety assessment of the GM crop. All EU MS get the opportunity 
to assess the application and send their conclusion, remarks and questions 
to EFSA. Eventually, this results in a scientific opinion that is sent to the 
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EC.[6] If the EFSA concludes that the product does not pose a risk to human 
health or to the environment, the EC submits a draft implementing decision of 
authorisation to the MS, represented in either the Standing or the Regulatory 
Committee.[7] Voting officially has to be scheduled within three months after 
publication of the EFSA scientific opinion.
Under the comitology procedure[8], MS vote under the ‘qualified majority’ 
defined in the Lisbon Treaty (see EPRS 2014). If MS vote ‘Yes’, the EC adopts 
the draft decision. If they vote ‘No’, or if the result of the vote is ‘No opinion’ 
(no qualified majority in favour or against), the EC submits the draft decision 
to the Appeal Committee.[9] Here, MS vote a second time on the draft decision. 
A qualified majority in favour or against respectively results in the approval 
or rejection of the draft decision. If again the result is ‘No Opinion’, the EC is 
itself required by the GMO legal framework and by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights to adopt a decision on the application. 
Only once since 2003 there has been a qualified majority in favour of a draft 
Commission Decision on market authorisation of a GM crop (Smart et al. 
2015). Several authorisation decisions (only importation) have been adopted 
by the Commission without the support of the MS. Many applications in 
the system have however contracted a considerable delay (Smart et al. 2015) 
and authorisation decisions about cultivation have been completely halted, 
even when the European ombudsman concluded that these delays were 
unjustified.[10] Additionally, the incoherence of Europe on GM crop cultivation 
6 European Commission, ‘Review of the decision-making process on GMOs in the EU: questions and 
answers.’ (2015) Memo 15-4779_EN, Brussels, 22 April.
7 Applications submitted under Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003 are presented for voting in the Standing 
Committee on the food chain and animal health (SCFCAH), Applications under Dir. 2011/18/EC are 
presented for voting to the Regulatory Committee. Both committees are composed of governmental 
representatives of the relevant ministries of the MS. 
8 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the council amending 
Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for 
control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers’ COD (2017) 85 final.
9 In the Appeal Committee, usually an attaché of the permanent representation (Foreign Affairs) in Brussels 
represents the MS in the voting.
10 Case 1582/2014/PHP, ‘Decision of the European Ombudsman closing the inquiry into complaint 
1582/2014/PHP on the European Commission’s handling of authorisation applications for genetically 
modified food and feed’ European Ombudsman, 15 January 2016; European Commission ‘Proposal for a 
Council Decision concerning the provisional prohibition of the use and sale in Austria of genetically modified 




versus importation has moreover led to critique and incomprehension within 
and outside of Europe (Tagliabue 2016, Wager & McHughen 2010). To capture 
the origins of this disagreement, we go back to the beginning of GM regulation 
in Europe.
2.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE
After the Asilomar conference[11] in 1975 it was globally acknowledged that GMOs 
could potentially pose a risk to humans and the environment (Berg 2008). This 
trigger eventually resulted in national and international legislation to assess 
the potential hazards of GMOs in all laboratory experiments, field trials and 
market authorisations. In Europe legislation for commercial release of GM 
crops was put into place in 1990. Initially, several GM crops were authorized 
for commercialisation. 
However, when the first GM crops (corn and soy) were actually exported from 
the USA to Europe in 1996/1997, this led to considerable media attention, public 
concern about safety, demonstrations and boycotts.[12] Several MS invoked the 
safeguard clause and put a ban on GM crops.[13] MS and the EC continued to 
discuss which scientific data was needed to conduct the risk assessment and 
what kind of effects should be considered as adverse. Regulatory reforms, 
additional regulations[14] and increasing data requirements have however 
proven insufficient to facilitate decision-making and reach a qualified majority 
for market applications (see Box 1). Since 2004, the EC has utilised its mandate 
to approve several GM crops for market release (only import food/feed). 
Nevertheless, the tedious process resulted in stalling applications (Smart et al 
2016), complaints at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and court cases.[15] 
11 The Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA (February 1975) was an influential conference about 
potential biohazards and regulation of biotechnology. An international group of professionals (biologists, 
physicians, lawyers) participated to draw up voluntary guidelines to ensure the safety of recombinant DNA 
technology.
12 The elevated level of concern of EU citizens in the late 90s is often linked to a more general mistrust 
in the government caused by regulatory failures with regard to mad cow disease, an incident of dioxin-
contaminated Belgian food and the spreading of infectious animal diseases such as hoof and mouth disease. 
13 Member States may invoke a safeguard clause (art. 23 Dir 2001/18/EC or art. 34 Regulation (EC) 
No.1829/2003) to temporarily restrict or prohibit the use and/or sale of a GMO within their territory if they 
have justifiable reasons based on new information to consider that the approved GMO constitutes a risk to 
human health or the environment. 
14 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Directive 
90/220/EEC on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms’ COM 
(1998) 85. 
15 See for example: WTO (dispute DS291) and Pioneer v. Commission (Case T-164/10); see also Euractiv, 
‘EU GMO ban was illegal, WTO rules’ (2006), 12 May 2006. 
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2.2 DIVERGING VIEWPOINTS OF AND WITHIN EU MEMBER STATES
The lack of consensus between MS in favour of, or against, the commercial 
release of GM crops – despite a positive safety assessment - illustrates that 
MS in the EU have broadly diverging viewpoints with regard to GM crops. 
These differences are expressed in MS voting behaviour on the EU level and 
Box 1. Market approval of GM crops in Europe
As of 2018, in total 63 GMOs are authorised in the EU for food and feed uses (covering 
maize, cotton, soybean, oilseed rape, sugar beet).[1] Another 23 applications for GM 
crops are pending, all of which have a positive EFSA opinion (published between 2006 
and 2017). The EU depends on imports for over 80% of its vegetable proteins, largely 
provided by GM soybean. Over 36 million tons of GM soybean are imported to feed 
EU cattle.[2] Only one out of two crops[3] that have ever been approved for cultivation in 
the EU is actually being produced: maize MON810. 
Maize MON810 has been genetically modified to produce a specific protein (Bt) that 
protects it against the European corn borer, a pest insect. This GM maize variety was 
originally approved in 1998. MON810 is being cultivated in five EU countries (Spain, 
Portugal, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania). At the same time, 9 MS (Austria, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, Poland and Italy) used the 
safeguard clause to ban this GM maize variety. According to European regulations, 
a market approval renewal is needed after 10 years.[4] This application for renewal 
of MON810 was filed in 2007 according to Regulation 1829/2003 on genetically 
modified food and feed. The EFSA issued a positive opinion on this renewal in 2009 
(EFSA 2009). Voting took place in March of 2017 but MS could not reach a qualified 
majority on a decision about the renewal and no Commission decision has been taken 
yet. The authorisation from 1998 remains valid until a decision is taken. In total there are 6 
pending applications for GMO cultivation in the EU, including the renewal of MON810. 
1 European Commission, ‘Register of authorised GMOs’ <http://ec.europa.eu/food/dyna/gm_
register/index_en.cfm> Accessed 16 April 2018.
2 European Commission, ‘Fact sheet: questions and answers on EU’s policies on GMOs’ <http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4778_en.htm> Accessed 16 April 2018.
3 In 2010 a GM starch potato named ‘Amflora’ was authorised in the EU. This authorisation was annulled, 
see <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_CJE-13-160_en.htm> Accessed 16 April 2018.
4 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the 




in national bans on specific GM crops.[16] Furthermore, the fact that the EC is 
extremely hesitant to use its mandate to veto a final decision emphasises that 
this is a highly contested topic. In this Section, we will go into more detail 
about the specifics of the diverging viewpoints. 
The EU regulation for GM crop authorisation is predominantly based on safety 
aspects, while other elements are considered a national, individual or market 
choice and responsibility. These are therefore secured by amongst others 
labelling regulations and coexistence guidelines.[17] Both Directives for market 
authorisation mention ethical implications[18], but these do not have an actual 
weight in the decision-making process in practice. Ethical principles may be 
taken ‘into consideration’ by MS or an advice from the European Group on 
Ethics could be obtained, but these steps are non-committal. A consultation 
period for the public is mandatory, however comments are to be ‘taken into 
consideration’ and only risk-related arguments are taken into account. 
Scientific studies that indicate that certain risks of GM crops might have been 
disregarded (‘alarming studies’), cause considerable disquiet and anxiety.[19] 
Not only because there might be safety concerns, but also because they 
trigger the underlying debate about non-safety arguments against GM crops. 
Additionally, the scientific debate about the interpretation of these studies for 
policy decisions, indicates that science alone cannot be used as an unambiguous 
and objective ground for decision-making on GM crops or other contested 
technologies (Mampuys & Brom 2015b, Sarewitz 2004). In fact, it seems that 
even if alarming studies are formally dismissed as scientifically unsound and 
16 European Commission, ‘Questions and Answers on EU’s policies on cultivation and imports of GMOs’ 
(2013) EC (2013). MEMO-13-952_EN.
17 Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 
concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms and the traceability of food and 
feed products produced from genetically modified organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/EC; see 
also European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation on Guidelines for the Development of National 
Co-Existence Measures to Avoid the Unintended Presence of GMOs in Conventional and Organic Crops’ 
(2010) C200/1.
18 Art. 9 of Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 
90/220/EEC and Art. 42 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed.
19 For example Séralini et al. ‘RETRACTED: Long term toxicity of a roundup herbicide and a roundup-
tolerant genetically modified maize’ (2012) 50(11) Food and Chemical Toxicology 4221–4231. 
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unjustified, they continue to play a role in the ongoing debate. The discussion 
about these ‘alarming’ studies symbolises the underlying debate about the 
value and desirability of GM crops in our food production system (Mampuys & 
Brom 2015). 
Alarming studies have been used by several MS to invoke the safeguard clause 
and put a ban on GM crops. By 2013 eight EU countries had submitted such 
clauses to prohibit the cultivation of maize MON810 on their territories. 
Most safeguard clauses submitted to EFSA have been declared scientifically 
unfounded[20], but none of them have been lifted[21], which can be interpreted as 
an acknowledgement of underlying issues and respect for national autonomy 
of MS.[22]
Besides the broad upheaval of alarming studies and bans in some MS and not 
others, the diverging viewpoints are reflected in regulatory delays and the 
voting behaviour of the MS on the draft decision of the EC. The draft decision 
is based on the EFSA scientific opinion that is in turn compiled by both EFSA 
and MS competent authorities and scientific advisory bodies. Only positive 
assessments are sent to the Commission, because a GM crop that poses risks 
to humans and/or the environment cannot be authorised for market release. 
Despite the positive scientific safety assessment, some MS always vote in 
favour, some always oppose or abstain and some MS shift between positions. 
Official reasons mentioned for the negative vote or abstention have been 
amongst others: no agreed national position, negative public opinion, political 
reasons, risk of harm to the national agri-food industry, uncertainties in risk 
assessment, safety concerns for the environment, the precautionary principle 
and the lack of comprehensive data on long-term potential impact of GMOs 
(European Commission 2017). Obviously, several of these objections do not 
relate to safety and go beyond the scope of the European regulatory framework 
for market authorisation.
20 European Commission (n 20).
21 Tarja Laaninen ‘Member States’ bans on GMO cultivation’ European Parliament Research Service, 5 
January 2015, PE 545.708 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-AaG-545708-Member-State-
bans-on-GMOs-FINAL.pdf> Accessed 16 April 2018
22 For an overview of safeguard clause concerning the cultivation of GMOs, see Giovanni Tagliabue, 
‘The EU legislation on “GMOs” between nonsense and protectionism: An ongoing Schumpeterian chain of 
public choices’ (2017) 8(1) GM crops Food 57-73.
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Over the years, it became ‘the norm’ for decision-making on GM crop 
authorisation that the dossier is returned to the Commission for a final decision 
(European Commission 2015a, Bergmans et al. 2016). Despite a legal timeframe 
of three months between the EFSA scientific opinion and a 1st voting in the 
Standing Committee, scheduled voting and final decisions were moreover 
postponed leaving several applications in ‘regulatory limbo’. For GM food/
feed products approved between 2011-2013, the EC took on average 19 months 
to take products through the voting system. An average of 48 months was 
calculated from application submission to the Commission’s final decision for 
import of a GM product (Ernst & Young & EuropaBio 2014). 
Over the years the EC has made an effort to overcome the diverging viewpoints 
from MS by reforming the legislation and proposing practical solutions. 
Issues about the environmental and food safety assessment have resulted in 
increasing data requirements and detailed guidance documents for applicants. 
Disputes about freedom of choice have been solved by introducing labelling for 
GM food and feed ingredients. To deal with adventitious presence of GMOs due 
to accidental contamination, threshold values have been agreed on to specify 
when labelling should be applied. To prevent contamination of conventional / 
organic crops and GM crops, several EU rules and national pacts/treaties with 
regard to coexistence measures were put into place.[23] Finally, to prepare for 
any unanticipated adverse or long-term effects, a time-limit of 10 years was 
introduced for authorisations. After 10 years a re-evaluation has to be done 
based on monitoring reports and ongoing research. 
It can be concluded that MS are still not satisfied with the regulatory changes 
that have been made; for some the regulations are too strict and hamper 
innovation while for others they do not go far enough. The earlier reforms 
and changes (before Dir. (EU) 2015/412) have something in common; they 
are strongly based on reducing scientific uncertainty or ensuring freedom of 
choice for European citizens. They look for solutions in a quantitative/factual 
approach: asking for more data, setting up labelling requirements and threshold 
values for contamination. Consequently, the reforms disregard the underlying 
arguments about moral values with regard to agriculture and food production. 
The fact that these reforms have been unsuccessful in improving GM crop 
decision-making, again confirms an underlying cause for the disagreement 
about GM crop cultivation. 
23 European Commission ‘Coexistence of genetically modified crops with conventional and organic 
agriculture’< https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/gmo/coexistence_en> Accessed 16 April 2018.
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The desirability of GM crop cultivation has national, regional and local 
dimensions to it, and is linked to social, ideological and cultural values 
relating to land use, (local) agricultural systems and the protection of specific 
landscapes. For example, these values can be reflected in a national, regional 
or local preference for organic agriculture or a strong position of Green Parties 
in a country. But values are also expressed by the activities of NGOs (such as 
the European network of GMO-free regions or the March against Monsanto) 
and representative organisations for biotech companies (such as EuropaBio). 
The last European opinion poll about biotechnology, the 2010 Eurobarometer, 
showed that on average opponents outnumber supporters by three to one 
and that, in no MS, is there a majority of supporters (Gaskell et al. 2010). 
Motivations for this attitude do not only relate to safety but also to a perceived 
feeling of unease, the association with ‘unnaturalness’ or (the lack of) direct 
benefits for consumers. Mühlböck & Tosun (2017) investigated whether and 
how voting behaviour on GM crop authorisations in the Council of Ministers[24] 
reflects national interests. They concluded that ministers’ voting behaviour is 
influenced most by national factors such as public opinion, followed by party 
politics and sectoral interests. Other political and economic motivations for 
MS voting behaviour have been mentioned by among others Tagliabue (2016). 
The influence of national, regional and local dimensions and interests regarding 
GM crop cultivation explains why it seems unlikely that the European decision-
making could be based on solely the outcome of the scientific environmental 
risk assessment from EFSA. The (science-based) Directives on GMO market 
authorisation and the (political) users/authorities of these Directives seem to be 
in conflict here. This finding would plead in favour of the new Directive, which 
was created to facilitate multilevel governance and give room to diverging 
national interests other than safety.
3. NEW REGULATION GM CROP CULTIVATION
In an effort to resolve the long-standing issue around market authorisation 
decisions on GM crop cultivation, the EC made an extraordinary move in 2010. 
It announced plans to add an optional step to the science-based assessment 
framework for the market authorisation of the cultivation of GM crops. The 
goal of this proposal was twofold: it was supposed to provide MS with the 
possibility to 1) allow GM crops that meet the set safety criteria to be cultivated 
24 Under the old comitology procedure, voting would go to the Council of Ministers after voting in the 




OR 2) restrict or prohibit cultivation of GMOs in their territory based on 
considerations other than safety.[25] This partial decentralisation step could 
facilitate a form of multilevel governance in which more justice is done to local 
and regional factors while others, such as safety, remain centrally organised 
(see also Dobbs 2016).
3.1 REGULATORY AIMS OF THE NEW REGULATION
With this proposal, the EC explicitly acknowledged the role of and differences 
in national concerns which do not only relate to issues associated with the 
safety of GM crops for health or the environment. Therefore, the new approach 
was, according to the EC, likely to improve the centralised process for 
authorisations of GM crops and, at the same time, ensure freedom of choice of 
consumers, farmers and operators whilst providing greater clarity to affected 
stakeholders concerning the cultivation of GMOs in the Union. This Directive 
should therefore facilitate the smooth functioning of the internal market. The 
proposal for a partial renationalisation of GM crop cultivation was discussed 
and amended several times from 2010 to 2014. In 2015 Directive (EU) 2015/412 
came into effect.[26] 
The working mechanism of the new Directive is a two-step plan. First, during 
the authorisation or renewal procedure of a given GM crop, a MS may request 
from the applicant that the geographical scope of the authorisation be adjusted 
to exclude the territory of that specific MS from cultivation (Article 26b.1). No 
formal argumentation is needed for this step. If the applicant does not actively 
deny the demand (i.e. if he confirms or ignores the request), the adjustment of 
the geographical scope shall be implemented. Second, if the applicant denies 
the MS request for exclusion from the geographical scope, a MS may adopt 
measures restricting or prohibiting the cultivation of a GMO in all or part of 
its territory (Article 26b.3). The measures taken must be in conformity with 
Union Law, reasoned, proportional and non-discriminatory. The Directive 
states that the measures must be based on compelling grounds such as, but 
not limited to, those related to a) environmental policy objectives, b) town and 
country planning, c) land use, d) socioeconomic impacts, e) avoidance of GMO 
presence in other products without prejudice to Article 26a, f) agricultural 
25 We note that that media coverage of the new proposal in most cases only highlight the possibility to 
restrict or prohibit GM crop cultivation.
26 Directive (EU) 2015/412; see also a similar proposal from April 2015 by the EC to restrict the use of GM 
food/feed (2015/0093(COD). This proposal has different and more complex ramifications concerning 
international trade and is not a part of our analysis.
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policy objectives or g) public policy. The non-exhaustive list of grounds in the 
Directive can be used individually or in combination, but may never conflict 
with the environmental risk assessment carried out under the usual procedure 
under Directive 2001/18/EC or Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. This also means 
that even if MS decide to use Directive (EU) 2015/412, they are still required to 
vote on the safety of a GM crop.
In summary, MS can ask the applicant to exclude their territory from the 
geographical scope of the application. If the applicant actively denies this 
request, the MS can adopt measures to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of 
a GM crop on a national level based on non-safety arguments that have to 
be substantiated in official writing to the applicant and the EC. This second 
step has to be implemented in national legislation. The Directive has been in 
place since April 2015. As of 2018, only a few MS (i.e. Germany, Italy) have 
(nearly) completed the implementation, are working on new legislation (The 
Netherlands, Croatia) whereas some MS (Finland, Sweden) have decided not 
to implement the new Directive.[27] Research of both Dobbs (2017) and Tosun & 
Hartung (2018) looked into the motives of and challenges to MS to implement 
the Directive. MS name different reasons for availing the clause. Some claim 
to have no specific objections to GM crops but need more time to consider 
whether or not to facilitate GM agriculture, other MS mention their ‘green 
image’, distrust of GM technology, public opinion, environmental concerns 
and concerns on coexistence within MS. It should be noted that MS cultivating 
GM crops always have to put in place coexistence measures at their borders 
with non-cultivating countries.[28]
27 Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) report of November 4th: German Cabinet presents 
draft legislation to ban GE cultivation; Italy: Legislative Decree No. 227 of November 14, 2016, 
Implementing Directive (EU) 2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015, 
Amending Directive 2001/18/EC as Regards the Possibility for the Member States to Restrict or Prohibit 
the Cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in Their Territory (Law No. 227), GAZZETTA 
UFFICIALE (G.U.)(Sept. 8, 2016), NORMATTIVA (in Italian); personal communication.
28 European Commission ‘Adoption of national legislation in accordance with Article 26a (1a) of Directive 
2001/18/EC’ <https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/plant_gmo_auth_nat-measu-
res_summary-cross-border-national-measures.pdf > Accessed 16 April 2018.
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3.2 DISAPPOINTING INITIAL RESULTS 
Despite major dissatisfaction with the deadlock / standstill in decision-making 
regarding GM crop market authorisations, the responses from NGOs as well as 
industry to the new Directive were, from the start, quite pessimistic.[29] 
As the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the Directive’s initial success or 
absence thereof can be illustrated by actual voting on pending applications. In 
January 2017, the EC scheduled a voting on 2 new cultivation applications that 
received a positive EFSA opinion and on the renewal of MON810 (see Box 1). 
Nineteen of twenty-eight MS requested to be excluded from the geographical 
scope of these applications.[30] The applicant did not object and these requests 
were honoured. For all three applications, the vote’s outcome was ‘no opinion’ 
because no qualified majority was reached. Most MS who used step one of 
the new Directive, still voted against or abstained from voting on the market 
authorisation, with the exception of The Netherlands[31], Italy and Lithuania 
who voted in favour.[32] A second voting took place at the end of March, with 
the same result.[33] In conclusion; the new Directive has been successful in 
providing MS with the autonomy to decide on cultivation of GMOs in their 
territory, but it has not succeeded with the other goal: namely, allowing GM 
crops that meet the set safety criteria to be cultivated in other MS.
29 See for example: Greenpeace (Euractiv.com, 22 April 2015), ‘The Commission’s proposal is a farce 
because it leaves the current undemocratic system untouched. It would allow the Commission to continue 
ignoring major opposition to GM crops, despite president Juncker’s promise to allow a majority of EU 
countries to halt Commission decisions on GMOs’; and, EuropaBio (Euractiv.com, 22 April), ‘This proposal 
would limit the choice for livestock farmers and threaten their livelihoods. It would also set the alarm off 
for any innovative industry subject to an EU approval process in Europe. Failing to uphold the EU-wide 
approval of safe products will damage jobs, growth, innovation and competitiveness.’
30 European Commission ‘Restrictions of geographical scope of GMO applications/authorisations: 
Member States demands and outcomes’ <http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/authorisation/
cultivation/geographical_scope_en> Accessed 16 April 2018.
31 Awaiting implementation of Dir. (EU) 2015/412 in Dutch law, NL opted out from the geographical scope 
of the market applications, but voted in favour on the proposal for market authorisation in the light of the 
safety assessment.
32 GMWatch ‘EU countries say No to GM crops but not quite loudly enough’ (GMWatch, 27 January 
2017). <http://gmwatch.org/en/news/latest-news/17441-eu-countries-say-no-to-gm-crops-but-not-
quite-loudly-enough>
33 Louis Gore-Langton ‘MEPs appose GM approvals but Commission will have the final say’ 
(Foodnavigator, 27 March 2017). <https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2017/03/28/MEPs-
oppose-GM-approvals-but-Commission-will-have-the-final-say> Accessed 16 April 2018.
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Plans for a reform of the comitology procedures have been announced as a 
potential solution.[34] Additionally, some stakeholders recently even promoted 
an opt-in regulatory system instead of an opt-out strategy.[35] Before jumping 
to other solutions, we suggest first investigating why the new Directive is not 
working the way it was intended. We will do this using the theoretical lens of 
an ethos of controversies, which will be explained in the next Section.
4. THE INTERACTIVE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH: AN ETHOS OF 
CONTROVERSIES
This Section explores our theoretical framework, which builds on Poort’s earlier 
work: the interactive legislative approach. This approach can be understood 
in the context of the interactionist paradigm (Van der Burg 2014). The 
interactionist paradigm contains a gradual shift from top-down law-making 
(vertical structures) towards law-making building on co-operative effort in 
which law is made by various stakeholders (horizontal structures) (Van der 
Burg 2016). Poort argues that the interactive legislative approach can be a more 
adequate legislative approach to complex issues with a strong moral impact 
(Poort 2031). These issues are characterised by uncertainties about knowledge, 
rapid developments and a profound moral pluralism. Hisschemöller & Hoppe 
(1995) define these complex issues as unstructured problems. 
The openness of the legal norms of interactive legislative approaches ensures 
that they can adapt to new developments in the field. Especially for issues that 
are characterised by rapid changes, responsiveness to these changes is relevant. 
Otherwise rules constantly play catch-up with technological developments. 
The characteristics of the issues that the interactive legislative approach aims 
to address, can also be recognised in the intractability of decision-making on 
the cultivation of GM crops. We, therefore, consider this approach as a first 
step towards a potential coping strategy for addressing the issues concerning 
GM crop cultivation in Europe. 
34 A Commission ‘options paper’ identifies four ideas, one of which excludes MS who are not represented 
or abstain from voting from the calculations for Qualified Majority (QM). Only taking into account yes/no 
votes should increase the chance of a QM. 
35 Eriksson et al. (2018) suggest an opt-in mechanism that allows individual MS to authorise GM crops in 
their territory after the EFSA has published a positive opinion on the safety for humans and the environment. 
We note that this strategy seems an unlikely scenario as this would surpass the official European Comitology 
procedures that form the basis of European decision-making. 
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4.1 THE INTERACTIVE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
The interactive approach (see Box 2) emphasises both horizontal decision-
making (interaction) and the need for dynamics in norm-development 
(dynamics) (Poort 2013). By involving stakeholders in decision-making based 
on co-operative effort (interaction), stakeholders are more willing to accept 
the rules. After all, these stakeholders were involved in designing these 
rules. Furthermore, dynamics in norm-development are argued to improve 
responsiveness to developments in practice (Selznick 1992). Both interaction 
and dynamics are justified by a strong focus on reaching consensus in these 
processes of decision-making and norm-development. Consensus, here, 
means a quest for consensus, and is defined as a regulative ideal. In that sense, 
consensus is rather an orienting aim than being the ideal outcome. Van der 
Burg & Brom argue in the context of the ideal-typical model of the interactive 
approach, that it is enough if the various actors can deliberate freely together to 
come up with norms that are orientated to practice (Poort 2013, Chapter 9 and 
Van der Burg & Brom (2000). Furthermore, striving for consensus contributes 
to structuring these processes in such a way that stakeholders are willing to 
co-operate (Habermas 1996 and Gutmann & Thompson 1996).
Box 2. The Interactive legislative approach
The basic elements of the interactive legislative approach (interaction and dynamics) 
build on the ideas of Selznick and Fuller who both have had a major influence on the 
development of the theoretical model of the interactive legislative approach (Selznick 
1992 and Fuller 2001). 
Interaction can be related to both Selznick’s and to Fuller’s work. Selznick explains the 
need for a process of interaction between the legislature and society or relevant sectors 
within a society. Fuller points at the need for both horizontal and vertical structures of 
communications to guide interactive processes of law-making. According to Fuller, the 
vertical structures are embedded in the horizontal ones (Poort 2016). 
The need for dynamics originates from Selznick’s argument for responsiveness: an 
ongoing process of norm development ensures that legislation does not continually 
have to play catch-up with society. Dynamics can be stimulated by the use of open 
norms. Furthermore, the interplay between interaction and ongoing norm development 
contributes to concretisation of these norms and, thus, to dynamics.
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The interactive approach identifies four functions of law: articulation, 
communication, interaction, and coordination. The first involves articulation 
of the issue at stake. The second function relates to the communication 
between government and the actors involved. The horizontal structure of 
this relationship ensures open and direct communication. The third function 
stimulates interaction between the legal framework and the field of application 
which leads to a dynamic interplay of norm development on various levels. 
The fourth function involves coordination of the interactive process by 
institutionalising this process and the framework for communication. This 
function ensures control and procedural fairness.[36] 
Poort states that these incentives of willingness to co-operate and 
responsiveness to new developments can only be achieved if we no longer 
focus on consensus. She claims that, consensus striving even as a regulative 
ideal is counterproductive in the case of intractable disagreements as it risks 
premature closure of debate.[37] To that extent, despite the open structure of 
the legal framework, dynamics is not established. Furthermore, it also risks 
that for the sake of reaching consensus diverging viewpoints are excluded 
from the (legislative) process in an early stage. On the one hand, this can 
facilitate problem-definition and may stimulate smoothening of the regulatory 
process. On the other hand, only part of the problem is addressed and (some) 
stakeholders are excluded from the horizontal process of decision-making. 
Here, we can identify consensus-thinking as a taming strategy of governance 
which involves transforming wicked problems into more manageable ones 
(Daviter 2017). This, however, involves addressing only part of the problem, 
which may eventually backfire and result in a deadlock, as we see in the case 
of GM crops (see Poort (2013), Chapter 9 and Castle & Culver (2013). 
With regard to the safety assessment of GM crops by EFSA and the decision-
making process on an EU level, this is a recurrent complaint issued by several 
NGOs and scientists. Some safety arguments of NGO’s and scientists are 
36 The explanation of the four functions closely connects to the explanation Poort gives in Poort (2013) pp. 
35-36. 
37 Poort builds her argument on a threefold case study in which the regulation of animal biotechnology 
in three European countries (Switzerland, Denmark, and the Netherlands) was analysed; see Poort (2013) 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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declared invalid[38], and non-safety issues are excluded from legal decision-
making.[39] As an alternative to consensus-thinking, Poort suggests an ethos 
of controversies which we will explain in the next Section. 
4.2 AN ETHOS OF CONTROVERSIES
An ethos of controversies[40] can best be explained as a normative way of 
thinking in which, obviously, controversies have a more central role (Poort 
2012). An ethos of controversies structures decision-making processes by 
exploring controversies and giving them an explicit role in the process. 
The complex issues with a strong moral impact that the interactive legislative 
approach tends to cope with, are characterised by uncertainties and ambiguities 
on both facts and values. Poort argues that these uncertainties make it difficult 
or even impossible to arrive at concrete decisions, based on consensus. In 
this light, Castle & Culver (2013) refer to antecedent policy failures, meaning 
that failures in policy-making arise ‘as a result of prior choices regarding 
the structure and starting point of a policy process’ (p. 34). They argue that 
dissensus can better be used to structure these problems. Their argument 
coincides with the background of an ethos of controversies. This ethos can 
contribute to a comprehensive problem-definition as well as to avoid that 
problems will get out of control (antagonistic). Mouffe (1999) argues that the 
lack of resolvability that comes along with this conflicting nature has to be 
recognised. She claims that recognition of the conflict will do greater justice to 
the conflicting nature of pluralism. In Poort’s view, acknowledgement of the 
conflict helps to establish a regulatory framework that manages intractable 
disagreements instead of trying to control them or impose consensus. 
Hisschemöller & Hoppe (1995) argue for a coping governance strategy to 
deal with these kinds of issues and suggest a learning strategy. An ethos 
38 See for example EFSA, ‘Final review of the Séralini et al. (2012a) publication on a 2-year rodent feeding 
study with glyphosate formulations and GM maize NK603 as published online on 19 September 2012 
in Food and Chemical Toxicology’(2012), EFSA journal 28 November 2012; and GMO free regions, 
‘Berlin declaration, 8 May 2015) <http://www.gmo-free-regions.org/fileadmin/files/gmo-free-europe/
Berlin_declaration_final.pdf> Accessed 16 April 2018.
39 In delivering its scientific opinion, the EFSA GMO Panel took into account application (application no), 
additional information provided by the applicant, scientific comments submitted by the Member States and 
relevant scientific publications.
40 The explanation of the ethos of controversies and of three stages in which an ethos of controversies 




of controversies may structure such a learning process by acknowledging 
and confronting differing viewpoints, concerns and preferences, which 
stimulates further norm-development. The latter distinguishes the ethos of 
controversies from other coping strategies as it goes beyond reflecting upon 
and acknowledging intractability and diversity. By confrontation, the ethos of 
controversies seeks to stimulate further norm development. It, therefore, does 
not consider controversies as a known fact we have to cope with, but embraces 
its surplus value. 
Of course, in the end decisions have to be made in regulatory frameworks. 
Decision-making would be a lot easier if all parties agreed. An ethos of 
controversies cannot offer an alternative to consensus-thinking in light of 
legitimacy of legal decisions. Waldron (1999) acknowledges that a decision 
has to be made, but at the same time he notices that a conflict can linger on. 
Acknowledgement of the conflicting nature may enable a constructive debate as 
awareness that disagreement still exists demonstrates greater respect for the 
views that have been excluded from the decision-making. It is, then, possible 
to have a reasonable and constructive debate while the core of intractable 
disagreements at first sight seems to go beyond reason. 
4.2.1 THREE STAGES
The ethos of controversies functions in three stages: articulation, confrontation 
and awareness. In the first stage the problem is defined by articulating the 
various viewpoints, concerns and preferences. Different from other processes 
of norm-development, this stage involves taking stock of the variety of 
viewpoints, concerns and preferences instead of searching for commonalities. 
Poort argues that this approach will result in a more comprehensive definition 
of the problem. An ethos of controversies, here, avoids simplifying the conflict. 
Castle & Culver have developed a method of contested exchange to develop and 
exchange knowledge base and to prioritise core values. Within this method, 
the stage of articulation is designed as a stage in which different perspectives 
on several issues are identified and documented (Castle & Culver 2013, p. 39).
The second stage involves confrontation of the variety of viewpoints. 
Stakeholders in this stage acknowledge that differences in reasoning exist. 
They do so by a confrontation between the different viewpoints, concerns and 
preferences. Stakeholders are, then, forced to explain, to think through and 
perhaps even to reconsider their ideas. This process will result in reflected 
opinions instead of repeated statements. Consequently, confrontation 
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may result in a more comprehensive and thorough problem-definition and 
stimulate further development of norms. The aim of confrontation is to make 
the underlying issue and the diverging viewpoints explicit, not to judge these 
viewpoints. Following Castle & Culver’s method of contested exchange, this 
stage can best be operated in an open session building on a systematic exchange 
of insights between the different perspectives. This exchange contributes to a 
better structuring of the issues, and to clearly identifying the core of emerging 
issues. Furthermore, participants are forced to reflect upon their deeply held 
convictions which may lead to new insights by stakeholders involved (Mouffe 
1999). Following Stirling (2008), this stage involves broadening the input for 
decision-making, but it also opens up the output to alternative questions and 
framings (see also Leach et al. 2005). To that extent, the norm-development is 
reflexive and open-ended. 
The third stage evolves around awareness and acknowledgement of the 
controversy. Eventually, decision-making will be easier if all stakeholders 
agree as we cannot legitimise decisions built on disagreements. It must be clear 
that an ethos of controversies cannot legitimise decisions. Nonetheless, the 
ethos of controversies can do justice to the diverging viewpoints and contribute 
to decision-making. This ethos can do so by ensuring that these viewpoints 
have had an explicit role in decision-making by facilitating awareness of the 
conflict that still exists after decisions are made. In other words, in this stage 
the ethos of controversies ensures acknowledgement of the temporary status 
of the compromise (political or otherwise) laid down in the legal decision or 
in the regulation.[41] A legal decision might not represent the end of the moral 
conflict and does not necessarily represent a consensus about underlying 
norms and values. This way, it does more justice to acknowledging and 
respecting different viewpoints. Smith & Stirling (2007) emphasise that ‘social 
appraisal rarely closes down definitively upon a given socio-technical object’. 
This however, does not have to postpone or prevent legal-decision making. 
41 Interactive approaches to law attract considerable criticism considering their tension between the 
traditional function of law to end conflict and the interactive approach’s incentive to create dynamics. See 
for example John Griffiths, ‘Do laws have symbolic effects?’ in: Nicolle Zeegers, Willem Witteveen, Bart 
van Klink (eds.) Social and symbolic effects of legislation under the rule of law, (The Edwin Mellen Press, 
2005) 147-161.We are aware of this criticism. Poort (2013) addresses this criticism by introducing a two-
track approach in which legal and moral decision-making are distinct, but interplay. However, it exceeds the 
context of this paper to go into detail on this approach and the criticism. It is not relevant for the argument we 
intend to make here. For further information on this two-track approach, we refer to Poort (2013) Chapter 10. 
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5. THE NEW DIRECTIVE IN LIGHT OF AN ETHOS OF CONTROVERSIES
As became clear in the previous Sections, the new Directive is not generally 
conceived as an adequate solution to the struggle for decision-making on the 
cultivating of GM crops in the EU by all parties involved. Some argue that the 
new Directive symbolises a failure of the EP to come to a shared assessment 
framework: the EP has not come any closer to a solution after over twenty 
years of struggle. Others claim that this solution indicates a shift of the 
struggle from the EU-level to a national state-level in which an agreement on 
decision-making still needs to be found. National agencies struggle with the 
implementation of the Directive and the draft of an assessment framework. 
Furthermore, the recent voting makes clear that, so far, nothing has changed. 
In Section 2, we have shown that the cultivation of GM-crops is a disagreement 
which is characterised by diverging viewpoints on the scientific, moral and 
social impact. Over the years, a consensus on the matter seemed to become more 
and more unlikely or even impossible. Despite this, the EC drafted and adopted 
the new Directive. As a result, this Directive was met with great pessimism 
and considered an empty box by several stakeholders. The first results of the 
Directive in practice seem to confirm this; a majority of the MS used the first 
step of the Directive to exclude their territory from the geographical scope of 
the GM crop application, but this did not change their voting behaviour on 
the safety of the European market application. Hence, a deadlock in decision-
making on EU market authorisation applications remains. In this Section, we 
will first identify factors that might have caused the initial failure of the new 
Directive. These factors can be related to motivations of the proponents and 
the opponents of GM crops (user factors, Section 5.1) and to factors in the 
structural design of the Directive (design factors, Section 5.2). 
Second, we think that a different approach could still unleash the potential of 
the new Directive and we argue that an ethos of controversies can potentially 
offer a first step in such an approach.
5.1 USER FACTORS LIMITING THE POTENTIAL SUCCESS OF THE DIRECTIVE
Let us go back to the motivation for the new Directive and those who initiated 
the process. The EC was confronted and burdened with taking a decision on 
the authorisation of GM crops because MS could not reach a qualified majority. 
Aware of the political sensitiveness of the subject, the EC has been hesitant 
to take a decision on, and to accept responsibility for, the legality of GM crop 
cultivation. Meanwhile, the intended procedure for market authorisation based 
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on an environmental safety assessment is hampered and those MS who do want 
to cultivate new GM crops cannot do so. Hence, the status quo is a very limited: 
cultivation of just one GM crop (MON810) in a few MS and an obstruction of 
the EU market authorisation procedure. The potential gain of the new Directive 
was to allow GM crops that are deemed safe for cultivation onto the European 
market, while acknowledging that some MS don’t want GM crop cultivation 
for different reasons. Here, the EC, however, seems to simplify the problem.
First, we identify a lack of gains for the opponents of cultivation of GM crops. 
More particularly, the EC seems to have failed to take into account their gains 
within the status quo. For those MS who reject or abstain from voting on market 
authorisation of GM crops, the situation should be viewed from a different 
perspective. They reject GM crops or abstain from voting in order to represent 
national interests and to prevent these crops from entering the market. 
With currently only one GM crop authorised for cultivation and limited to no 
cultivation in most MS, one could argue that the ‘naysayers’ are supposedly 
quite satisfied with the status quo. And this may change with the new Directive 
that could, additionally, cause a shift of the debate on this topic from EU level 
to a national, regional or local level within MS.[42] From this perspective, the 
naysayers have a lot to lose compared to the status quo. Changing their formal 
position at an EU level regarding the market authorisation procedure based on 
environmental risks, can come at a (political) cost of being held accountable 
and reopening debate on a national or regional level (see also Tosun & Hartung 
(2018). This may not necessarily be a desirable option for opponents.
Second, proponents of cultivation, likely do not share the presumptions of 
the EC either. Proponents want to cultivate GM crops and are served with a 
smoothening of the market authorisation process by clear (scientific) rules 
on safety and risks. These rules were already available through the existing 
Directive 2001/18/EC and or Regulation (EC) No.1829/2003, resulting in positive 
opinions by EFSA on the safety of several GM crops. The new Directive obviously 
means more rules and more (political) decisions to be taken. Additionally, the 
implementation of the Directive on a national level seems to become a complex 
and time-consuming process, further delaying decision-making about pending 
applications. In summary, their gains from the new Directive are also limited.
42 This seems likely, as some MS already indicated ‘no agreed national position’ as a reason for the 
negative vote or abstention.
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Third, the EC failed to recognise the underlying values within the environmental 
safety assessment and their role in driving MS to vote ‘No’. After all, they 
argue, the GM crops that are presented for voting on market authorisation all 
have received a positive EFSA opinion and are thus considered safe. The new 
Directive offers the opportunity to address non-safety issues, but at the same 
time it indirectly denies the value-oriented discussion about safety and risks. 
It is assumed that safety (scientific) and non-safety (social) reasons can be 
strictly separated and that the latter are the (only) reason for MS to reject GM 
crops for cultivation. It presumes that MS agree on the topic of environmental 
risk assessment and risk management. Several reasons that were given during 
the last voting rounds in the Appeal Committee indicate that this is not the 
case.[43]
Fourth, the EC recognises differences in values on (GM) agriculture and offers 
the possibility to express these on a national level but it also denies the weight 
of more idealistic positions that encompass that no one in Europe (or even 
the world) should support GM crop cultivation. MS holding these idealistic 
positions have nothing to gain with the new Directive that may change the 
status quo of a negligible adoption of GM crop cultivation in their territory or 
even in neighbouring countries. The new Directive could more explicitly divide 
the MS when cultivation takes place in some MS and not others. Ideological 
factors are closely related to the last user factor: politics.
Fifth, the GM crop debate is also strongly intertwined with a political strategic 
view on agriculture (from the opponents’ perspective: against industrial 
agriculture, use of pesticides and against technology ownership and control by 
large firms; from the proponents’ perspective: hi-tech, biotechnology driven 
and large scale agriculture). From the opponents’ perspective, any technology 
that facilitates industrial agriculture is seen as a threat. This indicates 
that from the opponents’ side there is a strong political resistance against 
industrial agriculture overall. This could mean that the tables cannot be turned 
by adapting legal procedures for one particular aspect (GM crops), because it is 
part of a broader (political) strategy. This is in line with amongst others Head 
who criticises evidence based policy because political reality is not only driven 
by scientific facts but also by the messy reality of negotiations, commitments 
43 Reasons for the negative vote or abstention during the last voting round (27th March 2017) on three GM 
crops also included: uncertainties in risk assessment, safety concerns for the environment, the precautionary 




and other political interactions (Head 2010). Additionally, Daviter (2015) 
explains that the role of scientific facts is not inert and the political use of 
knowledge can differ from its scientific use in being used strategically. 
We conclude that while drafting the new Directive, the EC seems to have 
followed a problem-definition that is not shared with all stakeholders involved. 
5.2 DESIGN FACTORS AND THE DIRECTIVE AS A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
Let us continue with our conclusion in the previous Section, namely that 
the problem-definition used to design the Directive is limited from a user 
perspective. From the perspective of the three stages of policy-making in which 
an ethos of controversies can operate, the EC moderated the stage of problem-
definition by assuming all positions were clear and taken into account using a 
simplified categorisation of viewpoints in terms of safety and risks on the one 
hand and socio-economic values on the other. The EC failed to acknowledge 
the complexity of the positions in MS that cross these categorisations or that 
limits them to national territories. The question is how MS positions can be 
reflected more effectively in the design of the Directive.
As explained in Section 4, the first stage of an ethos of controversies inclines 
articulation of the viewpoints as well as of the motivations for a certain 
opinion. The new Directive is designed in such way that several motivations for 
prohibition or restriction can be used. As we explained in Section 3, the working 
mechanism of the Directive follows a two-step plan. In the first step however, 
no argumentation is needed for restricting the scope of an authorisation. A 
simple written request will do. In regulatory practice, the process thus far ends 
with step 1 without any debate, confrontation or explanation. We therefore 
argue that, from the perspective of an ethos of controversies, step 2 deserves 
more attention in order to arrive at adequate decision-making on GM crops. 
For, if an applicant denies the request for exclusion of the territory of the 
MS from the geographical scope, the MS can still take measures to restrict 
or prohibit cultivation based on step 2. Different from step 1, these measures 
must be reasoned and follow compelling grounds.[44] 
44 The Directive states that the measures must be based on compelling grounds such as, but not limited 
to, those related to a) environmental policy objectives, b) town and country planning, c) land use, d) 
socioeconomic impacts, e) avoidance of GMO presence in other products without prejudice to Article 
26a, f) agricultural policy objectives or g) public policy.
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At first instance, this step thus creates room for an exchange of viewpoints and 
confrontation, reflecting the first stage in the ethos of controversies. In step 
2 of the Directive other grounds than safety have to be made explicit by MS 
who want to restrict or prohibit cultivation on their territory. The requirement 
to motivate the decision forces the MS to articulate their viewpoints. This 
articulation is a first step towards further exploring the diverging viewpoints 
at stake, and to gaining a better understanding of the issue within MS itself. 
As discussed in Section 2.2, although the voting behaviour of MS suggests 
a national consensus, opinion polls, law suits[45] and literature indicate this 
is not necessarily the case. Therefore, step 2 of the new Directive offers an 
opportunity to reopen the debate on a national level as this step will force MS 
to reflect on their position regarding GM crop cultivation and express their 
motivations. The competence in step 2 thus gives room for further reflection 
on the considerations that play a role in the conflict about cultivation of GM 
crops. Viewpoints that were earlier excluded from national decision-making, 
either in favour or against GM crop cultivation, can be re-introduced in this 
procedure. A remark must be made on this point. Reopening the debate on a 
national level may not be desirable for some that are satisfied with the status 
quo and is at risk of having the same consensus-focused discussion on the 
safety or desirability of GM crops again. This would turn this Directive into 
window-dressing instead of a window of opportunity. It is therefore essential 
to focus on mapping diverging viewpoints. Confrontation of these diverging 
viewpoint may lead to better understanding and substantiating of the different 
viewpoints. 
Step 2 of the Directive thus has a potential for articulation and confrontation 
of the issue, but there is a catch. When applying step 2 of the Directive, MS 
have to provide their motivation for a ban in writing to the applicant through 
the EC. Legally, the EC can but is not obliged to respond/comment on the 
argumentation of the MS. After deliberation on a national level, this could 
provide opportunity to continue and further develop viewpoints (confrontation 
and articulation) on an international EU level. Applying the Directive however, 
is the sole (legal) responsibility of the MS (or specific regions within a MS), not 
the EC. Any legal issues resulting from the national ban will be between the 
45 Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-111/16, 13 September 2017. In 2017, the European court 
ruled in favour of Italian farmer Giorgio Fidenato who was prosecuted by his country for planting genetically 
modified corn. Italy has upheld a ban on GM crop cultivation since 2006, the request for an emergency 
ban (safeguard clause) was turned down by the Commission. The court ruled that a MS does not have the 
right to ban GM crops without substantial evidence for human or environmental health hazards. 
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MS and the applicant. Therefore, one could say that the EC has no motive or 
incentive, to comment or deliberate on the argumentation of a MS to ban a GM 
crop on a national level. After all, one of the motives of the EC for the Directive 
was even to avoid being in a position of responsibility for national decision-
making on cultivation of GM crops (Randour et al. 2014). 
In summary; from the perspective of an ethos of controversies, there are two 
factors in the design of the Directive limiting its potential success: step 1 does 
not need articulation of viewpoints and step 2 does not require confrontation 
from other viewpoints. 
To see the Directive as a window of opportunity we suggest, first of all, to give 
step 2 of the assessment framework a more prominent role (recommendation 
1). And second, we suggest, to follow an ethos of controversies to improve 
problem structuring and to arrive at reflected opinions (recommendation 2). 
This will contribute to addressing and acknowledging the different viewpoints 
and motivations of the users of the Directive identified in Section 5.1.
That leaves us with the last factors, which concern the role of ideology and 
politics from a broader perspective on agriculture and food production. The 
political realities regarding GM crops are illustrated by amongst others the 
(non-)acting of the EC in taking measures against unjustified national bans 
or using its mandate to take authorisation decisions and in the different 
attitudes towards cultivation and importation. At first instance, the ethos of 
controversies does not offer an answer to the reality of the involved political 
aspects of such issues. 
Political strategies seem to impede a comprehensive problem-definition (stage 
1) and, moreover, seem to bring about avoidance of any form of confrontation 
(stage 2). As long as stage 1 and stage 2 of an ethos of controversies are not 
adequately followed and problem-definition is still ill-structured, decision-
making is unsatisfactory and therefore deliberately hampered, as the actual 
voting exemplifies. MS have not changed their voting behaviour. Furthermore, 
the pessimistic attitude of both the industry and NGOs may cross this stage, 
as they represent part of the national interest. None of the stakeholders seems 
satisfied with the new assessment framework. Instead of acknowledging 
that the conflict remains unresolved, the EC initiated a similar proposal for 
6
196
a Directive to restrict GM food and feed (import) on a national level[46] and 
mentioned plans for a change of the comitology procedure for smoothening 
the voting process.[47] Additionally, third parties have even suggested an 
opposite approach that focusses on an opt-in instead of an opt-out strategy 
(see Eriksson et al. 2018). These efforts illustrate both the frustration as well 
as the importance of this subject to stakeholders in Europe. The existing 
and proposed strategies seem to have something in common, which Daviter 
(2017) describes as a ‘taming’ strategy: aiming ‘to transform an ill-structured 
or wicked problem into a more manageable and well-structured problem for 
the purpose of decision-making.’ To accomplish this, the problem is framed 
in such a way ‘to align it with existing administrative expertise and policy 
responsibilities’ (p. 580). As an advantage of this strategy, amongst others 
limited participation and debate from public authorities are mentioned, as 
well as a reduced need for cross-sector coordination. According to Daviter, 
‘taming wicked problems accepts that competing problem perspectives are 
cast aside rather than explored’. Aside from solving and taming, he identifies a 
third strategy to deal with wicked problems: coping, which aims to reflect the 
fragmented, uncertain and ambiguous nature of wicked problems by relying 
on a more disjointed and tentative process of formulating policy responses.
We see possibilities of the ethos of controversies to contribute to the potential 
of the Directive already in place that are in line with a coping strategy. This is 
where the third stage (‘awareness’) comes into play.
We think that the basic idea of stage 3 of an ethos of controversies should be 
emphasised to deal with the identified political realities (recommendation 3). 
The third stage of an ethos of controversies involves awareness and ideally 
acknowledgement that the ideological, cultural or religious conflict continues 
to exist, even after decisions are made. Either cultivation of a GM crop or 
prohibition of it by MS does not signal the end of conflict or the end of a 
debate. Smith & Stirling (2007) argue that definitive closure around appraisal 
46 The Commission proposed to amend Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 by adding a new Article 34a, 
allowing Member States to restrict or prohibit the use of GM food and feed in part or all of their territory, 
complementing the possibilities they already have concerning GMOs for cultivation. The proposal was 
rejected in October 2015 on technical grounds by EU lawmakers and the process has since then been 
on a standstill. See <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_
europeenne/com/2015/0177/COM_COM(2015)0177_EN.pdf > Accessed 16 April 2018.
47 A Commission ‘options paper’ identifies four ideas, one of which excludes MS who are not represented 
or abstain from voting from the calculations for QM. Only taking into account yes/no votes should increase 
the chance of a QM.
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of a socio-technical object cannot be reached. Moreover, ‘closure is not reached 
through objectification, but through negotiated commitment formation’. As 
such, it seems to make more sense to ensure commitment to the process and 
acknowledging fundamental differences than to chase objective knowledge 
to reach a consensus. As such, a decision or ‘consensus’ should be seen in a 
different light. Quoting Mouffe (2000): 
‘It is for that reason that the ideal of a pluralist democracy cannot be to reach 
a rational consensus in the public sphere. Such a consensus cannot exist. We 
have to accept that every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional 
hegemony, as a stabilization of power, and that it always entails some form of 
exclusion. The ideas that power could be dissolved through a rational debate 
and that legitimacy could be based on pure rationality are illusions, which can 
endanger democratic institutions.’ (p.104)
This means we also need to rethink the role and position of stakeholders in 
decision-making on GM crop cultivation. To create room for diverging value 
loaded viewpoints of the stakeholders and to create an area for confrontation 
of viewpoints, we need to view stakeholders as reflexive political agents 
(Biale & Liveriero (2017). Biale & Liveriero conclude, in an argument for 
grounding democratic legitimacy on the actual, non-idealised circumstances 
of deliberations, that ‘disagreement is not only a factual circumstance of 
democratic decision-making systems, but the perfect expression of democratic 
ideals because only when citizens disagree and express their dissent can they 
properly exercise political agency.’ (p.586) Citizens can only do so if they 
reciprocally acknowledge one another as epistemic peers (p.590). We intend 
to use a similar line of argument for stakeholders in GM crop regulation. The 
Directive can only function adequately if stakeholders as well as the EC and MS, 
in the context of step 2 of the assessment-framework, recognise their shared 
status as political agents with whom they might fundamentally disagree. 
Acknowledging the other as an equal peer, brings the reciprocal obligation 
to explain, challenge, compare and critically assess their claims, programs 
and values that shape their political proposals (p.586). These obligations 
correspond with the basic tenets of the ethos of controversies in the interactive 
legislative approach-though, within this approach, the reciprocal character 
of the relation between stakeholders being political agents has never been 
considered. This understanding of the relationship, however, suits one of the 
basic elements of the interactive legislative approach: interaction. In Section 
4.1, interaction is explained in terms of responsiveness and co-operation. 
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These terms closely relate to an understanding of another as being an equal 
peer. We, therefore, consider this understanding a valuable contribution to 
Poort’s model of the interactive approach. Although challenging[48], we think 
that this understanding, can help to overcome some of the difficulties caused 
by the actual circumstances of the political field in which the regulation of GM 
crop cultivation is debated. 
6. CONCLUSION 
By explaining the new GM crop cultivation Directive (EU) 2015/412 in light of an 
ethos of controversies, it can be seen as a window of opportunity for decision-
making in Europe on the cultivation of GM crops. The twenty-year struggle 
resulted in a proposal in which EU MS can have their own considerations for 
prohibiting, restricting or allowing GM crops in their territory. In theory, this 
partial decentralisation step is in line with the concept of subsidiarity and 
could facilitate a form of multilevel governance in which more justice is done 
to local and regional factors while others, such as safety, remain centrally 
organised (see also Dobbs 2016). 
By following this approach, broader grounds for prohibition or restriction of 
GM crop cultivation are acknowledged. In other words, the Directive aims to 
end a legal struggle on a European level, while at the same time, doing justice to 
diverging viewpoints that are deeply rooted and might never be overcome. This 
Directive provides a unique example of how those controversies are not only 
acknowledged, but non-safety considerations are also given an explicit legal 
status in the regulatory process. However, we have also shown that positioning 
controversies in law structures is not sufficient by itself, demonstrating a good 
example of the difference between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’. As long as 
the Directive is used and implemented as a taming strategy instead of a coping 
one, competing problem perspectives are not explored and commitment from 
stakeholders not encouraged. Reciprocal acceptance of decentralised (MS level) 
decision-making and a continuous interaction, confrontation and exploration 
of the controversies is needed to arrive at effective decision-making.
We have argued that even when dealing with deep value-orientated 
disagreements, it is in theory possible to come to an adequate and reasonable 
regulation. The contribution of the theoretical lens of an ethos of controversies 
48 Mampuys & Brom (2015) have shown that personal arguments (authority, ad hominem, conspiracy and 
tu quoque) play a recurring role in the GM debate, disqualifying the opponent as an equal peer. These 
arguments are contra-productive, increase polarisation and escalation of the debate. 
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lies in the explicit acknowledgement of different viewpoints, which can be 
a first step towards decision-making. Thereafter, several political and legal 
challenges remain still to be tackled. Decision-making will only be possible 
based on reciprocal acknowledgement of the remaining conflict and a 
willingness to loosen or let go of strategical political motivations.[49]
Finally, several legal challenges from a global perspective remain with the 
use of the new Directive, such as the question of what can legally and from 
an international perspective be considered a valid non-safety consideration 
and how to measure and evaluate these considerations (COGEM 2014, Tosun 
& Hartung (2018)). This has been thoroughly analysed by Punt & Wesseler 
(2016). Concerning the latter challenge, several bridges still have to be crossed. 
Considering the new Directive as a window of opportunity, however, is a first 
necessary step in unleashing its full potential.
49 We note that the Directive explicitly facilitates an opportunity for opponents to ban GM crop cultivation, 
in addition to obstructing decision-making in the previous procedures. It does not, for example, facilitate 
a similar opportunity for those in favour of GM crops. This could indicate that there is no demand for 
GM crops in Europe in general or that the specific characteristics of available GM crops do not benefit 
European agriculture because effective weed management is possible with existing measures or that pest 
insects targeted by insect resistant crops do not pose a problem (yet) in European agriculture.
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Regulation has been fundamental to the debate on the use of agricultural 
biotechnology because of: (1) the possible safety implications for the 
environment and human health, and (2) non-safety implications including 
socio-economic considerations (SECs) on the other. Effective and useful 
regulation ensures an adequate level of safety while, at the same time, 
enables access to safe products that will benefit society in general, and local 
communities in particular. As such, regulation is concerned with obtaining a 
balance between costs and benefits. Cost can be economic costs, but can also 
include risks to humans and the environment. Benefits can be profit, but they 
also can include welfare, quality of life or environmental improvement. Apart 
from identifying and measuring costs and benefits, the distribution of each is 
of great importance; who bears the costs and who incurs the benefits? Many of 
these as classified as socio-economic aspects (SECs). 
National and international regulations increasingly acknowledge the importance 
of formalising the inclusion of SECs in decision-making (CBD, 2010). Currently, 
most commercial applications in biotechnology relate to agricultural products 
(i.e. genetically modified [GM] crops), and as such, SECs in this field tend to 
focus on those aspects that have an influence on the food supply chain as a 
whole. SECs include economic as well as social effects at the farm-level, on the 
supply chain and on the end user (i.e. the consumer). The wide range of SECs 
covers everything considered socio-economically relevant; this can complicate 
their implementation and operationalisation in regulatory decision-making. It 
is therefore important to set out a clear framework indicating what is meant by 
SECs and how they can be measured. The assessment and inclusion of socio-
economic impacts in regulatory decision-making for GM crops is complex, but 
the amount of research and data available on SECs s increasing (Smale et al., 
2009; Hall et al., 2013; Brookes & Barfoot, 2017). Over the years, methodologies 
used for socio-economic impact assessments have improved with increasing 
experience of GM crops (Morris, 2011; Garcia-Yi et al., 2014; Kathage et al., 
2016).
This article reviews of the use of SECs in regulatory decision-making, either in 
parallel to or as part of biosafety decision-making. First, a brief introduction 
to the international legal provisions for including SECs within regulatory 
decision-making will explore the most commonly used categories of SECs for 
GM crop cultivation. Next, the different aspects and challenges of measuring, 
implementing and using SECS in regulatory frameworks will be explored. Many 
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countries recognise the importance of SECs and have mentioned them in their 
biosafety regulations. However, relatively few have formally implemented 
them into the actual assessment of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). 
This review aims to provide greater insight into both the opportunities and 
challenges of integrating SECs into regulatory decision-making. 
2. LEGAL BASIS. ARTICLE 26, CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY 
The legal basis for the inclusion of SECs in biosafety decision-making is primarily 
Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB),[1] a legally-binding 
international agreement, negotiated, concluded and adopted in the framework 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity.[2] It was established to guide Parties 
in developing countries in the environmentally-sound management of modern 
biotechnology practices, specifically focusing on transboundary movements. 
Parties to the CPB are expected to establish functional regulatory systems that 
have both the capacity to access state-of-the-art research and development 
facilities along with a platform for exchanging scientific and technical 
information. Following the CPB, a number of capacity building initiatives 
have assisted (and continue to assist) developing countries to build functional 
regulatory systems. The CPB addresses all aspects of biosafety regulation, 
including the use of SECs (see Box 1).
According to Article 26 of the CPB, the inclusion of SECs in regulatory decision-
making (1) can apply to import decisions; (2) can apply to issues included under 
domestic laws and regulations; and (3) is voluntary; and furthermore, (4) if 
countries chose to include them, then the assessment needs to be consistent 
with international obligations, for example the World Trade Organisation (see 
also Falck-Zepeda et al., 2016). Finally, Article 26 of the CPB also suggests 
that SECs should have a specific focus: there should be direct causality from 
adopting GM crops to effects on biodiversity. 
The importance of formalising the inclusion of SECs in national regulations 
is increasingly acknowledged, particularly in developing countries. There are, 
however, no standard provisions to include SECs in domestic legislation of 
Parties to the CPB: this creates possibilities and flexibility, as well as challenges, 
in implementing SECs at the national and international levels (Tung, 2014). 
Before addressing these challenges, SECs will be explored in more detail. 
1 https://bch.cbd.int/protocol 
2 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD; https://www.cbd.int) is a multilateral treaty with the 
objective to develop national strategies for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.
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3. SPECIFYING SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
There is no strict definition of socio-economic considerations, nor is there an 
exhaustive list of factors that encompass SECs. SECs can be wide-ranging: 
they can relate to direct or indirect impacts, be technology-specific or relate to 
non-specific impacts. Moreover, the impacts can be positive or negative, and 
sometimes affect different groups of stakeholders at the same time in different 
ways. The specific impact and characteristics of SECs depend on the context 
in which they are used. The context of biotechnology applications can differ 
depending on the following variables: the type of application, as well as its 
geographical location and technology users (i.e. what, where and who). 
• Type of application: this determines which SECs are relevant for analysis. 
Different types of GMOs are developed for a range of goals and contexts: 
for example, GM crops in an agricultural context and GM mosquitoes to 
eliminate vector-borne diseases in a human health-related context. GM 
crops are developed primarily to increase yield, farmers income and, further 
down the line, food security. The primary purpose of GM mosquitoes is 
to reduce disease incidences; they can have a direct (beneficial) effect on 
human health, but also a secondary (beneficial) effect on employment 
and income in local communities. Different SECs will be relevant for 
different situations; alternatively, the same SECs can have a different level 
of importance when assessing a specific GMO application. This review 
primarily focuses on the application of various types GM crops: insect-
resistant, herbicide-tolerant, virus-resistant or bio-fortified.
Box 1. Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
Art. 26 states that: 
1. The Parties, in reaching a decision on import under this Protocol or under its domestic 
measures implementing the Protocol, may take into account, consistent with their 
international obligations, socio-economic considerations arising from the impact of 
living modified organisms on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity to indigenous 
and local communities.
2. The Parties are encouraged to cooperate on research and information exchange on 




• Geographical location: the location of release/use can influence the socio-
economic impact of a GM crop. For example, the impact on food security 
is likely to be negligible in developed countries because agricultural inputs 
have already been optimised in many areas (such as irrigation, fertiliser, 
weed management and pest management). In developing countries, such 
as in Africa, 30 - 50 % of crops (and thus, harvests) can be lost because to 
insect pests (Deloitte & Touche, 2015). Introducing an insect-resistant GM 
crop can therefore have a big effect on food security in rural communities 
in these countries. 
• Technology users (or stakeholders): SECs can have a varying impact on 
different users, known as ‘the distribution of effects’. The socio-economic 
impact of a specific GM crop can vary amongst different groups of 
stakeholders (i.e. farmers, retailers and consumers) or within the same 
group of stakeholders (i.e. adopters and non-adopters of GM crops). 
The following sections discuss the most commonly used SECS and their impacts 
on farming, on of coexistence measures, on environmental economy, along the 
supply chain and on food security and consumer.
3.1 FARM-LEVEL IMPACTS
GM crops can generate benefits for adopting farmers, including yield and profit 
increases, as well as less tangible benefits, such as less variability in yield and 
more flexibility in time management (for example, a wider time window for 
applying herbicides). However, not all farmers may profit equally from adopting 
GM crops. The extent of potential benefits will depend on characteristics of the 
specific agricultural plot and farm management, such as the previous incidence 
and severity of pest attacks, amongst others (Hall et al., 2013). To determine the 
underlying mechanisms of socio-economic effects, a socio-economic analysis 
should start by profiling the typology of farms, farmers and adoption rates in 
the area under research (Kathage et al., 2015). Adoption rates can be measured 
by (1) calculating the number of hectares planted with GM crop(s) divided by 
total hectares by crop or total hectares of arable land by country or region; (2) 
the number and proportion of farmers adopting GM crops (ex post); or (3) the 
number of farmers willing or unwilling to adopt a GM crop (ex ante). Farm 
typology relates to both farm characteristics (e.g. location [country/region], 
size, income by crop and livestock type, ownership and organic certification) 
and farmer characteristics (e.g. education, age, sex, household income, off-
farm income and time dedicated to farming). 
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Socio-economic impacts at the farm-level include all direct and indirect effects 
(see Box 2) of a GM crop while it is being produced. The impacts can affect the 
farmer, farm workers or other farmers in the same region. The impacts can 
also be divided into income, health, social, and ethical or cultural aspects.
3.1.1 INCOME-RELATED ASPECTS
Income-related aspects of farm-level impacts contribute to the balance 
between inputs (expenses) and outputs (income). Farmers rely on different 
types of input, that is, expenses related to: seed and agrochemical (e.g. 
fertiliser, pesticides, herbicides) purchase; irrigation (depending on the 
climate); and fuel/machinery and labour. The output is the yield, which the 
farmer will sell for a certain price depending on crop quality and local market 
characteristics. Crop quality can be determined by seed quality and crop 
management efficiency, which also influences the overall input/output balance 
on a technical and allocative scale. For example, efficient management may 
result in more time to generate off-farm income from other activities. 
Box 2. Direct and Indirect Effects
Socio-economic impacts can be the direct or indirect consequences of technology use, 
as illustrated by the following examples. 
Conventional (i.e. non-GM) crops such as maize need regular applications of pesticides. 
The incorrect or unprotected use of pesticides can poison field workers (Damalas & 
Eleftherohorinos, 2011). Insect-resistant GM crops produce a specific protein that 
functions as a pesticide. These GM cops will generally need fewer pesticide spraying 
applications than the comparable non-insect-resistant crop. Thus, insect-resistant GM 
crops can have the direct effect of reducing pesticide use. As an indirect effect, insect-
resistant GM crops can decrease the number of cases of pesticide poisoning of field 
workers (Kouser & Qaim, 2011; Racovita 2015).
Herbicide-tolerant GM crops can facilitate a change in crop management system 
that requires a different herbicide to be applied and can result in a reduction in soil 
preparation (tilling). Such low or no-till agriculture can indirectly reduce soil erosion as 
well as fossil fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions due to less tractor use.
Virus-resistant GM crops can directly reduce local viral loads, which can indirectly cross-
protect nearby non-GM crops sensitive to the same virus.
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There is no general formula for calculating the gain in income from adopting 
a GM crop. The potential increases in yield and economic return depend on 
a variety of factors (Table 1). The more heterogeneous these factors are, the 
more variable will be the resulting benefits and costs. The effect of a change 
or improvement in one factor may be mitigated by other factors. For example, 
the use of an insect-resistant GM crop may result in suboptimal yield if other 
factors are limiting. 
Farmers who do not adopt GM crops may also be affected by the cultivation of 
GM crops by others. The availability of GM crops on the market can have an 
influence on the availability of non-GM seeds and output prices. Non-adopting 
farmers will probably face additional costs of segregation measures or damage 
(if cross-pollination or admixture occurs; see Section 3.2). However, they may 
also benefit from crop protection spill-overs (i.e. a local reduction in pest 
pressure caused by insect-resistant GM crop cultivation). 
3.1.2 HEALTH ASPECTS
These relate to factors influencing the health of the farmer, farm workers 
and local community. For example, a change in pesticide management may 
influence not only income and yield, but also affect the health of workers, 
leading to longer, healthier and more productive working lives (Bennett et al., 
2006; Krishna & Qaim, 2012; Racovita et al. 2015). Increased yields or better-
Table 1: Factors determining changes in yield and economic returns
Factor Variability
Current crop Has the farmer already cultivated this crop? 
Trait characteristics What type of GM crop is introduced (e.g. 
herbicide-tolerant, insect-resistant, virus-resistant, 
biofortified)?
Incidence(s) of pest infestations Low or high pest pressure? 
Single or multiple pests?
Agricultural practices Low- or high-tech?
Climate conditions Temperature, humidity, precipitation, etc.?
Soil conditions Nutrient level, need for fertiliser etc.?
Seed costs Price premium for GM seed?
Market characteristics Are GM crops already on the market? 
What is the demand?
Level of societal acceptance?
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quality crops (with increased nutritional value) can benefit health. Finally, 
other less-quantifiable factors may influence people’s health, such as a reduced 
need for physical labour or improved working conditions (Bennett et al., 2006). 
Health aspects can be quantified economically using morbidity/mortality data 
associated with the use of pesticides and chemicals or with nutrition. 
3.1.3 SOCIAL ASPECTS
The social, ethical and cultural aspects of farm-level impacts relate to factors 
influencing working conditions such as working hours and overtime, wages 
and health insurance, training and education, and the availability of machinery 
and safety equipment. All of these aspects influence the quality of life at the 
farm level. Additionally, there can be an impact on social interactions between 
farmers (i.e. between adopters/non-adopters or a shift/change in buyers and 
supplier). Impacts at the farm level can include ethical and cultural effects, such 
as a change in moral values (for example, concerning good agricultural practice 
and the exploitation of natural resources), the use of indigenous knowledge 
and cultural practices concerning farming (versus hi-tech agriculture) or the 
distribution of justice (accessibility of the technology and the influence on any 
inequality between adopting and non-adopting farmers). Social effects can be 
mapped qualitatively using interviews or questionnaires.
3.2 IMPACT OF COEXISTENCE MEASURES
Cultivating GM crops has implications for the organisation of agricultural 
production. GM crop-adopting farms might have an unintentional impact on 
non-GM adopting farms due to unwanted pollination between their fields or 
admixing of their products. Therefore, it is necessary to establish systems to 
enable the coexistence of GM and non-GM crops (conventional agriculture, 
including organic certified agricultural systems). Coexistence is defined as 
the ability to successfully produce and market products from both GM and 
non-GM crops within the same agricultural system. This enables farmers to 
choose a production system that helps meet demands for niche markets by 
maintaining crop integrity within a system and preserving the economic value 
of the harvest. 
It should be noted that the issue of coexistence of GM crops with non-GM 
crops is not a safety issue as legal GM products on the market have passed 
health and environmental safety reviews and regulations. Rather, coexistence 
is an economic issue that is market-driven.
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Socio-economic impacts of coexistence include all direct and indirect effects 
of measures to prevent unintentional presence of GMOs or admixture from 
GM crop farming to conventional and organic certified systems (see Box 3). 
Coexistence measures can influence farm-level costs and GM crop adoption 
dynamics.
Two strategies are generally used to implement coexistence: precautionary 
(ex ante) and damage control (ex post) strategies. The first strategy aims to 
Box 3. Coexistence Measures to Minimise Adventitious Mixing
Coexistence systems aim to reduce the likelihood of admixing crops grown via GMO, 
conventional, organic or subsistence agriculture. Admixing can occur before, during and 
after crop production
Before crop production, admixing of seeds can occur. Ensuring seed purity is the first step 
in preventing GMO contamination. The risk of seed mixing depends on the type of seed 
system in use. Formal, well-organised seed systems are generally used by commercial 
farmers, whereas informal systems are used by smallholders or subsistence farmers. In an 
informal seed system, the seeds are saved by farmers, and then distributed by registered 
or unregistered traders and vendors. Therefore, seed mixing and adventitious presence of 
GMOs are more difficult to control in informal systems than in formal systems.
During crop cultivation, the unwanted presence of GMOs may result from gene flow due 
to cross-pollination between GM plants and non-GM plants of the same type. Whether 
cross-pollination actually occurs depends on several factors: the crop type, pollen and 
seed dispersal; and the distance between fields. Coexistence management measures 
are therefore crop-specific. The European Bureau on Coexistence has developed crop-
specific guidance documents[1] for best practices in coexistence management. 
Admixing can also occur after production; during harvest, transport and post-harvest 
crop handling (such as storage and drying). Therefore, GM and non-GM harvests must 
be handled separately to prevent co-mingling. A contributory factor is that (smallholder) 
farmers often share harvesting machinery, transport wagons and storage facilities. 
The difficulty and costs of separating production chains depends on many factors, for 





prevent admixture and gene flow; whereas the second provides measures to 
handle the situation after admixture has occurred. Ideally, both systems need 
to be in place because admixture is almost impossible to prevent. Examples of 
coexistence measures of both strategies are shown in Table 2.
Besides technical and practical measures to ensure effective coexistence, other 
measures include: careful record-keeping and administration and regular 
testing; training/education of farmers and farm workers; and good cooperation 
and communication between farmers and the operators of shared agricultural 
equipment. These measures provide transparency and may reduce or prevent 
disputes between neighbouring farmers. 
Coexistence can increase farming costs such as operational costs, transaction 
costs, opportunity costs and testing and remediation costs. The type and scale 
* Isolation distance is the distance maintained between fields of crop plants to help minimise cross-
fertilisation by pollen flow. The minimum isolation distance depends on factors such as the fertilisation 
mechanism of the species (self- or cross-pollinated crop) and the pollination agent (wind or insect).
** Because zero admixing is not achievable in agricultural systems, a legal threshold for the products 
of adventitious mixing must be set. This varies, but for most countries the legal tolerance threshold for 
authorised GMOs in non-GM products is 0.9%.
Table 2: Measures to promote coexistence (adapted from Czarnak-Kłos & Rodríguez-Cerezo, 
2010; Devos et al., 2009)
Pre-cautionary measures (ex ante) Damage control measures (ex post)
Mandatory segregation: 
• Ensure seed purity
• Provide rigid/flexible refuge areas
• Have voluntary GM-free zones
• Maintain isolation distances* 
• Adjust planting/flowering distance and/
or timing
• Keep machinery & equipment clean
• Seal and label seed containers
Compensation funds
Identity preservation / traceability Insurance schemes
Minimum GMO tolerance levels** Marketplace liability
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of these costs can vary between GM crop adopters, conventional farmers and 
organic farmers.[3] The need for coexistence measures can influence GM crop 
adoption dynamics, such as the rate of adoption, spatial configuration of 
adoption, and the rate and stability of GM crop expansion. Finally, admixture 
can also have a social impact by damaging the level of trust between neighbours, 
leading to conflict or even lawsuits (Levidow & Boschert, 2011). 
3.3 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
Besides farm-level impacts, GM crop cultivation can also have environmental 
impacts, both positive and negative (Raven, 2010; Mannion & Morse, 2012; 
Knox et al., 2013; Garcia-Yi et al., 2014). Environmental impacts related to SECs 
are limited to those with economic effect, such as pesticide use and carbon 
emissions. After all, an environmental risk assessment has already been 
conducted during the decision-making process. Environmental economic 
effects are crop-specific and relate to herbicide and insecticide use, crop yields 
and effects of unwanted gene flow. They can also have effects on soil, water 
and air conditions, biodiversity, the use of resources and fuel consumption. 
For example, drought- or salinity-tolerant GM crops can reduce the need for 
resources (water) and fuel use (reduced use of machineries), which can affect 
soil, water and air conditions in the area. 
The use of GM crops may avoid the need for agricultural inputs and practices 
that might harm the environment, such as tilling. It can also change the type 
or quantity of herbicides/insecticides in use (Brookes & Barfoot, 2016), which 
may benefit soil and water conditions if the replacement herbicide/pesticide 
is less toxic. Apart from direct effects, the use of GM crops can have indirect 
effects due to changes in agricultural practices, such as less machinery and 
fossil fuel use resulting from fewer herbicide applications (e.g. CO2 emission 
and carbon sequestration). Overall, improving crop yields without increasing 
the use of land and water resources could reduce total land use and help 
minimise impacts on biodiversity (Brookes & Barfoot 2017). GM crops approved 
for commercial cultivation have undergone a thorough environmental risk 
assessment and are considered safe. To date, no incidents of approved GM 
crops causing direct harm to the environment or human health have been 
3 These differences are based on the relative costs compared to the consequences. Conventional farmers 
may lose part of the non-GM price premium for conventional crops and may be affected from not being 
able to sell the crop as non-GM. For organic farmers, the consequences can be more severe, as they can 




confirmed by governments or competent authorities (Nicolia et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, GM crops are associated with more general concerns related to 
industrial agriculture and pesticide use, both of which are considered unwanted 
or undesirable to the environment by certain stakeholders (Mampuys & Brom, 
2015). Whether these should be considered as SECs remains under debate.
3.4 IMPACT ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN
Socio-economic impacts along the supply chain include all direct and indirect 
effects of the GM crop, from the technology provider and/or producer, to 
intermediaries (food industry, companies and retailers), and on to consumers. 
Changes resulting from the introduction of GM crops can affect the structure 
or performance of the supply chain or the distribution of costs and benefits 
within the supply chain (i.e. shift). The supply chain can be affected either 
upstream or downstream of the crop farming sector by various factors. 
• Bidirectional effects. These include (inter)national GMO regulations, 
enforced local or national co-existence rules, voluntary and mandatory 
GMO certification schemes, and the protection of intellectual property 
rights (e.g. patents, licenses).
• Upstream effects. GM seed companies and manufacturers of complementary 
products (such as herbicides) may profit from GM crop-adopting farmers 
buying their products, while competitors selling non-GM seeds and other 
herbicides may lose market share. Similarly, GM insect-resistant crops: 
companies that sell insecticides might experience reduced sales because 
less pesticide is used compared with a non-GM crop. Further upstream, 
GM crop adoption can also affect innovation, for example by increasing or 
decreasing research investment in R&D.
• Downstream effects. These include all socio-economic effects on 
intermediaries between the farm level and consumer. GM crops can 
affect market access and (national) trade interests, logistics, governance 
mechanisms (coexistence). The market power of different actors (i.e. ability 
to influence the price of a commercial item), and the price elasticities of 
supply and demand for the crop can also be affected. The scale of these 
effects will depend upon whether the country is a large or small producer 
(i.e. price-setter or price-taker), whether the country trades the crop 
internationally (i.e. closed or open economy), adoption rates, and the 
nature and magnitude of the supply shift caused by GM crop adoption. The 
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cost of Identity preservation and traceability of GM crops affects the entire 
supply chain (Kalaitzandonakes et al., 2009). In addition, the feed industry 
might benefit from lower prices for raw materials if an increased GM crop 
cultivation leads to higher yields combined with lower prices. Likewise, 
the organic industry might capitalise on the demand for non-GM feed. 
Although livestock producers may benefit from less expensive feed, those 
in the organic sector may have to pay a higher premium for GMO-free feed 
as it becomes scarcer as more GM crops are cultivated. The food industry 
depends on the acceptance of GM crops for food production and any related 
GMO labelling requirements.
The commercialisation of GM products under different enforced co-existence 
rules, labelling schemes, and intellectual property rights can impact the 
supply chain structure (both vertically and horizontally) and performance (e.g. 
efficiency, effectiveness, and innovation ability). This, in turn, can affect the 
distribution of costs and benefits amongst the different actors along the supply 
chain, as well as their market power (e.g. ability to influence the price of a 
commercialised item).
Worldwide, countries have different domestic regulations concerning the 
trade and labelling of GM products, which can affect the international trade 
patterns in agricultural products and the competiveness of partner countries 
and their corresponding sectors. The stringency of GMO regulations of large 
food importers such as Europe is reported to affect the strategies of developing 
countries (e.g. Argentina and selected African countries) concerning GMO 
production and regulations (Paarlberg, 2010; Adenle, 2011; Laursen, 2013).
The handling of GM materials and products along the supply chain can also 
have social or legal effects owing to political and trade differences regarding 
GMOs, such as disputes regarding market access and trade interests (World 
Trade Organisation; for an example, see Punt & Wesseler, 2016), shifts in 
market power of different actors and the response from retail sector based on 
(perceived) consumer acceptance (Tung, 2014).
3.5. FOOD SECURITY AND CONSUMER LEVEL IMPACTS
In countries with suboptimal agriculture and limited access to resources, GM 
crops can improve food security (Qaim & Kouser, 2013). Most of the world’s 
hungry people live in developing countries, where one report estimated the 
prevalence of undernourishment as 14% (FAO, IFAD & WFP, 2013). The same 
report defined food security as: 
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“a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary 
needs and food preferences, for an active and healthy life”. 
It identified four dimensions of food security: 
1. Availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied 
through domestic production or imports (including food aid);
2. Access by individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods 
for a nutritious diet;
3. Utilisation of food through an adequate diet, clean water, sanitation 
and health care, to reach a state of nutritional well-being, where all 
physiological needs are met, and;
4. Stability in the availability of, and access to, food regardless of sudden 
shocks (e.g. an economic or climatic crisis) or cyclical events (e.g. seasonal 
food scarcity).
Thus, food security is a multi-dimensional concept that needs all four 
dimensions to be fulfilled simultaneously to be successful (Ruane & Sonnino, 
2011). Therefore, GM crops alone are unlikely to provide an overall solution to 
food security problems. They can, however, contribute to a wider approach to 
food security (Dibden et al., 2013). GM crops can improve food availability by 
utilising traits such as insect and/or herbicide resistance, as well as drought 
and/or salinity tolerance, to decreases yield losses from pest insects, weed 
infestations or adverse climate conditions. GM crops can also improve food 
access (e.g. by increasing income for farmers), and improve food utilisation 
(e.g. biofortified crops with increased nutritional value).
As indicated in Section 3.2., farmers can choose whether or not to cultivate 
GM crops or instead to adopt an organic farming system. This same range of 
choices extends to consumers, for whom a wide variety of food preferences 
that can be influenced by national, cultural and individual characteristics (age, 
gender, highest attained educational level) and values (cultural, religious and 
ethical influences). Consumer choice for GM or non-GM products is determined 
by availability, acceptance and pricing of GM versus non-GM products. 
Several countries have either mandatory or voluntary GM-related labelling 
schemes (GMO or GMO-free), with different tolerance levels (i.e. the permitted 
threshold under which GMOs can be present in the final product without 
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impacting the products “non-GMO” status).[4] Most organic certification 
schemes require their products to be GMO-free, as this is one of the main 
principles of organic agriculture (USDA, 2013). Socio-economic impacts at the 
consumer level relate to the costs of labelling or banning products and the 
willingness to acquire or avoid specific products. The effect of price premiums 
for non-GM products have been evaluated in different GM-related labelling-
schemes, including their effect on consumer welfare (Lusk et al., 2005; Costa-
Font et al., 2010; Aerni et al., 2011; Oh & Ezezika, 2014). As indicated by Garcia-
Yi et al. (2014): 
“Potential buyers can indicate their willingness to pay (WTP) for these products, 
and changes in social welfare can be calculated based on the differences 
between the WTP and actual or expected prices (price premiums). If there is 
a moratorium or ban on GM products, option values can be calculated based 
on a (hypothetical) WTP to preserve or maintain this situation. Social welfare 
can be estimated by the difference between the WTP and the opportunity costs 
of forgoing economic growth associated with the commercialization of GM 
products.”
4. USING SECS IN REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
This section discusses the main aspects and challenges of using SECs within 
regulatory frameworks, beginning with methods to measure and compare 
SECs. SECs will then be discussed from a legal and regulatory perspective 
by identifying the challenges of implementing them and harmonising the 
different biosafety regulations. 
4.1 MEASURING SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS
Numerous methods are available to calculate SECs (e.g. the list reported by 
Falck-Zepeda & Zambrano, 2011); however, there is no standard methodology 
for measuring socio-economic impacts. Every analysis is case-specific and 
each method has specific strengths and weaknesses. 
SECs related to economic, social, environmental, cultural and health-related 
impacts can sometimes be expressed in monetary or other quantifiable terms 
(e.g. the number of employees, working hours, hourly pay rate, revenue in 
currency per tonne), but others, such as innovative ability or competitiveness 
4 Tolerance levels for unintended adventitious or technically unavoidable low level presence of GMOs in 
food and feed are set because a zero tolerance level is almost impossible to achieve in an international 
trade setting. Most countries have a threshold value of 0.9 % per ingredient for authorised GMOs.
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are more challenging to quantify. SECs can be quantitative and qualitative, 
absolute or relative. Social effects can be expressed quantitatively (e.g. the 
number of unemployed people, the number of people living in poverty or on 
social security benefits), but social exclusion or justice, for example, are more 
difficult to quantify. 
Although there are many potential SECs, those used within a regulatory 
assessment framework should preferably have at least one measureable 
indicator (either quantitative or qualitative) and a plausible causal mechanism 
by which GM crop cultivation might affect the indicator (i.e. a direct relation 
or link between the indicator and GM crop cultivation). A scientifically sound 
method of assessing the impact of GM crop cultivation on the indicator is 
also needed to ensure transparency, traceability and reproducibility (Kathage 
et al., 2015). The following sub-sections discuss the most significant aspects 
of measuring SECs. 
4.1.1 EX POST OR EX ANTE?
Socio-economic assessments can be done ex post or ex ante:
• Ex post assessment. This is done to evaluate a technology after it has been 
introduced, based on data from the actual case, within a specific country/
region and over a specified time period. Information gathering is based 
on production input and output data and information from surveys. One 
example is a study of Bt cotton in South Africa that highlighted the impact 
that institutions can have on the type and level of benefits that technology 
may bring to farmers (Gouse et al., 2005; Gouse, 2009). The study found 
that the successful introduction and adoption of Bt cotton by smallholder 
cotton farmers on the Makhathini flats in South Africa came to a halt due 
to institutional failure.
• Ex ante assessment. This is done by countries when there is a need to evaluate 
a technology before deciding whether it can be authorised for introduction. 
As no data is already available specific to the SECs of the technology in the 
country, data has to be identified from identical or comparable cases and/
or assumptions based on baseline data and extrapolation. One example 
is a series of studies by Kikulwe and colleagues (cited by Falck-Zepeda & 
Grouse, 2017) on GM banana in Uganda, where low adoption levels due to 
negative perceptions about GM technology in general was identified as a 




• In general, an ex ante assessment has more uncertainties and limitations 
compared to an an ex post study; therefore it is even more important that the 
assessment is clearly defined in terms of scope, methods and assumptions 
made.
4.1.2 DATA AVAILABILITY AND QUALITY
It is important to first define the scope of the socio-economic analysis: What 
exactly is to be investigated? For instance, is it an investigation of the impact 
of a GM crop on farm gross income, or on local food security, or on farm 
workers health? Once the research question has been defined, the type of data 
to challenge the hypothesis can be quickly identified. This can be primary 
data (input/output, crop specific) or secondary data (welfare economics). It is 
important to remember that data sets may not always be available or accessible, 
and might need to be collected or generated by the researchers. 
Next, it is important to evaluate the data quality (Falck-Zepeda & Gouse, 2017). 
This is influenced by factors such as specificity, significance, sample size, 
accuracy and reliability, experimental design and randomisation, and statistical 
analysis. Data on GM crop adoption and distribution should preferably be 
distinguished by typology of farms and farming systems to overcome potential 
biases (see Table 3). 
In measuring farm-level effects (such as adoption rates), obtaining accurate 
and sufficient data on the adoption and distribution of GM seed by type/
size of farmers (large-scale, small-scale, commercial or subsidence) may be 
challenging if accurate records of seed sales and users are unavailable. Similar 
issues concern the accuracy of farmer survey recall data and the administration 
of on-farm activities, which may be impaired because of illiteracy, for example. 
Although it may not be possible to solve these issues or to adjust for them, 
it is important to acknowledge and make explicit potential uncertainties and 
limitations of the data set.
When investigating socio-economic impacts over a specified period, the data 
continuity is important. Single-year and single-location studies have limited 
value, because climatic conditions and the production practices of individual 
farmers may unduly influence pest pressure or weed persistence and thus the 
assessment. Multi-year / multi-location studies are preferable to increase the 
representativeness and accuracy of the results. However, data continuity may 
also pose a challenge. Inevitably, climate conditions and pest pressure over 
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the years may vary (within a certain range). Other, less predictable factors 
can also hamper data continuity, such as extreme erratic weather or damage 
from animals, farmers discontinuing GM crops because of external conditions 
such as off-farm employment, changes in government support or subsidies, 
and seed availability. Finally, gradual climate change may lead to the loss of 
a group of farmers (e.g. GM crop adopters) after a number of seasons. These 
factors are not directly associated with the effect of the crop itself, but they 
may influence the data continuity and the results of the assessment. 
4.1.3 UNCERTAINTIES AND LIMITATIONS
SEC measurements inevitably suffer from uncertainties and limitations. 
Uncertainties can relate to the objectivity and accuracy of data, for example, 
how independent are the data, who collected or provided them, and how 
objective and accurate are data from farmer surveys or interviews (e.g. when 
Table 3: Potential biases in socio-economic assessments of GM crops (adapted from Falck-Zepeda 
& Gouse, 2017).
Source of bias Description
Selection Can occur when individuals, groups or data are selected for analysis such that 
proper randomisation is not achieved: the obtained sample is therefore not 
representative of the intended population. For example is when adopters and 
non-adopters have different characteristics (other than adopting/not adopting the 
technology) that affect the indicator and are not controlled for. Another example 
is when adopters within government programmes or programmes initiated by 
seed companies are not ‘real adopters’ because the decision to adopt was not 
made by them.
Measurement Can occur when the act of sampling influences the measurement. This can result 
from factors such as too small sample size or too few samples taken from a 
population.
Estimation Can occur when the impact is over- or underestimated, for example in farmer 
surveys.
Simultaneity Can occur when the explanatory variable is determined jointly with the dependent 
variable. An example is when input decisions may be related but their connectivity 
is not addressed (i.e. the use of specific herbicides with herbicide-tolerant crops).
Sampling Can occur when samples are collected in such a way that some members of the 
intended population are less likely to be included than others, such as sampling 
only higher profit-generating or larger farms.
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asking about (perceived) drawbacks or benefits of adopting GM crops or the 
motivations for certain decisions in farm management)? Uncertainties relate 
not only to the data but also to the method chose for quantification.
It is theoretically possible to quantify almost every SEC by scoring the responses 
related to experiences with GM crops. However, quantification should never be 
a target in itself because quantitative analysis is often partial and does not 
present a complete picture. In addition, quantitative assessment is only as 
good as the input data. Therefore, the risk of quantifying qualitative data is 
that it gives the illusion of hard data. 
For these reasons, uncertainty and sensitivity analysis are extremely important, 
along with an explicit analysis of the limitations, when assessing SECs. The 
use of averages in multi-year, multi-location studies can easily mask effects 
on individual stakeholders, whereas specific effects might overestimated or 
underestimated in smaller studies. Hence, the limitations of all studies should 
be made explicit when drawing up conclusions.
Once effects have been identified and measured, their position within the 
overall context of the study must be determined. To arrive at a conclusion, 
the measured effects need to be compared with a baseline (see Box 4). In an 
analysis of GM crops, the impact is usually calculated as the value indicator 
under the impact scenario (i.e. with GM cultivation) minus the value indicator 
under the baseline scenario (i.e. without GM cultivation) (Kathage et al., 2015). 
In conclusion, measuring and comparing SECs can be challenging due to a lack 
of (accessible) data and the effort needed to transform data into a form that is 
useful for analysis. There may also be information asymmetries: data on benefits 
(health/environmental impacts) are often scarcer (and more uncertain) than 
data on costs. Finally, the use of both qualitative and quantitative information 
may cause difficulty in comparing impacts. 
Box 4. Baseline
A baseline (or reference) is a minimum or starting point used for comparative analysis, 
usually comprising an initial set of critical observations or data used for comparison or as 
a control. It is therefore critical for assessing the impact of an intervention. A comparable 




4.2 IMPLEMENTING SECS IN REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
An effective regulatory system should: (1) have adequate legal authority and 
clear safety standards for decision-making procedures; and (2) operate in a 
cost- and time-efficient manner (Jaffe, 2004). As discussed in Section 2, Article 
26 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (see Box 1) allows for the inclusion 
of socio-economic considerations in biosafety approval processes. Moreover, 
the openness of the CPB to different interpretations provides possibilities and 
flexibility, as well as challenges, in implementing SECs at the national and 
international level. These relate to the meaning of SECs and how they can be 
used in an overall assessment framework of GM crop applications. 
The importance of clearly defining the questions “when”, “how” and “under 
what decision-making-rules” that developers or decision-makers will consider 
in assessing the socio-economic issues for products undergoing regulatory 
review is widely recognised, not only for companies and other stakeholders 
but also from an international perspective (Jaffe, 2005; COGEM, 2009, Falck-
Zepeda, 2009; Binimelis & Myhr, 2016; Racovita, 2017). Two types of challenges 
using SECs in regulatory decision-making can be identified: procedural and 
technical challenges (see Tables 4 and 5). 
From a procedural perspective, the CPB does not indicate the rationale for 
including SECs in Parties reaching a decision on specific GMOs. Therefore, 
depending upon interpretation by individual Parties, this can lead to the 
question of whether SECs can constitute a legitimate reason to object or ban 
GM crops that are deemed safe.[5]
Several technical challenges relate to the inclusion of SECs in biosafety 
decision-making. This review, describes several categories of SECs that can 
be split into numerous sub-categories and indicators. A clear definition of 
scope, method and data requirements is needed to effectively include SECs in 
regulatory decision-making (see Table 5).
For the purposes of regulatory decision-making, the assessment of SECs 
requires a mechanism for identifying positive and negative socio-economic 
impacts. This, in turn, requires a workable framework to ensure that socio-
5 Biosafety regulations predominantly require an assessment of risk, or safety, to underpin decision-making. 
The inclusion of SECs into this procedure is highly debated because it not only brings up the question of 
whether SECs might be used to ban GM crops, but also how this relates to comparable conventional crops 
that are not subject to such a safety assessment nor a socio-economic analysis.
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economic impact assessments add valuable insights and arguments to 
decision-making and do not constitute an obstacle to the safe development 
and transfer of biotechnology products to end users. Therefore, it is important 
that socio-economic assessment frameworks are conducted within a regulatory 
framework that is accessible, transparent, reproducible, flexible, predictable 
and science-based.
4.3 HARMONISATION OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
There is no universal agreement or consensus on which factors constitute SECs, 
or on the way that they should be used in regulatory decision-making. As 
Article 26 of the CPB is open to interpretation, its implementation has resulted 
in the use of various terminologies and in different combinations of associated 
non-safety concerns. An overview of the status of national implementations 
of Art. 26 of the CPB can be found in the working documents of the Ad Hoc 
Technical Expert Group on Socio-Economic Considerations of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity.[6] 
6 www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/bs/bs-ahteg-sec-01/official/bs-ahteg-sec-01-02-en.pdf 
Table 4: Procedural challenges with the inclusion of SECs in biosafety decision-making (adapted 
from Falck-Zepeda & Zambrano, 2011; Falck-Zepeda et al., 2016)
Attribute Procedural Choices 
Goal • Provide insight OR
• Support decision-making
Status • Voluntary OR
• Mandatory OR
• Absent
Applications • All applications OR
• (Confined) field trials ONLY OR
• Market applications ONLY
When • Concurrent but separate to the ERA* OR
• Sequential (after the ERA) OR 
• Embedded within the ERA
How • Case-by-case OR
• Per crop trait (herbicide tolerant, insect/virus resistant or biofortified crops)
Who • Policy makers OR
• Experts OR
• Applicants




Article 26 of the CPB limits the scope of SECS to those impacts on biodiversity 
that are valued by indigenous and local communities, while national legislation 
in several countries has an expanded scope that includes a broader set of socio-
economic issues. Some national laws simply include only the term ‘socio-
economic’ with an indication of its type or role, while others link them to other 
aspects, such as culture, ethics, religion or even to esthetical norms (Falck-
Zepeda, 2009). 
Measuring, objectifying or weighing several of these aspects in the overall 
decision-making process for GM crops will obviously be difficult. This may, 
in turn, lead to uncertainty for applicants and stakeholders (such as farmers) 
about whether new GM crops will be approved for market release. Eventually, 
this may justify avoiding certain markets and investment climates, potentially 
leading to opportunity costs. 
International differences in procedural aspects of the implementation are also 
observed. For example, some countries have proposed that SECs should be 
included in all stages of the decision-making process and for all applications, 
whereas other countries have proposed their inclusion only in specific stages 
or for only some types of applications (Falck-Zepeda & Zambrano, 2011). With 
respect to how SECs, risk assessment, and decision-making should interrelate 
or interact with one another, some jurisdictions require SECs to be incorporated 
into the risk assessment process, whereas others instead have a process that 
separates SECs from risk assessment but within decision-making. Other 
differences relate to which actors should assess SECs within the regulatory 
system, potentially leading to overlapping mandates between Ministries or 
expert committees. 
Table 5: Technical challenges with the inclusion of SECs in biosafety decision-making (adapted from 
Falck-Zepeda & Zambrano, 2011; Falck-Zepeda et al., 2016)
Attribute Technical Challenges 
Scope • What questions are relevant for SECs in GM crop applications?
Method • Which methodology is best suited for the purpose of the analysis?






4.3.2 ONGOING EFFORTS TO HARMONISE SEC IMPLEMENTATION
Several of the Parties of the CPB have already begun to experience difficulties 
in defining and identifying SECs for their national context, as well as in how 
to integrate SECs into decisions in a manner consistent with international 
obligations such as the World Trade Organisation Law. Faced with these 
implementation challenges, they have identified a need for further guidance 
when choosing to include SECs in their legislation.
International differences can also impair ongoing R&D and the introduction 
of new GM crops to the market. Otherwise, a well-structured harmonised 
regulatory system confers benefits such as: cost efficiency; effectively shared 
technical capacity; harmonised compliance procedures; the creation of more 
competitive markets; a facilitation of cross-border trade; and standardised 
and transparent processes for predictability in international trade. These 
benefits are of socio-economic importance to countries and regional economic 
communities. Owing to regional and national agroecological differences and 
concomitant regional and national regulations, international harmonisation 
of the inclusion of SECs in regulatory decision-making of GM crops requires 
insight, understanding and a willingness to cooperate from all involved 
Parties. Regulatory harmonisation requires a platform for consultation and a 
clear understanding of the benefits of an efficiently functioning system. Such 
a platform calls for peer-level (country-to-country) dialogues for confidence 
building and for partnerships that promote resource-sharing and exchange of 
experiences, data and best practices.
To develop a global overview, several activities and mechanisms were 
undertaken to compile, take stock of and review information on SECs. A scoping 
exercise on SECs was carried out by United Nations Environment (UNEP) – 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) and included a survey that was conducted 
in late 2009 in three UN languages; English, French and Spanish (Secretariat 
of the CBD, 2010). The survey highlighted a need for further work. Therefore, 
an Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on SECs (overseen by the Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity) was created which has since examined the 
outcomes of online discussion groups and regional online conference in an 
attempt to provide conceptual clarity on SECs. These efforts, amongst others, 
have resulted in a descriptive approach to SECs (AHTEG-SEC, 2014). Continuing 
dialogue is aimed at agreement on identifying those SECs that can be included 
in regulatory decision-making in a standardised and structured way. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS & DISCUSSION
Worldwide, there is a growing global adoption of GM crops; as a consequence, 
several socio-economic benefits for society and farmers have been reported, 
including farm profitability, decreases in crop losses, increased income stability, 
ease of operation, savings on labour and pesticide use, time savings, and less 
exposure to toxic chemicals. Many SECs are not specific to GM crops and are 
applicable to other agricultural developments and changes. These include: 
access and affordability of planting materials and accompanying technologies; 
suitability of hi-tech crop systems to smallholder farm operations and 
resource-poor farmers; intellectual property rights; the influence of large seed 
companies; balancing food distribution infrastructure vs production output; 
commercialisation of relevant products versus profit considerations; and a 
possible negative impact on trade with traditional trading partners.
Inherently, new market introduction has concomitant microeconomic and 
competitive benefits and drawbacks. Distribution of the benefits and costs 
between growers, consumers, food manufacturers, retailers, and technology 
developers can make an assessment rather complex. Socio-economic impacts 
can be advantageous or disadvantageous, and sometimes both, so it is important 
to note that in most cases, both effects will occur and are not necessarily specific 
to GM crops. Socio-economic analyses focus on the resources used or gained by 
a specific GMO introduction compared with alternatives to determine the better 
option. However, it should be noted that not introducing (or even delaying) 
a technology or application can also have a socio-economic (Zimmerman & 
Qaim, 2004; Stein et al., 2006; Wesseler, 2017). SECs are dependent on the 
type of GM crop, geographical location and type of user. Therefore, data and 
conclusions for a socio-economic assessment of a certain type of crop in one 
country cannot simply apply to the crop in another country. 
Worldwide, modern biotechnology and its regulation are subject to public 
and political debate. In addition to environmental risk assessments, socio-
economic assessments can contribute to balanced decision-making regarding 
the market approval of GMOs and future investments in R&D and technology 
deployment. This calls for systematic and clearly outlined procedures and 
data/information gathering, to guide policy formulation and decision-making 
on biotechnology applications. 
To include all possible SECs in biosafety decision-making would take a 
tremendous effort and significant funding, which does not seem either feasible 
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or practical within GMO regulatory decision-making. However, the importance 
of SECs in agricultural development is internationally acknowledged and 
becomes increasingly important when assessing at not only the risks but also 
at the potential benefits of GM crops. 
Until countries have agreed on why and how SECs should be included in their 
decision-making processes for biotechnology applications, Binimelis & Myhr 
(2016) suggest taking a learning process approach as a starting point in order 
to establish a more solid knowledge basis. In a co-creative process, a pool of 
data can be established that provides better insight into the socio-economic 
impact of GM crops. Over time, this could result in a more structured approach 
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Biotechnology is an important driver for innovation in multiple fields and 
sectors. After years of continuous research and selected applications entering 
the market, developments in this field have started to accelerate (Booth 
2016). Biotechnological techniques are broadly taken up across the field of 
agricultural, environmental, medical and industrial innovation. Furthermore, 
modern biotechnology is increasingly used in combination with other 
emerging technologies such as nanotechnology or 3D printing, leading to novel 
applications, but also to potentially new or uncertain risks (Oye et al. 2014). 
From an innovation perspective, the integration of biotechnology can be 
viewed as a regular development of a technology reaching adulthood and 
becoming mainstream (Mampuys & Brom 2010). From a societal and safety 
perspective, however, a strong debate is ongoing on the potentially far-
reaching implications of this powerful technology. On an international and 
individual level, there are diverging views on what role we want biotechnology 
to play in our world and lives. 
Given the turbulent political and societal history of biotechnology and 
particularly the application of genetic modification, the process of integration 
will therefore inevitably be confronted with both regulatory and societal 
challenges. However, as biotechnology vanishes from its original position as a 
demarcated technology, this also means that it can no longer be regulated or 
discussed from a unique and separate position. Thus, the central question is: 
how can we properly organise and regulate a socially contested technology that 
technically becomes mainstream? In this paper we will illustrate the merging 
of biotechnology into other areas and identify governmental and societal issues 
that arise because of this process. We will argue that the fundamentals of 
current biotechnology regulatory frameworks no longer suffice to provide 
suitable governance of scientific developments. Instead, we suggest to move 
from a technology specific risk regime to a general balanced framework from 
the perspective of both innovation and safety that, within reason, takes into 
account different perspectives on the role of technology in our daily lives. 
2. EXPANSION AND REFINEMENT OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL 
TECHNIQUES
Biotechnology merges into two directions, 1) fields of application and 
2) sectors. From a scientific technological perspective, this means that 
biotechnological tools and techniques become less application specific. The 
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newest biotechnological techniques such as CRISPR-Cas are extremely versatile 
and used as a one-size-fits-all tool in agricultural, environmental, medical 
and industrial biotechnology. We propose to call this horizontal integration. 
From a technological-innovation perspective, biotechnology converges with 
other technologies such as nanotechnology, computer science, neuroscience, 
modeling and engineering. Different technologies converge into innovation 
platforms. We suggest calling this vertical integration. We will illustrate the 
merging of biotechnology with two developments that exemplify horizontal 
and vertical integration of biotechnology; CRISPR-Cas (see Box 1) and synthetic 
biology (see Box 2).
Box 1. CRISPR horizontally integrates biotech working fields
The recent discovery of the gene editing precision tool CRISPR was taken up horizontally 
across all working fields of biotechnology. The CRISPR-Cas system provides a new tool to 
edit (remove, change or add) genetic information (DNA and RNA) (Jinek et al. 2012). The 
technique, originating from a bacterial defense system, is highly specific and efficient and 
can theoretically be used in every cell type and in any living organism (microorganisms, 
plants, animals and humans) (Barrangou & Doudna 2016). Additionally, the tool is easy 
to design and use and at low costs. More interestingly, the tool does not necessarily 
result in a genetically modified organism or GMO (e.g. if no foreign or vector DNA 
is introduced). This strategy can – amongst others – be used to speed up the breeding 
process.
The simplicity and efficiency of CRISPR technology were embraced by all biotechnology 
fields. In agriculture, CRISPR has been proved to work in a wide variety of crops such 
as maize, wheat, rice, soybeans, potatoes, sorghum, oranges and tomatoes (Schiml & 
Puchta 2016). The technique is also being explored for trait improvement in livestock such 
as cattle, chickens and pigs (Nature 2016a,b). In the industrial production of cheese 
and yoghurt manufacturers have been using the natural CRISPR-encoded resistance to 
fend off phage infections in their production process to avoid food waste (Grens 2015). 
Potential applications in food and industrial biotechnology are engineering probiotic 
cultures and the manufacturing of green chemicals such as biofuels and biomaterials 
(Selle & Barrangou 2015). In medical research, the technique is used for fundamental 
research into the gene function, to create custom disease models (germline modification) 
and new therapies. In 2016 the first two CRISPR based gene therapy trials in humans 
were approved (somatic cell gene therapy) (Nature 2016a, b). 
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Synthetic biology has been on the horizon a little longer and has, after an initial 
hype (Mampuys & Brom 2010), diversified into specialized subfields such as 
metabolic pathway engineering, synthetic cells (protocells) and xenobiology. 
Synthetic biology became an umbrella term for a wide variety of applications 
that have been vertically taken up in divergent sectors and industries (see 
Box 2).
CRISPR and synthetic biology are typical examples that illustrate the 
horizontal and vertical merging of biotechnology. There are a number of other 
developments that confirm this trend of refining and expanding tools within 
and beyond the field of biotechnology.
Besides CRISPR, a set of other new techniques has been developed over the years 
providing a comprehensive toolbox for (plant) biotechnology. Within plant 
biotechnology, these techniques are horizontally integrating in and fading the 
boundaries between conventional and ‘modern’ plant breeding (Sprink et al. 
2016). Several of these techniques such as zinc fingers and TALENs are also 
used in medical applications, and as mentioned earlier, CRISPR has been taken 
up in all three main sectors of biotechnology. Additionally, a patent analysis in 
Box 2. Synthetic biology integrates beyond biotech
Synthetic biology can be described as the rational design and construction of new 
biological parts, devices and systems with predictable and reliable functional behaviour 
that do not exist as such in nature, and the redesign of existing natural biological systems, 
for basic research and targeted purposes (Pauwels et al. 2013). The applications 
make use of diverse skills from different scientific disciplines that go beyond biology, 
including engineering, chemistry, physics, computer science and bioinformatics. The 
vertical integration of this part of biotechnology is illustrated best by the wide variety of 
applications that have been developed with metabolic pathway engineering, a subfield 
of synthetic biology. Synthetic biology is well known for its application in the production 
of semi-synthetic artemisinin, a precursor for anti-malaria medicine (Paddon & Keasling 
2014). Other pharmaceutical products and vaccines are in the pipeline (Jones 2015). 
Micro-organisms have been engineered to convert corn sugar to biopolymers that 
are used in commercial carpets and apparel such as sports clothing (COGEM and 
Gezondheidsraad 2016). Last but not least industrial applications such as the production 
of lubricants and biofuels are put into commerce (Chubukov et al. 2016).
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The Netherlands showed that applications of biotechnology no longer strictly 
adhere to a single use purpose (e.g. medical, agricultural or industrial), but are 
increasingly a blend of food and medical use or agricultural and industrial use 
(COGEM & Octrooicentrum 2014). 
Besides synthetic biology, other cross-sector applications of biotechnology 
have surfaced, such as bioprinting and data storage. 3D bioprinting uses 
different technologies (engineering, cell biology, chemistry, modelling and 
math) to print living structures that can be used in medical applications such 
as tissue, skin, bone or partial organs (Mandrycky et al. 2016). The use of DNA 
for data storage as archiving technology is gaining an increasing interest from 
research and business (Extance 2016). Fields such as optogenetics - the use 
of light and genetics to manipulate and monitor the activities of defined cell 
populations - and bionanotechnology are moving towards application as well 
(Song & Knöpfel 2016, Nagamune 2017). 
3. BIOTECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS ACCOMPANIED BY A 
MULTITUDE OF CHALLENGES
The expansion and refinement of biotechnology and its horizontal and vertical 
merging into other sectors diminishes its visibility as a separate entity; 
this means it can also hardly be regulated and discussed as a separate and 
unique technology anymore. And this could lead to governance issues because 
biotechnological developments bring a wide array of challenges to the table 
ranging from political to legal, ethical and risk issues. 
It is already debated in the EU whether new plant breeding techniques (NPBTs) 
and applications result in genetically modified organisms (GMOs), as the end 
products do not necessarily differ from products from conventional breeding 
techniques, not using genetic modification (SAM 2017). The agricultural context 
of this debate – which is ongoing for more than a decade now – becomes 
increasingly problematic as any regulatory decisions will also affect other 
fields of biotechnology. The horizontal integration of gene editing techniques 
such as CRISPR means that either restrictive or permissive regulatory decisions 
based on the techniques used, not only affect one working field (such as 
agriculture) but also have consequences for other fields of application (e.g. 
medical applications). On the other hand, the same tools, treated differently 
depending on their application (for example in animals vs. plants) also leads to 
incomprehension and debate (Nature 2017). Additionally, tools such as CRISPR 
can induce both subtle to comprehensive genomic changes with similar ranges 
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in uncertainties and risks - not necessarily related to the size of the DNA 
changed. Therefore, from this perspective, regulating a tool or technique in 
itself does not seem to match the purpose of regulations in view of managing 
risks. 
The widespread adoption of CRISPR illustrates that the stakes are high while 
at the same time the speed and uptake of the technique across the entire 
biotechnology field pressurizes the discussion about the regulatory status of 
these applications (GMO or not? (Europe), novel or not? (Canada), plant pest or 
medicinal product? (United States)).
The uptake of synthetic biology into everyday consumer products seems 
successful and has largely gone unnoticed (Hayden 2014). However, the 
potential to spark public debate remains present, as illustrated by a case of an 
eco-friendly firm that got into trouble after going public about its shift from 
palm oil to the use of oil made by (synthetically) genetically engineered algae. 
The discussion on products made by new biotechnology (either GMOs or not) 
is unpredictable and irregular but emphasizes the societally contested status 
of biotechnology (Stemerding & Asveld 2016). Moreover, other biotechnological 
trends, such as 3D bioprinting, RNAi technology, personalised medicine, 
GM insects, gene therapy and next generation sequencing all represent a 
multitude of challenges for governments, scientist and society (COGEM & 
Gezondheidsraad 2016).
It can be concluded that several challenges resulting from biotechnological 
trends await political decision-making. However, a problem arises as we 
realise that the current regulatory and legal frameworks might no longer apply 
to the merged biotechnological applications and their consequences. Resulting 
products from techniques such as CRISPR and synthetic biology can’t always 
strictly be defined or distinguished into legal categories and their implications 
are not specific to biotechnology but relate to broader issues relating to our view 
on agriculture, health and food production. Societal debates about agriculture 
and food production differ significantly from discussions about medical 
applications. They are viewed through different lenses and usually either 
conceived as a chance or a threat. These debates have influenced regulatory 
decision making over the years, specifically in Europe that has a reputation of 
being restrictive and in indecisive with regard to plant biotechnology (Malyska 
et al. 2016). We emphasize that regulatory decisions on techniques such as 
CRISPR extend to other fields (both new and existing) where these issues are 
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not relevant or relevant from a different perspective. For example; discussing 
the use of gene editing (i.e. CRISPR) in food production in a regulatory context 
as a form of GM because it raises the same food-identity issues as GM food, 
can also have consequences for framing the use of CRISPR in health care where 
the relevant medical issues differ from GMO-related questions (Stemerding 
2017).
4. STIMULATING, REGULATING AND DEBATING BIOTECH
The focus of regulating biotechnology is and from the start has been specifically 
on the risk and safety of GMOs (i.e. Berg et al. 1975). A comprehensive risk 
assessment is required before GMOs can be used in research, field trials or 
brought onto the market. The trigger for (GMO or biotechnology) regulation 
varies internationally, depending on whether one looks mainly at the process 
(EU), the product (US) or the novelty of the characteristics introduced (CA). 
Internationally, different approaches are in place, each with their own benefits 
and issues (Sprink et al. 2016).
Besides the GMO/non-GMO distinction, the atmosphere of the societal debate 
also differentiates between fields of application. Society overall has different 
attitudes towards green (agriculture), red (medical) and white (industrial) 
biotechnology. In general, the most intense debate focusses on biotech in 
the food/agricultural sector and at medical applications directed at human 
enhancement. Medical applications directed at restoring or maintaining health 
are mostly accepted and industrial applications thus far hardly generate any 
attention, although this is expected to change (Hayden 2014). However, as 
a consequence of the horizontal and vertical integration, the regulatory 
frameworks (based on GMO/non-GMO) and the societal frame (based on red/
green/white biotech) no longer fit. In response, several countries are looking 
into a reform of the regulations, but this is easier said than done (Barbero, 
Boling et al. 2016, Kuzma 2016, Parliament 2016).
For years, regulators have tried to ‘domesticate’ new biotechnological 
developments to make them fit into the existing frameworks. The predominantly 
process-based EU regulations strictly define a GMO, lists which techniques lead 
to the production of a GMO and which ones are exempted. A thorough legal 
debate is ongoing for many years now to discuss the applicability of the GMO 
definition to NPBTs (SAM 2017). But even if they fall within the definition, 
the products resulting from NPBTs cannot always be distinguished from 
conventional products, significantly impeding enforcement of regulations 
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(Sprink, Eriksson et al. 2016). The USA basically has a voluntary GMO regulation 
and regulates some applications and not others, resulting in questions from 
producers and consumers (Nature 2016c). International ad hoc adaptations 
(within the EU and outside) to deal with new developments can – unseen and 
unintended – enlarge international differences (Abbott 2015). In the absence of 
regulatory decision-making in Europe, several individual countries (Sweden, 
Germany, UK, Finland) have concluded on their own that some applications of 
new techniques (CRISPR, Oligonucleotide Directed Mutagenesis (ODM)), do not 
result in a GMO as defined in the EU regulations (Eklöf 2015, Fladung 2016). 
EU regulations, or more specifically, their implementation and use, also have 
additional issues. The European position towards GMO crops has a reputation for 
being inconsistent with regards to its different attitudes towards importation 
and cultivation (Tagliabue 2016). This issue has been moreover identified and 
emphasized in international literature. Because of strict regulations that are 
not adapted to the scientific state of the art, Europe is lagging behind from an 
innovation perspective while in the USA new developments can go unnoticed 
and disregard potential ethical and societal issues such as admissibility, 
ownership and privacy. 
This calls into question whether new developments should be regulated 
eventually but also calls to question whether techniques that do not legally 
result in a GMO are inherently safe and do not need to be regulated. Both 
questions are difficult to answer and there is much at stake. Postponing 
answering these questions could lead to a regulatory limbo and innovation 
standstill, as currently in the EU (Podevin et al. 2012, Kuzma 2013). And in the 
meantime, technological innovations continue to develop rapidly.
5. PREPARING POLICY: FROM REACTION TO FORESIGHT
From a governance perspective, the biotechnological developments can 
no longer be dealt with by force-fitting them into the existing regulatory 
frameworks. Besides legislation that is lagging, the developments call for a 
broader discussion on non-safety issues. If this debate is not picked up actively, 
technical developments will move ahead and choices are made regardless of 
public support. This has been illustrated recently in the medical field. While 
the world is discussing the ethical and safety implications of human genome 
editing and mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT), the birth of the first 
‘three parent baby’ was announced by a Chinese doctor working in a US 
hospital who initiated the procedure in Mexico to circumvent legal issues. The 
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announcement was quickly followed by news from other countries claiming 
similar developments (Coghlan 2016). International differences in regulations 
are a fact and there will always be ways found around legal restrictions. 
However, these events also illustrate that the lack of international governance 
and coordination can (unintentionally) facilitate a race to the bottom where 
scientific fame or commercial benefit prevail. If individual countries do not 
actively take up the regulatory and ethical discussion, the lowest denominator 
in the international context can become leading. According to König (2017), the 
focus should not be to control, but to manage different approaches to deal with 
new technological developments
Policy makers should rapidly start preparing for these developments and they 
can do so by identifying the issues that ask for stimulating, regulating and 
debating biotechnology and making them explicit from a policy perspective. A 
suitable instrument for this identification is the compiling of a trend analysis, 
as illustrated in the Netherlands with the Biotechnology trend analysis 2016 
that provides an overview of eight trends typical of modern biotechnology: 
next generation sequencing (NGS), CRISPR-Cas, personalized medicine, gene 
therapy, new techniques (RNAi), GM insects, 3D bioprinting and synthetic 
biology. For each trend, the major societal, regulatory and legal dilemmas and 
questions have been identified (COGEM & Gezondheidsraad 2016). The issues 
and challenges in this report are not only applicable to the Dutch or European 
context but also have international ramifications. 
Besides a positioning towards these issues on a national level, an international 
dialogue is urgent: firstly because international regulatory frameworks interact 
in both politics and policy development (Brom 2015), secondly because both 
scientific-technological and technical-innovative perspectives are evolving in 
a global perspective and thirdly because regulations and societal acceptance are 
of major influence on global trade systems. This dialogue should be held in an 
international context and should focus on how to shift from a biotechnology / 
GMO framed debate to a debate about the normalisation of biotechnology from 
three perspectives:
A debate about innovation should focus on biotechnology as one of the (many) 
instruments to contribute to global challenges with regard to food supply and 
distribution, climate change, sustainability, infectious diseases etc.
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A debate about safety should focus on making safety regulations less technology 
specific. This means a reform of the (global) (GMO) regulations is urgent. The 
current EU approach based on a GMO/non-GMO distinction with either process 
or product as a regulatory trigger is no longer manageable, nor does it properly 
safeguard the potential risks of new products from integrating emerging 
technologies or does it do justice to societal concern and freedom of choice. 
The integration of biotechnology asks for a context related safety assessment. 
What is needed is to zoom out from the perspective of specific GMO biosafety to 
a more general view on biosafety, regardless of what types of technologies are 
involved or combined. In relation to the recently initiated US regulatory reform, 
it was suggested that a global coordinated framework should be novelty- and 
risk based (Straus & Sax 2016). Given the current difficulties in international 
trade it seems that a global consensus on regulating biotechnology is unlikely. 
Therefore, a system needs to be developed that facilitates and manages 
transparency and national autonomy. 
A debate about societal embedding should shift from a technology-specific 
(GMO) discussion to a debate about which role we want technology to play in 
our lives. Technology is not value-free and can bring about societal and ethical 
issues and challenges such as human enhancement, equal access, privacy, 
sustainability and bio-piracy (Schmidt et al. 2009). It is up to society to take 
up an active role in shaping technology and deliberate about the conditions 
and terms for (bio)technology to be used. Over the years, it has become clear 
that many arguments in the GMO debate relate to wider issues than safety. 
Specifically, the role and importance of non-risk-related arguments in 
agriculture have been recognised for some time (Devos et al. 2014). After a 
long period of deadlock in the decision-making process with regard to GM 
crop approvals in Europe, the EU installed a new directive in 2015 (Dir (EU) 
2015/412) that, separately from the safety assessment, enables individual 
member states to refuse GM crop cultivation based on non-safety arguments. 
Although a brave move towards a more inclusive debate in a pluralistic 
society, this has – thus far - not changed the overall voting behaviour on 
the safety assessment for market applications for GM crop cultivation. This 
shows the resilience of normative frames, agent-relative expectations and the 
fundamental views on the world, future & nature. It seems that moving away 
from a technical scientific perspective is impossible in the context of GMO-
regulation. If the notion of GMO is tainted beyond depuration, we might need 
to develop a perspective in which new technologies can be regulated outside 
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the distinction of GMO/non-GMO. Confining the definition of GMO strictly 
and discussing the new technologies (gene editing, bionanotechnology etc) in 
a broader discussion on the role of technology in general in food production 
and medical treatments, might be a fruitful step. Additionally, this may enable 
a reframing of the discussion and provide an opportunity to shift ideologies 
without losing face and focus on the role of technology in general in food 
production and medical treatments.
6. CONCLUSION
Recent developments in biotechnology have a major impact on society, policy 
and legislation while we lose sight of their impact on our everyday lives at the 
same time as a consequence of refinement and merging of the techniques. This 
brings about the question how to organize a biotechnology that becomes a tool 
instead of a strictly defined working field in a world where both regulations 
and societal debate is focused on the distinction between GMO and non-GMO. 
As the current focus on event and GMO based regulations is surpassed by 
technological developments, other approaches should be investigated that are 
future-proof and workable in an international context. These approaches do 
not necessarily have to be drawn up from scratch. With technological tools 
integrating, a starting point could be a learning process between the different 
risk regimes to identify and manage uncertainties, risks and benefits. One of the 
hurdles is the presence of not one, but several problem-owners with different 
goals and agenda’s. A coordinated action is needed from policy makers and 
scientists to start a dialogue, with a shared responsibility for prioritizing the 
issue. As well in the past, as more recently there have been several initiatives 
that explore ideas for a multi-agency and multi-criteria approach to facilitate 
adaptive governance on emerging technologies and their accompanying risks 
and benefits (Cummings & Kuzma 2017, Oye 2012, Trump et al. 2017).
There are and will always be diverging views on what kind of world ‘we’ want 
to live in and what kind of technologies ‘we’ want to adopt into our daily 
lives (the problem of ‘we’). Therefore, there is a need for a plural and robust 
style of governance that does not solely focus on safety and absence of risks, 
but balances these with the potential gains, as with any other technology. 
To facilitate the societal embedding of biotechnology becoming mainstream, 
an international dialogue and agenda setting is urgently needed from the 






EUROPEAN DECISION-MAKING ON GM CROP AUTHORISATIONS: 







The authorisation of GM crops in Europe is seen as a prime example of a 
wicked problem (e.g. Jelsma 2001, Durant & Legge 2006b, Bovenkerk 2010, 
Inghelbrecht et al. 2014, Newman & Head 2017, Daviter 2017 and Weimer 2014). 
Wicked problems (Rittel & Webber 1973) involve conflicting facts and values, 
they lack a shared problem definition and show significant resilience to being 
resolved. The authorisation of GM crops in Europe fits these characteristics 
which have led to a situation in which decision-making is stalling because 
(1) the final step in formal decision-making (e.g. comitology) systematically 
results in ‘no opinion’ (Smart et al. 2015) and (2) the European Commission 
(EC), who is mandated (but not obliged) to take a decision in these situations, 
is reluctant to do so. With significant delays (Smart et al. 2017), decisions on 
importation are taken eventually (driven by amongst others economic reasons 
and the threat of international trade conflicts),[1] while decisions on GM crop 
cultivation are completely deadlocked since 1998. Only one GM crop has been 
authorised for cultivation and its renewal process has been in legal limbo 
for over a decade.[2] In addition, several European Member States (MS) have 
installed bans on GM crops, some of which are being upheld despite being 
declared invalid by European authorities (e.g. EFSA 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 
2012f, 2013 and 2014).
In Chapter 2 I argued that so far, attempts to resolve the deadlock in decision-
making have had limited success (see also Chapter 4, 5 and 6). I have discussed 
three strategies that have been used to, either directly or indirectly, mitigate the 
GM crop conflict by focusing on improving the input into the decision-making 
process, and the process itself: more scientific research and expertise to reduce 
uncertainties, public and stakeholder participation processes for consensus 
building and adapting regulations to be more evidence-based, precautionary 
and inclusive. I have argued that these strategies, alone or together, are and 
will be insufficient to arrive at a yes/no decision about GM crop authorisations 
because their outcomes do not compel (a singular course of) action. 
1 See Tagliabue (2017) and Lieberman & Gray (2006) for more details on the dependency of Europe 
on (GM) soy imports. In addition, see WTO dispute DS291 for an example of a trade conflict about GM 
crop authorisations.
2 Maize MON810 was authorised in 1998 for a period of 10 years. A renewal application was submitted 
in 2008 and received a positive EFSA opinion in 2009. Voting under comitology took place in 2017 and 
2018 with an outcome of ‘no opinion’. The EC has taken no further action. The old application remains valid 
until a decision has been made.
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The current situation where applications for GM crop authorisation are 
systematically neither approved nor rejected (the outcome of the voting process 
is ‘no opinion’), does not engage with the variety of opinions that are present 
in society about GM crops and GM food. Not engaging reaffirms the conflict 
about GM crops which has led to a strongly polarized arena with little room 
for dialogue or transforming positions. Instead it seems that the breathing 
room within the existing regulatory framework is used by both national and 
European actors responsible for political decision-making, to obstruct the 
decision-making process about the authorisation of GM crops. They do so by 
delegating responsibility for decision-making to science and/or society or by 
postponing decision-making awaiting a change of regulations.
In this concluding chapter I will focus on the role of politics in the decision-
making process. I will argue that political conflict is, deliberately or not, evaded 
and why political decision-making is important and needed. This substantiates 
my hypothesis that repoliticisation of the decision-making process about GM 
crop authorisations in Europe is an underexposed or ignored factor in the 
problematisation of the issue. 
In Section 2, I will reflect on the contribution of scientific input, participatory 
activities and the regulatory framework to the decision-making process. In 
Chapter 2 I concluded that these factors will not by themselves add up to a final 
decision. This however, does not render them useless. Therefore, this section 
reflects on what we can and cannot expect from them. 
Section 3 discusses the importance of political decision-making in situations 
of conflict. While I have described indicators of political conflict in Chapter 3 
of this thesis (Section 3.2), I will now take my argument a step further and 
defend the position that engaging with political conflict is strategically evaded 
in the authorisation of GM crops. In addition, I will illustrate that political 
decision-making is possible about controversial technology (applications), 
even without scientific certainty or societal consensus. I will do this through a 
brief discussion of the authorisation process of glyphosate (a broad spectrum 
pesticide) in Europe. The debate about this case shows strong similarities to 
the GM crop discussion; potential harm, scientific uncertainties and strongly 
divided interests and values in society and amongst stakeholders. The 
authorisation of pesticides in Europe also follows roughly the same procedures 
as GM crops. Remarkably though, a decision about the glyphosate authorisation 
was forced through exercising politics (negotiating, bargaining, arguing). This 
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begs the question what then withholds political decision-making in case of 
GM crops? I will discuss possible answers and argue a difference between high 
and low level politics is a probable one. It seems that authorisation decisions 
on GM crops lack political priority and that in the absence of priority, evading 
decision-making on complex issues could be justified from a strategic political 
perspective. However, in view of the normative nature of the conflict about GM 
crops and the role and responsibility of the political decision-making actors 
from a democratic perspective, I will argue that avoiding decision-making 
on GM crops does not do justice to either GM crop opponents or proponents. 
Finally, I will reflect on the implications of repoliticisation of decision-making 
about GM crop authorisations. 
In Section 4, I will revisit and answer my research questions and formulate 
recommendations on future research. I conclude that GM crop authorisation 
in Europe is a wicked problem by design in which decision-making is evaded 
through delegating responsibilities to scientific, societal and legal actors. Whilst 
science, participatory activities and a regulatory framework each contribute to 
the input in the decision-making process, political judgement and decision-
making are needed now. Evading explicit decision-making and upholding the 
illusion of a working system, does not do justice from a democratic perspective 
to both proponents and opponents of GM crops. 
2. ADJUSTING EXPECTATIONS FROM AND WITHIN SCIENCE, 
PARTICIPATORY ACTIVITIES AND REGULATIONS
In chapter 2 and 3 I have critically analysed and discussed three common 
strategies in the field of regulatory science to mitigate the conflict over GM 
crop authorisations in Europe: they focus on science, public and stakeholder 
participation and the regulatory framework. I argued that alone or together 
they are unlikely to result in the singular course of action that is needed for 
decision-making on GM crop authorisations: either a yes or a no. However, 
their limitations in the overall decision-making on GM crop authorisations 
do not render them useless. Before zooming in on the role of politics in the 
decision-making process, I recapitulate on what I think we can expect of these 
factors in the overall process. 
2.1 SCIENCE INFORMS EXPECTATIONS
Science informs expectations about choices and their possible outcomes. 
Technical and scientific expertise are essential to ‘navigate causal complexity 
and reduce uncertainty’ (Daviter 2018, p.161). However, science is in a certain 
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way always provisional; it cannot produce everlasting facts about the world, 
because scientific uncertainty is endemic and irreducible. More importantly, 
science in itself does not compel action: it does not tell us what to do, let alone 
tell us what the ‘right’ choice is in a certain situation. It provides knowledge 
that has a validity within a specific research context and methodology, and 
until other research might prove otherwise. This implicates science is not well-
suited to deal with challenges that play a role in policy making such as ‘shifting 
problem boundaries, incompatible and competing problem perceptions and 
unclear or evolving evaluative criteria’ (Daviter 2018, p.161). 
In situations of uncertainty, a common strategy is the involvement of experts 
in the decision-making process (i.e. post-normal science, see Funtowicz & 
Ravetz 1993). Interdisciplinary scientific and expert knowledge can be valuable 
to help determine the most desirable, least risky or most precautionary way 
forward. However, scientific or expert knowledge on complex issues usually 
cannot feed directly into the policy process (i.e. the science-policy gap, see 
Cairney et al. 2017, Wellstead et al. 2018), but has to be translated and evaluated 
in order to be used in argumentation for a specific policy action. Sarewitz (2004) 
called this ‘an excess of objectivity’ that is produced by science. And as he – 
and others – argue, this excess can be used to substantiate a variety of political 
decisions (e.g Daviter 2015, Klika 2013, Robert 2019). This means advocates 
of particular viewpoints can select, contextualize or reframe information to 
substantiate their preferred action. This is a part of the political process, and 
as a consequence this also means that scientists have to accept that their input 
may be used strategically outside the scientific discourse. In addition, the 
excess of objectivity and the science-policy gap also exemplify the limits of 
policymakers and politicians to take knowledge into account. It is impossible 
for one agent to take into account all possible evidence relating to a certain 
issue (i.e. ‘bounded rationality’ see Cairney 2017). Therefore, choices have to 
be made on the use, prioritization and translation of knowledge. 
Just as scientific knowledge can provide new insights, technologies resulting 
from scientific insights can create new options for policy problems. They 
can provide a window of opportunity, which can bridge conflicting values 
and ‘allow them to co-exist in a shared sense of practical benefits’ instead 
of forcing a choice between them (Sarewitz 2011). Although contested, the 
attempt to resolve the ‘naturalness’ conflict about GMOs through technical 
innovations could be seen in this light. It has been argued that small genetic 
changes (gene editing, see Chapter 1) that could also occur in nature or that 
do not cross a species barrier may be perceived as more ‘natural’ and thus 
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acceptable (Matveeva & Otten 2019, Custers et al. 2019, Ricroch et al. 2016). This 
new ‘fork in the road’ would not necessarily bridge the value conflict about 
genetic modification, but it could facilitate a partial agreement on the legal 
acceptability of some types of GM crops. However, with regard to the example 
of the ‘naturalness’ conflict about GMOs, the issue for opponents is not (only) 
the species-barrier but also manmade intentional and targeted genetic change 
or broader impacts besides risks (Van Hove & Gillund 2017, GMWatch 2019a). 
From this perspective, gene editing is labeled as a technological fix. 
Scientists are increasingly expected to interact and cooperate with society, the 
private sector, policy makers and politicians in both their role as scientists 
as in their role as expert (e.g. Poort & Bovenkerk 2016, Saltelli & Giampietro 
2017). While this is encouraged from perspectives of, for example, robust 
science or responsible innovation, it inevitably has consequences for the role 
scientists have. It will become difficult or even impossible to be the ‘pure 
scientist’ or the ‘honest broker’ of knowledge (Pielke 2007). Pielke identified 
four idealised roles of science in policy and politics,[3] and pointed out these 
are not always explicitly or willingly chosen (i.e. scientists can hide value 
commitments behind science or can be pressurised into value judgements) 
and emphasised the importance of being aware and transparent about the role 
of science. A conflict or tension can arise when science is considered as value 
free and objective on the one hand, and as justified and accountable from the 
perspective of democratic politics and society on the other hand. This tension 
is not new and has already been mentioned by Daniels (1967) who stated that 
‘The pure science ideal demands that science be as thoroughly separated from 
the political, as it is from the religious or the utilitarian. Democratic politics 
demands that no expenditure of public funds be separated from political 
control’ (p.1704). The discourse analysis of alarming studies has shown that 
the objectivity and independence (or the lack thereof) of scientists is a recurring 
argument in the discussions (see Chapter 4).
Even in their role as scientist, they are engaged in normative judgements. 
The scientific ‘true or false’ distinction is based on what has been agreed on 
to be ‘good science’ or ‘good scientific practice’. As we have seen in the case 
of alarming studies, there are scientific disagreements on how ‘good science’ 
should be done in the context of environmental and food safety research. On 
3 Pielke (2007) identifies the following four idealised roles for scientists: the pure scientist (a resource of 
general factual information), the science arbiter (resource of information about specific questions), the issue 
advocate (requested to provide information to substantiate a specific decision) and the honest broker (has 
a guiding role that provides information but leaves the choice open for the decision-maker).
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the bright side, these conflicts provide opportunity to improve the scientific 
method, but at the same time it is a continuous source of conflict about the 
value of scientific results. Moreover, science is not immune to value-related 
criticism about decisions based on scientific input. Montpetit (2011) has shown 
that scientific disagreement is more likely to occur on highly politicised topics, 
because of the perceived high costs of scientific error in these cases. This has 
also been pointed out by Jasanoff (2003), who asserted that ‘science invoked 
to support policy tends to unravel under the stresses of politics: those wishing 
to question a given scientific interpretation can generally find errors, hidden 
biases or subjective judgements that undercut their opponents’ claims to truth 
and objectivity’ (p.160). 
For these reasons, science cannot provide an unambiguous objective answer 
to determine political decision-making on GM crops. However, it can help 
identify potential risks and provide estimates of how a GM crop will interact 
with the environment. Whether a GM crop is safe enough and an acceptable 
option for agriculture and food production, is a political choice and requires 
political argumentation. This is also the case for other types of knowledge 
that are included or considered in the decision-making process. Chapter 7 
discussed the opportunities and challenges of socio-economic considerations 
in regulatory frameworks on GM crops. The overview illustrated that data and 
numbers can be put on almost every aspect of life, but their value and weight 
in the overall balance are even so subject to political judgement.
2.2 PARTICIPATION HIGHLIGHTS VALUES, HOPES AND THREATS OF TECHNOLOGIES
Participatory and deliberative activities can contribute to the identification of 
values and of perceived hopes and threats of a technology that can inform the 
political decision-making process. The broader and more inclusive, the more 
likely these processes are to capture the variety of perspectives that may need 
to be taken into account in policy- and decision-making. In turn, participatory 
activities and the inclusion of societal actors and stakeholders may contribute 
to trust in the eventual decision-making process. 
However, participatory activities are unlikely to result in societal agreement or 
consensus about wicked problems. The general public and stakeholders can’t 
make decisions as an entity, because it is a pluralistic collective of individuals 
with a broad spectrum of different and sometimes conflicting views on ‘the 
good life’, ‘goods’ and ‘a good society’. While individual views on ‘a good life’ 
may be facilitated by regulations, a conflict between a view on ‘a good society’ 
9
251
and a view that is seen as a compromise reflected in the regulations may be 
irreconcilable (e.g. when GM food labelling facilitates individual consumers’ 
choice, while in the view of some consumers ‘a good society’ should be GM 
free). Christiansen et al. (2017) even argued that public participation activities
about controversial science cannot be justified from a democratic perspective,
because how can we expect general public to form an opinion on an issue based
on knowledge that even scientists cannot agree about?
According to Biale & Liveriero (2017), the different views in society inform 
deliberative democracy, even calling dissent the ‘raison d’être of democracy’ 
(p.585). They argue for robustness as a criterion for political decision-making, 
in the sense that it does not refer to an external standard of rightness but 
evaluates whether decisions are responsive to the agents involved in the 
deliberation. In other words: it is not solely about the process (i.e. including 
all stakeholders as a primary criterion) or the outcome (i.e. a ‘good’ or ‘right’ 
decision), but a combination of the two that can justify a decision from 
a democratic perspective. In the light of Sarewitz (2004) notion of ‘excess 
of objectivity’, the input from participatory and deliberative activities with 
societal actors could be seen as providing an ‘excess of subjectivity’ as input 
into the political decision-making process. 
Nonetheless, the aim of societal consensus on controversial technologies before 
moving ahead towards decision-making seems unfeasible. 
2.3 REGULATIONS ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITIES
Regulations, amongst others, assign responsibilities and define rules on who 
needs to decide about what based on which criteria. EU regulations are designed 
and implemented though a co-decision procedure of the European Commission, 
The Council (representing the MS) and the European Parliament (representing 
EU citizens). Their decisions are supposed to reflect views of ‘goods’ and ‘the 
good society’, and determine both liberties and rights of the general public 
and stakeholders in society. In view of GM crops, the regulatory framework 
reflects what needs to be protected (human health, the environment, freedom 
of choice) and what is acceptable within the realm of (individual or collective) 
freedom (biotechnological research and innovation). As such, the regulations 
for GM crops facilitate the freedom of industry to develop and commercialise 
GM crops, and the right of individuals in society to safe products and to avoid 
GMOs in food products if they want to. If the criteria and prerequisites defined 
in the regulations are fulfilled, the resulting decisions can be seen as justified 
and from a legal perspective ‘good’. 
9
252
The view of the ‘good society’ reflected in the regulations cannot (fully) overlap 
with all different conflicting individual views on ‘a good life’. In addition, the 
GMO regulations have been be criticized from a scientific (Amman 2014), risk 
(Edvardsson Björnberg et al. 2018), and legal (Christiansen 2019) perspective, 
but they may still be justified from a societal perspective. Justified, because 
the regulations reflect the plurality of views on ‘goods’ or visions on ‘the 
good society’ by promulgating a perspective in which fundamental moral 
disagreements are acknowledged. At the same time, conflicting views on a 
‘good society’ or on ‘goods’ are not resolved through regulatory strategies 
alone, as has been illustrated in this thesis. 
Aiming to address conflicting values on GM crops has resulted in an interactive 
regulatory framework that has characteristics of being both science-based 
as well as precautionary (see Chapter 2). The inclusion of different views 
and perspectives in the regulations inevitably leaves room for different 
interpretations, and facilitates the use of arguments from the principle of 
precaution as ammunition against the principle of being evidence- or science-
based. At the same time this may be inherent to a dynamic system that reflects 
the existing gap between expectations of different stakeholders and the general 
public. I have argued in Chapter 3 that regulations may determine the rules and 
requirements based on a reflection of what has been democratically decided to 
represent a common perspective on ‘a good society’. However, these rules and 
requirements do not determine the outcome of a decision. Regulations cannot 
resolve conflict by themselves and they inevitably have a certain distance from 
actual societal values because of the legal context in which regulations have 
to function. This legal context also has another consequence, namely that 
it always has a degree of interpretative space, i.e. that different courses of 
action can be justified in view of the same regulations based on different views 
on the intended outcome. Regulations need to be fit for purpose but not too 
rigid, specifically when applied to a scientific context that may change in the 
future. Necessarily, a tradeoff has to be made with regard to flexibility and 
being future-proof and the legal room for diversion (i.e. the more specific 
and comprehensive definitions are formulated, the more robust a framework, 
however, less future proof when it comes to scientific developments that do 
not fit within the narrow definitions). This tradeoff is part of the (political) 
process of designing and implementing new regulations. In Chapter 8, Brom 
and I have argued that given the scientific developments, the current regulatory 
framework on GMOs in Europe has reached the limits of its flexibility and that 
horizontal and vertical integration of biotechnology developments calls for a 
multi-agency and multi-criteria approach to facilitate adaptive governance of 
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emerging technologies and their accompanying risks and benefits. In this final 
chapter however, I will firstly emphasise the importance of decision-making 
itself, whether under the current regulatory framework or a future one. 
3. POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES, MOTIVATIONS AND DECISION-
MAKING AT EU LEVEL
I have argued that while scientific, participatory and regulatory factors are 
essential and contribute to the overall decision-making process, they will not 
compel action. They don’t automatically point towards the singular course of 
action that is needed for a digital yes/no decision on GM crop authorisations. 
And this is, in my view, where acknowledgement of the political nature is 
needed to balance the input from science and society/stakeholders and take 
decisions in situations of uncertainty and conflicting views. 
However, political behavior and actions such as deliberation, argumentation, 
bargaining and compromising have shown to be very limited or even absent 
in the case of GM crop authorisations. The decisive step has been reduced to 
a voting process by MS representatives with a predetermined national voting 
mandate under EU comitology procedures (see also Weimer 2010, p.646). As 
a consequence, the only way to express underlying disagreements about the 
issue of GM crops, is to use the breathing room within the existing regulatory 
framework to obstruct the decision-making (e.g. negative votes or abstaining 
from voting, national or regional bans on GM crops). 
In Chapter 2 I mentioned that the technocratic, participatory and regulatory 
strategies I would discuss are not necessarily deliberately and purposefully 
thought out strategies designed by a specific actor. In this final chapter I will 
take a less neutral and more normative approach to these strategies. One of 
the reasons for discussing these particular strategies is that political actors, 
policy-makers and stakeholders in the GM crop conflict repeatedly refer to 
these approaches as they emphasize the need for (more) scientific certainty 
and societal consensus. What if political actors are the implicit agent of these 
strategies and what if their purpose is not resolving but avoiding political 
deliberation and decision-making? With this in mind, in the next section I will 
have another look at some of the indicators of political conflict I have identified 
in Chapter 3. 
3.1 INDICATORS OF EVASION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT
Here I will take a normative view on the previously identified indicators of 
political conflict about GM crop decision-making. Firstly, I will argue that the 
regulations themselves as well as the procedures defined in them, are used 
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strategically to avoid decision-making. Secondly, I will discuss an example 
of another contested technology application that shows many similarities to 
the GM crop debate and that is subject to the same procedures and decision-
making under comitology. In this case however, decisions have been taken 
despite scientific uncertainty and stakeholder disagreement, substantiating 
the crucial role of politics.
The regulations provide room for the evasion of political debate by being broad 
and to varying degrees either very specific and mandatory or vague and optional. 
The draft decisions on GM crop authorisation of the EC are predominantly 
based on a scientific risk assessment from the EFSA. Socio-economic and 
ethical issues are part of the regulations,[4] but they are not mandatory and 
do not play an explicit role in the current reality of decision-making. Instead, 
non-safety issues have to a certain extent been delegated to the national and 
individual realm, which avoids having to discuss them at EU level. They are put 
in the category of views on ‘the good life’ through mandatory labelling of GM 
ingredients in food for individual consumers (Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003) 
and the option to ban GM crops on a national level (Directive (EU) 2015/412). 
The optional character of the latest Directive can also be seen as to serve another 
purpose, namely that of international accountability towards the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and trade partners. Europe is seen as having one of the 
strictest GMO regulations worldwide and has been accused of protectionism 
(e.g. Tagliabue 2017, WTO dispute DS291). In this light, the regulatory changes 
that have been made over the years can be seen as a strategic way of managing 
accountability[5] on several levels. This argument can be illustrated by two 
examples: the de facto moratorium (1998-2004) and the 2015 Directive. 
Lieberman & Gray (2006) discussed three different interpretations of the de 
facto moratorium (1998 – 2004, see also Chapter 1): there was an effective 
moratorium (1), there was no effective moratorium (2) and: there was no 
formal moratorium (3). The de facto moratorium facilitated the MS who are 
opposing GM crops to maintain to their electorates and the environmental 
movement that a moratorium on approvals of new GM crops for cultivation is 
effectively in place. The MS who are in favor or have no objections against GM 
4 See for example Directive 2001/18/EC, consideration 62 and Art. 29, and Regulation No 1829/2003/
EC, consideration 42 and Art. 33, see also Chapter 2.
5 Skogstad (2011, p.898) identified different notions of accountability: accountability through participation 
or delegation, horizontal (between MS) and vertical accountability (between EU and MS) or internal 
(within EU) and external accountability (EU to non-EU countries).
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crops can maintain to the agri-biotech sector that there is no formal ban on 
either previously-licensed GM crops and foods, or newly-licensed GM foods. 
Towards the WTO and international trade partners it could be argued that no 
official moratorium was or is in place. In conclusion, from the perspective of 
protecting it’s the European Commission’s accountability on different levels, 
the fact that this was never a ‘formal’ moratorium, can be seen as politically 
strategic.
In my view, a similar argument can be made for Directive (EU) 2015/412 which 
provides MS with the option to ban a GM crop from cultivation on their national 
territory. Since this Directive is optional (in addition to and separately from 
Directive 2001/18/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003), the main criterion 
for GM crop authorisations remains safety. From a legal perspective, it can 
be argued that Directive (EC) 2015/412 does not play a role in the overall EU 
decision-making process, hence avoiding issues of the EC with the WTO based 
on accusations of protectionism. 
Towards MS, it is argued that disagreements on GM crops are acknowledged,[6] 
but the EC may also have chosen the option of a new Directive strategically 
over another option, namely an overhaul of the entire GMO legislation. 
Randour (2014) discussed the Directive (EC) 2015/412 as a compromise given 
the complex situation in Europe. He argued that there is no grand overhaul of 
the entire GMO legislation because ‘individual Member States have an interest 
not to get too involved in substantial discussions on GMOs that are politically 
sensitive at the domestic level, although the 2010 proposal might also be seen 
as an attempt by the Commission to force Member States to make clear choices 
on GMO policies so that the latter can no longer shift the blame for unpopular 
GMO policies to the Commission’ (p.1319).
However, the Directive has thus far not resulted in a political debate within MS 
themselves. A majority of the MS used the Directive to ban GM crops, but have 
taken no further action to implement the Directive. As explained in Chapter 
6, the first step of the Directive only requires a simple opt out request to the 
applicant. Unless the applicant denies the request, it is granted. Here too, 
political deliberation is avoided. Or, as Poort and I have argued in Chapter 6, 
objections and controversies on GM crops are not confronted. If the applicant 
would object to the request, the MS has to provide a written argumentation on 
why / which grounds it wants to ban the GM crop. For this step, the Directive 
6 e.g. Directive (EU) 2015/412, Considerations 6 & 7
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has to be implemented in national legislation and procedures need to be in 
place to act in such a situation. Given the controversy of the issue not only 
between but also within MS, the implementation of the Directive would likely 
initiate a political debate on how to do this. Despite the fact that a majority 
of the MS have used the Directive to ban GM crops that were pending for 
cultivation authorisation in 2018, most of them have not taken further action 
to implement it in national regulations (see Dobbs 2017). Given the very limited 
amount of cultivation applications in Europe that are still in the regulatory 
system and given that applicants have not objected to the national bans, there 
seems to be no urgency to implement the Directive on a national level. That 
also means there is no (legal) urgency to organize political debate on a national 
level.
Finally, EU regulations for GM crop authorisation that reflect both precaution 
and the importance of scientific evidence, provide leeway to avoid decision-
making because arguments based on these principles can endlessly feed into 
each other: we need to be precautious because there are scientific uncertainties, 
therefore we need more science to reduce uncertainties, but science will always 
be uncertain, so we need to be precautious… and so on. In academic literature, 
the avoidance of political responsibility has been noted by several authors such 
as Van Asselt & Vos (2010, p.282) who labelled it as ‘organised irresponsibility’ 
(a concept from Beck 1986) and Weimer (2015, p.624) who argues that political 
responsibility gets lost through the accelerating trends of politicisation and 
scientification. 
Evading political deliberation is also facilitated in the final decision-making 
procedures. GM crop authorisations have been put in the legal category of 
implementing acts, which are subject to a voting procedure that leaves ample 
room for political deliberation. MS representatives can, if they wish, make a 
statement about their reasons to abstain from voting or a negative vote, but 
this is not mandatory and not intended to trigger a discussion or change MS 
positions. The representatives have a mandate from their national authorities 
and lack the political power to make adjustments. 
The last reform[7] of the comitology procedures in 2011, after the Lisbon Treaty, 
resulted in several changes that further depoliticised the decision-making on 
GM crops: firstly, a ‘no opinion’ in the first voting is no longer referred to 
the Council of ministers of the MS, but to an ‘appeal committee’. The appeal 
7 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.
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committee was intended to represent a higher political level (see Christiansen 
& Dobbels 2012), but there are no strict requirements on the (political) status 
of the MS representatives in this committee.[8] In practice, the composition 
of the Appeal committee changed over time to represent representatives of 
an equal level as the standing committee (Christiansen & Dobbels 2012, note 
2). Secondly, the EP (representing EU citizens) has less power to intervene in 
the process, as it can only object through a non-binding resolution (Stratulat 
& Molino 2011). As pointed out in Chapter 1, resolutions on draft decisions 
about GM crop authorisations are systematically submitted objecting both the 
decision itself as well as the ‘undemocratic’ process of decision-making. The 
EC is not obliged to act or respond to these resolutions and in practice goes 
ahead with decisions when concerning GM crop importation. 
In addition, the voting procedures themselves have been systematically delayed 
and postponed (e.g. Smart et al 2015, 2017, Punt & Wesseler 2016). Officially, 
the EC has to schedule a voting in the standing committee within three months 
after the EFSA opinion has been published. In practice, there may be years in 
between, and even so between the first and the second voting. If the second 
voting also results in ‘no opinion’, the EC is mandated but not obliged to take 
a decision, providing it with a strategic and flexible position where she can 
instantly adopt the decision in case a complaint is filed with the WTO by non-
EU countries and trade partners, or postpone decision-making indefinitely 
should MS or the EP complain about undemocratic decision-making.
Besides the EC, also the MS themselves seem to evade political debate. Several 
MS have used the safeguard clause or emergency measures to ban GM crops 
based on safety reasons.[9] But even when these bans have been considered 
unjustified by EFSA (see Chapter 1), they are not lifted and the Council has 
rejected proposals from the EC to enforce this process (MS don’t want to 
impose measures onto each other with regard to their own territory on this 
controversial topic). It seems that it is not only the EC avoiding political debate 
but also the Council and the MS themselves. 
Finally, by requesting more scientific data or calling for additional research, 
the EC can postpone decision-making while it awaits the results. This may 
8 Regulation 281/2011, consideration 7: ‘Where appropriate, the control mechanism should include 
referral to an appeal committee which should meet at the appropriate level’ (emphasis added)
9 Based on regulatory safeguard clauses (Directive 2001/18/EC, Art. 23) or emergency measures 
(Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, Art. 34)
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be technical scientific research (such as the GRACE and G-Twyst project), 
legal research (such as the expert working groups on NPBTs) or the upcoming 
stakeholder consultations on NPBTs. Through these actions, the EC is 
seemingly and temporarily delegating part of the responsibility for decision-
making to science, society and legal experts. Interestingly, while political 
actors seem to evade politics, other actors have become more politicised and 
they fuel the above processes of evading decision-making. The debates about 
alarming studies can be seen in this light, where both the instigators of the 
alarming study as the ones involved in reviewing or repeating the research 
become politicised (see Chapter 4).
3.2 GLYPHOSATE AUTHORISATION: SIMILAR CASE, DIFFERENT OUTCOME
In Chapter 1, I have discussed academic insights on wicked problems, most of 
which concluded that solving this type of problem is not possible. Instead, the 
focus has been on so called partial and imperfect solutions that do not aim to 
be comprehensive and exhaustive, but in the best case form an accumulation of 
small wins that eventually lead to steps forward (e.g. Termeer et al. 2019). The 
‘strategies’ of evading decision-making can be seen as examples of ‘coping’ 
(e.g. Daviter 2017) or ‘muddling through’ (a concept from Lindblom 1959) ways 
of dealing with wicked problems, where decisions are made based on partial 
knowledge and the prioritisation of certain values over others. However, in 
my view these coping strategies should be seen as unsuccessful because they 
freeze the status quo, increase the level of discontent amongst stakeholders 
and translocate the debate to areas that are unsuitable arenas for political 
conflict (science regulation).
In the last part of this section, I will argue that better strategies are in 
theory possible, because the GM crop conflict is not ‘wicked by nature’ but 
‘wicked by design’ (a distinction made by Nie 2003, see Chapter 1). I will 
substantiate this through a comparison with a similar case of a controversial 
technology application. If the GM crop conflict would be wicked by nature (i.e. 
controversial because of its scientific and societal implications), it suggests 
that other controversial technologies that go through similar procedures in 
Europe, are likely to suffer the same fate of undecideability. Interestingly, 
this is not necessarily the case. I will briefly discuss the case of the European 
authorisation of glyphosate, a broad spectrum herbicide. This case too, is 
controversial with regard to divided perspectives on human and environmental 
risks and its societal benefits. Its controversy however, did not result in 
undecidedness, because the EC actively engaged in political behavior through 
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arguing, bargaining and compromising with the MS until a (temporarily) 
decision was made on the authorisation of glyphosate.
The case of the market authorisation of the herbicide glyphosate has been 
more extensively discussed by Tosun et al. (2018), Bazzan & Migliorati (2020) 
and Arcuri & Hendlin (2020). In brief, glyphosate is the active ingredient of 
several broad-spectrum herbicides that are used in Europe and worldwide 
for agricultural and non-agricultural purposes (such as weed control and 
gardening) since the mid-70s. The compound also has a direct link with GM 
crops, since a major part of the GM crops that are commercialised worldwide 
are tolerant to glyphosate.[10] The first European authorisation of glyphosate 
in 2002 was unproblematic and had a validity of 10 years. The renewal 
authorisation process of glyphosate however, turned out to be challenging 
and initially resulted in a deadlock after several ‘no opinion’ outcomes 
under comitology voting. Finally, the EC changed its strategy from a ‘static 
technocratic’ position to a ‘responsive’ one (see Bazzan & Migliorati 2020) 
resulting in an explicit political process where the EC argued and bargained 
with the MS to find circumstances that would result in a qualified majority 
vote of the MS. Eventually, it was a (coincidental) shift of political powers 
in Germany that led to a qualified majority for the renewal of the glyphosate 
authorisation, but the explicit political process differs substantially from the 
situation with GM crops. 
Similar to GM crops, science played an essential role in the debate about 
glyphosate. At the time of renewal, scientific studies indicated two risks: 
a contamination of drinking water sources and soil and the World Health 
Organization’s International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) classified 
glyphosate as a probable human carcinogen (IARC 2015). This resulted in a 
discussion in the scientific field and beyond that is very similar to the dynamics 
around the ‘alarming studies’ described in Chapter 4. Starting out as a scientific 
debate with a focus on uncertainty and precaution, shifted towards a broader 
debate about human health, food production and sustainable agriculture and 
finally resulting in accusations of non-neutrality and conflicts of interests on 
those involved in the assessment and reassessment of glyphosate (e.g. Myers 
et al. 2016, Unterweger (2017). 
10 Herbicide tolerant plants are unaffected by the use of certain herbicides, facilitating weed management 
for producers, since they do not have to avoid their crop when applying herbicides. The use of herbicide 
tolerant GM crops is integrally connected to the use of the specific herbicide that crop is tolerant for. 
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The EFSA was asked by the EC to review the IARC findings and came to the 
conclusion that glyphosate was unlikely to pose a carcinogenic hazard to 
humans (EFSA 2015). The report was heavily criticised and accused of being 
influenced by industry (i.e. Monsanto).[11] Nevertheless, the EC prepared a draft 
proposal to renew the authorisation for 15 years. A first voting under comitology 
procedures resulted in ‘no opinion’ (European Commission 2017d). Next, more 
science was added to the table when the EC asked the European Chemicals 
Agency (ECHA) to also assess the hazard from their expertise. ECHA supported 
the conclusion of EFSA (ECHA 2017). This was followed by another EFSA study, 
several rounds of discussions of the EC with the MS (indicating the urgency for 
political deliberation),[12] a citizen’s initiative calling for a ban on glyphosate 
(heightening the political visibility of the conflict) and resolutions from the 
EP opposing the renewal for authorisation (European Parliament 2016, 2017). 
Finally, a 4th revision of the EC proposal, in which the authorisation period had 
been shortened from 15 to 5 years and MS were encouraged to take measures 
to minimize the use of the herbicide, was adopted by qualified majority in 
the Appeal Committee in 2017. It should be noted that the reason for this 
breakthrough was more coincidental than specifically related to the glyphosate 
case. A qualified majority was reached because Germany changed its position 
from abstaining to voting in favor of the draft proposal.[13] Tosun (2018) points 
out that the political conflict is likely to be reignited within five years when 
the next decision on renewal needs to be taken. She concludes that ‘in the end, 
all member states will have to determine how best to address the substance in 
the future, and what levels of uncertainty they are willing to accept concerning 
its potential hazards—both to humans and the environment’ (p.14), followed 
by referring to the need for stakeholder engagement within the MS. While I 
agree with the need for deliberation on a MS level, I argue in this thesis that 
11 EUWeed-Killer Evidence ‘Written by Monsanto’. Available online: https://euobserver.com/
environment/137741
12 Different from GM crops, the legal authorisation of herbicides/pesticides in Europe is subject to expiration, 
meaning that if the authorisation expires without a decision on its renewal, its use would become illegal.
13 Germany usually abstains in GMO votings because of a rule that requires agreement between the 
minister of environment and agriculture to voting in favour or against. This was never the case. In 2017 
however, because of delays in forming a new coalition government, the cabinet of Chancellor Angela 
Merkel had to act as a caretaker government. Under these circumstances, the German delegates were 
asked to vote in favour of the Commission’s proposal, against the will of the minister of environment (see 
Tosun 2019, p.10). It should be noted that the minister of agriculture was under both internal and external 
pressure, as Germany was also the European Rapporteur for the glyphosate assessment that had a big 
influence on the EC’s proposal. Ignoring their conclusion would indicate the minister did not trust the German 
Federal Institute for Risk Assessment.
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the process requires more than a ‘broader debate’ and an ‘open dialogue’ with 
stakeholders. It requires the acknowledgement of the political nature of the 
conflict to balance the input from science and society/stakeholders and take 
decisions in situations of uncertainty and conflicting views.
The glyphosate case illustrates a similarly controversial case as GM crops where 
the decision-making is under threat of ending in a deadlock. The decision on 
glyphosate was initially strategically blocked through the comitology procedures 
(resulting in ‘no opinion’), and the weight of the discussion shifted to science 
and scientific experts. With regard to science and risk assessment, Arcuri & 
Hendlin (2020) note that the regulations on pesticides are theoretically very 
stringent, but nevertheless omit vulnerable groups in the actual assessments 
(p. 245). In addition, they argue that legal frameworks determining risk 
in environmental toxicology tend to minimise risks and overestimate the 
certainty and accuracy of assessments. As a consequence, important concerns 
are systematically excluded from the decision-making process. Interestingly, 
for glyphosate the uncertainties and concerns seem to be no reason to delay 
and postpone decision-making, while for GM crop authorisations it is. This 
strengthens the view that decisions on what or whom should be protected are 
political decisions, and that therefore, both science and regulations themselves 
are insufficient to inform the exact course of decision-making on this level.
There is at least one important difference between the two cases. It seems that 
the political priority of the subject of glyphosate is significantly higher than GM 
crops. According to Tosun (2018) this has to do with the fact that glyphosate 
is widely used in Europe, and critical for agri-food production in Europe as a 
whole. Glyphosate is related to economic and agricultural benefits that have 
to be weighed against environmental and health costs. Interest groups from 
both sides are strongly involved in lobbying activities, indicating there is also 
something to win from a political perspective. The increase of issue visibility 
was also pointed out by Bazzan & Migliorati (2020) as an important urgency 
factor to resolve this issue. Being unable to decide could result in reputation 
damage for the EC as well. Finally, the EC engaged in political behavior 
through organising discussions with the MS to bargain and negotiate under 
what circumstances a decision could be made. 
The glyphosate case illustrates that priorities, urgency and potential political 
wins can put dynamics back into discussions on controversial technologies, 
even in situations that seem wicked at first. Like other wicked problems, the 
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glyphosate issue is also characterised by a variety of problem definitions and 
solutions and widely diverging views on facts and values towards agriculture, 
environment and human health. More importantly, the glyphosate case 
illustrates that scientific certainty on the risks, nor a consensus amongst the 
general public or stakeholders involved are prerequisites for political decision-
making. 
An even more striking example emerged more recently: in June 2020, the EC 
presented a draft proposal to dismiss the environmental risk assessment for 
clinical research with GMOs intended to treat or prevent COVID-19[14] (such as 
GM-vaccines), arguing that human health, or even individual patients’ health 
overrides other considerations such as the environment (European Commission 
2020). Despite concerns from MS scientific advisory bodies (e.g. COGEM 2020, 
personal communication), the proposal was adopted by the Council and the EP 
and entered into force on July 17 (see Regulation (EU) No 2020/1043). 
These examples substantiate my claim that technocratic or participatory 
strategies with the aim of (scientific) certainty or consensus are not only 
unfeasible but also not necessary for decision-making on a political level. The 
current regulatory system for GM crop authorisations provides political actors 
leeway to be accountable internally (to the MS) and externally (to the WTO and 
international trade partners) without having to take a decision that will cause 
political debate. This could be a valid strategy from a political perspective, 
but, in the next section I will argue that this strategy is not justified from a 
democratic perspective because proponents and opponents of GM crops need 
and deserve explicit political decision-making. While evasion of decision-
making can provide strategic political breathing room, but damages democratic 
legitimacy when postponed indefinitely.
3.3 THE NEED FOR POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING ON GM CROPS
In this section I will use the views of amongst others Bovenkerk (2012) and 
Poort (2013) on deliberative democracy with regard to biotechnology to defend 
that whilst deliberation outside of the formal political realm is important 
to inform decision-making, it is a responsibility of political actors to (1) 
14 At the end of 2019, the first human infections were reported of what turned into a pandemic in 2020. 
A – seemingly bat derived – coronavirus was transferred to humans and quickly spread across the globe. 
The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) leads to Coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19), and has resulted in 14,3 million infections, 602,000 deaths (as of 19 July 2020) and severe 
economic and societal disruption because of national and regional lockdowns.
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decide when public deliberation has (temporarily) reached its transformative 
potential and (2) to move forward to deliberation on a political level with the 
explicit aim of decision-making. In Chapter 3 I briefly characterised political 
decision-making which, apart from input of different sources of information 
and a predefined process to arrive at a legitimate decision, requires a sense of 
direction and argumentation. The last two are, in my view, aspects that fall 
typically within the responsibility of politics. In addition, I will argue that 
the timing for this step is now or even overdue, since upholding the current 
decision-making framework can be seen as an illusion of a working system 
that is not justified from a democratic perspective towards both opponents and 
proponents of GM crops. 
Deliberative democracy is a political model in which political decisions are 
legitimate when they are reached through free and uncoerced debate between 
equals in the absence of power structures. In other words, political decision-
making should not (only) be arrived at through voting, bargaining and 
compromising (the dominant approach in most liberal democratic views), but in 
essence should be informed by deliberation based on quality of argument. These 
deliberative actions can have a different audience, goal and aim, depending on 
what view on deliberative democracy one holds. They may focus on (ideal) 
consensus (e.g. Habermas 1989, Cohen 1997) broadening participation and 
inclusion (e.g. Einsiedel 2001, Bovenkerk 2012), or structuring and deepening 
the debate (e.g. Gutmann & Thompson 1990, Poort 2013). 
While I agree with the importance of the previously mentioned deliberative 
approaches (focusing on inclusion, broadening and deepening the discussion 
and if possible even with the aim of consensus), I conclude that they are 
insufficient to result in decision-making. I will provide three arguments that 
illustrate the application of theoretical perspectives on deliberative democracy 
is complicated in reality and one argument illustrating why these strategies 
will both in theory and in practice not lead to a closure of the debate. Firstly, 
given the long history of debate, entrenched positions of strong opponents and 
proponents and powerful (commercial and political) actors, it seems impossible 
to have an open and inclusive debate about GM crops free of power-structures. 
Secondly, the call for an inclusive dialogue with citizens presupposes that 
there are clear criteria and boundaries on how to organise such a dialogue. 
Thirdly, it presupposes there is a clear view on with whom and by whom this 
dialogue should be organised (e.g. all citizens? Stakeholders? A representative 
part or a majority?). Fourth and in my opinion most importantly, neither of the 
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deliberative strategies addresses the question when this step of the process is 
(sufficiently) fulfilled or how this can be determined. 
Several authors have argued that striving for consensus risks premature 
closure of the debate and results in the exclusion of certain viewpoints (e.g. 
Poort 2013, Chapter 9, Castle & Culver 2013). They take an agonistic approach 
where the acknowledgement of disagreement deepens the discussion. The 
question of when the disagreement has been deepened sufficiently and 
how to take a next step towards decision-making remains unanswered. 
Bovenkerk (2012) argued that ‘In order to respect the views of their citizens 
[…] governments need to participate as a non-party to the conflict as long 
as possible’ (p.4). Hisschemöller & Hoppe (1995), who promote a learning 
strategy for unstructured problems, conclude that a decision on problem choice 
should not be taken before problem structuring has produced ‘new insights 
on the problem and its potential solutions’ (p.66). Each of these strategies 
aim for an inclusive and broad public deliberation to deepen the discussion 
and/or reveal the real sources of disagreement. This, in turn, could enable 
opinion transformation (Bovenkerk 2010). Neither of these authors claim that 
these strategies will result in consensus or decision-making, but they also 
refrain from going into the matter of when a controversy has been sufficiently 
acknowledged, deepened or addressed to take a justified decision and how this 
should be done.
In other words, when is a closure of the debate and a move towards decision-
making no longer premature? Whose responsibility is it to decide when the 
‘real’ sources of disagreement are revealed and when there has been sufficient 
opportunity for opinion transformation? When has the potential for opinion 
transformation reached its limits? Is this a matter of time? And if so, is five or 
ten or twenty or more years enough? (I note that the conflict over GM crops 
is ongoing since the 90s). And if no (partially) shared perspectives can be 
achieved: when, at what percentage, is there sufficient support or rejection of 
the general public to vote in favor or against a GM crop authorisation? The same 
holds for questions about scientific certainty or other sources of knowledge: 
at what point is there sufficient certainty? How safe is safe enough? Which 
socio-economic considerations should be taken into account? These are not 
questions for science or the general public, but depend on ‘a wider judgement 
of the relative merits of a particular technology compared with its alternatives’ 
(Mayer & Stirling 2004, p.1023). I argue that the answers to these questions will 
not present themselves and decisions on when to move ahead are an essential 
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part of politics. In my view there are no predetermined or ‘right’ answers to be 
found on these questions, which is exactly why they require political decision-
making. In addition, I argue that the repetitive character of the discussion 
about alarming studies and GM crop authorisations provides strong indications 
that these discussions have reached the limits of their transformation potential 
and require political decision-making as a next step.
Political decision-making is not (solely) the outcome of scientific research 
or societal perspectives, nor is it a static reflection of ‘reality’ or the end of 
moral disagreement. Carpentier (2016, p.99) identified views on decisions 
either as a ‘consensus’, reflecting ‘social makeability’ or as ‘universality’ 
as ‘fantasies’ that do not reflect the reality of political decision-making. 
Presenting them this way may even further obstruct the decision-making 
process. By accepting the regulations and acting according to them, there is 
an implicit acceptance of underlying assumptions in the system that suggest 
being rationally comprehensive (all factors have been taken into account, as 
illustrated amongst others by the inclusion of broad non-mandatory terms 
such as ethics and socio-economic considerations). This may suggest that by 
playing according to these rules, one in principle, accepts GM crops, which does 
not reflect the views of individuals or collectives with fundamental objections 
against GM crops. Here I will follow Mouffe (1999) who argues that political 
decisions should not be seen as the end of moral conflict, but as a temporarily 
compromise between different (or even agonistic) views. It is ‘a stabilisation of 
power that always involves some form of exclusion’ (p.756). While Mouffe also 
doesn’t go into the timing of decision-making itself, in theory this could be 
at any point where a compromise or simply a well substantiated decision can 
be reached. In view of the central case of this thesis, GM crop authorisations, I 
want to add urgency to the step towards decision-making and I will do this by 
reflecting on the consequences of not taking a decision and keeping a ‘neutral’ 
position. 
While the importance of a neutral position of the government towards some 
issues is widely recognised (e.g. matters that relate to individual choices based 
on views on ‘a good life’), amongst others Van der Burg & Brom (2010), have 
argued that political inaction on moral issues is not always as neutral as it seems. 
It risks removing topics off the agenda because no agreement can be reached. 
In that sense, Gutmann & Thompson (1990) propose to deal with intractable 
moral disagreement through a so-called ‘economy of moral disagreement’, 
where one tries to avoid moral conflict with one another while at the same time 
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not compromising their own moral views and principles (p.85-94). Based on 
the analysis in this thesis I argue that (1) scientific, participatory and regulatory 
strategies are (close to) being exhausted in attempts to bring proponents and 
opponents closer together and (2) that the (fundamental) disagreements about 
GM crops are unlikely to be solved. With regard to GM crop authorisations, the 
question then is what kind of decision can be justified based on the current 
positions in the debate about GM crops? The EU is prolonging the deliberative 
space on this fundamental disagreement by avoiding decision-making, which 
raises the question of when refraining from a decision can be justified from 
the perspective of neutrality and when it becomes unfair towards those who 
(urgently) need or deserve an explicit political decision. 
Several authors have pointed out that taking a decision or staying neutral both 
have consequences. Bovenkerk (2012) argued that ‘a government could avoid 
conflict by simply declaring one view to be correct or by remaining neutral 
between its citizen’s views. In the first case it would not accord its citizens the 
equal respect they deserve and would fail to be democratic; in the second case 
it would fail to acknowledge the nonneutral consequences of doing nothing.’ 
(p.235). Bovenkerk illustrates the last point by pointing at the normative 
choice to allow GM crops on the market in the first place (instead of banning 
them), which (potentially) penalizes farmers who want to stay GM-free. In 
my view however, this does not accurately reflect the situation. Inghelbrecht 
(2016) described the European situation as one ‘where moving forward in 
trying to implement GM crops has been systematically blocked, while at 
the same time attempts to fully exclude GM crops from EU agriculture have 
been systematically prevented’ (p.12). I want to take this claim a step further 
and argue that the EC disregards both GM proponents and opponents whilst 
upholding the ‘illusion’ of a working system. According to the official website 
of the European Union, the EC is supposed to promote the general interest 
of the EU by proposing and enforcing legislation as well as by implementing 
policies. It is also supposed to protect the interests of the EU and its citizens 
on issues that can’t be dealt with effectively at national level. However, the EC 
decides not to interfere with the deadlock in the decision-making process on 
GM crops while upholding a system that can hardly be challenged by either 
proponents or opponents, because theoretically the system ‘works’. 
Firstly, people with fundamental objections against GM crops are disregarded 
in the current system. Despite the lack of decision-making, there are GM 
crop products on the (consumer) market. They are present indirectly through 
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importation of livestock feed containing GM crops and ingredients, but also in 
other food ingredients (such as vitamins) produced by GM micro-organisms. 
In addition, for practical reasons, there are threshold levels for labelling, 
meaning that some unlabelled products may still contain small amounts of 
GM ingredients. Inghelbrecht et al. (2014) argue that ‘the current EU non-GM 
crop regime is in fact a ‘fictitious’ or ‘virtual’ non-GM crop regime that has 
developed into a wicked problem (p.67). With the rise of NPBTs it will become 
even more problematic if not impossible to trace GMO’s in the food system 
(ENGL 2019, see also Chapter 8). By upholding the current traceability and 
labelling regime, the EC promises something that is not realistic or feasible. 
Secondly, the current system also disregards GM proponents. There is a legal 
framework that aims to facilitate, amongst others, agricultural innovation 
and a functioning internal market, but in practice, decisions are not made 
and the feasibility of commercial applications is limited to agricultural 
staple crops (maize, soybean, rapeseed and cotton) with a very limited set 
of GM traits (herbicide tolerance and insect resistance). Effectively, there are 
no authorisations for GM crop cultivation and GM crops are only and after 
significant delays authorised for importation for feed purposes. This disregards 
principles such as legal certainty and proportionality towards companies and 
developers of GM crops. 
In summary, I agree that in cases of conflict, moving too early towards 
decision-making based on consensus striving or by dismissing certain values, 
conceptions, types of knowledge, arguments or controversies, risks premature 
closure of the debate that can backfire. In a democratic society, complex and 
wicked problems that involve disagreement on both facts and values should 
have an opportunity to be discussed and explored to enable a learning process 
and opinion transformation. However, political judgement is needed to arrive 
at decision-making too. 
I have argued that a decision on when technocratic and deliberative strategies 
have been sufficiently applied, also belongs to the responsibility of political 
actors. In my view the timing of this step is now or even overdue because the 
current system does not do justice to either proponents or opponents. I argue 
that (1) if facilitating individual decisions based on conceptions of a ‘good 
life’ are insufficient (the political liberal strategy) and if at the same time, (2) 
conflicting views on a ‘good life’ obstruct or hijack decision-making based 
on democratically determined conceptions of ‘goods’ and a ‘good society’, 
9
268
this puts the topic in the realm of views of a good society, and thus within 
the responsibility of political judgement and decision-making. Upholding the 
illusion of a working regulatory system to both proponents and opponents, 
in my view, makes it difficult from a democratic perspective to justify 
avoiding decision-making on a political level and delegating the issue back 
to science, stakeholders and the general public. Instead, there is a need for 
repoliticisation of the political level in the decision-making process about GM 
crop authorisations, both at a MS and EU level.
3.4 FACTORS AFFECTING THE LIKELIHOOD OF REPOLITICISATION
Politicisation can be seen as a means to add political power; to act and decide 
from a non-neutral point of interest. In academic literature there are various 
views on the meaning of depoliticisation and repoliticisation in different 
contexts, as have been discussed by amongst others Hisschemöller & Hoppe 
(1995), Bovenkerk (2012) and Poort et al. (2013). These authors have mainly 
focused on the need and function of de- and repoliticisation through technical 
expertise, delegated bodies (such as ethics committees) and the general public, 
where the first two can be viewed as processes of depoliticisation while the 
involvement of the general public is seen as a way of repoliticisation that 
brings the issue at hand out in the open to be debated and to facilitate opinion 
transformation. In my view repoliticisation of the decision-making procedures 
of GM crop authorisations means acknowledging the political nature of the 
decision-making process and actively initiating political deliberation with 
the aim of arriving at a decision. In other words, repoliticisation means 
explicit political decision-making in situations of (scientific) uncertainty and 
controversy. Moreover, it implicates marking a point in time with a decision 
(that expresses intentionality through an explicit standpoint) that excludes 
alternatives for the time being.
In this thesis I have emphasised and substantiated the need of repoliticisation 
from a theoretical perspective. However, in the real world additional factors 
play a role that influence the likelihood of repoliticisation. In this last section 
I will switch my perspective once more from theory to practice and briefly 
reflect on two factors that may either facilitate or impede repoliticisation: 
problem ownership and urgency. 
Mühlböck & Tosun (2017) have shown that MS voting behavior on GM crops 
is driven by different national interests such as public opinion, the ideological 
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background of the Ministers[15], and sectoral and structural interests. The 
reason for MS to abstain from voting is usually because they also diverge on 
these aspects within their borders, as is also illustrated by the network of 
GMO free regions in the EU (Tosun & Shikano 2015). Therefore, the EC has 
argued that a MS level would be a more suitable arena for political discussions 
about the authorisation of GM crops.[16] This view has been endorsed by several 
authors supporting decentralised competences in multi-level systems (e.g. 
Tosun & Hartung 2017) and subsidiarity-based multi-level governance (Dobbs 
2016). In my view this could be a first step towards political deliberation about 
GM crop authorisations. 
However, it has been noted that renationalisation of part of the decision-
making may strategically shift the discussion and responsibility to another 
level (and is successfully avoided by the EC) where it may also be ignored 
or avoided for the same reasons of being contentious (e.g. Tosun & Hartung 
2017 and Hartung & Hörisch 2017). This is illustrated by the fact that most 
MS have not taken active steps in implementing Directive (EU) 2015/412 in 
their national legislation (Dobbs 2017). Dobbs (2016) recognises the potential 
of subsidiarity-based multilevel governance within the GM cultivation regime, 
but also identifies opportunities for further improvement with regard to agenda 
setting, decision-making power and coordination. She particularly highlights 
the underlying question of authority. ‘In the long run, a more proactive 
approach may be required - one that considers specifically where relevant 
powers ought to rest.’ (p.246). I support this view because the question is not 
only whether GM crops should be authorised, but also who has the political 
power to decide about this. Here a difference can be found with the notion 
of deliberative democracy as described in Section 3.3 that aims to be free of 
power-relations. Deliberative democracy at a political level should in my view 
explicitly address first and foremost where the decision-making power lies.
This requires coordination, since at this point there seems to be a lack of 
incentive for MS to initiate these discussions as no GM crops are authorised 
and the status quo remains unchanged. Since the authorisation of GM crops is 
ultimately an EU decision, one could argue that the EC is the issue owner and 
should take (political steps) to engage the debate with the MS, who in turn also 
15 Mühlböck & Tosun (2017) analyse voting data from before the Lisbon Treaty, where Ministers of the MS 
were voting. After the Lisbon Treaty, the voting has been downscaled to a lower political level and is being 
exercised by MS representatives.
16 Resulting in Directive (EU) 2015/412
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have to initiate dialogue on a national level. In the absence of an active issue 
owner, I think steps are unlikely to be taken.
The glyphosate case (Section 3.2) illustrated that the EC is capable of organising 
political discussions with MS about controversial topics, but apparently only 
does so for some cases (i.e. glyphosate, COVID-19) and not others (i.e. GM 
crops). Similarly, Tosun (2019) noted that ‘the application of the precautionary 
principle is determined by the dynamics of the relevant political process. 
Sometimes its application is accepted by the European Commission, and in 
other instances it is challenged’ (p.4). In addition, in the past, the EC has 
engaged in political behaviour with the MS about GM crops. Skogstad (2003) 
describes the early days of the GM conflict (late 90s) as a process of aggregated 
politics including power politics and brokerage politics (p.332). It seems that 
there was a process of political bargaining between 1998 and 2004 resulting 
in the current hybrid regulatory system that takes into account both scientific 
and broader aspects. Once settled however, the failure of the execution of 
this framework seems either insufficient or not urgent enough to reopen 
political debate with the MS. In this view, Princen & Rhinard (2006) made a 
relevant distinction between high and low level politics. High level politics are 
topics that are characterised by a high-level of controversy or intense public 
debate and are sensitive to media attention. Decisions on these issues are the 
responsibility of high level politicians. In low-level politics, the key actors are 
state bureaucracy (scientific) experts and interest groups. Whether low-level 
politics results in policy outputs or not depends on the relationship between 
bureaucracy and politicians as well as the politicians’ assessment of the topic in 
terms of electoral benefits. When reflecting once more on the case of glyphosate 
and COVID-19, these topics can be seen as moving from low-level politics to 
high-level politics because of the urgency of a decision. Even fundamental 
viewpoints that have been static for a long time seem to be dynamic again 
because of the high stakes (e.g. generally dismissing the environmental risk 
analysis for COVID-19 research versus referring to uncertainties about the food 
safety of GM crops after extensive research and upholding data requirements 
that are deemed unnecessary by a large part of the scientific community, see 
Chapter 1, Section 5). Several authors have pointed out that GM crops have a 
low political urgency in Europe, putting hardly any weight in the scale (for the 
moment) with regard to reigniting political deliberation. Skogstad (2011) said 
‘the majority view in every EU MS is that GM foods are not useful, not morally 
acceptable, and a risk for society’ (p.906). More recently, the low political 
priority of GM crops has also been mentioned by Smart et al. (2015): ‘We suggest 
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that further research test the hypothesis that in the EU the political-economic 
benefit-cost ratio is too low for politicians to vote in favour of approving GE 
crops.’(p.258). 
In conclusion, in my view unless an issue owner with sufficient political 
power steps out, or if political urgency with regard to GM crops moves the 
issue from low- to high-level politics, repoliticisation of the authorisation of 
GM crops seems unlikely compared to the ‘comfort’ of the status quo that 
has been around for at least two decades. However, I have argued that this 
undeciciveness cannot be justified from a democratic perspective. 
4. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
My main research question was: Why is there a deadlock in decision-making 
on the authorisation of GM crops in Europe and how can it be addressed?
In this thesis I have argued that it is the lack of political judgement and 
decision-making that is an underexposed and avoided factor in the conflict 
over GM crops. Underexposed because stakeholders, policy-makers, politicians 
and academics keep pointing at scientific, regulatory and societal factors as the 
cause of the conflict and focus their mitigation strategies on those. Avoided 
because these factors seem to be used strategically to postpone, delay or stall 
decision-making. Decision-making on GM crop authorisations in Europe 
is deadlocked because the voting procedures under comitology regulations 
systematically result in ‘no-opinion’, and the EC is reluctant to decide on the 
MS behalf about such a contentious issue. In this chapter, I have argued that 
strategies to evade decision-making might be justified from the perspective 
of internal and external accountability, but they cannot be justified from the 
perspective of democratic accountability towards both GMO proponents and 
opponents amongst stakeholders and the general public. 
Therefore, a repoliticisation of decision-making about GM crop authorisations 
is needed to resolve, not solve, the conflict over GM crop authorisations. 
Questions about how safe is safe enough and when have societal discussions 
been deepened sufficiently do not have ‘right’ answers, and therefore they 
ultimately require political decision-making. In my view the repetitive 
character of the discussion about GM crops provides an important indication 
that the transformation potential of opinions has been reached. Political 
decision-making is needed, despite scientific uncertainties and in the presence 
of diverging viewpoints. This implicates decision-making should take place 
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in an environment, either at the subnational, national or EU level, that allows 
for political deliberation to be taken into account and decisions to be made. 
It also has implications for the meaning of decisions that are made. Finally, I 
have identified problem ownership and political urgency as two factors which 
co-determine the circumstances under which repoliticisation of GM crop 
decision-making can be facilitated. 
I. What kind of problem is the deadlock in decision-making about GM crops 
and why? 
In Chapter 1 I have argued that the GM crop conflict has the characteristics 
of a wicked problem, because it involves disagreement on both (scientific) 
facts and (normative) values. This has been illustrated in depth in Chapter 
4 providing a discourse analysis of the debate about alarming studies. The 
wickedness of the GM crop issue can also be found in its resilience to problem 
solving, as illustrated by the attempts of resolving the disagreement about 
alarming studies through technocratic strategies in Chapter 5 (standard 
governance responses to alarming studies fail). In Chapter 2 I have analysed 
and evaluated the technocratic, participatory and regulatory strategies that 
have been used over the years to mitigate the issue and concluded that their 
success has not been overwhelming. After analysing why these strategies did 
not work (chapter 3) I have argued that they cannot resolve the situation in 
the absence of political decision-making. After identifying several indicators 
of political conflict in chapter 3, in this final chapter I have also provided 
argumentation to substantiate that the avoidance of political decision-making 
could be deliberate. From this perspective, I argue that the GM crop conflict is 
not just ‘wicked’ but ‘wicked by design’, and there seems to be a situation of 
strategic political undecideablity. 
II. Why is the deadlock in decision-making a problem? 
In this chapter I have argued that the deadlock in decision-making about GM 
crops may be justified from a political perspective of internal and external 
accountability towards MS and non-EU parties. Nevertheless, I have defended 
that decision-making is needed from a democratic perspective with respect 
to stakeholders and the general public, representing both proponents and 
opponents of GM crops. In addition, the current situation of non-decision-
making disregards basic legal principles such as legal certainty and 
accountability in a national and international setting. Furthermore, Chapter 7 
has illustrated that GM crops have potential impacts on both innovation and 
other socio-economic considerations and finally, the undecideability in the 
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EU will not stop developments in an international setting (Chapter 8). In this 
light, not deciding also resembles the decision not to take part in what future 
governance frameworks should look like when biotechnology integrates both 
horizontally and vertically into other fields. 
III. Has the issue been addressed and how? 
The deadlock in decision-making has been addressed through technocratic, 
participatory and regulatory strategies (Chapter 2, 4 and 5). Some of these 
strategies have been addressed in more depth in Chapter 6 with regard to the 
inclusion of non-safety arguments on a national level as a legal argument 
to ban GM crops on a national level. The opportunities and challenges of 
the inclusion of non-safety (e.g. socio-economic) considerations have been 
reviewed in Chapter 7. 
IV. Did this resolve the issue and why (not)? 
In Chapter 2 and 3 I have argued that these strategies have proven insufficient 
to resolve the deadlock in decision-making about GM crop authorisations 
because they are alone or together insufficient to result in the single course 
of action that is needed for a yes/no decision on authorisation of GM crops. 
These strategies did not resolve the deadlock, but instead are used strategically 
to evade decision-making. In addition, the positioning of contentious issues 
as implementing acts in the EU decision-making process facilitates evading 
political judgement and postponement and delays hiding behind a complex 
regulatory framework that has a focus on technocratic factors on safety and 
risk. This problem is not specific for GM crops, but also in other policy areas 
such as pesticides (glyphosate). The latter issue has been (temporarily resolved) 
amongst others because of urgency and political prioritisation. 
V. How can the issue be addressed to improve the situation? 
My hypothesis was that technocratic, participatory and regulatory input in 
the decision-making process are insufficient if political actors renounce or are 
unable to take up their own role in the decision-making process; which is to 
decide in case of conflict. An explicit repoliticisation of the decision-making 
process about GM crops is needed.
In this final chapter I have substantiated this hypothesis by looking into the 
contributions and limitations of science, participatory activities and regulatory 
frameworks and identifying and describing the specific role of politics that is 
needed in addition to these processes. It is a task and responsibility of political 
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actors to argue and defend when there has been sufficient room for scientific 
and societal deliberation, confrontation and discussion. These answers will 
not present themselves but require political judgement and decision-making. 
Repoliticisation of the decision-making process is needed. In my view, 
repoliticisation in the context of this thesis means explicit decision-making 
in situations of scientific uncertainty and controversy.  Finally, I argue that 
repoliticisation is only likely to take place if there is a shared motivation or 
urgency to resolve the deadlock. In my view, unless an issue owner with 
sufficient political power steps out or the urgency of a decision is increased 
that moves the issue from low- to high-level politics, repoliticisation of the 
authorisation of GM crops seems unlikely compared to the ‘comfort’ of the 
status quo of non-decision-making that has been around for at least two 
decades. Nevertheless, I argue that the strategic political undecisiveness cannot 
be justified from a democratic perspective.
Finally, some recommendations or focus points for future research on wicked 
problems can be made based on the research presented in this thesis. In my 
view, research on decision-making about controversial technologies should 
not only focus on gaining insights into why decision-making is problematic, 
but also into what is needed to arrive at decision-making. It would be valuable 
for future research to look into the question when the preceding (deliberative) 
steps towards political decision-making are (sufficiently) fulfilled and how 
this can be determined? In other words, when is a closure of the debate and 
a move towards decision-making no longer premature? How can be decided 
when the ‘real’ sources of disagreement are revealed and when there has been 








Altering the DNA of living organisms, also genetic modification, genetic 
engineering or genetic manipulation, triggers a wide variety of views and 
standpoints related to moral values, perceptions of risks and benefits and 
broader issues such as socio-economic aspects. To address these diverging 
perspectives, a regulatory framework for Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs) has been developed in Europe that aims to guarantee safety for humans 
and the environment, facilitates innovation for research and commercial 
applications and leaves room for individual decision-making regarding 
the consumption of genetically modified (GM-) food. However, this system 
doesn’t work as intended in Europe. This is particularly the case for market 
authorisations of GM crops for importation and cultivation. The European 
conflict over GM crops is ongoing since the late 90s and has shown to be 
remarkably resilient to being solved or mitigated. 
Under the current regulatory system, GM crops are neither explicitly approved 
nor rejected by the Member States (MS). European regulatory decision-making 
procedures on the authorisation of GM crops are systematically delayed or 
stalling. After a positive opinion from the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) on the risks to humans and the environment, the European Commission 
(EC) presents a draft proposal for authorisation to the MS. However, the 
voting procedure (part of EU comitology) with the MS nearly always result in 
‘no opinion’ because no qualified majority can be reached either in favor or 
against the proposal. Consequently, most GM crop authorisation applications 
for importation have been authorised through a unilateral decision from the EC 
and without the support of the MS. Authorisations of GM crop cultivation have 
completely halted since the late 90s. 
Discussions over the safety and acceptability of GM crops amongst political and 
policy actors, stakeholders, scientists, NGOs and the general public have shown 
a repetitive pattern of exchanging the same arguments over and over without 
moving in any direction. These discussions are regularly reignited by ‘alarming 
studies’, a concept that was introduced by the author of this thesis. These 
are scientific or other studies claiming that a technological innovation (e.g. a 
GM crop) poses a threat to human health or the environment which has not 
been acknowledged by the existing governance system. These studies trigger 
a technocratic response from governments, which has proven insufficient 
to reach an agreement about the scientific value of these studies because, 
amongst others, perspectives on ‘good science’ diverge. In addition, involving 
stakeholders or adapting regulations have also proven unable to move towards 
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a common ground for decision-making about GM crops. Alarming studies 
continue to be cited by those opposing GM crops as proof that they are unsafe. 
Legislative opportunities and interpretative leeway are used by MS to divert 
from a multilateral European decision on GM crop authorisations.
These characteristics of the GM crop conflict, such as a lack of a shared problem 
definition and disagreement on both facts and values, classify the issue as 
a wicked problem, a concept from Rittel & Webber. They used it initially to 
distinguish technical from societal problems in engineering, but the concept 
has taken its own turn in academic literature over the years, where it became 
used to describe problems that are wicked in themselves. Framing GM crops as 
a wicked problem suggests that a) it is biotechnology itself that is a problem 
and b) the issue is impossible to solve because of its wickedness. Nevertheless, 
strategies have been developed and applied to deal with the issue of GM crops 
in Europe. After two decades however, these strategies seem to have had 
limited success. 
This thesis provides an empirically informed analysis of the decision-making 
process on European GM crop authorisations and the factors contributing to 
this decision. It aims to analyse why there is a deadlock in decision-making on 
the authorisation of GM crops in Europe and how it can be addressed. 
Besides an empirical analysis of the discourse used in discussions on alarming 
studies, I use academic literature from the field of sociology, political science, 
philosophy of law, and science & technology studies (STS) to reflect on the 
common mitigation strategies which are proposed in the field of regulatory 
science to deal with GM crop authorisations, alarming studies and new 
scientific developments. This approach of combined methodologies provides 
a toolbox that enables a multidimensional view on the problem at hand. In 
addition, working for a scientific advisory body (The Netherlands Commission 
on Genetic Modification (COGEM)) provided me with firsthand experience of 
how ‘messy’ reality can be compared to theory. Together, the interaction, 
overlap and differences of these empirical, academic and anecdotal insights 
have resulted in a dissertation that aims to provide a step forward in the 
controversy over GM crops.
The dissertation can be divided in three parts.[1] The first part (Chapters 1 - 
3) introduce the subject of this thesis (GM crop authorisations) and provide 
1 For a chronological overview of the chapters in this thesis see Chapter 2, Section 4
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the problem analysis that results in my research question and hypothesis. 
The second part (Chapters 4 – 8) consists of a series of published articles 
that deepen the problem analysis as well as provide partial answers to the 
question why mitigation strategies for the GM crop conflict thus far have had 
limited success. Finally, I wrap up my findings in Chapter 9 and substantiate 
my hypothesis that the GM crop issue is wicked by design and in urgent need 
of acknowledgement of the political nature of the conflict, followed by explicit 
decision-making.
Several strategies have been developed to mitigate the deadlock in GM crop 
authorisations in Europe. These strategies predominantly focus on three areas: 
science, (public) participation and regulation: increase scientific knowledge, 
involve the general public and stakeholders and add or change regulations to 
be fit for purpose. The potential and contributions of each of these strategies 
are evaluated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, while their limitations are discussed 
in Chapter 3.
Technocratic strategies seem to be based on the assumption that better science 
and more knowledge will lead to better decision-making. Three examples of 
commonly used technocratic strategies are discussed: 1) reducing uncertainties, 
2) adding scientific expertise and 3) technological solutions. These strategies 
seem to be a standard response to situations of conflict about GM crops, whether 
they be about alarming studies, authorisation processes or the regulation of 
new plant breeding techniques (NPBTs). But although broadly applied, their 
success has been limited. Besides practical insights, I used critical theoretical 
views on technocratic strategies from amongst others Sarewitz and Jasanoff to 
substantiate this conclusion.
The debates about existing alarming studies remain and reignite when new 
ones are published. This is analysed in more depth in Chapter 4 which consists 
of a discourse analysis that illustrates the repetitive pattern of arguments 
being brought forward after publication of a series of alarming studies. 
Chapter 5 discusses the standard governance responses that focus on the 
scientific debate while omitting the normative aspects of science as well as 
the broader underlying debate about GM crops that relate to fundamentally 
different views on agriculture and food production. Scientific expertise has not 
resulted in decisions about the regulatory status of NPBTs, nor has it convinced 
MS to lift their national bans on GM crops or did it resolve the debate about 
the scientific value of alarming studies. Finally, technological solutions, such 
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as the possibility to create small DNA changes that can also occur in nature, 
have not changed the debate on GM crops. These solutions have not provided 
generally accepted answers to questions about naturalness or benefits of GM 
crops. 
In Chapter 9 I revisited these findings on technocratic strategies and I argue 
that science and scientific expertise are on the one hand essential to navigate 
complexity and reduce uncertainties. On the other hand science is always 
provisional with an endemic and irreducible level of uncertainty. Science 
does not compel action or tells us what to do.  Whether a GM crop is safe 
enough and an acceptable option for agriculture and food production, is a 
political choice and requires political argumentation. This is also the case 
for other types of knowledge that are included or considered in the decision-
making process, such as a broader assessment that includes socio-economic 
considerations. Socio-economic considerations are, perhaps even more than 
environmental risk, subject to normative judgements and choices providing 
a number of challenges, which are reviewed in Chapter 7. Finally, the input 
of science in the decision-making process is challenging: it needs translation 
(the ‘science-policy gap’) and provides an ‘excess of objectivity’ that can be 
used to substantiate a variety of viewpoints. At the same time, policy-makers 
and politicians face ‘bounded rationality’ that makes it impossible to take all 
existing evidence into account. A strong focus on adding science can even have 
an adverse effect, leading to discussions about reproducibility, integrity and 
legitimacy of science and scientific experts.
Participatory strategies can contribute to the identification of values and 
of perceived hopes and threats of a technology that can inform the political 
decision-making process. The broader and more inclusive, the more likely 
these processes are to capture the variety of perspectives that may need to be 
taken into account to legitimise policy- and decision-making from a democratic 
perspective. In addition, participatory activities and the inclusion of societal 
actors and stakeholders may contribute to trust in the eventual decision-
making process. Calls for public and stakeholder participation seem to suggest 
that taking stakeholders into account ideally results in a collective vision on 
the way forward, or at least a shared or common ground on which decisions can 
be built. In Chapter 2 and 3 I discuss and evaluate three types of participatory 
strategies, focusing on 1) inclusion and engagement, 2) consensus building and 
3) acknowledging controversies. I use insights from amongst others Bovenkerk 
and Poort whose work has also been directed at biotechnology and genetic 
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modification as a case study. In Chapter 9 I further reflected on and criticised 
their work and finally added my own perspective to it. Numerous initiatives, 
global observatories, dialogues etc. have been set up over the years about GM 
crops, GM animals and GM in humans, but viewpoints remain diverged and the 
(intended) use of the outcome of participatory strategies in decision-making 
on regulations and authorisations is often implicit, providing difficulty to 
identify or measure the results of participatory strategies. Revisiting these 
reflections in Chapter 9, I argue that the general public and stakeholders can’t 
make decisions as an entity, because these groups are a pluralistic collective 
of individuals with a broad spectrum of different and conflicting views on ‘the 
good life’, ‘goods’ and ‘a good society’. While participation and deliberation 
are valuable and necessary in debates about controversial technologies, they 
are in themselves insufficient to inform the direction of the decision-making 
on GM crop authorisations. 
Regulatory strategies to mitigate the conflict on GM crops focus on evaluating 
and (re)defining rules and boundaries on who decides about what and based on 
which grounds. These strategies seem to be based on the assumption that that 
‘better’ rules and regulations will facilitate better decision-making. 
The regulations have been criticised and adapted moreover throughout the 
years to improve the conflict over GM crop authorisations in Europe and within 
MS. Interestingly, these strategies generally follow two opposite directions; 
they focus on a more science or evidence-based regulatory framework and on a 
more precautionary & broader regulatory framework that includes non-safety 
aspects. There has been an increase of (legally binding) requirements for the 
environmental and food safety assessments on the one hand. On the other hand 
regulations have been implemented facilitating consumers freedom of choice 
through food labelling (Regulation (EC) No 1830-2003) and acknowledging 
non-safety arguments as a reason to ban cultivation of GM crops on a national 
level (Directive (EU) 2015/412). 
I used critical reflections from academic literature from amongst others 
Cairney, Tosun and Stirling to point out that both strategies encounter practical 
challenges on implementation. Science-focused regulatory frameworks 
are based on the assumption that 1) there is sufficient scientific evidence 
and 2) there is agreement about this evidence. Differences in national risk 
assessments on GM crop authorisations and the discussion over alarming 
studies illustrate this is not the case. In addition, the scientific developments 
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discussed in Chapter 8 illustrate that the scientific status quo reflected in 
the regulations will continuously be challenged by new findings, which calls 
for a more dynamic instead of a more detailed science-based regulatory 
framework. Broader and more inclusive regulatory frameworks tend to lead 
to a complex regulatory framework that takes into account an almost endless 
amount of factors that are difficult or even impossible to compare and balance 
due to normative differences. The current EU framework for GMOs has both 
characteristics of precautionary and evidence-based systems. As a result, a 
tension arises between those that see science as the only legitimate source of 
knowledge for a regulatory framework and those that promote the inclusion 
of other perspectives (such as political, cultural, and socio-economic factors). 
Instead of complementing each other, the concepts of evidence-based and 
precaution seem to be used as ammunition against each other, contributing to 
a deadlock in decision-making. 
A third proposed regulatory strategy aims to change the rules of the voting 
procedures to dismiss the option of ‘no opinion’. This will force MS to take a 
position in favor or against GM crops. This strategy could work, in theory, but 
reality has proven to be more complex. Chapter 6 provides an in depth normative 
analysis of Directive (EU) 2015/412, illustrating that adjusting the regulations 
does not necessarily provide a solution for the conflict and disagreement on 
biotechnology, even if the regulation in itself seems fit and reasonable. As 
with every regulation or directive, there is always a certain amount of leeway 
for alternative use, facilitating differences between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in 
action’. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a change of comitology rules would 
mitigate the issue on GM crop authorisations as long as underlying issues are 
not explicitly addressed. 
Revisiting these insights in Chapter 9, I argued that regulations may 
determine the rules and requirements based on a reflection of what has been 
democratically decided to represent a common perspective on ‘a good society’ 
but, these rules and requirements do not determine the outcome of a decision. 
Regulations cannot resolve conflict by themselves and inevitably include a 
degree of interpretative space, i.e. different courses of action can be justified 
in view of the same regulations based on different views on the intended 
outcome. In addition, the views on a ‘good society’ reflected in the regulations 
can impossibly (fully) overlap with all different conflicting individual views on 
‘a good life’. 
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The insights from the discussion and evaluation of technocratic, participatory 
and regulatory strategies substantiate the proposition that no matter how 
much science, regulatory measures or public participation you throw at it, 
these will not automatically result or add up to  political decision-making. 
And this is, in my view, where acknowledgement of the political nature of the 
conflict is needed to balance the input from science and society/stakeholders 
and take decisions in situations of uncertainty and conflicting views. 
Political behavior and actions such as deliberation, argumentation, bargaining 
and compromising have been very limited or even absent in the case of GM 
crop authorisations. The decisive step has been reduced to a voting process by 
MS representatives with a predetermined national voting mandate under EU 
comitology procedures. As a consequence, the only way to express underlying 
disagreements about the issue of GM crops, is to use the breathing room 
within the existing regulatory framework to obstruct the decision-making 
(e.g. negative votes or abstaining from voting and installing national or 
regional bans on GM crops). In Chapter 9 I argued that decision-making on 
GM crops is strategically evaded by the EC and the MS by using the leeway 
in the regulations and delegating responsibilities back to science (to provide 
more certainty) and society (to build a consensus or shared perspective) or by 
postponing decision-making awaiting a change of regulations. 
This strategy of evasion can be seen as a strategic way of managing accountability 
on different levels (i.e. towards MS and non-European countries) to avoid 
economic, political or legal consequences. The hybrid regulatory system that is 
both detailed and science-based as well as broad and optional on non-safety 
issues, combined with decision-making rules (comitology) that provide room 
for non-decision-making (i.e. ‘no opinion’), leaves the EC with a strategic and 
flexible position where she can instantly adopt decisions in case a complaint 
is filed with the WTO by non-EU countries and trade partners, or postpone 
decision-making should MS or the European Parliament (EP) complain 
about undemocratic decision-making. This classifies the conflict on GM crop 
authorisations not just as a wicked problem, but as a wicked problem by design 
(a concept from Nie). This claim can be substantiated with a comparison of 
a similar case of a wicked problem: the authorisation of the broad spectrum 
herbicide glyphosate in Europe. Despite its wicked character, a lack of scientific 
certainty and societal consensus, an authorisation decision was reached, because 
the EC engaged in political behavior and argued, bargained and negotiated with 
the MS until a compromise had been reached. The glyphosate case illustrates 
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that priorities, urgency and potential political wins can put dynamics back into 
discussions on controversial technologies, even in situations that seem wicked 
at first.
Based on the analysis in this thesis I argue that (1) scientific, participatory 
and regulatory strategies are (close to) being exhausted in attempts to bring 
proponents and opponents closer together in the conflict over GM crops and 
(2) that the (fundamental) disagreements about GM crops are unlikely to be 
resolved. With regard to GM crop authorisations, the question then is what 
kind of decision can be justified based on the current positions in the debate? 
The EU is prolonging the deliberative space on this fundamental disagreement 
by avoiding decision-making, which in addition raises the question of when 
refraining from a decision can be justified from the perspective of neutrality 
and when it becomes unfair towards those who (urgently) need or deserve an 
explicit political decision. 
In academic literature on deliberative democracy, the importance of a neutral 
position of the government is emphasised in cases of controversy. Government 
should stay neutral to allow for deliberation amongst stakeholders and 
the general public to voice their concerns and optionally transform their 
viewpoints. This view has also been criticised, since staying neutral also has 
consequences. Authors such as Bovenkerk and Poort have endorsed a view 
on deliberative democracy that focusses on inclusion of all stakeholders and 
deepening disagreements, while also acknowledging that these approaches will 
not automatically lead to decision-making. However, they refrain from going 
into the matter of when a controversy has been sufficiently acknowledged, 
deepened or addressed and moving forward to decision-making is no longer 
premature. After this critical note, I added to their work and argued that a 
decision on when technocratic and deliberative strategies have been sufficiently 
applied, also belong to the responsibility of political actors. In addition, in 
my view the timing of this step is now or even overdue because the current 
system does not do justice to either proponents or opponents of GM crops. The 
current situation of non-decision-making disregards basic legal principles 
such as legal certainty and accountability in a national and international 
setting. Chapter 7 has illustrated that GM crops have potential impacts on both 
innovation and other socio-economic considerations and the undecideability 
in the EU will not stop developments in an international setting (Chapter 8). 
In this light, not deciding also resembles the decision not to take part in what 
future governance frameworks should look like when biotechnology integrates 
both horizontally and vertically into other fields. 
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Upholding the illusion of a working regulatory system to both proponents and 
opponents, in my view, makes it difficult from a democratic perspective to 
justify non-decision-making on a political level and delegate the issue back 
to science, stakeholders and the general public. Instead, there is a need for 
repoliticisation on the political level in the decision-making process about GM 
crop authorisations, both at a MS and EU level. In my view, repoliticisation 
in the context of this thesis means explicit decision-making in situations of 
scientific uncertainty and controversy. However, as democratic accountability 
is not the only determinant for political decision-making, I note that, similar to 
the glyphosate case, political urgency as well as issue ownership are important 






Het wijzigen van het DNA van levende organismen, ook wel genetische 
modificatie of genetische manipulatie genoemd, roept een grote diversiteit aan 
perspectieven en standpunten op die gerelateerd kunnen worden aan morele 
waarden, risicopercepties en aspecten zoals sociaal-economische factoren. 
Om deze uiteenlopende perspectieven recht te doen, is  wet- en regelgeving 
ontwikkeld voor Genetisch Gemodificeerde Organismen (GGO’s) die beoogt 
de veiligheid voor mens en milieu te waarborgen, onderzoek en innovatie te 
faciliteren en ruimte te bieden voor individuele keuzevrijheid op het gebied van 
genetisch gemodificeerd (gg-) voedsel. Dit systeem werkt in Europa echter 
niet zoals bedoeld. Dit is in het bijzonder het geval voor markttoelatingen van 
genetisch gemodificeerde (gg-) gewassen voor import en teelt. Het Europese 
conflict over gg-gewassen loopt al sinds eind jaren 90 en toont zich bijzonder 
weerbarstig tegen aangedragen oplossingen en compromissen.
In de huidige situatie worden marktaanvragen voor gg-gewassen niet expliciet 
goedgekeurd noch afgewezen door de Europese lidstaten. De Europese 
besluitvormingsprocedures voor de autorisatie van gg-gewassen zitten in 
een impasse en worden systematisch vertraagd of lopen volledig vast. Na een 
positieve opinie van de Europese autoriteit voor Voedselveiligheid (European 
Food Safety Authority, EFSA) over de risico’s voor mens en milieu, presenteert 
de Europese Commissie (EC) een voorstel voor een besluit tot toelating aan de 
lidstaten. De stemmingsronde die hierop volgt (als onderdeel van de Europese 
comitologie of besluitvormingsprocedures) resulteert vrijwel altijd in ‘geen 
mening’ omdat er geen gekwalificeerde meerderheid voor danwel tegen het 
conceptbesluit wordt behaald. Als gevolg hiervan, worden de meeste besluiten 
voor import uiteindelijk unilateraal genomen door de EC, zonder de steun van 
de lidstaten. De markttoelating van gg-gewassen voor teelt is volledig tot 
stilstand gekomen sinds eind jaren 90. 
Discussies over de veiligheid en aanvaardbaarheid van gg-gewassen onder 
politieke en beleidsactoren, stakeholders, wetenschappers, NGO’s en het 
algemene publiek laten een patroon zien waarbij dezelfde argumenten steeds 
opnieuw worden uitgewisseld zonder dat de uitkomst van de discussie in enige 
richting beweegt. Deze discussies worden regelmatig aangewakkerd door 
zogeheten ‘alarmerende studies’, een concept dat werd geïntroduceerd door 
de auteur van dit proefschrift. Dit zijn wetenschappelijke of andere studies 
die claimen dat een technologische innovatie (bijvoorbeeld een gg-gewas) 
een risico vormt voor de humane gezondheid of het milieu dat (nog) niet 
erkend is door de autoriteiten. Deze studies leiden in eerste instantie tot een 
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technocratische respons van overheden om de wetenschappelijke validiteit van 
het onderzoek te onderzoeken. Deze aanpak is echter onvoldoende gebleken 
om overeenstemming te bereiken over de wetenschappelijke waarde van 
alarmerende studies, onder meer omdat ook de meningen over wat ‘goede 
wetenschap’ is, blijken te verschillen. Het breed betrekken van stakeholders bij 
dergelijke evaluaties evenals het aanpassen van de regelgeving zijn eveneens 
onvoldoende gebleken om een gezamenlijk draagvlak te bereiken voor 
besluitvorming over  de veiligheid van gg-gewassen. Hoewel formeel afgewezen 
om hun gebrek aan wetenschappelijke validiteit, worden alarmerende studies 
nog steeds aangehaald door tegenstanders van gg-gewassen als bewijs dat 
deze gevaarlijk zijn. De juridische mogelijkheden en interpretatieve ruimte 
binnen de regelgeving wordt daarnaast volop gebruikt door lidstaten om af te 
wijken van een multilaterale besluitvorming over de markttoelating van gg-
gewassen. 
Deze kenmerken van het conflict over gg-gewassen, zoals een gebrek aan een 
gezamenlijke probleemdefinitie en onenigheid over zowel ‘feiten’ als ‘waarden’, 
classificeren het conflict als een ‘wicked probleem’, een concept van Rittel & 
Webber. Zij gebruikten het om een onderscheid te maken tussen technische 
en sociale problemen in de bouwkunde, maar het concept is in de loop der 
jaren vooral gebruikt om problemen te beschrijven die ‘wicked’ in zichzelf 
zijn. Het classificeren van gg-gewassen als een wicked probleem suggereert 
dat a) biotechnologie zelf een probleem is en b) het probleem onoplosbaar 
is door zijn intrinsieke ‘wickedness’. Desondanks zijn in de loop der jaren 
verschillende strategieën ontwikkeld en toegepast om een oplossing te vinden 
voor het conflict over gg-gewassen in Europa. Na ruim twee decennia lijken 
deze strategieën echter beperkt succesvol.
Dit proefschrift presenteert een empirisch geïnformeerde analyse van het 
besluitvormingsproces over Europese markttoelatingen voor gg-gewassen 
en van de factoren die bijdragen aan deze besluiten. De vraag die ik hiermee 
wil beantwoorden is waarom er een impasse is in de besluitvorming over 
markttoelatingen van gg-gewassen in Europa en hoe deze kan worden 
geadresseerd. Naast een empirische analyse van het discours dat gebruikt 
wordt in discussies over alarmerende studies, gebruik ik inzichten uit de 
academische literatuur van verschillende vakgebieden waaronder sociologie, 
politieke wetenschappen, rechtsfilosofie en science & technology studies (STS) 
om te reflecteren op de bijdragen en beperkingen van veelgebruikte strategieën 
om een oplossing te bieden voor het conflict. Deze ‘gecombineerde methode’ 
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benadering levert een gereedschapskist op die een multidimensionaal 
perspectief op het probleem faciliteert. Mijn werk voor het wetenschappelijke 
adviesorgaan de Commissie Genetische Modificatie (COGEM) heeft mij 
bovendien uit de eerste hand laten ervaren hoe ‘rommelig’ de realiteit kan zijn 
ten opzichte van de theorie. Samen hebben de interactie, overlap en verschillen 
van deze empirische, academische en anekdotische inzichten geresulteerd in 
een proefschrift dat beoogd een stap voorwaarts te bieden in de controverse 
over gg-gewassen. 
Het proefschrift bestaat uit drie delen.[1] Het eerste deel (Hoofdstukken 1-3) 
introduceert het object van het onderzoek (markttoelatingen van gg-gewassen) 
en vormt de probleemanalyse die leidt tot de onderzoeksvraag en hypothese. Het 
tweede deel (Hoofdstukken 4 – 8) bestaat uit een serie gepubliceerde artikelen 
die de probleemanalyse verder verdiepen en deelantwoorden geeft op de vraag 
waarom strategieën om het conflict over gg-gewassen op te lossen vooralsnog 
weinig succes hebben gehad. Het derde deel betreft het afsluitende Hoofdstuk 
9 waarin ik reflecteer op mijn bevindingen en mijn hypothese onderbouw dat 
het conflict over de besluitvorming over gg-gewassen niet wicked in zichzelf is 
maar een ontworpen wicked probleem (‘wicked problem by design’). Dit vraagt 
om erkenning van de politieke aard van het conflict gevolgd door expliciete 
politieke oordeelsvorming en  een besluit: repolitisering van de besluitvorming.
Er zijn verschillende strategieën ontwikkeld om de vastgelopen besluitvorming 
over gg-gewassen vlot te trekken. Deze strategieën hebben voornamelijk een 
focus op drie gebieden: wetenschap, stakeholderbetrokkenheid en regelgeving: 
meer wetenschappelijke kennis, het betrekken van een breder publiek en meer 
stakeholders en het aanpassen van de regelgeving zodat deze beter aansluit 
bij de wetenschappelijke en maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen. De (potentiele) 
bijdragen van deze technocratische, participatieve en juridische strategieën 
zijn geëvalueerd in Hoofdstuk 2, en hun beperkingen worden besproken in 
Hoofdstuk 3.
Technocratische strategieën lijken gebaseerd op de aanname dat betere 
wetenschap en meer kennis tot betere besluitvorming leiden. Ik bespreek drie 
voorbeelden van veelgebruikte technocratische strategieën: 1) reduceren van 
onzekerheden, 2) inzetten van wetenschappelijke expertise en 3) technische 
oplossingen. Deze strategieën lijken een standaard reactie te zijn op discussies 
1  Voor een chronologisch overzicht van de hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift zie Hoofdstuk 2, Sectie 4 
(Outline). 
294
over gg-gewassen, of het nu gaat om alarmerende studies, markttoelatingen of 
de regulering van nieuwe plantenveredelingstechnieken (NPBTs). Maar hoewel 
breed toegepast is het succes van deze strategieën beperkt. Naast bevindingen 
uit de praktijk, gebruik ik kritische perspectieven uit de academische 
literatuur van onder andere Sarewitz en Jasanoff om te beargumenteren dat 
technocratische strategieën beperkingen hebben voor het oplossen van het 
probleem. 
Discussies over bestaande alarmerende studies gaan onverminderd door en 
worden aangewakkerd wanneer nieuwe alarmerende studies gepubliceerd 
worden. In Hoofdstuk 4 worden deze discussies geanalyseerd aan de hand van 
een discoursanalyse die het patroon van de verschillende argumenten laat zien. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt de standaard reactie van overheden op dit soort discussies 
besproken die vooral gericht is op de wetenschappelijke discussie, terwijl de 
normatieve aspecten van wetenschap evenals de onderliggende discussie over 
fundamenteel verschillende visies op landbouw en voedselproductie genegeerd 
worden.
De inzet van wetenschappelijke experts heeft niet geresulteerd in besluitvorming 
over de juridische status van nieuwe plantenveredelingstechnieken, het 
opheffen van nationale verboden voor gg-gewassen of consensus over de 
wetenschappelijke waarde van alarmerende studies. Ook technologische 
oplossingen, zoals de mogelijkheid om met nieuwe technieken alleen 
wijzigingen in het DNA aan te brengen die ook in de natuur voor (kunnen) 
komen, hebben geen brug kunnen slaan tussen voor- en tegenstanders 
van gg-gewassen. Deze technische oplossingen worden bestempeld als een 
‘technologische fix’ en leveren geen generiek aanvaardbare antwoorden op ten 
aanzien van het (moreel geladen) natuurlijkheidsvraagstuk of perspectieven 
op de voor- danwel nadelen van gg-gewassen.
In Hoofdstuk 9 reflecteer ik op deze bevindingen en beargumenteer ik dat 
wetenschap en wetenschappelijke expertise enerzijds essentieel zijn om te 
navigeren binnen complexe vraagstukken en om onzekerheden te verminderen. 
Anderzijds heeft wetenschappelijke kennis inherent een tijdelijk karakter en 
een endemische onzekerheid. Wetenschap dwingt bovendien niet tot specifieke 
acties; het vertelt ons niet wat te doen. Of een gg-gewas veilig genoeg is en 
een aanvaardbare optie voor landbouw en voedselproductie, is uiteindelijk een 
politieke keuze en vraagt om politieke argumentatie. Dit geldt ook voor andere 
soorten kennis die worden meegenomen in het besluitvormingsproces, zoals 
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sociaaleconomische overwegingen. Deze overwegingen zijn, mogelijk nog 
meer dan veiligheidsrisico’s, onderhevig aan normatieve oordelen en keuzes. 
Het betrekken van sociaaleconomische overwegingen in de regulering van gg-
gewassen leidt tot een breed scala aan uitdagingen, die besproken worden in 
Hoofdstuk 7. Wetenschappelijke kennis kan bovendien niet zomaar worden 
toegevoegd aan het besluitvormingsproces. Het moet vertaald worden om de 
‘kloof tussen wetenschap en beleid’ (‘the science-policy gap’) te overbruggen 
en levert vaak een ‘overschot aan objectiviteit’ (‘excess of objectivity’) dat 
gebruikt kan worden om verschillende standpunten te onderbouwen. Tenslotte 
hebben beleidsmakers en politici te maken met ‘gebonden rationaliteit’ 
(‘bounded rationality’). Het is onmogelijk voor één actor om al het beschikbare 
bewijsmateriaal ten aanzien van een complex vraagstuk in ogenschouw te 
nemen. Een te sterke focus op wetenschappelijk bewijs kan zelfs een nadelig 
effect hebben, wanneer het leidt tot discussies over de wetenschap zelf ten 
aanzien van reproduceerbaarheid, integriteit en legitimiteit van wetenschap en 
wetenschappelijke experts. 
Participatieve strategieën kunnen bijdragen aan de identificatie van waarden, 
verwachtingen en angsten die het politieke besluitvormingsproces kunnen 
informeren. Hoe breder en meer inclusief, hoe groter de kans dat dit soort 
activiteiten de variëteit aan perspectieven in kaart kunnen brengen waar 
mogelijk rekening mee gehouden moet worden om de democratische legitimiteit 
van politieke en beleidsmatige besluiten te waarborgen. Daarnaast kan het 
betrekken van stakeholders en algemeen publiek bijdragen aan vertrouwen 
in het besluitvormingsproces. De oproep om stakeholders te betrekken lijkt 
te suggereren dat dit soort activiteiten idealiter resulteren in een collectieve 
visie of een gedeelde basis voor besluitvorming. In Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 evalueer 
ik drie soorten participatieve strategieën die gericht zijn op 1) inclusie en 
betrokkenheid, 2) consensus en 3) erkenning van controverse. Ik gebruik 
inzichten van onder meer Bovenkerk en Poort wiens werk eveneens gericht 
was op biotechnologie en genetische modificatie als casus. In Hoofdstuk 9 
plaats ik enkele kritische noten bij hun werk waarna ik mijn eigen perspectief 
daaraan toevoeg met een suggestie voor een volgende stap. 
Door de jaren heen zijn vele initiatieven ontplooid om stakeholders en 
algemeen publiek te betrekken bij de discussie over gg-gewassen, gg-dieren 
en genetische modificatie bij mensen. De afstand tussen de uiteenlopende 
perspectieven blijft echter bestaan en het gebruik van de (beoogde) uitkomsten 
van participatie-activiteiten blijft vaak impliciet, waardoor het lastig is om de 
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resultaten hiervan te meten of identificeren. In Hoofdstuk 9 beargumenteer ik 
dat participatieve strategieën geen oplossing kunnen bieden voor het conflict 
over gg-gewassen. Algemeen publiek en stakeholders kunnen geen besluit 
nemen als entiteit omdat deze groepen bestaan uit een pluralistisch collectief 
van individuen met een breed scala aan verschillende en conflicterende visies op 
‘het goede leven’, ‘het goede’ en ‘een goede samenleving’. Hoewel participatie 
en deliberatie waardevol en nodig zijn in discussies over controversiële 
technologieën, zijn ze op zichzelf onvoldoende om de richting te bepalen van 
de besluitvorming over gg-gewassen.
Juridische strategieën om het conflict over gg-gewassen op te lossen zijn 
gericht op het evalueren en (her)definiëren van de regels voor, en grenzen van 
wie waarover besluit en op basis van welke gronden. Deze strategieën lijken 
er vanuit te gaan dat betere regelgeving betere besluitvorming faciliteert. De 
ggo-regelgeving is door de jaren heen bekritiseerd en meermaals aangepast 
om de besluitvorming over gg-gewassen te verbeteren. Opmerkelijk genoeg 
volgen de verschillende wijzigingen van de regelgeving een tegenovergestelde 
richting; ze zijn enerzijds gericht op een systeem dat gebaseerd is op meer 
‘wetenschappelijke feiten’ (‘science based’) en anderzijds op een bredere 
regelgeving die ook niet-veiligheidsaspecten meeneemt en sterk leunt op het 
voorzorgsbeginsel. Hierdoor zijn in de loop der jaren aan de ene kant de (juridisch 
bindende) datavereisten voor de milieu- en voedselveiligheidsbeoordeling 
toegenomen. Aan de andere kant is aanvullende regelgeving geïmplementeerd 
om keuzevrijheid van de consument te faciliteren door middel van labeling 
(Verordening (EC) Nr. 1830/2003), en om niet-veiligheidsaspecten te erkennen 
als formele reden voor een nationaal verbod op de teelt van gg-gewassen 
(Richtlijn (EU) 2015/412). Ik gebruik kritische reflecties uit de academische 
literatuur van onder andere Cairney, Tosun en Stirling om te onderbouwen 
dat deze strategieën verschillende praktische beperkingen en uitdagingen 
kennen. Zo gaat regelgeving die sterk gebaseerd is op wetenschappelijke feiten 
er vanuit dat er 1) voldoende wetenschappelijk bewijs beschikbaar is en 2) 
dat er overeenstemming bestaat over de waarde van dit bewijs. De verschillen 
in de uitkomsten van de risicobeoordeling door de Europese lidstaten en de 
discussies over het wetenschappelijke bewijs van alarmerende studies laat zien 
dat dit vaak niet het geval is. Daarnaast laat ik in Hoofdstuk 8 zien dat de 
wetenschappelijke status quo die is neergeslagen in de regelgeving continu op 
de proef zal worden gesteld door nieuwe ontwikkelingen die juist vragen om 
een dynamisch en open in plaats van een meer gedetailleerde wetenschappelijk 
gerichte regelgeving. Ook breder georiënteerde regelgeving kent verschillende 
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praktische uitdagingen. Meer inclusieve regelgeving waarbij ook niet-
veiligheidsaspecten worden meegenomen, hebben de neiging om uit te monden 
in een complex systeem dat een bijna oneindig aantal factoren in overweging 
neemt die ook nog eens moeilijk of zelfs onmogelijk onderling met elkaar 
vergelijkbaar zijn door normatieve verschillen.
De huidige regelgeving voor gg-gewassen heeft kenmerken van beide 
systemen (gericht op inclusiviteit en voorzorg EN gericht op wetenschappelijk 
bewijs). Hierdoor ontstaat een spanning tussen actoren die wetenschappelijke 
data zien als enige legitieme bron van kennis voor de regelgeving en actoren 
die voorstander zijn van het betrekken van bredere kennisbronnen zoals 
contextuele, culturele en sociaaleconomische factoren. In plaats van elkaar aan 
te vullen, worden de concepten van wetenschappelijk bewijs en voorzorg tegen 
elkaar gebruikt, hetgeen bijdraagt aan een impasse in de besluitvorming.
Een derde juridische strategie die ik bespreek is niet gericht op het inhoudelijk 
oplossen van het conflict over gg-gewassen, maar op het veranderen van de 
regels voor de stemmingsronde waarbij de optie voor ‘geen mening’ komt te 
vervallen. Dit zou lidstaten ertoe dwingen om een expliciete positie in te nemen 
voor of tegen gg-gewassen. Deze strategie zou in theorie kunnen werken om 
een besluit af te dwingen, maar de realiteit blijkt vaak meer complex.  Zo bevat 
Hoofdstuk 6 een normatieve analyse van Richtlijn (EU) 2015/412 die laat zien 
dat het aanpassen van de regelgeving niet noodzakelijkerwijs een oplossing 
biedt voor onenigheid over biotechnologie, zelfs niet als de regelgeving op 
papier een uitstekend passend en redelijke oplossing lijkt. Elke richtlijn of 
verordening heeft bovendien een zekere mate van ‘interpretatieve ruimte’ 
voor alternatief gebruik die kan leiden tot verschillen tussen ‘law in books’ 
en ‘law in action’, oftewel een verschil tussen theorie en praktijk. Daarom 
lijkt het onwaarschijnlijk dat een verandering van de regels voor comitologie 
het conflict over gg-gewassen op zal lossen zolang onderliggende issues 
niet expliciet geadresseerd worden. In Hoofdstuk 9 bekijk ik deze juridische 
oplossingen opnieuw en beargumenteer ik dat regelgeving weliswaar de regels 
en vereisten kan bepalen op basis van een democratische reflectie van een visie 
op ‘een goede samenleving’, maar dat het niet de uitkomsten van een besluit 
kan bepalen. Regelgeving alleen kan het conflict over gg-gewassen daarom niet 
oplossen en zal altijd een zekere interpretatieve ruimte laten, dat wil zeggen 
dat verschillende acties gelegitimeerd kunnen worden op basis van dezelfde 
regelgeving op basis van verschillende visies op de beoogde uitkomsten. 
Daarnaast kan het perspectief op ‘een goede samenleving’ dat ingebed is 
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in de regelgeving onmogelijk volledig overlappen met alle verschillende en 
conflicterende individuele visies op ‘een goed leven’ in de maatschappij.
De inzichten uit de evaluatie van technocratische, participatieve en juridische 
strategieën onderbouwen de stelling dat hoeveel wetenschap, regelgeving 
of publieke betrokkenheid men er ook bij haalt, dit niet vanzelfsprekend 
en automatisch zal resulteren in politieke besluitvorming. Dit is, naar mijn 
mening, waar erkenning van het politieke karakter van besluitvorming nodig 
is om de input uit wetenschap en maatschappij te wegen en besluiten te nemen 
in situaties van onzekerheid en controverse.
Kenmerken van politiek gedrag zoals deliberatie, argumentatie, onderhandelen 
en compromissen sluiten zijn zeer beperkt of zelfs afwezig bij het proces 
voor markttoelatingen van gg-gewassen. De uiteindelijke besluitvorming is 
gereduceerd tot een stemmingsronde met vertegenwoordigers van de lidstaten 
die een vooraf vastgesteld mandaat hebben. De enige manier om onderliggende 
onenigheid over gg-gewassen te uiten, is de juridische ruimte te gebruiken 
in de regelgeving om besluitvorming te voorkomen (zoals tegenstemmen of 
onthouden van stemmen of het instellen van nationale of regionale verboden 
voor gg-gewassen). In Hoofdstuk 9 heb ik beargumenteerd dat besluitvorming 
over gg-gewassen strategisch lijkt te worden vermeden door zowel de Europese 
Commissie als de lidstaten door gebruik te maken van de interpretatieve ruimte 
in de regelgeving en door verantwoordelijkheden tijdelijk terug te delegeren 
naar de wetenschap (om onzekerheden weg te nemen) en de maatschappij (om 
tot een consensus of gedeeld perspectief te komen) of door het uitstellen van 
besluitvorming in afwachting van een wijziging van de regelgeving. 
Het vermijden van besluitvorming kan gezien worden als een strategische 
manier om verantwoordelijkheid te managen op verschillende niveaus 
(zowel naar de lidstaten als naar niet-Europese landen) om economische 
of juridische consequenties op internationaal niveau te voorkomen. De 
Europese hybride regelgeving die zowel zeer gedetailleerd en wetenschappelijk 
gericht is, evenals breed en optioneel aangaande niet-veiligheidsaspecten, 
gecombineerd met besluitvormingsregels (comitologie) die ruimte laten 
voor niet-besluiten (‘geen mening’) faciliteert een flexibele positie voor de 
Europese Commissie. Zij kan een knoop doorhakken als een juridisch conflict 
dreigt met de Wereldhandelsorganisatie (World Trade Organisation, WTO) of 
kan besluitvorming uitstellen als lidstaten of het Europees Parlement hun 
beklag doen over niet-democratische beslissingen. Op basis hiervan kan het 
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conflict over gg-gewassen niet alleen geclassificeerd worden als een ‘wicked’ 
probleem, maar als een ontworpen wicked probleem (‘wicked problem by 
design’, een concept van Nie). Dit kan verder onderbouwd worden door een 
vergelijking met een andere casus van een wicked probleem: de autorisatie 
van het herbicide Glyfosaat in Europa. Ondanks het ‘wicked’ karakter van dit 
probleem, gekenmerkt door een gebrek aan wetenschappelijke zekerheid en 
maatschappelijke consensus, werd hierover toch een besluit genomen, omdat 
de Europese Commissie politiek inzette en onderhandelde met de lidstaten 
totdat een akkoord was bereikt. De Glyfosaat casus laat zien dat prioriteit, 
urgentie en mogelijk politiek gewin de dynamiek terug kunnen brengen in 
discussies over controversiële technologieën, ook in situaties die in eerste 
instantie ‘wicked’ lijken.
Gebaseerd op de analyse in dit proefschrift heb ik beargumenteerd dat 1) 
wetenschappelijke, participatieve en juridische strategieën uitgeput worden 
in een poging om voor- en tegenstanders dichter bij elkaar te brengen 
in het conflict over gg-gewassen en 2) dat het onwaarschijnlijk is dat de 
(fundamentele) onenigheid over gg-gewassen hiermee wordt opgelost. Met 
het oog op markttoelatingen van gg-gewassen is de vraag enerzijds welk 
besluit gerechtvaardigd kan worden gebaseerd op de huidige posities in het 
debat. De Europese Commissie prolongeert de deliberatieve ruimte over dit 
fundamentele conflict door besluitvorming te mijden, wat anderzijds de vraag 
oproept wanneer het ontwijken van een besluit gerechtvaardigd kan worden 
vanuit het perspectief van neutraliteit en wanneer dit als onrechtvaardig kan 
worden gezien naar diegenen die een expliciet politiek besluit nodig hebben 
of verdienen. In academische literatuur over deliberatieve democratie wordt 
het belang van een neutrale positie van de overheid benadrukt in gevallen 
van controverse. Overheden moeten neutraal blijven om deliberatie tussen 
stakeholders te faciliteren en de ruimte te creëren voor transformaties van 
standpunten. Deze positie is echter ook bekritiseerd omdat een neutrale positie 
ook niet vrij van consequenties is. Auteurs zoals Bovenkerk en Poort promoten 
een perspectief op deliberatieve democratie dat de nadruk legt op inclusie van 
betrokkenen en het uitdiepen van de controverse. Zij erkennen echter ook 
dat deze benaderingen niet direct resulteren in besluitvorming. De vraag die 
hiermee niet beantwoord wordt, is echter hoe bepaald kan worden wanneer 
een controverse voldoende is erkend, uitgediept en geadresseerd en wanneer 
een besluit niet langer prematuur is. Na deze kritische noot, beargumenteer 
ik dat een dergelijk besluit eveneens onder de verantwoordelijkheid van 
politieke actoren valt. Wat betreft de discussie over gg-gewassen is het naar 
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mijn mening de hoogste tijd dat een dergelijk politiek besluit genomen wordt 
omdat het huidige systeem vanuit democratisch perspectief geen recht doet 
aan zowel voor- als tegenstanders. De huidige situatie van ‘niet-besluiten’ 
veronachtzaamt principes zoals juridische zekerheid en aansprakelijkheid 
in een nationale en internationale setting. In Hoofdstuk 7 heb ik laten zien 
dat gg-gewassen impact kunnen hebben op zowel innovatie als andere 
sociaaleconomische aspecten en uit Hoofdstuk 8 komt naar voren dat het 
niet nemen van besluiten internationale ontwikkelingen niet zal stoppen. 
Dit betekent, dat niet-besluiten tegelijkertijd een besluit is om niet deel te 
nemen aan de discussie over hoe toekomstig beleid eruit zou moeten zien als 
biotechnologie zowel horizontaal als verticaal integreert in andere kennis- en 
toepassingsgebieden en daardoor steeds minder zichtbaar wordt.
Het vasthouden aan de illusie van een functionerend systeem en uitstellen van 
besluitvorming is vanuit democratisch perspectief moeilijk te verantwoorden 
naar zowel voor- als tegenstanders. In plaats van het terug delegeren van 
het vraagstuk naar wetenschap en maatschappij is repolitisering van de 
besluitvorming over gg-gewassen nodig op het niveau van zowel lidstaten 
als de EU. Repolitisering in de context van dit proefschrift betekent expliciete 
besluitvorming in situaties van wetenschappelijke onzekerheid en controverse. 
Ik erken echter ook dat democratische aansprakelijkheid niet de enige 
determinant is voor politieke besluitvorming en voeg daaraan toe dat politieke 
urgentie evenals probleemeigenaarschap belangrijke factoren zijn die de 
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